

# MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

*Volume III*

1941

PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES  
TORONTO, CANADA

*Sheed & Ward*

NEW YORK

LONDON

**PIO · XII**

**PONTIFICI · MAXIMO**

**QUI**

**HOC · INSTITUTUM**

**CANONICA · ERECTIONE · DONARE**

**BENIGNE · EST · DIGNATUS**

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THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES  
59 QUEEN'S PARK CRESCENT, TORONTO

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Reprinted 1971. in the Netherlands  
ACADEMISCHE PERS N.V. — AMSTERDAM

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The publication of this volume has been made possible  
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# A Romantic Approach to the Middle Ages

E. K. RAND

I AM afraid that the title I have selected for this address<sup>1</sup> may have kept some serious-minded people away and may be exceedingly distasteful to some who have been courteous enough to be present. In fact, I could scarcely induce myself to select such a title. For I am not a romanticist, but a professor of the dead and ancient Latin language, which to few people today is a symbol of romance. Possibly I have chosen the wrong term. I am not speaking of 'romantic' as something opposed to 'classic'. Far be it from me to put up some Chinese wall between 'classicism' and 'romanticism' and then be forced to admit that the highest literature in any age must have a place for both. Nor let us think, this afternoon, of romantic as something adventurous, heaven-scaling, sentimental, wild-eyed or wistful. And yet hold—perhaps I should not be so rigid. I really mean by 'romantic' that which seeks and proclaims the ideal. One who approaches the Middle Ages romantically is alive to its ideal aspects. So he is engaged in adventure; the book that he reads is romance.

Different ages inevitably make different appeals to the generations that succeed them. In dress and speech and thought, new fashions grow which by force of habit make to the children of the present the dress and speech and thought of their fathers seem antiquated and absurd. To the eighteenth century, the Middle Ages connoted, with a shudder, something "Gothick," a barbarism "of Greece and Rome well purged." Dryden could lavish that savage word "Hun" as zealously on the Middle Ages as we did on our foes in the late World War, and as, with some reason, we have learned to do again. Dryden lived in the era of good taste and the return to the impeccable norm of the ancients. But what reward for its propriety did the eighteenth century receive from the nineteenth? Oh stinging satire, oh worse than Gothic opprobrium—it became Pseudo-classic. The nineteenth century had a great advantage over all preceding epochs. It had mounted to ultimate heights whence it could observe with a cool and critical eye both the Middle Ages and the eighteenth century, and make them know their places. Ah me, the heir of all the ages in the foremost files of time was unaware that we should classify him as Mid-Victorian. There is a point here for us, which I will not pause to labor, since it was made even before our days. In fact it was Pope himself who declared:

"We think our fathers fools, so wise we grow:  
Perhaps our wiser sons will think us so."

Strange that these verses should so soon be forgotten. They ought to be engraved on an enduring arch and be contemplated by each generation as it passed through. Let us commit them to memory at once, certain that even now the dark recesses of the future hold embryonically some malignant formula intended to encompass us. We know it not yet, even as the Middle Ages were unaware that they were middle.

<sup>1</sup> This address is here printed in substantially the same form in which it was given at the Royal Ontario Museum of the University of Toronto under the auspices of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies on

January 28, 1941. It was originally delivered at the Pius X School of Liturgical Music at the Convent of the Sacred Heart in New York City on October 25, 1929.

The writing of history is a delicate affair. Who can, at this moment, write the history of the present War? Or of week before last? We are embarrassed by the richness of facts and by their apparent lack of purpose and inter-relation. Horace said of a contemporary historian that he was walking on fire o'erspread with treacherous ashes. The ash-road inviting the historian looks solid; tread it and he will find it hot. Animosities are hot. He will encounter animosities that defy a cool description. Or he himself may possess animosities that make him see all things red. It is only when the present has cooled down that it is safe to walk on. It is only when multitudes of facts have withered away from our memories that we can see woods and not mere trees. It is only when human events have grown small enough to be conceptually comprehended that we can comprehend. There follows the ancient pragmatist's conclusion that man is the measure of all things. It follows that the scientific historian, with a comic irony that delights the fates, is unwittingly obeying the Delphic oracle: *Know thyself*, and writing himself large in the past. He talks of data, sources, causes, influence, evolution. Really he is exercising his imagination. His imagination differs from that of the picture-book historian, whom he despises, merely in being bibliographical instead of picturesque.

Perhaps you are beginning to wonder whether I am not really proclaiming a sceptical, rather than a romantic, approach to the Middle Ages. Let me hasten to avow my faith in history, my conviction that mankind has somehow recorded the essential achievements of the race. This follows from the conviction that mankind in all the ages has been fundamentally the same and that from the great mass of similar events one may select, and better select when viewed from a distance, those that are prominent and characteristic. I believe in the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome, in the faith of the Middle Ages and the humanism of the Renaissance, in the wit and wisdom of the eighteenth century and even in the acquaintance on the part of Mid-Victorians with a naughtiness unsurpassed by our own.

Now there exists today a group of writers engaged in what they call, if I may venture their unlovely expression, the "debunking" of history. "True" biographies, by authors carefully to be distinguished from their mendacious predecessors, are devoted to eminent characters of the past whom a too grateful posterity has placed on impossible pedestals. Such writers pull away the pedestals, bringing down the statues to our common plane. As a revered teacher of mine once put it, they poke about in the back premises of the great, seeking in ash-barrels and garbage-pails incriminating evidence of the humanity of those who after all were merely men.

Or whole movements may be thus "debunked," such as the Great War. To many of us as we look back on it now and as we felt it then, it was a Golden Age of heroism, of a united national and international struggling for a great ideal. What it really was we can read in various products of the "disillusionized Twenties," of which the powerful German work entitled "*Im Westen, nichts Neues*" is typical. Read it in its French or its English translation and you seem also to have before you the experience of the *poilu*, the Tommy and the doughboy. The writer's skill has universalized his theme.

But did he tell the whole story? A certain countryman of ours, who had been a sergeant at the front, was asked on his return to the United States what he thought of Remarque's book. "Say," was the answer, "that bird was out of luck. I got quite a kick out of the war." This is the reply, in somewhat colloquial language, of an exalted spirit, who knowing well the horrors and vulgarities of war, refused to be mastered by them. There is a danger in debunking—a danger to the one who practises the art. Hemmed in by his own temperament and by his desire to make men and movements no better than they were, he succeeds in making them worse. We get to know him and to make allowances, just as we make

allowances for the mediaeval biographers, who go to the other extreme, especially in some of the lives of the saints. There the conscious aim was to idealize; here it is to detract.

Now the ancient and mediaeval form of exaggeration, I submit, is the less objectionable. If we are going to be inaccurate, why not be inaccurate pleasantly? Horace will perhaps allow us to emend his familiar precept to read:

Ridentem dicere falsum  
Quid vetat?

The writer of morbid biographies, novels or dramas is no more accurate for his morbidity. He is giving us unconsciously his autobiography. We need not trouble to censure such autobiographies; rather we should allow them free scope, and therefore less advertising, until the reading and hearing public has purged itself by satiety and a recovery of the sense of humor. Give us time and we shall tire of those

"Ape-and-monkey climes  
Where vile Mundungus trucks for viler rhymes."

And before Pope, old Martial said of a pessimist of his day

Non nostri faciunt tibi quod tua tempora sordent  
Sed faciunt mores, Caeciliane tui.

"Not ours the nastiness that makes you prone  
To curse your times, Mundungus, but your own."

My excuse for this preamble is that there are of late, evidences of a debunking spirit in estimates of the Middle Ages. This is a natural moment to occur in their posthumous career. The Renaissance cast them out, the Romantic Period rediscovered them, and now Critical History finds once more that they have their flaws. I think we may note a very lively flair for flaws in the monumental writings of my friend Dr. George Gordon Coulton. It were both discourteous and absurd to attach that unlovely word "debunking" to either the intention or the performance of that eminent scholar, whom the world honors for his multifold learning, his candor, and his rigid self-criticism. His aim is not to shock his readers or to deflate their heroes, but to tell the truth. In his book called *Life in the Middle Ages*, written in 1930, we find under orderly headings and in admirable translations extracts from a wide circle of mediaeval writers, mainly from the twelfth century and after. These he presents in such a skilful way that we seem to be reading a new *Gesta Romanorum* without the morals, or a new *Decamerone*, generally without the immoralities. And though the anecdotes are true, or at least are given by their authors as true, they are as interesting to the modern reader as fiction, which some of them doubtless are. In any case, they attract us with their various flavors, whether spicy or quaint or romantic. The learned author is not debunking the Middle Ages; he is presenting them in all their lights and shades, dark clouds and silver linings.

In a very recent book, *The Mediaeval Panorama, The English Scene from Conquest to Reformation*, Dr. Coulton gives some of this material again, with much other material, in a different form. He now becomes the expositor, taking us on a kind of Canterbury pilgrimage, save that with due regard for modern comfort, we do not stir from easy chairs, but enjoy the panorama as he unfolds it to us with all its varied scenes. The shadings, as before, are both bright and drab. He would not touch them up, or down, with colors from his own brush. He intends to show no animosity toward the Catholic Church. "With all these undeniable failings," he remarks, "I cannot doubt that the Church was, on the whole, a power working for good."

At the same time, in a work begun ten years before the one I have just mentioned, *Art and the Reformation* (1928), the tone seems somewhat different. He here indulges in a vigorous polemic directed against that eloquent and influential work, *Les Moines d'Occident* of Charles de Montalembert. Dr. Coulton rightly corrects and supplements some of the assertions made in this book, calling us back to what the Middle Ages said about themselves. However, he writes perceptibly, as he himself admits, from a point of view; and this the reader must take into account. The effort to "show up" an exaggerated worship of the Middle Ages seems accompanied by a certain delight in showing up the Middle Ages themselves. The gates are left ajar for an incursion of muck-rakers and debunkers of a vulgar sort. The van was led by Mr. Aldous Huxley, who some time ago in a generally respectable periodical, degraded St. Francis of Assisi by discussing him on the same page with Rasputin and by holding up to the world a daemonic and Priapic image composed of the worst parts of what he finds in both. It is against such extravagance as this that I would incite my hearers to a less sensational yet romantic approach to the Middle Ages, not because romance is more fascinating than a sober, scientific narration of events but because an idealistic view of history is the more critical.

This statement is so startling that it encourages me to amble, and preamble, yet farther. In our estimate of the Middle Ages, or of any period, we must not blink the facts. The more research can show us, the better our understanding. But some of the facts we may take for granted. We may assume that the inspired Shakespeare, the heroic Washington and the mystic St. Bernard had a certain amount of sleep every night and a certain amount of food every day. We may admit, especially after Dr. Coulton's demonstrations, that the builders of mediaeval cathedrals often worked for pay and that not all monks, perhaps very few monks, were artists. Our critical task is to extract the extraordinary from the banal and to contemplate what we extract as the essence of history. This is the true picture of a man or his times. We should exaggerate neither virtues nor vices, but some virtues and vices may pass without remark. If Shakespeare was in the habit of paying his rent—a matter about which I am uninformed—it is superfluous to state that he did so. If he regularly did not pay his rent, the fact is important to state.

Now, one step farther. After searching thus critically for good and evil—and it takes less critical sense to find evil than to find good—we weigh and appraise what we have found. Here is where the all important question of emphasis comes in. An American hero is discovered to have done questionable things in his private life. Shall we refuse him the reward for a great victory because of minor defeats? Instead of besmirching his popular fame with dabs of petty scandal, leaving a portrait defaced, we will begin by acknowledging his human failings and adding "nevertheless"—"a hero for all that." This "nevertheless," ("quand même,") is the clue to the real writing of history, which leaves us with the contemplation of the ideal. The outcome of our study may of course be a hero's tragedy, *corruptio optimi pessima*, or the triumph of a villain, sometimes a villain, like Milton's Satan, not utterly to be condemned, but in Tennyson's phrase,

"A glorious devil, large in heart and brain."

But whatever the facts amassed by the historian, his own record will lack not only interest but truth if it is not permeated with the ideal, with a Platonic glimpse of the one amidst the many. A few *were* saved from Sodom and Gomorrah, and to them we should devote our attention. The one of them who was more interested in Sodom and Gomorrah was turned into a pillar of salt. The "debunking" historian needs to remember Lot's wife.

In such a conception of history as essentially a study of ideals, I am merely summing up an old-fashioned view set forth by an old-fashioned historian,—Livy. In the preface to his universal history of Rome, he declared it his purpose to set forth for the reader's inspection conspicuous examples of every sort—*omnis exempli documenta*—in order that “you may note,” he adds, “that which in behalf of yourself and your state you should imitate, and that which base in its origin, base in its outcome, you should avoid.” This is a moral reading of history, something which may seem naive to scientific historians today, but which Livy can show us, I believe, is the only way to read history with profit and with truth—that is, by making friends with the noblest characters of the past.

You may not think that I am helping Livy much when I add that his view of history seems to be that of Adolf Hitler. Hitler is undoubtedly the villain *par excellence* of our times, but it were idle, and dangerous, to regard him as a wild man or an ignoramus. His book, *Mein Kampf*, is one of the great works of our time. His account of the days of his boyhood and young manhood presents a character for which I felt no little sympathy as I read it last summer. It should be read, needless to say, in the original. It is that of a lad of no little genius, who possessed by a great ideal, the unification of his race, thought much and read much as he formulated a plan for translating his vision into action. At the other end is the Hitler whom we know today, and know only too well, to whom the all-compelling end justifies the most unscrupulous means. That development I will refrain from tracing here. I will emphasize merely his insatiable passion for history, which, whether he knew Livy or not, he read in Livy's spirit. World-history became for him an inexhaustible source for the understanding of historical action in the present, and thus for politics, world-politics. “Weltgeschichte ward mir immer mehr zu einem unerschöpflichen Quell des Verständnisses für das geschichtliche Handeln der Gegenwart, also für Politik.” To this he adds that in studying history his aim is not to “learn” it, but to have it teach him. “Ich will sie dabei nicht lernen, aber sie soll mich lehren.” This is a neat epigram for Livy's meaning.

But let us not dwell further with our arch-enemy, but return to the ancient historian from whom he may have drawn precepts, as Macchiavelli did, but certainly not all of his practices. And Livy is not naive. He tells the old stories, which sober historians of Rome today cast aside, but he takes pains to inform us that in the case of the events that preceded or accompanied the founding of Rome—including the early nurture of Romulus and Remus—he will neither affirm their truth nor deny it. That is a really critical procedure. As a boy I studied Roman history from a book in which the early myths were sedulously relegated to fine type in the footnotes, while the residuum of Simon Pure veracity constitutes the text. Alas, we know today so many more things that weren't so, that all of the worthy Leighton's text, I fear, would now have to join the footnotes. Well, then, if all is printed as footnotes, it might as well be printed all as text,—which is what Goldsmith and Rollin and Livy did.

All the way along, moreover, the Roman historian shows his acquaintance with the dubious nature of his ancient sources. He often appends quite different versions in a rationalizing or shall we say—I hope we shall not—debunking spirit, with touches of wit and satire now and then. But he suffers tradition to stand. Moreover he confesses, in a later part of his work, that as he proceeds he finds his own mind becoming ancient—*antiquus fit animus*. In other words, historic sympathy leads to that imitation to which he invites his readers; to reconstruct the past imaginatively he identifies himself with its heroes. Old conflicts live again on, what Byron called, his pictured pages, not merely because he colors them with rhetorical charm but because he divines the living issues, the animating ideals of

distant ages, which he feels must have been as modern as his own. His approach to the past was romantic and dramatic, and it was essentially true, even though we may not care with Dante, to call him infallible:

Siccome Livio scrive, che non erra.

In such a spirit we step down into the Middle Ages. In the part of this address remaining, I shall not undertake an epitome of mediaeval history. I will not even select a variety of topics, or heroes, to illustrate my point. I will invite your attention to just one matter of much concern to Dr. Coulton in his attack on Montalembert, namely the part played by monks in the development of mediaeval art.

"In that very bulky work," declares Dr. Coulton,<sup>2</sup> "Montalembert undertakes to write the history of monasticism from St. Benedict to St. Bernard; the book has obtained a general acceptance far beyond its deserts; for it is indeed nothing but an elaborate party pamphlet. . . . In a tone of exaggeration . . . he fills twenty pages of his sixth volume with a detailed description of the monk as artist; and those twenty pages form practically the basis of all that has been written on that subject for the last sixty years." Dr. Coulton adds that he had "long known the extreme weakness of Montalembert's case," and that after spending nearly a week in verifying his fifty odd references, he found only eight of them, or sixteen per cent, that could legitimately be quoted in support of his thesis. That thesis is set forth in a passage which he thus translates (p. 31) from the *Nouvelle Edition* of 1882; the original work appeared in 1860. "When we say that the innumerable monastic churches scattered over the whole face of Europe were built by the monks, this assertion must be taken in its literal sense. They were, in fact, not only the architects but also the masons of their buildings; after having drawn up their plans, whose noble and scientific character still excites our admiration, they worked them out with their own hands, in general, without the aid of outside workmen. They chanted psalms as they worked, and laid down their tools only to go to the altar or the choir. . . . While simple monks were often the chief architects of these buildings, abbots gladly condescended to play the part of common workmen."

What becomes of this magniloquence in the light of Dr. Coulton's cool facts? His own generalization is (p. 32) that "the monks who did any kind of artistic work, at the most favorable times and places, were a small minority in the community; and, if we take all times and places together, the monastic artist was quite an exception." He concludes, therefore (p. 67) "that the story of the monastic artist . . . is to a great extent legendary; and if so, then it is a mischievous legend, since it tends to falsify the real perspective of mediaeval art history, and to misdirect our aspirations for the future." He advises us (p. 72) to "beware of connecting Gothic art too closely with the real religious spirit," and commenting on Milton's sympathy with the great monuments of the past, thinks it would be "difficult to find in any of the saints or theologians or poets of the Middle Ages" a parallel to certain familiar verses in *Il Penseroso*.

Now instead of coming to close quarters at once in the matter that I have selected for discussion, I am going to present to you, in all its lights and shades, a human little episode which occurred in the early Middle Ages and which illustrates very clearly the attitude of certain monks towards architecture. Let me say in passing that some of Dr. Coulton's learning is poured forth in vain, since it is the early Middle Ages with which Montalembert is primarily concerned, the period from St. Benedict to St. Bernard, or what is recognized as peculiarly the time when

<sup>2</sup> *Art and the Reformation*, p. 28.

monasticism was the controlling force in culture, whereas a goodly amount of Dr. Coulton's evidence is drawn from the later Middle Ages, a period in which he is especially at home. True it is that Montalembert himself dips down into the later centuries for corroborative illustration, but to refute his main point one should concentrate the attack on the citadel that he professes to hold.

But now for a glimpse of life at Fulda in the early years of the ninth century when Hrabanus Maurus, favorite pupil of Alcuin and according to Dr. Coulton—for once unduly courteous—"one of the greatest of mediaeval theologians" (p. 248) had returned from Tours as preceptor to the monastery of Fulda, where his early training had begun. At the time of his return, Hrabanus found the monastery in charge of the Abbot Ratgar. The latter experienced something that I imagine was rare in the Middle Ages—a monastic strike, if not a walk-out. The episode bears on our theme. I speak of it here since, to the best of my knowledge, neither Montalembert nor Coulton mentions it; the latter doubtless knows all about it, for he has taken notes on the subject for years, and his volume presents only a selection from his data (p. 51). Strange that Dr. Coulton should not have winnowed out the story of Ratgar; it might have been grist for his mill. It makes a pretty parallel for a story that he does tell<sup>3</sup> about some hired workmen of St. Stephen of Aubazines, who founded a monastery about the middle of the twelfth century. After long abstinence from meat by the Abbot's orders, they bought a pig, cooked it in the forest, had a good meal and buried what remained. The Saint berated them roundly, and then the men, after answering him impudently, were finally ashamed of their act and craved his pardon. "Which when they had obtained, they came back forthwith to their work, corrected and emended to their own profit and the health of their souls."

And now for the other story. In the year 812, the monks of Fulda sent to the Emperor Charlemagne a letter of protest against their Abbot Ratgar. He was an intensely modern and progressive man, more interested, it would seem, in enlarging his monastic buildings than in giving his monks enough time to save their souls. Were he living today, he would undoubtedly be a College President of the most hustling and up-to-date type. The monks, not being one hundred per cent American, did not appreciate him. Even the large-hearted Hrabanus Maurus did not like it when the Abbot appropriated his notebooks. He wrote a little poem of protest, very mild and reverent protest, to Ratgar,<sup>4</sup> explaining that on account of the poverty of his own genius he had taken careful notes on all that his masters had taught him, and that though all that slaves owned was the lawful possession of their lord and master, he *would* be grateful if he could have his notebooks within reach. "But whether you give them back to me or not," he concludes hastily, "may Heaven shower on you all its blessings, that after finishing your course and fighting the good fight you may dwell with the Lord in the celestial realms forever."

Fighting the *bad* fight was what Ratgar was really engaged in according to the monks of Fulda. They stood it as long as they could, and then in the year 812, presented a letter of appeal to Charlemagne.<sup>5</sup>

The document bears the dignified title SVPPLEX LIBELLVS MONACHORVM FVLDENSIVM CAROLO IMPERATORI PORRECTVS. It starts out seductively

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 65-67; repeated in *Life in the Middle Ages*, pp. 8-10.

<sup>4</sup> *Mon. Germ. Hist., Poet. Lat. Aev. Car.* II (1884), 185 (No. XX).

<sup>5</sup> *Mon. Germ. Hist., Epist.* IV (1895), 548-551 (No. 33). The editor, E. Dümmler, refers to *Ann. Lauriss. Minores* (*Mon. Germ. Hist., Scriptores* I (1826), 121, and to B. Simson, *Jahrbücher des Fränk. Reichs unter Ludwig dem Frommen*, I (1874), 371-376.

The interesting sequel, as told in detail by Simson, need not concern us here. In brief, both Ratgar and his monks appeared before Charlemagne, who sagely referred the affair to a council composed of eminent ecclesiastics and the dissension was calmed for the moment. It did break out afresh. The dissatisfied monks actually seceded, but returned when Ratgar was deposed and Eigil appointed in his stead. The strikers had won.



with verse,—a bit of technique borrowed from Alcuin, who not infrequently versifies his salutations or his yours—trulies in addressing his Royal Master. The little poem is not so good as the best of Alcuin's, and not much worse than his worst. I suspect, though I do not know, that its author was Hrabanus Maurus.

Haec quoque coenobium totum Fuldense rogavit  
Augustum Carolum iura novare sibi  
Quae cuncta honesta censebat caesar opimus.  
Et votum precibus iussit inesse piis.

"This, gracious Sovran, is all Fulda's plea,  
That what your Majesty did once decree  
In answer to our prayers, he'll now restore—  
Our rights and seemly customs as of yore."

There follows an eloquent appeal to Charlemagne, embracing twenty different requests—a document of six more than fourteen points. The first is that the monastery be allowed its ancient quota of prayers, psalms and vigils, with the intimation that the monks were restrained from interceding for the dead, from offering daily petitions for the Emperor and his household—a very serious omission—from praying for all good Christian folk and from commemorating in a seemly manner the anniversaries of Sturmi, the first abbot, and of the founders. The document states precisely, in a way that should interest liturgists, what portions of the services had fallen into disuse.

The following sections specify abuses of the same sort; for instance the age-long practice of daily communion before breakfast was no longer observed.<sup>6</sup> Then there was insufficient care of the sick, the infirm and the old; they were ill-clothed and ill-fed; the lame and the blind were not allowed to carry canes and the decrepit were bluntly bidden not to stick to their seats in the choir.<sup>7</sup> Breakers of these rules were in danger of being driven from the monastery; thus forced to dwell in cells under lay auspices, they might well breathe their last without confession and Extreme Unction. Ratgar was apparently ready for the most advanced doctrines of modern eugenics; kill off the feeble and old and thus speed up the efficiency of the remainder.

Another abuse. Candidates for the monastic vows would come not from humble and Christian motives but because of their worldly ambitions—*magis propter commoda terrena quam propter aeternae vitae amorem*—and thus their evil character would prove a bad example for the brethren.<sup>8</sup> It is implied that some had been actually lured to take the vows by sordid promises—*propter pecuniam vel possessionem terrenam*<sup>9</sup>—and had then been disappointed to find that the spiritual life was not so profitable after all. Others, too, it would seem, had been forced to join the order, and had naturally turned out to be authors of crimes and ministrants of vice—*auctores scelerum et executores vitiorum*.

Furthermore, the regime of dress and diet had been altered. Sturmi, the first abbot, had introduced the Benedictine practice, which now had been abandoned.<sup>10</sup> There were also innovations in the government of the abbey. Instead of the old *commune magisterium* administered by deans and a general director—a *decanis*

<sup>6</sup> No. IV (p. 549).

<sup>7</sup> No. V (p. 549). Possibly kneeling-desks are meant. The word is *inclinatorium*, *quod nos formulam dicimus*. See the conflicting definition in Du Cange. *Formula* is defined as '*pulpitum minus*' or '*analogium*', which would mean a *prieu-dieu*. *Inclinatorium* is defined as '*sella canentium in choro*'. The sec-

tion in the letter reads: *nec ad inclinatorium quod nos formulam dicimus morando haerere, quia caecus et claudus non possunt sine sustentatione baculi bene incedere nec decrepitus sine formula genua flectere.*

<sup>8</sup> No. VII (p. 549).

<sup>9</sup> No. VIII (p. 549).

<sup>10</sup> No. X (p. 549).

*et praeposito omnibus fratribus*—certain separate groupings—*divisiones*—had been contrived, which proved fertile in scandals, dissensions and disputes.<sup>11</sup> Could the enterprising Ratgar have put through something like a House Plan for his students?

The next grievance, No. XII,<sup>12</sup> gets at the heart of the matter; at this point the African emerges from the wood-pile.

"We do further entreat," the section reads, "that the enormous and superfluous buildings and other useless work be abandoned." *Aedificia immensa et superflua*—oh, what a sermon could be preached today on that text with Mark Hopkins and the log by way of contrast! Preach it I will not, and I apologize for this interruption of the monks' most earnest appeal. To repeat, then,—"that the enormous and superfluous buildings and other useless works be abandoned, whereby the brethren are wearied beyond measure and their congregations perish without the walls; but that all things be regulated with moderation and discretion; and also that the brethren be allowed fixed hours of repose for reading in accordance with the Rule and likewise fixed hours for working." The grievance here stated, as I have suggested and will further explain, is the root of the whole trouble.

But first let us hear the monks' demands on the subject of entertainment. Entertainment could be of a jovial sort, as readers of the delightful annals of St. Gall are aware. The right of welcoming pilgrims and of washing their feet is demanded.<sup>13</sup> Ancient hospitality (*hospitalitas antiqua*) should not be forgotten: even when crowds came to celebrate the day of the patron, St. Boniface, such guests should be shown every decent honor and courtesy (*congruus honor et omnis humanitas*) and they should *all* be entertained at table.<sup>14</sup>

Then comes another protest<sup>15</sup> against the intrusion of outside interests and the owning of property by outsiders and against other petty innovations, which broke down the essential principles of monastic communism—*sed sint omnia omnibus communia*.

This communism is carried to its logical conclusion<sup>16</sup> that the work of the monastery should be done by the monks themselves—the work of the bake house, the garden, the brewery (*bratiarium*), the kitchen, the farm and other sorts of service should as of old be in the hands of the monks, "since every sort of work will be accomplished with more devoutness and more dignity by the brethren than by a lay-man or a mischievous slave."

I need not discuss the other requests. In general, their aim is to purge the monastery of mundane intrusions and to return to the ways of the fathers. The final plea is for harmony. "Let us live in unity and concord with our abbot as we did with all the abbots before him, and let him be"—there follows a list of some twenty-five good things which he might be, but which by implication, he was not. For instance, he should not be cloudy of countenance, nervous of spirit, excessive in passing judgment, stubborn in debate, but joyous of face, discreet in conducting work, and sympathetic in promoting the general weal.<sup>17</sup>

A little "Mirror of the Abbot" is upheld for Ratgar's respectful contemplation. I take it he was not an altogether bad man. It was he who had sent Hrabanus to study under the famous Alcuin and it was he who had called him back as pre-

<sup>11</sup> No. XI (p. 549). Quod commune magisterium a decanis et praeposito omnibus fratribus fiat, quia hae divisiones, quae modo factae sunt, occasiones sunt scandalorum, dissensionum et contradictionum.

<sup>12</sup> No. XII (p. 549). Ut aedificia immensa et superflua et cetera inutilia opera omittantur, quibus fratres ultra modum fatigantur et familiae foris dispereunt, sed omnia iuxta mensuram et discretionem fiant; fratribus quoque secundum regulam certis horis vacare

lectioni liceat et item certis operari.

<sup>13</sup> No. XIII (p. 550).

<sup>14</sup> No. XIV (p. 550).

<sup>15</sup> No. XV (p. 550).

<sup>16</sup> No. XVI (p. 550).

<sup>17</sup> No. XX (p. 551): fieretque non turbulentus vultu, non anxius animo, non nimius in iudicio, non obstinatus in consilio, sed hilaris facie, laetus mente, discretus in opere, consentiens in utilitate.

ceptor. Despite his tyrannical ways, he doubtless had the best interests, or what he conceived to be the best interests, of his monastery at heart. But he had committed himself to a campaign of better, bigger and busier building. The monks rebelled.

Now how is this incident to be judged by a historian writing a book on "The Monk as Artist"? What Dr. Coulton would say, I will not presume to infer. Whatever his results, he proclaims a high principle of interpretation. "By all means," he declares,<sup>18</sup> "let us err on the side of over-generosity if we err at all; but let us try not to err on either side; let us try to get at the actual facts." But I have called the story grist to his mill. One might, at least, conclude from the action of the monks, that the art of building was an exception in monastic life, since they made such a fuss about it. In the salvage of facts, therefore, that Dr. Coulton's extracts from Montalembert's eloquence (p. 29) this instance would be entered in Pigeon Hole No. 4. He is of course aware, to quote his words (p. 68), that we cannot "pigeon-hole men's motives exactly," but tentative or preliminary pigeon-holes, such as he constructs in the present instance, do no great harm. So besides the classes that he names, viz. (1) monks who worked at their own buildings under missionary conditions and (2) those who were too poor to hire workmen, and (3) those who undertook artistic labor as a kind of penance "in proof of their special sanctity or humility," we now can add (4) those poor unfortunates who built because their tyrant told them to. We then might comment on their laziness, their preference of idle psalm-singing to honest toil, their desire to control the brewery, their insidious and hypocritical appeal over their own abbot's head to the Emperor, whose favor they sought to curry on the ground that his soul might be lost if Abbot Ratgar's strenuous building program were not forthwith suspended. As for the abbot, no extra black paint would be necessary for a portrait to hang next to Hitler's in time's gallery of despots; one need merely select a few of the epithets that the monks themselves had lavished on him. In short, all the materials are here for a sensational chapter in a "true" history of the monastery of Fulda.

If, on the other hand, we approach the Middle Ages by a romantic path, we are on the look-out for ideals, even ready, with Dr. Coulton, to err in over-generosity. Something also of the spirit of Balzac and George Meredith will temper our scorn of vice, and our delight in scandal, showing us how to stage this scene in the *comédie humaine*. These monks were normal. They were not all the human dynamos that their Abbot evidently was. I can imagine that at first they were as enthusiastic as the Abbot himself in the building program for "old Fulda." Were they not to have a new gymnasium—I mean scriptorium—surpassing those of Reichenau and St. Gall? But with life nothing but building, with no time to read, to think, to pray or to entertain, the monks were ready for Aristotle's dictum that the excess of a virtue is tantamount to crime. Their revolt was well-considered and the appeal to the Emperor diplomatically framed. Furthermore if we look for the ideal behind this human comedy, it is not far to seek. Back of the discomforts of unremitted carpentry, is the monks' respect of the ways of the fathers, their resolve to keep the life of the monastery pure and undefiled and their desire for a communistic harmony and peace. Their Abbot, whatever his defects, was bent on improving the establishment committed to his hands, on shaking it out of its ruts. It is the old quarrel, and the ever-necessary quarrel, between the conservative and the progressive, both of whom are essential for the welfare of the world.

The story of Ratgar and his monks, as I have tried to intimate, should be cast into Montalembert's scale and not Coulton's. Indeed the monk's appeal to the

<sup>18</sup> *Art and the Reformation*, p. 28.

old regime, which consigned the work of the monastery to monks and not outsiders, is proof of a general practice. Among the regular works of a monk, it is clear that building was included, for such as could master the art of carpenter or mason. At least there can be no doubt about Ratgar's interest in building. Just what part he played in the operations is a minor affair. How often, if ever, he dropped the lash and grasped the trowel we shall never know. But that he was the motive force behind the architecture of Fulda is patent. So in various of the cases discussed by Coulton and Montalembert, while it may be impossible to prove that abbots or monks were architects or masons, certain it is that the inspiration of Ceolfrid of Wearmouth, of St. William of Hirschau, of Suger of St. Denis prompted the construction of edifices of beauty expressive of the religion that their inspirers professed.

I will not further pursue this aspect of our theme, but come, as my time draws near its close to what I am tempted to call a palpable injustice on Dr. Coulton's part. I hasten to add that his statement on this matter is necessarily brief and open to misunderstanding and that he announces his intention to treat the whole subject more fully in the last volumes of his work, *Five Centuries of Religion*. I shall endeavor to refrain from exaggeration in what I am about to say, with the assurance that my points will receive complete consideration, in the finishing portion of that monumental work with which Dr. Coulton will crown a life of indefatigable and fruitful labor in the field of mediaeval learning.

The sentence that particularly caught my eye is this: "*A priori*," he remarks, "it is most improbable that monks should have practised artwork to the same extent as copying." Here indeed is an utterance open to misunderstanding. Yet it seems characteristic of Dr. Coulton's utterances in general, whenever he talks about the function of the monk as a writer of manuscripts.<sup>19</sup> He belittles the importance of the scriptorium by declaring that "at best, (it) played a very small part in the total life of an average monastery" (p. 49, note) and calculates on the evidence of monastic catalogues, drawn mainly from the later Middle Ages, that not many books were copied. "If it can be proved, then," he concludes (p. 50) "that very little work was done in the scriptorium, the burden of proof certainly lies upon those who would argue that the men who did so little for writing were doing much for art."

Not pausing to discuss the data on which this demonstration rests, I will instead express my wonder that so profound a student of the Middle Ages should even momentarily leave a reader to conclude that art is to be set on the one side and the copying of books on the other. He talks of copying as though it were of the sort imposed upon bad boys kept after school. He cites, for instance (pp. 83, 521-2) some of the well-known verselets that scribes appended to their finished manuscripts in such a way as to indicate that they took little interest in their work, which was regarded as a base, mechanical employment, and were relieved when the unpleasant task was over. Particularly shocking, when translated into bald English, is the familiar verse:

Explicit hoc totum, pro Christo da mihi potum.

I will not translate it; one may say many things in Latin that do not translate well. Of course the scribes' occupation was mechanical, in that his business was first of all to reproduce exactly the words of the text he was copying. Of course it was no easy job, and when it was done, line after line and page after page, any human being might feel jubilant. A good example of such scribal exaltation, to add to

<sup>19</sup> *Art and the Reformation*, p. 49.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

those in Wattenbach and Coulton, I found in a manuscript of Boethius in the Laurentian Library at Florence. The scribe repeats the final syllable of the last word of the text, *scribit* some eight or nine times—bit, bit, bit, bit, bit, the b's being fashioned into human faces, bearing the marks of evident satisfaction. Then follows the subscription:

Qui me scribebat, Iohannes nomen h'bebat  
Explicit, expliceat, bibere scriptor eat.

"Who gave me to fame,  
Iohannes is his name.  
The end and the end let it be.  
Now goes the scribe on a spree."

Now, I would submit, this kind of evidence should not be analysed too seriously. Instead of calculating from all known subscriptions the percentage of monkish, or secular, scribes, who were undoubtedly, or very probably, or very possibly, drunkards, looking forward to a bowl of ale, or something stronger, as the *causa finalis* of a transcribed book, we should distinguish between work and play, between the sacred hymn and the Goliardic, or the clerical parody, between two aspects of the mediaeval mind, which was not alien to the mind of an Aristophanes, a Horace, or an Erasmus.

Miniatures are of course recognized by Dr. Coulton as a form of art, and he is not slow to point out that they were generally—in the later Middle Ages—the work of hired artists. (p. 509). He quotes our Hrabanus Maurus (p. 248) who in a short poem praises the written word above the painted picture.<sup>21</sup> He might also have referred to another little poem by Hrabanus,<sup>22</sup> in which the same subject is given a different emphasis. Literature is greater, he declares, than the monuments of art, for they shall perish while it abides. This, incidentally, is good Horatian doctrine, so let us not take it as typical merely of a monk's distaste for art. But Hrabanus, further, is thinking not only of the writer's service in giving the precious page of sacred writ its due immortality. Pleasure accompanies his task. Loving care goes into the tracing of the words and the joy of an artist contemplates their making.

Nam digiti scripto laetantur, lumina visu  
Mens volvet sensu mystica verba dei  
"Fingers delight in the writing and eyes with the  
sight of the letters  
While there indwells in his mind mystic communion  
with God."

This is the joy, the sacred joy, of the artist in his art.

But I need not labor this point by proof from what monks said. We have only to turn, as I am sure Dr. Coulton has often turned, to the beauty of the script—I will say nothing of the illumination—in books of the Middle Ages, and,—let me emphasize the point again at the risk of weariness of my hearers,—in books of the early Middle Ages. A master of one of the most beautiful scripts that I know, Adalbaldu of St. Martin's of Tours, who flourished in the first half of the ninth century, refers with a venial pride to a copy of Orosius that he had written as: HIC LIBER ADALBALDI ARTIFICIS.<sup>23</sup> I cannot think that he would accept

<sup>21</sup> *Mon. Germ. Hist., Poet. Lat. Aev. Car.* II (1884), 196 (No. XXXVIII). Coulton's reference is to Migne.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 186 (No. XXI).

<sup>23</sup> Only one leaf (Paris B.N., N.A., lat. 405) remains, the rest having probably been

appropriated by the infamous Ribri. See my *Studies in the Script of Tours, I, A Survey of the Manuscripts of Tours, 1929*, The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge, Mass., p. 147 (No. 99).

Dr. Coulton's translation of this word (p. 54) as 'artisan' or even the combination or 'artisan-artist' rather than 'artist'. Nor should we class with artisans a somewhat later, though not much later, member of St. Martin's fraternity who wrote the page in the Gospels of Lothaire that contains the first few words of the Gospel of St. John—and these are all it does contain:

In principio erat Verbum et Verbum erat apud Deum et Deus erat Verbum.<sup>21</sup>



Here we have the delicate splendor of illumination—as only those know who have had the joy of a life-time in turning the pages of this book—but no less splendid is the beauty of a perfect simplicity with which every letter and each stroke of every sacred letter is made devoutly by the careful scribe—

Nam digiti scripto laetantur, lumina visu.

Even if the scribe was a layman—a possibility that seems to me most doubtful—such work is no mere “copying”. We shall await with interest what Dr. Coulton has to say of the truly epoch-making events that occurred between the years 800 and 900, when the *scriptoria* of France were flowering with invention in both the hand-writing and the illumination.

In fine, although Dr. Coulton has rendered undoubted service in amassing new facts and in disturbing ancient generalizations, I venture to think that the work of Montalembert still has a service to perform. He was of course not a critical scholar. He was a man of letters and of action, with a career somewhat suggesting that of Gibbon. He was well versed in the political and ecclesiastical history of his century, with a keen interest in the liberal tendencies in the affairs of both church and state. He was intimate with various statesmen, like Cavour. He was acquainted with many or most of the languages of Europe, including Polish. He was a member of the French Academy. He therefore brought to bear on his studies of monasticism and the Middle Ages in general, if not a training in documentary research, at least the stores of a wide-ranging and inquisitive mind trained to observe human history by his own experience in it. And he did have a style. Though he be an orator of monasticism rather than its historian, his romantic eulogies are nearer the essential truth, in his comments on monastic copying, than Dr. Coulton's

<sup>21</sup> Paris, B.N. lat. 266. *Ibid.*, p. 157 (No. 119), Pl. CXXXV.

learned studies. As with Livy, whose utterance he quotes as a motto, his mind becomes antique; such a mind makes a better mirror of the past than that which conscientiously maintaining its own standards, stays firmly modern.

But hold! Dr. Coulton has a surprise up his sleeve. When I read after all in his conclusion (p. 69) that in the eleventh century there "came a great monastic revival and a great era of church-building" so that "in that sense, Romanesque architecture is rightly called a monastic art," I feel that the big guns have not made an irreparable breach in the ancient wall. Montalembert's famous chapter on monastic art could be readily pruned of its excesses, in the light of Dr. Coulton's researches, without damage to its essential purpose. It would then continue to instruct and to delight; for the essay is itself a work of art.

Let us then take heart, and while not blinding ourselves to the discoveries of historical science, continue the quest of the ideal. By that I mean, once more, that while we must note and study, we may ultimately discount the many mediaeval illustrations of all the cardinal sins as only too typical of frail humanity in any age. Instead of cataloguing types of mediaeval failure, we may begin by classifying the conditions of a normal mediaeval soul, if subjected to Catholic discipline, under the following seven heads. This, needless to add, is the inexpert classification of a layman. We have (1) the condition of a miserable sinner—a phrase of the Anglican Litany, delicately deleted in the American edition of the Book of Common Prayer; (2) repentance and confession; (3) absolution; (4) joy; (5) work; (6) progress; (7) goodness, or in special cases, saintliness. For there were mediaeval, as there are modern saints.

With this fact of mediaeval life in mind, and in its light, we may examine again the beauties of mediaeval art, whether expressed in stone or glass or music or manuscript illumination or in the very forms of letters. For all these acts of artistic creation, not always, but in some high moments of inspiration, were felt by the artist as the outer and visible signs of an inward and spiritual adoration, truly symbolic of the ages of faith.

This search for the ideal, amidst a multitude of human errors, vices and banalities, I call a romantic quest. Austin Dobson, in his delightful preface to the poems of Mat Prior, (p. xix) relates that in the library over the sacristy in the old church of St. Cuthberga at Wimbourne Minster there is a charred copy of Raleigh's *History of the World*, in which a hole is said to have been burned by the boy Matthew when "dozing over its pages by the light of a smuggled taper." This story, too, has been subjected to a "debunking" analysis, and yet one never knows what to expect of the eighteenth century or of anybody when very young. Mat Prior, or if not he, some monkish person who invented the yarn, could read romantically. It is thus that we may read. The book of the Middle Ages is open for our inspection, inviting us, without the resort to theft or arson, to make a romantic approach to its pages.

# The So-called Square Nimbus

GERHART B. LADNER

THE origin of the so-called square nimbus is surely one of the most puzzling problems of late antique and mediaeval iconography. In this paper I hope to show that both the symbolical significance of the square and its decorative value as a background of pictures should be taken into consideration in looking for a satisfactory explanation.<sup>1</sup> Some sidelights will fall on the history of the round nimbus or halo, of the clipeus or shield as a picture-form and of the lozenge-shaped and polygonal nimbi of the later middle ages. While I do not claim completeness for this study, I believe I have not overlooked important examples of square nimbi. Throughout the paper the monuments showing square nimbi will be numbered regardless of their date.

There is a continuous series of Roman mosaic and fresco portraits of popes and donors, from the 8th to the 12th century, in which the square nimbus occurs.<sup>2</sup> These must form the starting point of any investigation of this attribute. In them, the square nimbus is a surface or a frame of more or less square or at least rectangular outline, forming a background for the head, and in most cases reaches down to the shoulders. The colour is usually light or greenish blue. The first surviving examples are to be found in two contemporary portraits of Pope John VII (705-707):

1. Rome, Museo Petriano: Mosaic fragment from a *Mary Chapel in Old-St. Peter's*, executed on the order of John VII: *Pope John VII* as donor, carrying a model of the chapel (fig. 1); originally the pope was standing before the Madonna Regina.<sup>3</sup>

In a much shorter form this paper was read at the Meeting of the College Art Association, at the University of Chicago in January 1941; to my audience there I am indebted for criticism as well as for approval. To Professor Homer A. Thompson, Professor C. T. Currelly and Miss W. Needler of the Royal Ontario Museum in Toronto I am grateful for discussing with me the problems connected with the Roman-Egyptian mummy shrouds. I also express my sincere gratitude to Mr. Harold B. Burnham for improving upon my manuscript. — The question of the square nimbus in papal portraits has been touched on in my work on the portraits of the ancient and mediaeval popes, edited by the Pontifical Institute of Christian Archaeology, Vatican City; its first volume was almost printed, when war broke out.

<sup>2</sup> Most of these monuments are well known; therefore only two examples are shown in reproduction: the Popes John VII and Paschal I. The portraits, usually donor-portraits, are or were part of larger compositions. The word *portrait* will be used for all intentional representations of the likeness of persons, regardless of the degree of similarity actually reached. For a more exact definition of the concept of portrait, see my book, quoted in

note 1. A full bibliography of the Roman monuments in question may also be found there. Meanwhile I shall refer to the works of Wilpert, Grüneisen and Van Berchem-Clouzot. The lists of square nimbi, given by Ph. Lauer, in *Mémoires de la Société Nationale des Antiquaires de France* LXVII (1908) 55 ff., and by H. Leclercq, in *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie* XII 1 (1935) 1308 ff., are less complete than those on p. 15 ff., 23 ff. and 37 ff. Cf. also J. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes und seiner Ausstattung in der Auffassung des Mittelalters*, 2nd edition, (Freiburg im Breisgau 1924) 233, 413 f.

<sup>3</sup> For John VII's mosaics in Old-St. Peter's and surviving fragments of them see J. Wilpert, *Die römischen Mosaiken und Malereien der kirchlichen Bauten vom IV. bis XIII. Jahrhundert*, (Freiburg im Breisgau 1916) I 388 ff., fig. 128 ff., III pl. 113 f.; W. de Grüneisen, *Sainte Marie Antique* (Rome 1911) 279 ff., fig. 228 ff., pl. 65 ff. Around 1600 the cycle of mosaics was several times copied by the well-known Roman notary and archaeologist Grimaldi. The portrait of John VII is a damaged and restored fragment of a full figure in standing posture. While the head itself is comparatively well preserved, the square



2. *Rome, S. Maria Antiqua*, front-wall of the apse: Mural: Pope John VII amongst holy popes.<sup>4</sup>

The other Roman monuments, showing the square nimbus, are portraits in frescoes and mosaics, as follows:

3. *Rome, S. Maria Antiqua*, Chapel of St. Quiricus and St. Julitta, back-wall: Mural: Pope Zacharias (741-752) (fig. 2) in the company of the Blessed Virgin with the Child, of saints and of the donor. (No. 4). Above this group there is a famous representation of the crucifixion.<sup>5</sup>

4. *Ibid.*: Mural: The Primicerius Theodotus as donor, carrying a model of the chapel (fig. 3).

5. *Ibid.*, entrance-wall: Mural: The Primicerius Theodotus, kneeling and offering candles to St. Julitta and St. Quiricus (whose figures are partly destroyed) (fig. 4).

6. *Ibid.*, right wall: Mural: The son and daughter of the Primicerius Theodotus (only the lower parts of the bodies of the Madonna, with Child, and of Theodotus and his wife have escaped destruction).

7. *Rome, S. Maria Antiqua*, apse: Mural: Pope Paul I (757-767), standing before Christ in Majesty.<sup>6</sup>

8. *Rome, S. Maria Antiqua*, atrium right wall: Mural: Pope Hadrian I (772-795), in the company of the Madonna Regina and saints.<sup>7</sup>

9. *Ibid.*, left wall: Mural of the period of Hadrian I: Woman, kneeling, offering candles.<sup>8</sup>

10. *Rome, Oratory of the Forty Martyrs near S. Maria Antiqua*: Mural: Pope, probably Hadrian I.<sup>9</sup>

11. *Rome, Piazza S. Giovanni in Laterano*, Reconstruction of an Apse in a Triclinium of the old Lateran Palace, front-wall to the right of the apse: Mural: Pope St. Leo III (795-816) and Charlemagne, both kneeling before St. Peter.<sup>10</sup>

12. Formerly *Rome, S. Susanna*, apse: Mosaic: Pope St. Leo III as donor, carrying a model of the church, and Charlemagne, in the company of Christ and saints. The mosaic was destroyed in 1595, but 16th century copies and inscriptions survive.<sup>11</sup>

13. *Rome, S. Prassede*, apse: Mosaic: Pope Paschal I (817-824) (fig. 5), as donor, carrying a model of the church, in the company of Christ and saints.<sup>12</sup>

nimbus has perhaps suffered more extensively. Today it consists only of a dark frame-line on the gold-ground and does not reach down as far as the shoulders. In some of the Grimaldi-copies the square nimbus of the pope has the colour and shape usual in the Roman monuments of the period (cf. for instance fig. 4), that is to say it is blue and extends to the shoulders. The same form also appears in the portrait of John VII in *S. Maria Antiqua* (No. 2). On the other hand the square nimbus in the Coptic murals of Bawit is likewise only a frame-line (fig. 6). Since the Coptic square nimbi are the immediate predecessors of the Roman ones (see below), this fact should be well noticed.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Wilpert, *Die römischen Mosaiken . . .* II 666 ff., IV pl. 154; Grüneisen, *S. Marie Antiqua* 142 ff., 279 ff., fig. 108, pl. 50.

<sup>5</sup> For Nos. 3-6 see Wilpert op. cit. II 684 ff., IV pl. 179 ff.; Grüneisen op. cit. 117 ff., 310 ff., pl. 34 ff., 76 ff.—Fig. 2-4 in this paper are taken from the works of Wilpert and Grüneisen.

<sup>6</sup> Wilpert op. cit. II 701 ff., IV pl. 151; Grüneisen op. cit. 149 ff., 336, fig. 109.

<sup>7</sup> Wilpert op. cit. II 713 f., IV pl. 195; Grüneisen op. cit. 93 f., 336 ff., fig. 69.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Grüneisen op. cit. 97 f., fig. 74. For the

attitude of the woman (whose face is destroyed) cf. the portrait of Theodotus (fig. 4).

<sup>9</sup> This fresco which was probably similar to No. 8 is rather damaged; cf. Wilpert op. cit. II 724, IV pl. 197, 2.

<sup>10</sup> For this mosaic I can also refer to my article *I Mosaici e gli Affreschi Ecclesiastico-Politici nell'Antico Palazzo Lateranense*, *Rivista di Archeologia Cristiana* XII (1935) 267 ff. (with bibliography). While in the vault of the apse Christ is seen sending out the apostles, there are to the left and right on the front-wall representations of the conferring of the highest spiritual and temporal authorities: Christ granting the keys to St. Peter (unlikely Pope Silvester I) and the Labarum to Constantine the Great, and St. Peter giving the pallium to Pope Leo III and the banner of Rome to Charlemagne. The mosaic was practically renewed in the 18th century. In its present state as well as in old copies, Constantine too has the square nimbus; but it is doubtful whether this is reliable.—Cf. Wilpert op. cit. I 155 ff.; III pl. 114.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. my above mentioned studies; also Wilpert op. cit. I 110 f.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Wilpert op. cit. II 1075. Illustration for

14. *Rome, S. Maria in Domnica*, apse: Mosaic: *Paschal I*, adoring the Virgin with the Child amongst angels.<sup>13</sup>
15. *Rome, S. Cecilia in Trastevere*, apse: Mosaic: *Paschal I* as donor, carrying a model of the church, in the company of Christ and saints.<sup>14</sup>
16. *Rome, S. Prassede, Chapel of S. Zeno*: Mosaic: Half-length figure of *Domna Theodora*, the mother of *Pope Paschal I*.<sup>15</sup>
17. *Rome, S. Marco*, apse: Mosaic: *Pope Gregory IV* (827-844) as donor, carrying a model of the church, in the company of Christ and saints.<sup>16</sup>
18. *Rome, S. Clemente, Lower Church*, entrance-wall: Mural: *Pope St. Leo IV* (847-855). The pope and St. Vitus are standing on both sides of the apostles in a representation of the ascension.<sup>17</sup>
19. *Ibid.*, sanctuary: Mural, fragment: Half-length figure of a *monk* or *abbot*, in a painting of Christ's descent to the limbo; the person represented was probably the donor of the painting; the tomb found in the floor of the lower church close to this mural is probably that of the monk or abbot portrayed. According to its style the painting dates from the late 9th or more likely from the 10th century. The shape of the square nimbus shows the beginnings of a misunderstanding, which was to become more pronounced in certain liturgical rolls of South Italy of the 10th and 11th centuries (see p. 38f.).<sup>18</sup>
20. Formerly *Rome, S. Paolo fuori le mura, Tomb of John XIII*: Mural: *Pope John XIII* (965-972); half-length figure of the pope in a clipeus, on both sides of which smaller figures of St. Peter and St. Paul are seen to be enthroned. The originals of Nos. 20, 21, 22 and 24 no longer exist, they are known only through copies dating from the late 16th to the 18th century.
21. Probably formerly *Rome, S. Paolo fuori le mura, Tomb of Pope John XVIII*: Mural: *Pope*, probably *John XVIII* (1004-1009); arrangement apparently not unlike No. 20.<sup>19</sup>
22. Formerly *Rome, Lateran Palace, Chapel of St. Nicolas*, apse: Mural: *Pope Calixtus II* (1119-1124) and the *Antipope Anacletus (II)* (1130-1138), adoring the *Madonna Regina*, in the company of holy popes and St. Nicholas.<sup>20</sup>
23. *Rome, S. Alessio*, crypt: Mural: An *abbot* with a crozier and a scroll and a *priest*, carrying the model of the church; they stand below a representation of Christ in the clipeus, adored by two angels. The style of the paintings seems to indicate the 12th century.<sup>21</sup>
24. Formerly *Rome, S. Salvatore in Onda*: Probably a mural: The *priest and monk Boninus*.<sup>22</sup> Boninus, about whom nothing is known, holds the model of the church, and probably was a donor. The age of the original painting is uncertain,

instance in M. van Berchem and E. Clouzot, *Mosaïques chrétiennes du IV<sup>e</sup> au X<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Geneva 1924) 226 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. van Berchem and Clouzot op. cit. 241 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. van Berchem and Clouzot op. cit. 245 ff.

<sup>15</sup> Op. cit. 226 ff. Cf. also G. B. De Rossi, *Mosaici Cristiani delle Chiese di Roma* (Rome 1876-94) pl. 27; *Liber Pontificalis*, ed. Duchesne, II (Paris 1892) 54 and 64.

<sup>16</sup> Van Berchem and Clouzot op. cit. 251 ff.

<sup>17</sup> Wilpert op. cit. II 259, IV pl. 210.

<sup>18</sup> Illustration of the painting of S. Clemente for instance in Wilpert op. cit. IV 229, 2, see also I 111, II 892 f.

<sup>19</sup> Water-colour copies of the originals of Nos. 20 and 21 in *Cod. Barb. lat. 4406 of the Vatican Library*, fol. 141r and 142r. Cf. Wilpert op. cit. II 627; H. K. Mann, *Tombs and*

*Portraits of the Popes of the Middle Ages* (London 1928) 115 f. and my work quoted in note 1.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Wilpert op. cit. I 162 ff. See also note 138.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Wilpert op. cit. I 111, fig. 35; he asserts that the murals date from the pontificate of Honorius III (1216-1227), but without giving proofs. P. Toesca, *Storia dell'Arte Italiana. Il Medioevo I* (Turin 1927) 972 rightly states that the style gives the impression of an earlier origin.

<sup>22</sup> Illustration in Wilpert op. cit. I 111, fig. 36. The copy is in the Ciacconius—*Cod. Vat. lat. 5407*, pag. 45. It is accompanied by the following inscription: *Effigies Papae cuiusdam ex antiquissima et vetustissima pictura quae extat in ecclesia S. Salvatoris ad pontem Sirtum cui subsunt haec: BONINUS PRES-*

but, like the rest of the mosaics and murals mentioned so far, it may be considered to have been made in the life-time or immediately after the death of the person represented.

This is different in the case of the portrait with a square nimbus of Pope Liberius, which formerly was to be seen among the papal portraits of Old-St. Peter's. Similarly it is at least dubious whether the square nimbus of the lost portrait of St. Gregory the Great in St. Andrew in Rome (today SS. Andrea e Gregorio or simply S. Gregorio Magno), described by his 9th century biographer John the Deacon, actually dated from Gregory's time. It is our next task to discuss these two monuments.

25. Formerly *Rome, St. Peter*, nave: Mural: *Pope Liberius* (352-366). The portrait of Pope Liberius was part of the later series of papal portraits in Old-St. Peter's. The Roman notary and archaeologist Jacopo Grimaldi, who lived around 1600, informs us that there was an early Christian and a 13th century series.<sup>23</sup> The latter, painted in the pontificate of *Nicolas III* (1277-1280), showed the popes before *Silvester I* (314-335) with round nimbi, that is as saints, and those from *Silvester I* onward with tiaras and round nimbi; only *Liberius*, says Grimaldi, had a square nimbus.<sup>24</sup> Now, since the series of *Nicolas III* was obviously supposed to replace the early Christian one,<sup>25</sup> it has been asserted by *Wilpert*<sup>26</sup> that *Liberius* must have had the square nimbus also in the early series. The square nimbus according to *Wilpert* always being the symbol for the portrait of a living person, this would mean that the original series of papal portraits in Old-St. Peter's was initiated during the pontificate of *Liberius*. This theory however cannot be accepted, as Grimaldi, in describing the earlier series, says clearly that in it the popes had the round nimbus, without making an exception for *Liberius*.<sup>27</sup> What then was the reason for giving the square nimbus to *Liberius* in the 13th century? As we shall see, the square nimbus was a sign of excellence of a nature and origin somewhat different from the halo of sanctity. In early mediaeval Rome it was given to persons still living or recently deceased, usually to donors or con-

*BITER MONACHUS*. The person represented wears a chasuble, but no pallium or any other papal vestment. The original therefore certainly did not show a pope, but most probably the priest and monk *Boninus*. Many papal portraits of the early middle ages having the square nimbus, *Ciacconius* identified the image in *S. Salvatore* with a pope. Regarding the church *S. Salvatore* in *Onda* (near the *Ponte Sisto*), which is still extant, cf. *Chr. Huelsen, Le Chiese di Roma nel Medio Evo* (Florence 1927) 457; the oldest surviving document in which the church is mentioned is from 1127.

<sup>23</sup> For both series cf. my book quoted in note 1; meanwhile see *Wilpert, Die römischen Mosaiken* . . . II 560 ff., *L. De Bruyne, L'antica serie di Ritratti Papali della Basilica di S. Paolo fuori le mura* (*Studi di Antichità Cristiana, pubblicati per cura del Pontificio Istituto di Archeologia Christiana*, VII, Rome 1934).

<sup>24</sup> *Jacopo Grimaldi, Cod. Barb. lat. 2733 of the Vatican Library*, fol. 106: *At Nicolaus tertius Ursinus . . . supra quodlibet columnarum capitulum mediae navis Romanos pontifices pingi iussit. Dextra ab ingressu in ipso musiveo zophoro hi erant, in hac parte basilicae sub Paulo V. demolita, a pectore sursum cum pallio more graeco nudatis capitibus cum orbiculari diademate* (the round

nimbus) . . . : *Pius, Sother* . . . (and the following popes till *Miltiades*) *Sylvester cum thiara unius coronae atque orbiculari diademate* (tiara with one crown and round nimbus), *sic et sequentes pontifices praeter Liberium habentem quadrum diadema* (square nimbus) . . . The series of *Nicolas III* is also briefly mentioned by *Tholomeus of Lucca, Historia Ecclesiastica XXIII* 28, ed. *L. A. Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores* (Milan 1727) 1180.

<sup>25</sup> It should be remembered that the series of *Nicholas III* contained the earliest popes, like the older series which may have been in a poor condition by the 13th century.

<sup>26</sup> *Loc. cit.* I 379.

<sup>27</sup> *Grimaldi loc. cit.: Infra . . . historias spatiis distinctis in rotis (i.e. in clipei) picti erant summi pontifices a pectore sursum, nudatis capitibus cum orbiculari diademate et ipsorum nominibus* . . . *Grimaldi's copies* (in the *Cod. Barb. lat. 2733* and other codices) of the older series of papal portraits in *St. Peter's* show the popes without any nimbi at all. This is probably in conformity with the originals, since the surviving examples of the early Christian papal portraits of *St. Paul* (now preserved in the *Monastery of S. Paolo fuori le mura*) have likewise no nimbi whatever, only clipei.

temporary popes. But even before the 13th century its meaning was no longer always understood (see p. 42). The only purpose in using the attribute for Liberius seems to have been to differentiate him from the holy popes who came before and after him. For such a differentiation people in the 13th century thought they had good reasons. Because of a certain weakness of Liberius in the Arian controversy, his orthodoxy was unjustly doubted through the greater part of the middle ages.<sup>28</sup> While in the fifth century he had been listed in the *Martyrologium Hieronymianum*<sup>29</sup> and, in the late fourth, painted in the Catacomb of Priscilla as a venerable, if not holy figure,<sup>30</sup> he no longer occurred in the *Martyrologium* of Usuardus of the 9th century, which was much used during the middle ages. It would, to be sure, have been possible to represent Liberius without any nimbus whatever. But the square nimbus having been used in Rome for numerous earlier popes, it was not unnatural that it should be applied to Liberius who, whatever his shortcomings were believed to be, had been a pope, and as such was worthy of distinction.

26. Formerly Rome, Monastery of St. Andrew; Mural: Pope St. Gregory I the Great (590-604). The possibility that the square nimbus in the portrait of Gregory the Great, described by Johannes Diaconus,<sup>31</sup> really dated from the pontificate of that pope, cannot be absolutely excluded. But there are several reasons to favor the other alternative, that is a later addition of the attribute. The strongest of these reasons is that the surviving contemporary portraits of popes between Gregory I and John VII have no square nimbi. The head of Honorius I (625-638) in the mosaic of S. Agnese fuori le mura, it is true, has been completely restored in modern times, but still the square nimbus would probably not have been omitted if it was there originally.<sup>32</sup> There is at any rate no doubt about the lack of square nimbi in the mosaic portraits of John IV (640-642) and Theodore (642-649) in S. Venanzio near S. Giovanni in Laterano; the latter is especially well preserved.<sup>33</sup> It should furthermore be noted that according to John the Deacon the portrait of Gregory the Great was painted *in rota gypsea*,<sup>34</sup> that is to say on a clipeus (of plaster), which is a very ancient Roman form of portraiture (see below p. 34). It is likewise typically Roman that Gregory placed portraits of his parents in the atrium of the monastery, which, as should be observed, had formerly been his home.<sup>35</sup> Altogether it is not very probable that a contemporary portrait of the

<sup>28</sup> This opinion was expressed even in the *Liber Pontificalis*, cf. also the introduction to the edition of Duchesne, p. CXX ff. Cf. H. Leclercq, article *Libère*, in *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie* IX 1 (Paris 1930) 497 ff. On the "heresy" of Liberius, see also the *Chronicon* of Martinus Polonus (second half of the 13th century), *Monumenta Germaniae Hist. SS. XXII* (Hanover 1872) 416.

<sup>29</sup> *Acta Sanctorum Novembris* II 2 (Brussels 1931) 525 f., 523 f.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Wilpert, *Die Malereien der Katakomben Roms* 412 ff., pl. 250 f. In my book quoted in note 1, I believe I have given new evidence for the identification of the fresco in question as a portrait of Liberius.

<sup>31</sup> Johannes Diaconus, *Vita Gregorii Magni*, IV 84, Migne, *Patrologia Latina* LXXV 230.

<sup>32</sup> The heads of Honorius and of another, earlier pope were irreparably damaged as early as the beginning of the 17th century, see Penia, in *Cod. Barb. lat. 554 of the Vatican Library* (cf. also De Rossi, *Mosaici Christiani* pl. 18). It seems that they were first restored in painting (cf. G. Ciampini, *Vetere Monumenta* . . . II [Rome 1699] p. 105, pl. 29), and only later in mosaic. An illustration

of the mosaic also in Van Berchem and Clouzot op. cit. 195 ff.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Wilpert op. cit. II 736; Van Berchem and Clouzot op. cit. 199 ff.

<sup>34</sup> See Johannes Diaconus loc. cit.

<sup>35</sup> Regarding the Church and Monastery of St. Andrew cf. especially A. Gibelli, *Memorie storiche ed artistiche dell'antichissima Chiesa Abbaziale dei SS. Andrea e Gregorio* (Rome 1888), and by the same author, *L'antico Monastero de' Santi Andrea e Gregorio* (Rome 1892). See also V. Moschini, *S. Gregorio sul Celio* (*Chiese di Roma illustrate*, No. 17), with extensive bibliography. In the central part of the middle ages, probably in the 12th or 13th century, copies were made of the images of Gregory the Great and his parents; they are lost today, but in the 16th century A. Rocca saw them in *aedicula sancti Andreae prope beati Gregorii magni ecclesiam*, they were no doubt murals. Cf. Rocca's work *S. Gregorii ejusque Parentum Imagines* . . . (Rome 1597); he used them as well as the description of John the Deacon for the title print of his work, showing the pope and his parents. This print which represents Gregory with a rather corrupted form of the square nimbus, but without clipeus, is not a reliable

scion of a Roman senatorial family, Gregory, would have been connected with a symbol the origin of which, as we shall see, is eastern. Under Gregory the Great's Greek and oriental successors on the papal throne there prevailed of course very different conditions in Rome. John the Deacon himself says that the Monastery of St. Andrew had become Greek instead of Latin, and he adds rather significantly: *necessitate potius quam voluntate*; it was still inhabited by Greek monks at that time.<sup>36</sup> Now, a little later in his text, the Deacon reports that pictures of the holy apostles had been put next to the portrait of St. Gregory in the times of the Archdeacon Peter, of the "Hegumenos" John and of the monk Saturninus.<sup>37</sup> These three persons are not known from other sources, but it is clear that the Hegumenos John was a Greek superior of the monastery.<sup>37a</sup> It seems fairly probable to me that the square nimbus was added under his government, that is under the influence of monks from the east.<sup>38</sup>

While therefore it is, to say the least, very uncertain whether the square nimbus occurred in Rome as early as Gregory the Great, the description and interpretation given by John the Deacon to the square nimbus, which at his time certainly framed Gregory I's portrait in St. Andrew, is an important document of the existence and significance of the attribute in 9th century Rome. John says that there was round the top of Gregory's head not the round halo (*corona*),<sup>39</sup> but the likeness of a picture-panel, which, according to the Deacon, was the symbol for a living person: *Circa verticem vero tabulae similitudinem, quod viventis insigne est, praeferens, non coronam*.<sup>40</sup> It has been generally and rightly supposed that, in this sentence, John considered the square nimbus to have been not simply a symbol of a living person, but more specifically a symbol of a *portrait* of that person, which asserted its symbolic significance through its panel-like shape. We may well assume that the Deacon's statement was in keeping with the general opinion of the period, in which Italian art made important steps towards full-fledged mediaeval symbolism.<sup>41</sup> It is quite another question whether John the

source for our knowledge of the original portrait. A more genuine form of the square nimbus appears in a water-color copy in the Ciacconius—*Cod. Vat. lat. 5408 fol. 27 r*, which is both contemporary and very similar to Rocca's print. The reconstruction of the portrait of Gregory the Great, made by H. (E.) Wuescher Becchi in 1903, (cf. his article in *Dissertazioni della Pontificia Accademia Romana di Archeologia*, Series II, Vol. VIII [1903] 417 ff.), has of course no historical value.

<sup>36</sup> Joh. Diaconus op. cit. IV 82.

<sup>37</sup> Op. cit. IV 85. It seems rather probable that only the two princes of the apostles, St. Peter and St. Paul, are meant. We can perhaps assume that the picture looked like that over the tomb of Pope John XIII (see above p. 17), which was perhaps influenced by that of Gregory the Great.

<sup>37a</sup> Since the origin of the square nimbus can be traced back to Coptic and Roman Egypt (see below), it may be worth mentioning that Saturninus was the name of several martyrs of Alexandria of the early Christian era: see *Acta Sanctorum Bolland Januar. III* (Turin s.a.) 695, *Februar. II* (Paris 1864) 752, *Mai. I* (Paris and Rome 1866) 183, *Septembr. II* (ibid. 1868) 527, *April.* (ibid. 1866) 854. It is not impossible therefore that the monk Saturninus had some relation to Egypt.

It is true however that the name Saturninus was more widely spread in Christian North Africa than in Egypt, and that it is not lacking elsewhere; cf. E. Diehl, *Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres III* (Berlin 1931): *Indices*, p. 143; U. Chevalier, *Répertoire des sources historiques du moyen âge, bio-bibliographique II* (Paris 1907) 4149 ff.

<sup>38</sup> The Ciacconius-copy, mentioned in note 35, has a detail which is of some importance: In this copy the square nimbus shows an indication of the thickness or depth of a picture panel. This peculiarity cannot be found, in the surviving original square nimbi, before the late 8th and 9th century, see below p. 36 f. It is possible that the Ciacconius-copy and the 12th or 13th century fresco, which was its model, really preserved the original form of the square nimbus of the Gregory-portrait. In this case the characterization of the attribute as a picture panel would point toward its addition in the 8th or 9th century, instead of its being of the same period as the contemporary portrait of Gregory the Great.

<sup>39</sup> *Corona* was one of the most frequently used terms for the circular halo during the middle ages; see below note 131.

<sup>40</sup> Johannes Diaconus, *Vita Gregorii Magni* IV 84, Migne, *Patrologia Latina* LXXV 230 f.

<sup>41</sup> See also p. 37.

Deacon's statement is valuable as an explanation of the *origin* of the square nimbus.

It seemed indeed that it was so, after the discovery, in 1900, of the early mediæval murals of S. Maria Antiqua, in which, as has been said before, there are a number of portraits of popes and donors of the 8th century showing the square nimbus. Here in S. Maria Antiqua John the Deacon's interpretation seemed to be born out fully. For in one of the Theodotus-portraits (fig. 3) and in that of Pope Zacharias (fig. 2) approximately square layers of plaster, on which the features are painted, had been added to the figures which are of a somewhat earlier date. While the portrait of Zacharias is still extant, although much damaged,<sup>42</sup> the layer which bore the portrait of Theodotus has fallen off (fig. 3). It might seem as if the occurrence of these superimposed portraits gave proof that the portraits with square nimbi were but an imitation of such added portraits or perhaps a symbolic substitute for them. Instead of adding a portrait one might simply paint a square nimbus, meant to be its substitute. It was Mons. Wilpert who built up this ingenious theory,<sup>43</sup> which, however, has its great drawbacks.

The chief obstacle to Wilpert's hypothesis is that a square nimbus surrounds even the sketched outline of the head of Theodotus (fig. 3), that was only meant to indicate the location for the supplementary portrait-layer with Theodotus' actual portrait (which has meanwhile disappeared; see above). Similarly the frame-line of a square nimbus can still partly be seen<sup>44</sup> below the upper edge of the plaster with the portrait of Zacharias; this latter fact had never been noticed, but I made sure of it in examining the original. Now, if the square nimbus was really derived from the superposition of portraits like those of Zacharias and Theodotus, its occurrence beneath such portraits would make no sense.<sup>45</sup> Therefore I believe that in spite of the coincidence of the addition of portrait-layers with the occurrence of square nimbi in S. Maria Antiqua, there is no connection other than an accidental one. The superposition of later layers upon earlier ones was quite a common thing in Roman wall painting, not only in the murals of S. Maria Antiqua, but as far back as the frescoes of Pompeii.<sup>46</sup>

As to the much discussed question why the portraits of Zacharias and Theodotus were added on separate layers of plaster, it does not concern us directly. Nevertheless it may be useful briefly to mention some possible explanations.

First possible explanation: In order to paint actual portraits, the artist had to

<sup>42</sup> The inscription + ZACHARIAS PAPA, visible in the illustration, has almost disappeared in the original. The head of the pope is no longer as well preserved as when the photograph was taken.

<sup>43</sup> Besides the great work of Wilpert which I have quoted (especially IV 107 ff.) see the following articles of his: "Appunti sulle Pitture della Chiesa di S. Maria Antiqua", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* XIV (1905) 578 ff.; "Le nimbe carré", *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* XXVI (1906) 3 ff.; "Beiträge zur christlichen Archäologie VI: Zum quadratischen Nimbus", *Römische Quartalschrift* XXI 1 (1907) 93 ff.; "Sancta Maria Antiqua", *L'Arte* XIII (1910) 94 ff. A similar theory had been advanced by R. Garrucci, *Storia dell'Arte Cristiana nei primi otto secoli della Chiesa* IV (Prato 1877) 98, who thought that the square nimbus expresses "l'idea di un quadro o scarabattola dove si conservavano le immagini e le cere prese del vero."

<sup>44</sup> Scarcely visible in fig. 2.

<sup>45</sup> This difficulty has also been seen by W. de Gruneisen; cf. his article "Studi Icono-

grafici in S. Maria Antiqua II: I Ritratti di Papa Zaccaria e di Teodoto il Primitivo nella Chiesa di S. Maria Antiqua", *Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria* XXIX (1906) 85 ff.

<sup>46</sup> Therefore the 3rd or 4th century mural in the Oceanus-Crypt of the Roman Catacomb of S. Callisto, used by Wilpert for his explanation of the square nimbus, does not furnish convincing arguments for this theory. This painting shows a half-length figure, probably a woman (cf. Wilpert, *Die Malereien der Katakomben Roms* [Freiburg im Breisgau 1903] 32, pl. 134; also in *Römische Quartalschrift* XXI, 1, 102 ff. and *Die römischen Mosaiken* I 108, IV pl. 182); where the head should be visible, there is a square surface without paint, which was probably covered by a piece of canvas with the portrait. For possible reasons of such additions of portraits see p. 22 f.; there is no indication that there was any connection between the fresco of S. Callisto and the origin of the square nimbus. Wilpert, by the way, is mistaken in believing that the superimposed, but now destroyed

wait for an opportunity of having his model present. This was the reason why he first only outlined the heads.<sup>17</sup>

Such an explanation presupposes that there is under the extant portrait of Zacharias the *sketch* of a head, as in the case of Theodotus. This is indeed probable, because the trace of a square nimbus under the layer of the Zacharias-portrait is exactly like the square nimbus round the sketch of the Theodotus-head: in both cases there is only the *sketch* of a square nimbus, that is to say a thin yellow frame-line on the background, while the other square nimbi in the same chapel (in the portraits of Theodotus [No. 5, fig. 4] and his two children [No. 6]) are full surfaces, painted in light blue on the darker ground.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless this explanation is not probable; apart from other reasons, there is the fact that in the second surviving portrait of Theodotus (fig. 4), and in that of his children, there are nimbi also—they have been just referred to—but not superimposed layers.

Second possible explanation: Part of the murals in the Chapel of St. Quiricus and St. Julitta of St. Maria Antiqua, and especially the figures of Zacharias and of Theodotus (No. 4, fig. 3: Theodotus with the sketched head), are of a date *considerably* earlier than the period of Zacharias and Theodotus, perhaps from the pontificate of John VII. The superimposed portraits of Zacharias and Theodotus (Nos. 3 and 4) and the inscriptions identifying them would, according to this explanation, have been added in their own lifetime, while before another pope and another donor had been represented by the two figures.

This theory is based upon the distinction of different styles in the fresco cycle of the chapel, a distinction that is controversial.<sup>19</sup> It is not necessary for our purpose to take sides in the controversy, as this hypothesis alone can scarcely explain why the donor (and probably also the pope) should have been painted with heads and nimbi merely outlined.

Third possible explanation: When perhaps during the pontificate of Zacharias' predecessor Gregory III, the backwall of the Chapel of St. Quiricus and St. Julitta was decorated with the fresco of the crucifixion, and below, of the Blessed Virgin with the Child surrounded by saints and by a pope and a donor, it was not yet certain who was to be the paying donor and who would be pope after the donor had been found. For this reason the heads and square nimbi of the donor and the pope were only outlined in a sketchy way. Somewhat later, during the pontificate of Pope Zacharias, Theodotus made the necessary endowment, and it is from that later time that the superimposed heads of Zacharias and Theodotus date. In the same period two other portraits of Theodotus were painted in the same chapel: Nos. 5 (fig. 4) and 6 of our list. In No. 6 only the heads of the children survive,<sup>20</sup> but they as well as the head of Theodotus in No. 5, are not on superimposed layers, and the faces as well as the square nimbi are not merely outlined.

portrait of Theodotus in S. Maria Antiqua was likewise painted on canvas; for the trace of the layer of stucco which served as its ground can still be seen; cf. also Grüneisen, in *Archiv. Rom.* XXIX 90 f.

<sup>17</sup> Such is Wilpert's opinion (cf. *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.* XXVI 3 and *Römische Quartalschrift* XXI 1, 98). He was however influenced by the erroneous supposition, mentioned in the preceding note, that the superimposed Theodotus-portrait was painted on canvas. Later Wilpert preferred the explanation, listed as third by me.

<sup>18</sup> The assertion of E. Tea, *S. Maria Antiqua* (Milan 1937) 327, that the superimposed head of Zacharias also has a square nimbus of blue color, is wrong.

<sup>19</sup> The theory is chiefly upheld by Grüneisen, *S. Maria Antiqua* 118, and in *Archiv. Rom.* XXIX 90 f., and by M. Avery, "The Alexandrian Style at Santa Maria Antiqua, Rome", *The Art Bulletin* VII (1925) 138. According to E. Kitzinger, *Römische Malerei vom Beginn des VII. bis zur Mitte des VIII. Jahrhunderts* (Munich 1936) 30, the style of the original decoration of the Chapel of St. Quiricus and St. Julitta points to a date certainly not much before the pontificate of Zacharias; his criticism of the style seems convincing to me.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Grüneisen, *S. Maria Antiqua* fig. 96.

This solution<sup>51</sup> seems to me the most acceptable one. A similar explanation might perhaps also be applied to the addition of portraits in the wall painting of the Catacomb of S. Callisto, mentioned in note 46, and in the Louvre mummy shroud, to be discussed later.<sup>52</sup> But it should above all be remembered that a similar practice was not infrequently followed in ancient and early Christian sculpture, when sarcophagi, etc., were made in advance of demand, except for the completion of the portraits, for which the buyer's order was awaited.<sup>53</sup> As a matter of fact there was found in the Church of S. Maria Antiqua itself an early christian sarcophagus (still there), with figures of a couple whose faces had not been carved out.<sup>54</sup> Perhaps it is not out of the way to consider the possibility that this sarcophagus suggested to the painter of the Quiricus and Julitta Chapel of S. Maria Antiqua a similar device in his murals on the backwall of the chapel.

After having eliminated the theory which would derive the origin of the square nimbus from the imitation of superimposed portraits in wall paintings, we have to look out for examples of that attribute which are earlier than its first occurrence in Rome. These examples are not very numerous. There are a few Coptic murals from the 5th or 6th century,<sup>55</sup> a somewhat controversial painting in the Catacomb of Karmouz near Alexandria from the 3rd or 4th century, and some murals from the Synagogue of Dura from the middle of the 3rd century. We start with the monuments which are closer in time to the Roman square nimbi.

27. *Saqqara* (near Memphis), *Monastery of Apa* (i.e. Father and Saint) *Jeremias*, Cell D: Mural: The Madonna between two archangels, the *Apa Jeremias* and another saint, probably Enoch.<sup>56</sup> Jeremias has the square nimbus which is surrounded by a circular halo (fig. 6), the other figures have the latter only. The square as well as the round nimbus of Jeremias are painted as full surfaces, the former in a kind of purple or dark reddish blue, the latter yellowish-white. Apa Jeremias was the founder or at least the superior of the monastery about the end of the 5th and the beginning of the 6th century.<sup>57</sup> According to their style the murals cannot be much later than the first half of the 6th century. There is an almost identical painting in cell 1727, in which Apa Jeremias again has the square and the circular nimbus.<sup>58</sup> There are among the wall paintings of Saqqara several other representations of a St. Jeremias, in which he is characterized by the round nimbus only. It is possible that in these cases the holy prophet Jeremias is meant.<sup>59</sup> Since in the first-mentioned two murals Jeremias has both the circular and the square nimbus, it is not probable that they were painted in his lifetime: according to the style however they were executed soon after his death.

<sup>51</sup> This explanation, combined with that I have listed first, was advanced by Wilpert, in *Römische Quartalschrift* XXI 1, 100 f. Grüneisen's ironical remarks against Wilpert (cf. *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* XVII [1908] 271 f.) are not justified. The fact that the sketched outline of the donor's head has a tonsure is quite understandable: it was probably expected that the donor would be a cleric and not a layman like Theodotus (so also Wilpert, *Römische Quartalschrift* XXI, 1, 100).

<sup>52</sup> See p. 28 f.

<sup>53</sup> Sometimes the buyer did not insist on the completion of the portrait. See A. v. Gerkan, "Bossierte Köpfe auf Reliefsarkophagen", *Philologische Wochenschrift* LI (1932) 269 ff. Cf. also G. de Jerphanion, "Le nimbe rectangulaire en orient et en occident", *Etudes des Pères de la Compagnie de Jésus* CXXXIV (1913) 90.

<sup>54</sup> Wilpert, *I Sarcophagi Cristiani antichi I* (Rome 1929) pl. III 1.

<sup>55</sup> It is quite possible that more Coptic square nimbi survive than I am aware of.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. J. E. Quibell, *Excavations at Saqqara 1906-1907* (*Service des Antiquités de l'Égypte*, Cairo 1908) 67, pl. 59, 60.—Our fig. 6 reproduces Quibell's pl. 60.—See also W. de Grüneisen, "Le portrait d'Apa Jérémie . . .", *Mémoires présentés par divers savants à l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, XII 2 (1913) 719 ff.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Quibell op. cit. 1907-1908 (Cairo 1909) p. I f., also 1908-1909, 1909-1910 (Cairo 1912).

<sup>58</sup> Op. cit. 1908-1909, 1909-1910 pl. XXIV.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. for instance op. cit. 1908-1909, 1908-1910 pl. XXIV: mural of the Madonna with two archangels and Jeremias and Enoch, both of whom have circular nimbi. It is difficult to



28. *Bawit* (Upper Egypt), *Monastery of Apa Apollo*: Murals.<sup>50</sup> Figures with square nimbi appear in at least three instances.<sup>51</sup> The most important example is a representation of a story relating to the nativity of Christ in Chapel LI.<sup>52</sup> Beside the Blessed Virgin, recumbent, but without the Child, there is to be seen an angel, and a woman with the square nimbus, designated as the *Midwife Salome* by a Coptic inscription.<sup>53</sup> The scene is obviously taken from one of the apocryphal gospels which report the story of Salome whose hand was withered because of her disrespectful test of the virgin birth; the hand was later restored by touching the new-born babe.<sup>54</sup> While in the Roman monuments and in Saqqara the square nimbus was an attribute of contemporary or almost contemporary persons, it is different in the case of this mural of Bawit, and, as we shall see, also in the case of the paintings of Dura (No. 30) and of the Catacomb of Karmouz (No. 29), provided the square nimbus in the latter is genuine. The reason for the attribution of a mark of distinction like the square nimbus to the midwife Salome should perhaps be sought in her identification with the Salome mentioned in *Marc.* XV 40 ff. and XVI 1, who was a follower of Christ and almost certainly the same person as the mother of John the Evangelist and James the Elder. This Salome was believed by Alexandrian gnostics to have been trusted with a special revelation by Christ; cf. the excerpts of Clement Alexandrinus from the apocryphal *Gospel of the Egyptians* (middle of the 2nd century)<sup>55</sup> and from other gnostic writings,<sup>56</sup> see also Origen, *Contra Celsum* V 62, about Carpocrates (first half of the second century),<sup>57</sup> cf. finally the *Pistis Sophia* (3rd century).<sup>58</sup> Another mural of Chapel LI shows two saints on horseback, both with a round halo, and a man, standing between them, with the square nimbus; behind one of the horses the upper part of a small man, probably a boy, is visible; this figure has no nimbus at all.<sup>59</sup> Part of the painting is destroyed. It is almost certain that there were more figures and that the Coptic inscription, too, is incomplete. This inscription runs as follows: "Jesus Christ remember John and Naphrkhô and Paul." It is probable that these names refer to three contemporary persons (perhaps donors), two of whom are still to be seen in the fresco, one of them wearing a square nimbus.<sup>60</sup>

say whether the images of the Saints Apa Enoch and Ama (Mother) Sibylla portray contemporaries of Apa Jeremias, or represent the Prophet Enoch and a sibyll. The opinions of Quibell and Sir Herbert Thompson (Introduction to *The Coptic Inscriptions*, op. cit. 48) differ on this point.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. J. Clédat, Article *Baouît*, in *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie* II 1 (1925) 228 ff.

<sup>51</sup> The definitive publication of J. Clédat, *Le monastère et la nécropole de Baouît (Mémoires publiés par les membres de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, XII 1 and 2 [Cairo 1904 and 1906], XXXIX 1 [Cairo 1916])* is unfortunately still incomplete and does not yet contain the murals in Chapel LI.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. J. Clédat, "Nouvelles recherches à Baouît . . . Campagnes 1903-1904", *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, Année 1904, 1 (1904) 517 f., fig. 4 (which has served for our fig. 7).

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Clédat op. cit. 525. The translation of the inscription was kindly verified by Rev. A. A. Vaschalde C.S.B.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Protoevangelium Jacobi* (first half of the 2nd century, perhaps Egyptian), c. 20. Here, it is true, the unbelieving and later converted Salome is not called a midwife, while the midwife who called her in order to see the miraculous virgin birth, has no name. But

in c. 13 of the later Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew, which we possess only in a Latin form, both women are midwives; Salome is still the unbelieving, the other's name is given as Zelomi or Zelemi, obviously invented by slightly changing the name Salome. It is probable that our painter did not intend to represent Zelomi, but that he gave the square nimbus to Salome for reasons discussed below.

<sup>55</sup> Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* III 6. 9. 13, ed. O. Stählin (in *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der K. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Clemens Alexandrinus II, Leipzig 1906) 217; 225 f.; 238.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, 2nd edition, I (Freiburg im Breisgau 1913) 523.

<sup>57</sup> Ed. P. Koetschau, (*Die griech. christl. Schriftsteller . . . op. cit.*, *Origenes*, Vol. II, Leipzig 1899) p. 66, l. 1.

<sup>58</sup> *Pistis Sophia*, c. 54, 58, 132, 145, ed. C. Schmidt, (*Die griech. christl. Schriftsteller . . . op. cit.*, *Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften*, Vol. I, Leipzig 1905) p. 65 f., 73 f., 221, 248.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Clédat, Article *Baouît*, in *Dict. d'arch. chrét. et de liturgie* loc. cit. fig. 1286.

<sup>60</sup> Clédat loc. cit. believes that John is one of the holy riders and that Naphrkhô and Paul, one of whom he identifies with the wearer of

A third painting of Chapel LI in Bawit, exhibiting the square nimbus, shows a tall bearded saint, having a smaller man on each side.<sup>70</sup> The man to the saint's left, in the attitude of an *orans*, has the square nimbus; the other's head is too destroyed as to make it possible to decide whether he, too, had the attribute. The cycle of murals of Chapel LI in Bawit not yet having been studied and published in its entirety, I can only advance the conjecture that the last-mentioned painting represents Apa Apollo with two donors. The murals of Bawit probably date from the 6th century. While the square nimbi of Saqqara are full surfaces, those of Bawit are only frame-lines.

29. Karmouz near Alexandria, *Christian Catacomb*, apse: Mural, central scene: Christ multiplying the breads and the fishes, with the Apostles St. Peter and St. Andrew. As regards this catacomb and its frescoes, we must unfortunately rely upon reports and copies of the second half of the 19th century, since the catacomb, discovered about the middle of the century, seems to have been so badly neglected that practically nothing was left a few decades later. A water color picture of the painting in the apse by C. Wescher was reproduced in G. B. De Rossi's *Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana* of 1865.<sup>71</sup> According to this copy, the Apostle Andrew has a square nimbus, in the form of a grayish frame-line. The head of Peter is much damaged; there are no traces indicated by Wescher of a square nimbus in his case; according to the description of the catacomb by Néroutsos-Bey, St. Peter, too, did have a square nimbus of blue color.<sup>71a</sup> Diverse authors have attempted to ascertain the date of the painting, with the help of the style and iconography of Wescher's copy.<sup>71b</sup> De Rossi and others believed that it dated from the 3rd century and was retouched in the 6th or 7th, a period from which some of the other paintings of the catacomb dated. It was held possible that the square nimbus was added at this later period. But Wilpert has shown that Wescher's copy does not allow conclusions as to the style and that important iconographic details are likewise uncertain.<sup>72</sup> Wilpert as well as Lauer<sup>72a</sup> went so far as altogether to reject Wescher's copy, in so far as the square nimbus is concerned, probably chiefly for the reason that this would be the only certain instance in ancient or early mediæval times of this attribute being given to a christian saint. (Apa Jeremias, in the murals of Saqqara, has the square nimbus scarcely in his quality as a saint, as he has the round halo, too.) Grüneisen in his turn supposed that the features of a donor had been given to the Apostle Andrew, and that for this reason he obtained the square nimbus.<sup>73</sup> This hypothesis, based on numerous Roman donor-portraits with square nimbi in 8th and 9th century Rome, seems to me to have no serious foundation. On the other hand I do not see any stringent necessity to doubt Wescher's water-color painting,<sup>74</sup> as we have very similar frame-line nimbi in Bawit, about the 6th century. It seems quite possible that the square nimbus of Karmouz dates from approximately this period; but it is not impossible that

the square nimbus, are his sons. But J. David, in W. de Grüneisen, *Le portrait. Traditions hellénistiques et influences orientales* (Rome 1911) 93 f., is probably right in assuming that John, Naphrkhô and Paul are not saints, but that John is the man with the square nimbus. The invocation of Christ would make no sense if the three persons, whom he is asked to remember, were saints.

<sup>70</sup> This mural is reproduced in W. de Grüneisen, "Le portrait d'Apa Jérémie . . .", loc. cit., pl. I, after a photograph of Clédât; Grüneisen does not discuss the picture.

<sup>71</sup> Wescher and De Rossi, "Un Ipogeo cristiano antichissimo di Alessandria in Egitto", *Bull. di Arch. Crist.* III (1865) 57 ff.; pl. 5. Cf. also R. Garrucci, *Storia dell'Arte Cristiana*

. . . (Prato 1872 ff.) I 569, II pl. 105 B 5; *Dict. d'arch. chrét. et de liturgie* I 1 (1924) 1128 f.

<sup>71a</sup> Néroutsos-Bey, *L'ancienne Alexandrie* (Paris 1888) 43, quoted in J. Wilpert, "Eucharistische Malereien der Katakomben Karmûz in Alexandrien", in *Ehrengabe für Johann Georg Herzog von Sachsen* (Freiburg im Breisgau 1920) 275.

<sup>71b</sup> Survey of opinions expressed in Wilpert op. cit.

<sup>72</sup> Op. cit. 273 ff.

<sup>72a</sup> Lauer, in *Mém. de la Soc. Nat. des Antiquaires de France* LXVII 59.

<sup>73</sup> Grüneisen, *Le portrait* . . . 94.

<sup>74</sup> See also H. Leclercq, in *Dict. d'arch. chrét. et de liturgie* XII 1, 1310.

it is of an earlier origin.<sup>71a</sup> seeing that it occurs in Dura as early as the middle of the 3rd century.

30. *Dura-Europos* on the Euphrates. *Synagogue*, west-wall: Murals of about 245-256 A.D., recently transferred to the Palace of Azem in Damascus: *Single figure* with the square nimbus, in one of the four rectangular panels which frame the (damaged) central picture the meaning of which is not yet definitively ascertained.<sup>72</sup> The panel in question (fig. 8) is on the lower left (as seen by the spectator). The figure is that of a white-haired man whose head is surrounded by a black full surface square nimbus. Sun, moon and seven stars are to be seen above his head.<sup>73</sup> For this reason it has been suggested that the figure is Joshua, who commanded sun and moon to stand still; but the names of Abraham and Moses have been advanced more convincingly. It is interesting that E. R. Goodenough interprets this and the three other "portrait-panels" as Moses, in whom Hellenistic-Jewish mysticism had, as it were, become crystallized. Goodenough, on the strength of Philo's *De Virtutibus* c. 72 ff.<sup>74</sup>, refers our panel to the mystic song of Moses before his death and apotheosis; by Philo the power of his song is actually compared to the song of the sun, moon and stars (we have here the idea of the music of the spheres).<sup>75</sup> This hypothesis would well explain that in this panel Moses is represented as an old man with white hair, that is shortly before his death, while elsewhere he appears younger and brown-haired. It was probably in order to emphasize the white hair that black was chosen as the color of the square nimbus. If Goodenough's interpretation of the Dura paintings proves to be correct,<sup>76</sup> it would be of great importance for the solution of the problem of the square nimbus (see p. 33). Without discussing Goodenough's theory, Comte Du Mesnil Du Buisson has recently brought forward good arguments for seeing Abraham in the portrait which we have discussed, and Ezra in the man with the scroll to be dealt with below.<sup>77</sup> However this may be, the four portrait-panels are certainly not images of persons then living or recently deceased. Of the three other panels mentioned, the one to the upper left is almost completely destroyed; perhaps it represented Moses receiving the Tables of the Law on Mount Sinai.<sup>78</sup> In the two remaining ones the figures have a kind of square or rectangular nimbus of a rather indistinct character. *Moses* and the burning bush is the subject of the upper right panel. The square which forms the foil for his head is a continuation of the white background behind his body. Therefore it may perhaps be considered as a merely decorative set-off; but the square shape remains still remarkable, especially if we connect it with the incontestable square nimbus of

<sup>71a</sup> Wilpert op. cit. 276, rightly states that in the 6th or 7th centuries it was not usual to restore parts of a wall painting, one rather painted a new picture on a superimposed layer of stucco. Wilpert believes that the entire mural of Karmouz, as copied by Wescher, cannot date from a period earlier than the 5th or 6th century because of the cross-nimbus given to Christ. The question of the earliest occurrence of the cruciform nimbus of Christ cannot be discussed here.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. C. H. Kraeling, in *The Excavations at Dura-Europos. Preliminary Report of Sixth Season of Work* (New Haven, Yale University Press 1936) 337 ff. (with bibliography). I am indebted to Mr. F. E. Brown, Field Director of the Excavations in 1936, and to Prof. M. I. Rostovtzeff for some information regarding the square nimbi of Dura. A detailed new interpretation of the wall paintings of the Synagogue of Dura, on the basis of Hellenistic-Jewish mysticism, especially of that of Philo, which has been promised by

Prof. E. R. Goodenough, has not yet been published. But the few suggestions made in his book, *By Light, Light, The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism* (New Haven, Yale University Press 1935) are of importance for our problem, although the square nimbus is not discussed there.

<sup>73a</sup> The seven stars, placed between sun and moon in the original painting, are not clearly visible in fig. 8, which is taken from a photograph which was kindly put at my disposal by the Yale University Art Gallery.

<sup>74</sup> Ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland, V (Berlin 1906) 285 f.

<sup>75</sup> E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, 242; 195 f.

<sup>76</sup> See note 75.

<sup>77a</sup> R. Comte Du Mesnil Du Buisson, *Les Peintures de la Synagogue de Doura-Europos* . . . (Rome 1939) 53 ff., 92 ff.

<sup>78</sup> See Goodenough op. cit. 242; Du Mesnil Du Buisson op. cit. 45 f.

the first-mentioned panel.<sup>80</sup> The panel to the lower right shows an imposing male figure holding an open scroll. He is probably a prophet, but he has been interpreted in various ways as: Jeremiah, Ezra and Moses.<sup>81</sup> Vertical lines on each side of his head cause it to stand out against a tall rectangle which is slightly darker than the background. There is no definite indication whether this rectangle has decorative or symbolical nature.

We note that almost all the early examples of the square nimbus are from Egypt.<sup>82</sup> As regards Dura, it is not at all improbable that the square nimbus was imported from Egypt, possibly from Alexandria which had one of the most important Jewish communities of that period.

It is therefore not surprising that the two archaeologists who have most keenly investigated the question of the square nimbus, Wilpert and Grüneisen, have found evidence of the derivation of the attribute from certain works of pre-Christian Egyptian art, more exactly from portrait panels and portrait wrappings of mummies of the Roman period.<sup>83</sup> It is well known that under Roman influence a great change took place in the manner of mummification. For several centuries, it became a general practice to preserve the mummies in the house for a long time and to adorn them with naturalistic portraits, a custom similar to the use of the Roman ancestral portraits.<sup>84</sup> There are two principal kinds of mummy portraits, which make their appearance about the same time. Wooden panels showing the head and neck of the deceased could be fastened into the bandages of the mummy, above the face.<sup>85</sup> Or the mummy could be wrapped into a cloth which covered the

<sup>80</sup> Kraeling loc. cit. and Brown would consider the square or rectangular set-offs as purely decorative in the case of all three panels. But since the black square behind the head of the white-haired man with sun, moon and stars has no connection with the decorative system of the background and is so much like the ordinary square nimbus, this hypothesis does not seem probable to me. I do not know any example of a painted square, surrounding only the head of a person, for decorative reasons.—C. R. Morey, in his review in *The Art Bulletin* XXIII (1941) 232, of Du Mesnil Du Buisson, *Les Peintures de la Synagogue de Doura-Europos*, suggests "that the lines of the 'nimbus' at Dura are possibly demarcations meant to isolate a portion of the fresco for special treatment and care required for the making of the head, like the 'nimbi' that surround heads in textiles". But why should the heads of the figures with "nimbi" have required a treatment different from that given to quite similar heads of other figures in the Synagogue frescoes? If on the other hand the "nimbus" of Dura has a symbolical meaning, it is understandable that it is used only in those cases where a figure should be distinguished in a special way. As to the kind of "nimbi" found in textiles, which Professor Morey probably has in mind, see the Louvre mummy shroud (fig. 10), discussed on p. 28 f.: in this shroud the supplementary piece of canvas used for the head is considerably larger than the square set-off.

<sup>81</sup> According to Goodenough loc. cit., this panel would represent Moses as the giver of the mystic Torah. See Du Mesnil Du Buisson 92 ff. for Ezra.

<sup>82</sup> There is a curiously shaped nimbus in a

Coptic textile of the Museum Benaki in Athens (No. 211 of the exhibition of 1935).

Two *orantes* are standing under an arcade. The Coptic inscription (kindly read for me by Rev. G. Graf), identifies them as the Mother of God and as St. Macarius. While the latter has the round halo, the former's head is framed by a rectangle, clipped on the upper angles. The upper part of the rectangle differs from the rest by its colour (violet) and is certainly meant to represent a nimbus of sanctity. It runs directly into the veil that falls down the Virgin's back. There is a zig-zag line on the lower end of the veil, which probably indicates a fringe. A similar zig-zag line accompanies both sides of the rectangle, from the crown of the head down to the shoulders. It is probable therefore that the artist fused a round nimbus and the upper part of the veil, which made the former appear almost square. (Miss Marion Lawrence drew my attention to the veil and convinced me that there can be no question of a true square nimbus).

<sup>83</sup> Beside the quoted studies of Grüneisen see: "Intorno all'antico uso egiziano di raffigurare i defunti collocati avanti al loro sepolcro . . .", *Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria* XXIX (1906) 229 ff., with supplement on p. 534 ff.; "Lenzuoli e Tessuti egiziani nei primi secoli dell'E.V., considerati nel rispetto iconografico e simbolico", *Bullettino della Società Filologica Romana* X (1907) 19 ff. Among Wilpert's works cf. especially "Le nimbe carré", *Mélanges d'arch. et. d'hist.* XXVI 3 ff.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Hawara, Biahmu and Arsinoe* (London 1889) 15 ff.

<sup>85</sup> Good illustrations for instance in W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Roman Portraits in Memphis*

bandages<sup>51</sup> or the cartonnage, and on which usually the dead person was painted, either together with other figures (fig. 9 and 10), or alone (fig. 11-13); in the latter case the lower part of the body was sometimes represented in paint as being covered with the bandages of mummification or with an ornamented cover (fig. 12 and 13).

The shape of the wooden portrait panels is more or less rectangular (the upper angles are usually clipped). In the painted wrappings the head of the person is very often set before a rectangle or square of lighter color (fig. 11-13). In this Wilpert saw an imitation of the wooden panels and an analogy with the supposed imitation of the separate portrait-layers by the Roman square nimbi of the 8th century. While this analogy does not hold good (see above), there are some portraits on mummy wrappings which have a very superficial similarity with wooden portrait panels.<sup>52</sup> But there is a much greater number in which the background of the head looks distinctly like a square nimbus (fig. 11-13). Grüneisen attempted an explanation which is different from that of Wilpert. He asserted that the square or rectangular set-off of the head of portraits on mummy shrouds is derived from the rectangular outline of sepulchral pylons which were often used as a background for the representation of the dead in Egyptian art. According to Grüneisen the rectangle of the pylon became a kind of hieroglyph, regularly connected with funerary portraiture, and finally a "square nimbus," i.e., a portrait symbol. Two early painted shrouds, which were published by Grüneisen, seemed to bear out his theory. The earlier one, according to its style from the Hadrianic or early Antonine period (second third of the 2nd century), belonged to the Goleniscev Collection in Moscow which is now in the Art Museum Alexander III (fig. 9),<sup>53</sup> the later one, probably from the later Antonine period (second half of the 2nd century), is in the Egyptian Collection of the Louvre (fig. 10).<sup>54</sup> Both shrouds show a hellenized and rather distorted form of an old-Egyptian illustration of after-life. The dead man is represented twice: first in his natural appearance, with Anubis, the divine embalmer, standing at his left; secondly, after mummification, having become Osiris, whose symbols (the whip and the hook) he holds in his hands. Now, in the Goleniscev wrapping the non-mummified portrait is set before a

and *The Hawara Portfolio* (British School of Archaeology in Egypt and Egyptian Research Account, London 1911 and 1913); also C. C. Edgar, *Graeco-Egyptian Coffins, Masks and Portraits* (Service des Antiquités de l'Égypte. Catalogue général des antiquités égyptiennes du Musée du Caire XXVI, Cairo 1905) pl. 34 f. The numerous surviving portraits on wooden panels date from the time of Augustus to the second half of the 4th century; cf. H. Drerup, *Die Datierung der Mumienportraits* (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, im Auftrag der Görresgesellschaft herausgegeben, XIX 1 (Paderborn 1933)). In rare cases small pieces of canvas were used instead of panels, cf. Edgar op. cit. No. 33214, pl. 33; these should be distinguished from the full-sized shrouds (see below).

<sup>51</sup> This custom existed also in pre-hellenistic times. See H. E. Winlock, in *The Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum of Art* New York XXI (1926 March, Part 2) 1 ff., figures on cover and on p. 28: mummies of the XXI dynasty, excavated for the Metropolitan Museum at Thebes, wrapped into a sheet decorated with a life-sized figure of Osiris.

<sup>52</sup> Wilpert based his theory especially on a 4th century mummy shroud from Antinoë in the Egyptian Collection of the Vatican Mu-

seum, see his article in *Mél. d'arch. et d'hist.* XXVI 4 ff.; reproduction *ibid.* pl. 2-3, also in *Dict. d'arch. chrét. et de liturgie* XI 2, fig. 8292. The framed rectangle which forms the back-ground for the head of the portrait painted on this shroud has really little in common with the appearance of the wooden panels inserted into the bandages of mummies. Grüneisen is right in contradicting Wilpert, but his own "pylon"-theory (see below) is likewise not satisfactory in every respect, although it was almost generally accepted.

<sup>53</sup> Fig. 9 after Grüneisen, who has reproduced and discussed the shroud in *Archivio della R. Soc. Rom. di Storia Patria* XXIX 229 ff., in *Le portrait* . . . 95 and in *Mémoires présentées par divers savants à l'Académie des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres* XII 2,722. As to the dating of the shrouds, fig. 9 and 10, cf. the Antonine mummy portraits in Drerup op. cit. pl. 6-12.

<sup>54</sup> Beside the studies quoted in note 88, cf. Grüneisen in *Bull. della Soc. Filol. Rom.* X 19 ff.—I owe the photograph reproduced in fig. 10 to the kindness of M. J. Vandier from the staff of the Louvre. Cf. also Ch. Boreux, *Guide-catalogue sommaire du Département des Antiquités Égyptiennes du Musée National du Louvre* I (Paris 1932) 187.



FIG. 1



FIG. 2



FIG. 3



FIG. 4



FIG. 5



FIG. 8



FIG. 6



FIG. 7



FIG. 9



FIG. 10



FIG. 11



FIG. 12




FIG. 13



clearly characterized sepulchral pylon, which was no longer exactly understood in the Louvre shroud; there the sepulchral monument has become rather ornamental: a square of light blue color forms a foil for the head of the dead man's portrait. This square was probably flanked by two winged lions with disks on their heads, one of these lions is still extant. If Grüneisen's reconstruction<sup>90</sup> is right the upper edge of the square was crowned by a curved cornice, which would be a distinct remnant of the pylon-form. Since the shroud is much damaged in this spot, the question cannot be decided from the photograph. It should however be noticed that only in the Louvre cloth the Osiris-mummy has a round halo, a fact which makes it appear possible that the square, too, has a symbolical meaning in this shroud and is neither merely part of a pylon background nor purely decorative. In both shrouds Anubis bears the usual disk and crescent moon on his jackal's head. The moon belongs rather to Thoth than to Anubis; but these two gods of the dead were not always distinguished strictly in that late period. It is a peculiar feature of the Louvre shroud that head, neck and shoulders of the naturalistic portrait are painted on a separate piece of canvas which was fastened on the cloth. (The limits of this added piece are visible in fig. 10). On principle it is the same proceeding as in the case of the separate portrait panels of other mummies and also as in the portraits of Pope Zacharias and of Theodotus in *S. Maria Antiqua*.<sup>91</sup> Possibly the shrouds were made in great numbers and kept in stock, and individual portraits were sometimes added at the wish of the buyer. It is important to notice that the square set-off in light blue of the head in the Louvre wrapping is much smaller than the supplementary piece of canvas: this example therefore cannot be used for the derivation of the square nimbus from the addition of portraits. Furthermore, since the portrait was added separately, it is doubtful whether its painter knew the shroud to be used for the rest of the Louvre cloth (i.e. some wrapping similar to the Golenisev shroud), and whether he was influenced by the pylon background when he painted the square background of the head. Altogether the pylon-hypothesis of Grüneisen is not quite satisfactory, especially because square or rectangular set-offs of the head occur in a good many mummy shrouds from the 2nd century to the 4th, in which there is no suggestion of a pylon. Fig. 11 shows the fragment of a shroud from the Egyptian Collection of the Metropolitan Museum in New York.<sup>92</sup> The type and style of the portrait point to the late 2nd century.<sup>93</sup> The background is dark grey-blue, but around the head there is a rectangle of a lighter hue. Figs. 12 and 13 represent mummies wrapped in shrouds of the late 2nd or of the 3rd century; the heads of the portraits are set before squares.<sup>94</sup> The possibility shall not be denied that the origin of these rectangular or square backgrounds may have been chiefly the desire to give a decorative foil, which was sometimes framed by stucco-ornament, as in fig. 13.<sup>95</sup> But there remains still the question why the square or rectangular form was chosen. For the round clipeus (i.e. round shield) was a form at least as usual as the square or rectangle in pictures and backgrounds of that period.<sup>96</sup> The rectangular panel-form was, it is true, technically more adequate in those cases

<sup>90</sup> *Bull. della Soc. Filol. Rom.* X 23, fig. 5, 2.

<sup>91</sup> See p. 22 f.

<sup>92</sup> Accession No. 08.202.8. I am indebted to the Metropolitan Museum of Art for sending me the photograph, used in fig. 11.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. for instance the late Antonine portrait in Drerup op. cit. pl. 12.

<sup>94</sup> Figs. 12 and 13 are taken from Grüneisen, *Le portrait* . . . figs. 35 and 57.

<sup>95</sup> In mummy shrouds like No. 09.181.8 of the Metropolitan Museum, with the portrait of a woman of the Antonine period, the entire upper part of whose body is set off from a

light coloured rectangle, the purpose of the latter must have been exclusively decorative. I should like to thank Mr. A. Lansing, Curator in the Department of Egyptian Art in the Metropolitan Museum for information regarding the shrouds 08.202.8 and 09.181.8. The latter is illustrated in *Metropolitan Museum Studies II* (1930) fig. 2.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. J. Bolten, *Die Imago Clipeata . . . (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums. Im Auftrag der Görresgesellschaft herausgegeben, XXI 1 (Paderborn 1937))*. See also below p. 34f.

in which portraits painted on wood were fastened in the bandages of the mummy. But there was no technical reason for the painters of mummy shrouds to use this form; and it has already been mentioned that the painted square backgrounds on these shrouds have only a very superficial similarity with the wooden portrait panels. It is at any rate impossible to explain the square set-offs in the first-mentioned of the Dura "portrait-panels" and in the Coptic murals as a merely decorative device. Certain authors have indeed assumed that the Coptic square nimbi were used in imitation of square picture panels to indicate the portraits of persons living or recently deceased. Apart from the fact that this does not hold good for the midwife Salome in Bawit, such an interpretation is too much influenced by the famous passage from John the Deacon, which however cannot even be safely applied to the Roman monuments before the 9th or perhaps the late 8th century (see below). It is very improbable that in 6th century Egypt or in 3rd century Syria this typically mediaeval kind of conventional portrait-symbolism should have been used.

It seems then to be necessary to look out for an additional, symbolical, meaning of the rectangular backgrounds and square nimbi in Roman-Egyptian and Coptic art, as well as in the Dura paintings, even though the original meaning of the rectangular or square set-offs in the earlier mummy wrappings may have been merely decorative. This leads us to consider the possibility that the symbolism of the square and rectangle may furnish an explanation of the square nimbus. It is a possibility which is by no means excluded by the fact that this attribute is more often than not only approximately square and frequently rather rectangular. Symbolical significance did in the middle ages certainly not require geometrical exactitude<sup>97</sup> and it was more convenient to bring the set-off of the head down to the shoulders.<sup>98</sup> Besides, the ancient and mediaeval symbolism of the square was to some extent applied also to the rectangle in general; for it was the number four and the "rightness" of the angles which were the essential elements of this symbolism, although the equality of the sides was understood to give additional excellence to the square.

It is well known that the "tetragonon" (rectangle or square)<sup>99</sup> was a symbol of perfection quite common among the ancient Greeks, as far back as the Pythagorean mathematical and mystical speculations about the number four and the square (rectangle); these, it seems, signified, among other things the terrestrial world, human life, and especially the human soul.<sup>100</sup> Another early instance is found in certain verses of the poet Simonides of Ceos (about 500 B.C.), which might have been written under Pythagorean influence; in them the square occurs as a symbol of the ethical and intellectual perfection of man. The verses quoted in Plato's *Protagoras*, call a good man "tetragonos," more exactly "square without a flaw."<sup>101</sup> The idea of the square man was taken up by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*<sup>102</sup> and in the *Nicomachean Ethics*<sup>103</sup> and continued to live on in the ancient and later in the Christian world. Thus for instance *Quadratus* was a proper name among the early

<sup>97</sup> In an interesting paper, read at the Meeting of the College Art Association in Chicago, 1941, R. Krautheimer exemplified this on mediaeval architectural copies of famous buildings.

<sup>98</sup> In Bawit we have actually a square, as also in Pope John VII's portrait from Old-St. Peter's, in its present form, which however is perhaps not the original one (see note 3).

<sup>99</sup> Strictly speaking, "tetragonos" means four-angled, but usually, square or at least rectangular.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. for instance Johannes Lydus, *De Mensibus* II 8, ed. I. Bekker (*Corpus Scrip-*

*torum Historiae Byzantinae*, Bonn 1837), p. 20 f. Further references in A. Delatte, *Études sur la littérature pythagoricienne* (*Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Sciences historiques et philologiques* CCXVII, Paris 1915) 213.—It can of course not be my intention to give a full account of the symbolism of the number four; its fundamental meaning according to the Pythagoreans seems to have been that of a symbol for the terrestrial world and its four elements and extensions.

<sup>101</sup> Plato, *Protagoras* 339 A-B.

<sup>102</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric* III 11.

<sup>103</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I 10, 11.

Christians; the earliest apologist and a bishop of Athens, both of the 2nd century, were called so.<sup>104</sup> (In passing I may refer to the English expressions *squaretoes*, *on the square*, *square deal*, etc. On the other hand expressions like the Austrian idiomatic *Quadratschädel* have a considerably less flattering meaning: flawlessness has become stolidity).

It is of particular importance for our subject that the symbolism of the square, as representing human perfection, was known and used by the great Alexandrian philosophers and theologians, not long before and after the time of the first appearance of the square set-offs on Egyptian mummy shrouds. Philo Judaeus (1st century A.D.), in several of his treatises, discusses the square as including the perfections of the number four, of right angles and of the equality of sides; thus the square as well as the number four become a symbol of righteousness or justice, which Philo calls the leading one among the virtues.<sup>105</sup> In the 12th chapter of the 6th book of his *Stromata* (written about 200 A.D.) Clement of Alexandria describes the righteousness of the Christian wise man or "gnostic" as square, as "quadrangular, that is on all sides equal and like in word, deed, in abstention from evils, in well-doing, in gnostic perfection."<sup>106</sup> Finally Origen (ca. 185-254), in the second and third of his *Homilies on the Book of Genesis*, speaks of the perfect life as square.<sup>107</sup>

While it is of course unlikely that Philo or Clement or Origen directly influenced the painters of pagan mummy shrouds, their use of a symbolism which perceived the square as a sign of excellence and perfection makes it probable, I think, that some such idea was behind the frequent use of square set-offs for the portraits on Roman-Egyptian mummy shrouds from the 2nd century onward<sup>108</sup> and later in the Coptic and the Dura paintings. It might perhaps be objected that there is

<sup>104</sup> About diverse early christian bearers of the name *Quadratus* cf. O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* I, 2nd edition (Freiburg im Breisgau) 183 ff.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Philo, *De Opificio Mundi* 47 ff., ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland, I (Berlin 1896) 15 ff. After a long discussion of the mathematical and musical perfection of the number four (obviously influenced by the Pythagoreans), there follows a passage regarding the square (loc. cit. 51, p. 16). Cf. also Philo, *De Plantatione* 121 ff., ed. Cohn and Wendland, II (Berlin 1897) 157.

<sup>106</sup> Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* VI 12, 102, 4, ed. O. Stählin (*Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der K. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Clemens Alexandrinus*, Vol. II, Leipzig 1906) 483.

In spite of the fact that Clement of Alexandria wrote the sixth book of the *Stromata* after leaving Egypt (cf. Bardenhewer op. cit. II 67), nobody will deny that in this work as elsewhere he is a representative of the thought of Alexandria, where he lived at least from about 180 to 202.

<sup>107</sup> Origines, *In Genes. Homilia II* (transl. Rufinus), ed. W. A. Bachrens (*Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller . . . op. cit.*, Leipzig 1920), c. 4. (Origines, Vol. VI, p. 32, l. 8), c. 6 (loc. cit. p. 37, l. 21 ff.); *In Genes. Homilia III* c. 6 (loc. cit. p. 49, l. 6).

<sup>108</sup> It may also be recalled that the symbolism of the number four is particularly prominent amongst the Alexandrian heretical gnostics of the 2nd century (Valentinus etc.), who were strongly influenced by Pythagorean

ideas. The symbolism of the number four and that of the square can of course not be strictly separated. Both symbolisms survived throughout the middle ages (cf. J. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes und seiner Ausstattung in der Auffassung des Mittelalters*, 2nd edition, 62 ff.), the latter especially in connection with the allegories of the Church as constructed of perfectly square stones, which could be interpreted as its perfect members; see *Shepherd of Hermas* (middle of the 2nd century), *Visio III*, c. 5, 1 and c. 6, 6. (I am indebted for this reference to Mr. A. K. Coomaraswamy); cf. also Sauer op. cit. 112 ff. for evidence of similar ideas in St. Augustine, St. Ivo of Chartres, Honorius Augustodunensis, Hugh of St. Victor and Durandus of Mende. Particularly important is the following passage in St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum LXXXVI*, Migne, *Patrologia Latina* XXXVII 1103 (not mentioned by Sauer): *Non enim frustra etiam de lignis quadratis aedificata est arca Noe, quae nihilominus figuram gestabat ecclesiae. Quid est enim quadrati? Attendite similitudinem quadrati lapidis: similis debet esse christianus. In omni tentatione sua christianus non cadit: etsi impellitur et quasi vertitur non cadit: nam quadratum lapidem quacunque verteris stat. See the similar formulation of this thought in *De Civitate Dei* XV 26. Cf. also Otto of Freising, *Chronicon*, Prologue: *Sapientis enim est officium non more volubilis rotae rotari, sed in virtutum constantia ad quadrati corporis modum firmari*. For the idea that the square cannot fall, see the passages in Cornutus and in Lydus, referred to in note 115.*

no relation between the literary concept of "squareness" in a man—be it intellectual or physical<sup>108a</sup>—and the actual square found behind heads of figures in works of art. Yet there is no difficulty if we assume that the symbolism of the square was gradually applied to decorative set-offs (see p. 29), under the influence of ideas developed in literature.

The tradition of the ancient symbolism of the square may also have caused the attribution, in Bawit, of the square nimbus to the midwife Salome. Whether it was the painter of Bawit or one of the earlier Alexandrian gnostic writers that identified her with that Salome who was supposed to have received gnostic knowledge of special perfection from Christ (see p. 24), this identification had most probably taken place when the Salome of Bawit was given the square nimbus as a sign of higher rank, though not of sanctity.

If our explanation of the origin of the square nimbus is correct, the set-offs of portraits on mummy shrouds, which originally may have been merely decorative, came to be interpreted in a symbolical way. At what time this happened, cannot be made out with any degree of exactitude. There is however some further evidence connecting the 2nd century Egyptian as well as the 3rd century Dura square or rectangular portrait backgrounds with the symbolism of that age.

We have seen that in one of the earliest mummy wrappings in question, in that of the Louvre, the god Anubis, who carries the moon of Thoth on his head, is represented beside the dead man whose head is set before a square. The Egyptian god Thoth was identified with Hermes by the Greeks, at least from the time of the younger Hecataeus (about 300 B.C.)<sup>109</sup>; later the same happened to Anubis.<sup>110</sup> Plato and later the Stoics and Neo-Platonists also interpreted Hermes as a personification of the Logos,<sup>111</sup> this identification was transferred to Thoth in his quality as the god of speech and wisdom,<sup>112</sup> and occasionally even to Anubis.<sup>113</sup> Now, at least from the time of Thucydides Hermes had the epithet "tetragonos", rectangular or square, which was originally derived from the cubic form of the hermae.<sup>114</sup> But in magical texts of the 2nd or 3rd century A.D. and in stoic and late neo-platonic works this same epithet was used as an attribute of Hermes as the god of words, or of Hermes-Logos, who is the personification of the true word or true speech and therefore equal and harmonious in all parts.<sup>115</sup> Still as late as

<sup>108a</sup> See p. 33, on Damascius of Damascus.

<sup>109</sup> Hecataeus, in Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca Historica* I 15-16. Cf. R. Reitzenstein, *Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen* . . . (Strassburg 1901) 88 f.—Further references in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Neue Bearbeitung, Reihe II, Halbband XI (Stuttgart 1936) 383.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. W. H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* V (Leipzig 1916-1924) 862; Pauly-Wissowa loc. cit. 384 ff.; J. Gr. Milne, *A History of Egypt under Roman Rule* (London 1898) 147; W. Schubart, *Aegypten von Alexander dem Grossen bis auf Mohammed* (Berlin 1922) 286.—A god Hermanubis was being venerated in Graeco-Roman Egypt; cf. Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 61, ed. Hutten, p. 187.

<sup>111</sup> Plato, *Cratylus* 407 E ff. Cf. also Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 54 f., p. 178 f.; Varro, in St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* VII 14; Cornutus, *De Natura Deorum* 16; Joh. Lydus, *De Mensibus* IV 52 (see note 115). Further references in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Neue Bearbeitung, Halbband XXV (Stuttgart 1926) 1061 ff.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Hecataeus, in Diodorus op. cit. 15-16.

Further references in Pauly-Wissowa op. cit. 1068.—It is still an unsolved problem to define exactly how much is old Egyptian and how much Hellenistic-Roman in the conception of Thoth as the creative Logos. P. Boylan, *Thoth, the Hermes of Egypt* (London, Oxford University Press 1922) 108 ff., emphasizes the old Egyptian elements against R. Reitzenstein, *Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen* 73, and *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen* (Leipzig-Berlin 1920). In the *Corpus Hermeticum* of the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. the figures of Hermes Trismegistos and Thoth are already inextricably blended with one another and with the platonic and stoic Logos-doctrine.

<sup>113</sup> Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 61; it is true that the term "logos" is used in a rather specific way in this passage.

<sup>114</sup> Thucydides VI 27. Further instances: Pauly-Wissowa op. cit. Reihe II, Halbband IX (Stuttgart 1934) 1075 ff.; Roscher op. cit. V 399 ff.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Wessely, "Griechische Zauberpapyrus von Paris und London", *Denkschriften der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophische und Historische Klasse*, XXXVI (Wien 1888) 137, v. 414 ff.: Hymn to

about 500 A.D. the Neo-Platonist Damascius of Damascus says that the face of the philosopher Isidorus was almost a square and thus the holy pattern of the Hermes-Logios.<sup>116</sup>

Alexandria, an important seat of the neo-pythagorean and neo-platonic schools, had from the time of Philo Judaeus become the centre of non-christian Graeco-Roman Logos-philosophy and -theology. Philo particularly emphasized the "rightness" of the Logos,<sup>117</sup> (cf. also above, p. 31: Philo and Clement of Alexandria on the "righteousness" of the square; see also below). On the basis of the new Christian Logos-doctrine this tradition was continued by Clement Alexandrinus and Origen, from the late 2nd century onward. It is then perhaps not unlikely that the connection of the symbolism of the square with Hermes-Logos-Thoth-Anubis had something to do with the appearance of the square of perfection on Egyptian mummy shrouds of the syncretistic era.

Concerning the square nimbus of the Synagogue of Dura (perhaps imported from Egypt, see, p. 27), it might be recalled that by some Jewish writers of that period Moses was placed into a parallel with Hermes-Thoth.<sup>118</sup> He was also connected and even identified with the Logos by Philo and probably by others.<sup>119</sup> The Logos, in addition, Philo saw symbolized in right angles<sup>120</sup> and in the square.<sup>121</sup> While I have no evidence of the occurrence of the epithet "square" or "rectangular" for Moses in Hellenistic-Jewish literature, Philo at least emphasizes that Moses, the "perfect man", was very close to the "straight" or "righteous" ("orthos") Logos<sup>122</sup> and that he attributed great importance, nay even holiness to the number four.<sup>123</sup> The Moses-Logos mysticism, which according to Goodenough forms the basis of the subject-matter of the paintings in the Synagogue of Dura (see above), indeed seems to tie up well with the origin of the square nimbus, as suggested in this study.

If the square nimbus originated in Graeco-Roman-Egyptian-Jewish speculations about the square and its perfection, this attribute is akin to the circular nimbus in so far as it is at least partly symbolical in its origin. A few remarks about the round nimbus or halo may therefore find their place here.<sup>124</sup>

Hermes (probably from Egypt about 200 A.D., but perhaps after older Greek hymn).

Cf. similarly Wessely, *Denkschriften* . . . XLII (Wien 1893) 44 f., v. 734 ff. In those magical papyri Hermes, "the prince of words", is called "tetragonos" and "strongylos", both square and round. Like the square, the circle and the sphere are very old symbols of perfection. In addition "strongylos", like the Latin *teres*, can signify well-rounded, neat, terse. Horace, *Satir.* II 7, v. 86, uses round instead of square as a characteristic of perfection.—For the connection of Hermes with the square or the number four as well as with the Logos cf. Cornutus (1st century A.D.), *De Natura Deorum* 16.

Similar ideas, somewhat modified and combined with speculations about the sun, return in Macrobius (about A.D. 400), *Conviviorum Primi Diei Saturnaliorum* I 18, 14. An afterglow of the old ideas is the relation of *philologia* to the perfect number four and to Hermes in Martianus Capella, *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* (written about 410-439) II 106. See also Lydus (first half of the 6th century), *De Mensibus* IV 52, ed. Bekker, loc. cit. 89, (cf. the reference to Cornutus above).

<sup>116</sup> In Photius, *Bibliotheca*, *Cod.* 242, ed. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* CIII 1253 A.

Cf. similarly about the philosopher Agapius, *ibid.* *Cod.* 243, *ibid.* 1304. For the latter

fragment from Damascius cf. also Suidas, s.v. "tetragonos".

<sup>117</sup> "Orthos Logos"; cf. H. Leisegang, article *Logos*, in Pauly-Wissowa op. cit. Halbband XXV 1072.

<sup>118</sup> For instance by Artapanus (probably Jew from Alexandria, 2nd century B.C.), in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* IX 27. Cf. Reitzenstein, *Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen* 100 ff.; Pauly-Wissowa, op. cit., Reihe II, Halbband XI 388; Goodenough, *By Light, Light* 291 and 7. See also the (not always convincing) study of I. Lévy, *La légende de Pythagore de Grèce en Palestine* (Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, *Sciences Historiques et Philologiques* CCL Paris 1927) 207.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. the quotations from Philo in Goodenough op. cit. 201, 220, 231. Reitzenstein op. cit. 101 ff. quotes Aristeas besides Philo.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. the second quotation in note 105.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. *De Vita Mosis* II 128, ed. Cohn and Wendland IV (Berlin 1902) 230, where the square "Logeion" of the high priest (*Exod.* XXVIII, 15, in the *Vulgata: rationale*) is discussed.

<sup>122</sup> See the quotations in Goodenough op. cit. 203, 223 ff.; 184, 202.

<sup>123</sup> Philo, *De Abrahamo* 13, ed. Cohn and Wendland IV 4; *De Plantatione* 125, *ibid.* II 158, etc.

<sup>124</sup> Among the numerous older studies on

In its Roman and early Christian forms the round nimbus, although principally a symbol of light, appears nevertheless to have been influenced by a decorative device, namely by the aforementioned clipei, which were so frequently used as the background of Roman portraits. For, the round halo did not have from the start the simple shape of a circular disk or outline. The concept of *nimbus* means a "cloud" of light, a halo emanating from divine or deified persons;<sup>125</sup> it is a sun-like or moon-like splendor, but not identical with the disks of sun or moon. The oldest extant nimbi, which are to be found in the paintings of Greek and Apulian vases of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.,<sup>126</sup> often consist of several concentric rings of light; usually rays of light spread from the periphery. The nimbus as a simple disk first occurs in the frescoes of Pompeii. Diverse light colours, not yellow or white only, are used, which makes it clear that it is not the sun or moon that are represented, but rather an aura of light which has its source in the persons whose heads it surrounds. Now it can be observed that the Roman painters gave nimbi especially to those figures of gods or heroes, who have an artistically prominent role in the composition of the pictures. It seems therefore possible that the original form of the halo as a "cloud" of light, consisting of different spheres and ending in rays, was transformed into its later disk-like shape under the influence of the clipeus or round shield<sup>127</sup> which was the characteristic background used by the Romans for the portraits in colour or relief of famous men and later of ancestors, heroes and emperors, and which by the early Christians was transferred to Christ and his saints, like the nimbus itself.<sup>128</sup>

the round nimbus I mention the excellent works of A. N. Didron, *Iconographie chrétienne. Histoire de Dieu* (Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France [Série III: Archéologie] XCVII Paris 1843) 25 ff.; L. Stephani "Nimbus und Strahlenkranz in den Werken der alten Kunst", *Mémoires de l'Académie Imperiale des Sciences de St.-Petersbourg*, Série VI: *Sciences politiques, histoire et philologie*, IX (1859) 359 ff.; A. Krücke, *Der Nimbus und verwandte Attribute in der frühchristlichen Kunst* (Strassburg 1905). All these studies are now somewhat out of date, at least in so far as the pre-Christian nimbus is concerned: cf. the important article *Nimbus* in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Neue Bearbeitung, XVII 1 (Halbband XXXIII, Stuttgart 1936) 591 ff., on this the following remarks are chiefly based.—E. H. Ramsden, "The Halo: A Further Inquiry into its Origin", *The Burlington Magazine* LXXVIII (1941) 123 ff., tries to derive the Christian as well as the Indian round nimbi from the Mazdaic and Mithraic Light-religion of Persia, more exactly from the Hvareno, "the glory from above which makes the king an earthly god". But strangely enough he completely fails to mention the fact that there were nimbi in pagan Greek and Roman art, long before they appear in Persia and India. While the Christian halo seems to be a direct continuation of the Roman one (see below p. 35), it is more easily conceivable that there may have been Iranian influence on the Christian aureole or glory (see note 128, but also note 131). As to the question whether the pagan Graeco-Roman halo and aureole were influenced by Persian religious ideas of the pre-Christian era I do not dare to advance an opinion.

<sup>125</sup> The word *nimbus* in the meaning of

cloud of light first occurs in Vergil, but the idea is at least as old as Homer; cf. Pauly-Wissowa, op. cit. 597.

<sup>126</sup> The oldest nimbi in Iranian and Indian art are considerably later and likely to have been introduced by the Greeks. On the nimbi in the coins of Scythian and Bactrian princes of the 1st century B.C. and on the first nimbed Buddhas of Gandhara art cf. Ramsden op. cit., furthermore A.K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art* (New York, Leipzig, London, 1927) 41, 57, and J. Tavenor-Perry, "The Nimbus in Eastern Art", *The Burlington Magazine* XII (1907-1908) 22. Coomaraswamy, like Ramsden, thinks that the nimbus originated in India or Persia, the classical areas of sun-worship, but cf. note 124.

<sup>127</sup> While the clipeus originated from actual shields, there may have been some secondary influence of the symbolism of the circle, cf. Bolten, *Die Imago Clipeata* 45.

<sup>128</sup> This hypothesis, which seems to me rather obvious, I have not found in the literature, except for a remark of E. Tea in her afore-mentioned book on S. Maria Antiqua. J. Sabatier, *Description générale des monnaies byzantines* (Paris 1862) 31 f. goes much too far in deriving the round nimbus from the clipeus alone. As to the glory or aureole or mandorla (usually oval or round, with or without rays) which surrounds not only the head, but the whole body, see G. W. Elderkin, "Shield and Mandorla", *American Journal of Archaeology* XLII (1938) 227 ff., who discusses the influence of the clipei on the christian mandorla. Yet Elderkin does not take into account that, like the nimbus, the mandorla is chiefly and originally a splendor of light. Cf. for instance Krücke, *Der Nimbus* . . . 95 ff. For a possible connection of the

We cannot dwell here upon the facts, important for the history of the Christian halo, that, when it appears in the latter part of the fourth century, it was first given to Christ alone, and that furthermore it was taken over not from the nimbus of the pagan gods directly, but from that of the emperors<sup>120</sup> who had assumed it in their coins and other images from the third century and more frequently from the time of Constantine the Great. It has a more direct bearing on our subject that in early Christian art of the 5th and following centuries there are not a few examples<sup>121</sup> in which the half-length figure of Christ or of saints, when placed in a clipeus, lack the nimbus: this means that these two attributes were sometimes felt to be equivalent.<sup>121</sup>

The above suggestions concerning the circular nimbus and the clipeus have been advanced chiefly to stress the point that in ancient and mediaeval art decorative and symbolical motifs are not unfrequently contiguous or even fused.

mandorla with the old-Persian Hvareno (glory of light) see Ramsden op. cit.; see also note 124.

<sup>120</sup> Shown with convincing arguments by Krücke op. cit. 70 ff. The large use made by early Christian and Byzantine literature and art, of imperial insignia and attributes, in order to express the rulership of Christ and his saints, has been clarified by recent studies; cf. J. Kollwitz, "Christus als Lehrer und die Gesetzesübergabe an Petrus . . .", *Römische Quartalschrift* XLIV (1936) 45 ff.; E. Peterson, *Zeuge der Wahrheit* (Leipzig 1937), especially appendix: *Christus als Imperator*; A. Grabar, *L'empereur dans l'art byzantin* (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg*, LXXXV, Paris 1936) 189 ff. 8th and 9th century Byzantine iconoclasm was a violent reaction against this development, on behalf of profane imperial art; cf. my article "Origin and Significance of the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy", *Mediaeval Studies* II (1940) 127 ff.—While the imperial round nimbus certainly is the direct ancestor of the Christian halo, Old—and New Testament passages that speak of the splendor emanating from God, Christ, angels prophets etc. may have favored its reception.

<sup>121</sup> See for instance Krücke 101 ff.

<sup>121</sup> It may be noted that writers of the central part of the middle ages, like Sicardus of Cremona, *Mitrale* I 12, Migne, *Patrologia Latina* CCXIII 43 A ff., and Durandus of Mende, *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum* I 3, 19 f. (Venice 1599) 10 v., have lost all recollection of the round nimbus' origin from the cloud of light; it is no longer called *nimbus*, but *corona* or *diadema*, with reference to the crowns of eternal life which are so often mentioned in Holy Scripture and which are frequently represented as real crowns in early Christian and mediaeval art. The shield-like form of the *corona*, i.e. the nimbus, Sicardus and Durandus interpret in a purely allegorical, un-historical way, which is dependent upon *Psalms* V 13: *Ut scuto bonae voluntatis coronasti nos*. (Cf. also Krücke op. cit. 63 and J. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes und seiner Ausstattung in der Auffassung des Mittelalters*, 2nd edition, 232 f.). Sicardus loc. cit. also connects the round nimbus of sanctity with *Exodus* XXV 25: *Et ipsi labio* (that is the ledge of the table for the loaves of proposition) *coronam interrasilem altam quatuor digitis et super illam*

*alteram coronam aureolam*. His exegesis of the verse is on the whole the same as that of Bede in his *De Tabernaculo et Vasis eius ac Vestibus Sacerdotum* I 6, Migne, *Patr. Lat.* XCI 408 ff.: the *corona aurea* is eternal life, which is the reward of all the faithful, while the *corona aureola* belongs to those who chose the way towards perfection, that is to the virgins and the saints in general. But only Sicardus identifies this *corona aureola* with the round nimbus of sanctity. In this he was followed neither by St. Thomas Aquinas nor by Durandus. St. Thomas speaks about the *aurea* and the *aureola* in *Sent.* IV, dist. 49, quaest. 5 (cf. also dist. 33, quaest. 3, art. 3 ad 3; *Quaest. Quodlib.* V quaest. 12, art. 24; *Summa Theol.*, Suppl., quaest. XCVI). While he uses Bede, he does not know or not accept Sicardus' identification of the artistic nimbus with the *aureola*. For according to Thomas the latter is an attribute of the martyrs, virgins and doctors, but not of Christ and the angels, who are too perfect to have a special (accidental) reward; Christ however has the essential *aurea*. Now, since Thomas certainly knew that Christ and the angels were represented in art as having nimbi he obviously did not identify the *aureola* and the nimbus; neither is it probable that he was thinking of the cross-nimbus, peculiar to Christ, in discussing His *aurea*. Durandus follows Sicardus except for the specification of the crowns into *aureae* and *aureolae*; he gives the simple *corona* to the saints and the *corona* with the cross (cross-nimbus) to Christ.—The aureole or glory or mandorla likewise cannot be historically derived from the *corona aureola* which occurs in the Old Testament or in mediaeval exegesis. As regards the origin of the aureole or mandorla in Christian art, it is similar to that of the round nimbus: its artistic form is derived from haloes of light which sometimes surround the bodies of divinities in ancient art, and it was also influenced by the clipei (see above note 128). There were however powerful scriptural motives for the use of the Christian mandorla, which were lacking in the case of the mere halo of sanctity: the Transfiguration of Christ and the apocalyptic visions. Cf. Krücke op. cit. 95 ff.—The surviving examples of aureoles in Hindu art belong to an age when the Christian aureoles and nimbi long existed.

Since the square nimbus has nothing to do with the symbolism of light the name "nimbus" is of course not really adequate. If the term "square nimbus" were not rather deeply rooted in archaeological jargon, it might be better to speak of a "square of perfection".

The fact of the origin and persistence of the square nimbus in Graeco-Roman and Coptic Egypt throws an interesting light on the late-antique style of certain 7th and 8th century paintings in S. Maria Antiqua in Rome, a style which by Miss M. Avery<sup>132</sup> and Professor Morey<sup>133</sup> has been connected with Alexandria. For it seems likely that the square nimbus made its first appearance in Rome when the late-antique tradition of the 7th century painters of S. Maria Antiqua still survived,<sup>134</sup> that is in the period of Pope John VII (705-707). We have seen that the oldest surviving square nimbi—one of them in S. Maria Antiqua—belong to that pontiff,<sup>135</sup> who was one of a long series of Greek and oriental popes of the 7th and 8th centuries, and that the square nimbus of the portrait of Gregory the Great probably was an addition made in that very period (see p. 20). As regards the probable introduction of the Roman square nimbus from Egypt, it is remarkable that the attribute does not occur in Byzantine art proper.<sup>136</sup>

Whether on the occasion of its first appearance in Rome the square nimbus still retained the symbolical significance of the square of perfection, which, we suppose, it originally had, or whether it had already the portrait symbolism, attested by John the Deacon in the latter part of the 9th century, it is difficult to ascertain. The current opinion is that the explanation of the square nimbus given by John applies as early as the period of John VII or even of Gregory the Great. But I think it more probable that when it was introduced into Roman art, it still preserved the symbolism of the square, whereas its similarity with a picture panel was not noticed until later. This assumption seems to be confirmed by a slight change in the form of the square nimbus itself which began to appear from the late 8th century. While before that time the square nimbi had been either a surface or a square outline, a real suggestion of a picture panel was sometimes given from the time of Pope Hadrian I onward. This effect was reached by adding on each side a narrow edge which was obviously meant to give material depth to the square or rectangle,<sup>137</sup> cf. the example from Pope Paschal I's mosaic in S. Prassede,

<sup>132</sup> "The Alexandrian Style at Santa Maria Antiqua, Rome", *The Art Bulletin* VII (1925) 131 ff.

<sup>133</sup> C. R. Morey, "The Sources of Mediaeval Style", *The Art Bulletin* VII (1924) 35 ff. Professor Morey's definition of a late-antique Alexandrian style of hellenistic character as one of the principal roots of Mediaeval art, has encountered a good deal of opposition, chiefly because of the scarcity of "hellenistic" monuments in Alexandria and its immediate sphere of influence. Cf. the good survey of the problem in E. Kitzinger, "Notes on Early Coptic Sculpture", *Archaeologia* LXXXVII (1937) 181 ff. I can however not see, why Kitzinger discards the wooden door of St. Barbara in Cairo and the Louvre pilaster from Bawit as evidence of the Hellenistic Alexandrian style. See also D. Zuntz, "The Two Styles of Coptic Painting", *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* XXI (1935) 63 ff., for a "hellenistic" trend in Coptic art, even after the 5th century.

<sup>134</sup> At least as late as the time of Pope John VII; cf. Avery op. cit. 140.

<sup>135</sup> In John VII's biography in the *Liber Pontificalis*, ed. L. Duchesne, I (Paris 1886)

385, we find an interesting passage: *Fecit vero et imagines per diversas ecclesias quas quicumque nosse desiderat in eis eius vultum depictum reperiet*. Since there were many earlier images of popes in Roman churches, one may perhaps assume that there was something special about the images of John VII, which caused the biographer to mention them: this may have been the square nimbus.—The fact that the square nimbus occurs under John VII is the principal reason against the theory, advanced by Lauer, in *Mém. de la Soc. Nat. des Antiquaires de France* LXVII 67 ff., that it was introduced as a result of the Iconoclastic Controversy, which began only in 725.

<sup>136</sup> In the mosaics of the Church of St. Demetrius of Salonika some saints are represented before the battlements of the city-walls which they protect; there are no square nimbi in the mosaics, as has been erroneously assumed by some authors. See also C. R. Morey, in *The Art Bulletin* XXIII (1941) 232.

<sup>137</sup> The thickness of the picture-panel was indicated on both sides, in conformity with the usual early mediaeval practice in representing the spatial depth of objects.



in fig. 5.<sup>138</sup> In some cases there is a little cross on the upper margin of the nimbus.<sup>139</sup> It was perhaps this somewhat modified form of the square nimbus which made John the Deacon call it *tabulae similitudinem*.<sup>140</sup>

In comparing the portraits of the Popes John VII (fig. 1) and Zacharias (fig. 2) with those of Paschal I (fig. 5), it becomes evident how much less naturalistic, how much more conventional the latter are; in the late 8th and 9th centuries the Roman painters may therefore have welcomed a way to express clearly by the square nimbus, which sometimes they definitely characterized as a picture panel, that certain images were portraits of contemporary persons. It is rare indeed that we can follow the transition from the antique to the mediaeval conception of the image and of its symbolism, as well as we can in the history of the square nimbus.

That at the moment when the square nimbus was brought to Rome the symbolism of the square should have been remembered, seems well possible, since it survived throughout the middle ages, and in the 13th century apparently was still connected with the square nimbus, although some modifications of the symbolical meaning had occurred (see below p. 43). However this may be, and whether John the Deacon's idea of portrait symbolism was generally known and applied or not, it is evident and has never been contested that from the time of the square nimbus' appearance in Rome under Pope John VII to the 12th century it was the chief purpose of this attribute to single out eminent persons, usually still alive and therefore not to be characterized as saints by the round halo.

We have so far studied the history of the Roman square nimbus and investigated its oriental origins. A list of square nimbi outside Rome from the 9th century to the 12th<sup>141</sup> and a short discussion of the lozenge-shaped, hexagonal and octagonal nimbi will bring the history of the non-circular nimbus to its end.

The first monument to be mentioned is a late Egyptian example of the square nimbus, which gives evidence of the survival of the older Coptic square nimbi in the middle ages.

31. *Deyr Anbâ Hadrâ* (usually, but mistakenly called St. Simeon), monastery in ruins near Aswân (Assuan) in Upper Egypt,<sup>142</sup> central apse of the church: Mural: A priest (wearing the chasuble and having a tonsure), is standing in the attitude of prayer to the extreme left of Christ in Majesty Who is flanked by two arch-angels.<sup>143</sup> It is impossible today to make out with certainty whom the painter in-

<sup>138</sup> Among the Roman square nimbi mentioned on p. 16 f. cf. also that of Pope Hadrian I in S. Maria Antiqua; those of Pope Leo III and Charlemagne in the Lateran Triclinium and in S. Susanna, (in its present, restored state the Triclinium-mosaic shows the square nimbi as simple surfaces, but in most of the 16th and 17th century copies of the original they are characterized as picture-panels); that of Pope Leo IV in S. Clemente; finally those of Calixtus II and Anacletus (II) in the Nicolas-Chapel of the old Lateran-Palace (according to the Ciacconius-Cod. Vat. lat. 5407, pag. 85 f.; the original fresco is lost, the restitution in the Chapel of the Pontificio Seminario Romano Maggiore Lateranense is not reliable as to details).

<sup>139</sup> Cf. the square nimbi of Pope Paschal I in S. Maria in Domnica and of Leo IV in S. Clemente.

<sup>140</sup> See note 38 about the possibility that the square nimbus of the portrait of Gregory the Great, described by John the Deacon, which

was probably added only in the 8th or 9th century, had the indication of the thickness of a picture-panel.

<sup>141</sup> The list is probably less complete than the lists of earlier examples of square nimbi (p. 15 ff. and p. 23 ff.). Nos. 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 49, 51, 52, 53, 55, are also included in the lists of Lauer and Leclercq, mentioned in note 2. If not indicated otherwise the monuments listed are contemporary with the lifetime of the persons having the square nimbus, who are made recognizable by italics. Usually only one or two bibliographical references will be given. For Nos. 40-42 and 45, I may refer to my book quoted in note 1.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. U. Monneret de Villard, *Il Monastero di S. Simeone presso Aswân I* (Milan 1927), also for bibliography.

<sup>143</sup> Illustrated by Monneret de Villard, op. cit. fig. 71 (after water-colour copy of Clédat); cf. also the rather indistinct photograph of J. Strzygowski in Grüneisen, *Le portrait*, fig. 100.

tended to represent in this figure of a priest with the square nimbus.<sup>144</sup> In the picture he apparently does not offer anything to Christ; it is possible therefore that he is not a donor, but perhaps the patron of the monastery, Hadrâ, a 4th century Bishop of Aswân,<sup>145</sup> (cf. the images of Apa Jeremias in Saqqara, p. 23). The mural, according to its style dates from the 12th century.<sup>146</sup>

We come now to a group of 9th to 12th century monuments with square nimbi, originating from *South Italy* and connected with *Monte Cassino* and the sphere of its artistic influence.

32. *S. Vincenzo al Volturno, Chapel of S. Lorenzo*, belonging to the ruined monastery: Murals:<sup>147</sup>

a) Abbot Epiphanius of *S. Vincenzo al Volturno* (824-843), adoring the Crucifixus.<sup>148</sup>

b) A *deacon*, adoring the Madonna Regina.<sup>149</sup>

c) A *deacon*, in the attitude of an *orans*.<sup>150</sup>

33. *Monte Cassino, Cod. 175: Paulus Diaconus, Commentarius in Regulam S. Benedicti* etc., p. 2: Miniature: Abbot John of *Monte Cassino-Capua* (915-934), offering the codex to St. Benedict.<sup>151</sup>

34. *Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense, Cod. 724 B I 13: Pontifical Roll: Miniatures: A bishop* is shown twelve times conferring the minor and major orders. Every time he has the square nimbus. The manuscript contains a contemporary note: *Landolfi episcopi sum*, this refers to Archbishop Landolfus I of Benevento (957-984). Like Nos. 35 and 36, the Casanatense Pontifical roll is believed by Miss Avery to have been executed not in Benevento, but in *S. Vincenzo al Volturno*.<sup>152</sup> In this roll there appears for the first time a peculiar form of the square nimbus that, no doubt, is derived from the late 8th and 9th century square nimbi which suggested the edge of a picture panel (see p. 36f.). Some 10th and 11th century painters obviously misunderstood older models, and thus these edges were transformed into folding sides, not unlike the wings of a triptych; sometimes the painters seem to have thought that they were dealing with a clerical hood, for instance in No. 36.<sup>153</sup>

35. *Ibid., Cod. 724 B I 13: Benedictio Fontis Roll: Miniatures: In four pictures a priest* is shown performing the paschal blessing of the baptismal font. He always has the square nimbus. In script and style of the miniatures the roll is closely connected to No. 34; it later belonged to Archbishop Landolfus II of Benevento (1108-1119).<sup>154</sup>

<sup>144</sup> There was originally an inscription above the square nimbus, perhaps the name of the personage. Strzygowski asserted to have read CIMEON, while J. David on the strength of a water color copy of De Morgan believed that the name was CICINNIOC (cf. Grüneisen op. cit. 89 ff.). But both readings are quite uncertain, cf. Monneret de Villard op. cit. 48 f. (Strzygowski's hypothesis was obviously influenced by the name of St. Simeon, erroneously given to the monastery by modern archaeologists).

<sup>145</sup> Cf. Monneret de Villard op. cit. 143 f.

<sup>146</sup> Cf. op. cit. 49.

<sup>147</sup> Cf. P. Toesca, "Reliquie d'arte della Badia di S. Vincenzo al Volturno", *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano* XXV (1904) 1 ff.; id., *Storia dell'Arte Italiana I. Il Medioevo* 408 ff., 421; M. Avery, *The Exultet Rolls of South Italy II* (Princeton, London, The Hague 1936) 40 ff.

<sup>148</sup> Illustrated for instance in Avery op. cit. pl. 190.

<sup>149</sup> Avery op. cit. pl. 190.

<sup>150</sup> Avery op. cit. pl. 194 c.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. *Codicum Casinensium Manuscriptorum Catalogus*, ed. Don M. Inguauez I (Monte Cassino 1915) 259 f. (with bibliography). Illustrated for instance in Avery op. cit. pl. 196.

<sup>152</sup> Avery op. cit. 27 f. (with bibliography), pl. 104-109. In some cases the bishop has the pallium.

<sup>153</sup> Therefore G. Ciampini, *Vetera Monumenta* . . . II (Rome 1699) 143, doubted the correct interpretation of the Roman square nimbus as *insigne viventis*, which had been preserved by earlier Roman archaeologists, like N. Alemani, in his *De Lateranensibus Parietinis* (Rome 1625) cap. 6. According to Ciampini, old rituals (obviously the liturgical rolls of South Italy), show that the square nimbus once was *capitis ornamentum sive episcopale signum ut hodie thiaira vulgo mitra*. Ciampini was certainly mistaken. Cf. also Avery op. cit. 10.

<sup>154</sup> Avery op. cit. 28 f. (with bibliography), pl. 110-117. The pallium worn by the priest is according to Miss Avery a later addition.

36. *Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 9820: Exultet Roll*, containing the hymn for the blessing of the Easter candle on Holy Saturday: Miniatures:<sup>155</sup> The *archbishop* and the *deacon*, who several times appear in the representations of the liturgy of the blessing of the candle, are always given the square nimbus, as also the donor, the *Presbyter* and *Prepositus John*, who, in the last picture, offers the roll to St. Peter. The square in this roll is furthermore attributed to the personification of the *Church*, a theme which almost regularly occurs in the illustrations of *Exultet* rolls. The Church has also the round halo, which, however, may be a later addition.<sup>156</sup> Most of the square nimbi are much narrower on the top than on the base; in some of them the assimilation to a capuche, discussed in No. 34, is particularly pronounced. The roll probably dates from 981-987 and was probably written for the Convent of *St. Peter Outside the Walls of Benevento*, which belonged to the Abbey of *S. Vincenzo al Volturno*, where Miss Avery thinks the roll originated.<sup>157</sup>

37. *Monte Cassino, Cod. 109 GG: Sermons and Homilies of Diverse Fathers*, p. 295: Miniature: The *Monk and Deacon Grimoald*, who was the writer of the greater part of the codex and probably also illustrated it during the abbotship of Theobaldus of Monte Cassino (1022-1035).<sup>158</sup>

38. *Gaeta, Cathedral Archives: Exultet Roll*: Miniatures: The square nimbus appears twice as the attribute of clerics, one of them the *bishop*, the other perhaps a *deacon*. Origin and date of the roll: *Gaeta*, first half of the 11th century.<sup>159</sup>

39. *Mirabella-Eclano, Collegiate Church, Archives: Exultet Roll*, fragment: Miniature: The *bishop* and the *deacon* have square nimbi of "triptych"-like shape (see Nos. 34 and 36). Date and origin of the roll: first half of the 11th century, perhaps from *Mirabella-Eclano*.<sup>160</sup>

40. *Monte Cassino, Cod. 99 H: Sermons and Homilies of Diverse Fathers*, p. 3: Miniature (drawing): The *Abbot Desiderius of Monte Cassino* (1057-1086) introduces the donor of the codex to St. Benedict who is adored by the writer Leo, (he probably is also the designer of the miniature and identical with the famous chronicler Leo of Ostia). *Desiderius* alone has the square nimbus, St. Benedict the round halo. The manuscript was written in 1072.<sup>161</sup>

41. *Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 1202: Lives of St. Benedict, St. Maur, St. Scholastica* etc.: Miniatures:

a) fol. 2r: The *Abbot Desiderius of Monte Cassino* offers the codex to St. Benedict.

b) fol. 17r: Among other scenes from the life of St. Benedict, there is a representation of the saint, who has the halo, before his *teacher*, who has the square nimbus.<sup>162</sup>

42. *S. Angelo in Formis*, apse of the church: Mural: *Abbot Desiderius of Monte*

<sup>155</sup> Avery op. cit. 31 ff., pl. 135-146.

<sup>156</sup> Cf. Avery op. cit. 33.

<sup>157</sup> The names of princes of Benevento on the back of the parchment would allow the dating of the roll either between 981 and 987 or between 1035 and 1038. Following Bertaux, *L'art dans l'Italie méridionale* (Paris 1904), I formerly assumed that the roll dates from the first half of the 11th century; but the connection with the artistic centre of S. Vincenzo al Volturno, established by Miss Avery, seems to favor the earlier date, chosen also by E. A. Lowe, *Scriptura Beneventana II* (Oxford 1929) pl. 54, for palaeographical reasons. Cf. also my article "The 'Portraits' of Emperors in Southern Italian *Exultet* Rolls and the Liturgical Commemorations of the Emperor", to be published in *Speculum*.

<sup>158</sup> Cf. *Cod. Casin. Manuscr. Catal.* 151.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. Avery op. cit. 17, pl. 30-33: *Exultet Roll Gaeta I*. According to Miss Avery the round nimbus of the emperor in the last picture is repainted, possibly over a square nimbus.

<sup>160</sup> Cf. Avery op. cit. 21, pl. 56-59.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. *Cod. Casin. Manuscr. Catal.* 102 f.—See also my study "Die italienische Malerei im 11. Jahrhundert", *Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien*, Neue Folge V (1931) 38 ff.

<sup>162</sup> Cf. Toesca, *Storia dell'Arte Italiana* 1049; E. A. Lowe, *Scriptura Beneventana II* pl. 48, 62, 70 f.; Don M. Inguañez and M. Avery, *Miniature Casinesi del secolo XI . . . dal Cod. Vat. lat. 1202*, Vol. I.

Cassino as donor carrying the model of the church, in the company of three arch-angels and St. Benedict; above a representation of Christ in Majesty.<sup>163</sup>

43. *Troia, Cathedral Archives: Exultet Roll*: Miniature: In the picture accompanying the commemoration of the clergy, the bishop has the square nimbus. Origin and date of the roll: *Troia*, second half of the 11th century.<sup>164</sup>

44. *Velletri, Museum: Exultet Roll*: Miniature: A square nimbus is given to the personification of the Church. Origin and date of the roll: *South Italy*, end of the 11th century.<sup>165</sup>

45. *Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Vaticana, Cod. Barb. lat. 2724: Chronicon Vulturense*: Miniatures, most of them showing the handing over of donation charters to St. Vincent, in the presence of the Abbot of *S. Vincenzo al Volturno*; there are also numerous half-length figures of abbots. While St. Vincent has always the circular halo, the abbots have sometimes square nimbi; see the miniatures on fol. 54v, 58v, 68r, 74v, 80v and 81v. The abbots in question reigned in the 8th and 9th centuries, while the codex and the *Chronicon Vulturense* itself date from the beginning of the 12th century.<sup>166</sup>

46. *Troia, Cathedral Archives: Exultet Roll*, fragment: Miniature: Like in the older roll of *Troia*, mentioned in No. 43, the picture accompanying the commemoration of the clergy shows the bishop with a square nimbus. Origin and date of the roll: perhaps *Troia*, beginning of the 12th century.<sup>167</sup>

47. *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Cod. Nouv. Acq. lat. 710: Exultet Roll*: Miniature: Only in one of the pictures representing the bishop he has the square nimbus. Origin and date of the roll: *Fondi*, early 12th century.<sup>168</sup>

48. *Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense, Cod. 724 B 13: Exultet Roll*: Miniatures: In some of the pictures the bishop and the deacon are given square nimbi, in others the bishop has the circular halo. Moses has the square nimbus in the picture illustrating the miracle of the Red Sea. Origin and date of the roll: *Benevento*, 12th century.<sup>169</sup> A connection between the square nimbi of Moses, here and in the *Dura* paintings (No. 30), is unlikely. The illustrator of the roll obviously had no clear concept how to use the square nimbus.

Square nimbi can also be found in a number of works of art which originated in *Northern Italy, Southern Tyrol, Germany and Flanders*, in the Carolingian, Ottonian and Romanesque periods.

49. *Milan, S. Ambrogio, High Altar, Antependium* of gold and gilded silver, rear of the altar: Relief: Archbishop Angilbertus II of *Milan* (824-859), being crowned by St. Ambrose.<sup>170</sup>

50. *Mals (Southern Tyrol), Church of St. Benedict*, east-wall between the three apsidal niches: Murals:

- a) On the south side the figure of a clerical donor, probably a Bishop of *Chur*, carrying the model of the church.
- b) On the north side a personage in secular dress, bare-headed, holding his sword with both hands.

In the niches there are representations of Christ, standing between two angels, (central niche), of St. Stephen (south niche) and of St. Gregory the Great (north

<sup>163</sup> Cf. Bertaux, *L'art dans l'Italie méridionale* 250 ff.: Toesca, *Storia dell'Arte Italiana* 936 ff., 1026 f.

<sup>164</sup> Avery op. cit. 37, pl. 166: *Exultet Roll Troia* 1; cf. also Avery "A Manuscript from *Troia*: Naples VI B 2". *Mediaeval Studies in Memory of A. Kingsley Porter* I (Cambridge, Mass. 1939) 153 ff.

<sup>165</sup> Avery, *Exultet Rolls* 40, pl. 189 f.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. *Chronicon Vulturense*, ed. V. Federici, I (*Fonti per la Storia d'Italia* LVIII,

Rome 1925). The miniature on fol. 37 r shows two of the three founders of the monastery, i.e. Paldo and Tato, resting their heads on stones, which might easily be mistaken for square nimbi.

<sup>167</sup> Avery op. cit., pl. 170: *Exultet Roll Troia* 2: cf. also the article mentioned in note 164.

<sup>168</sup> Avery, op. cit. 23, pl. 80.

<sup>169</sup> Avery op. cit. 29, pl. 118-129.

<sup>170</sup> Cf. Toesca op. cit. 425 ff., 438 f.

niche). According to their style the paintings of Mals belong to the Carolingian period. J. Garber, who published them,<sup>171</sup> assumed that they date from the period between 805—the first occurrence in the sources of the Monastery St. John of Münster (Switzerland), by which the church St. Benedict in Mals probably was founded—and 881, the year in which St. John of Münster, which had been a Carolingian royal monastery, became the property of the Bishops of Chur.<sup>172</sup> Garber<sup>173</sup> argues that the presence in the paintings of a secular personage with the square nimbus suggests that at that time St. Benedict of Mals, along with the Monastery of Münster, still were in lay ownership. But while it is true that the occurrence of square nimbi makes it almost certain that the paintings date from the lifetime of the two personages who boast that attribute, it seems that Garber overlooked the fact that the clerical donor wears the dalmatica under the chasuble and therefore is a bishop, probably the Bishop of Chur. This favours the origin of the murals after rather than before 881; and indeed the style seems to me to point towards the late rather than the early 9th century. The other person with the square nimbus is not characterized as a donor; he is certainly a secular prince, who was to be honoured by his representation in the murals (to the right of Christ!); but since he does not wear a crown it is not probable that he was a member of the Carolingian dynasty, as Garber believed.

51. *Cividale, Museo Civico, Codex Gertrudianus: Psalter of Archbishop Egbertus of Treves, etc.: Miniatures:*

a) fol. 17r: *Archbishop Egbertus of Treves* (977-993), enthroned, receiving the codex from Ruodpreht, who is represented on the adjoining fol. 16v.

b) fol. 18v: *Archbishop Egbertus of Treves* offering the codex to St. Peter, who is represented on the adjoining fol. 19r.<sup>174</sup>

52. *Treves, Stadtbibliothek, Codex Egberti: Evangelistary of Archbishop Egbertus of Treves*, fol. 2r: Miniature: *Archbishop Egbertus* is seen receiving codices from two monks, Keraldus and Heribertus of Reichenau; they probably wrote and illustrated the Codex Egberti.<sup>175</sup> The archbishop only has the square nimbus. Both the Codex Egberti and the Psalter of Egbertus are products of the school of the Monastery of Reichenau.

53. *Ivrea, Biblioteca Capitolare, Cod. 86: Sacramentary of Bishop Warmundus of Ivrea*, fol. 13r: Miniature: *Bishop Warmundus of Ivrea*, in prayer. The date of the manuscript should be re-examined. Possible dates 999-1002 or ca. 969-973.<sup>176</sup>

54. *Marburg an der Lahn, Preussisches Staatsarchiv, Codex Eberhardi: Chartulary of the Monastery of Fulda*: Miniatures, representing chiefly benefactors of Fulda; in most of the images of popes there are crude rectangular set-offs of the heads which are obviously derived from square nimbi; their meaning was no longer understood by the painter who may have found them in some earlier manuscript of the ancient scriptorium of Fulda. The codex is a work of the Monk Eberhardus of Fulda, written about 1150.<sup>177</sup>

55. *Valenciennes, Bibliothèque, Cod. 501*, formerly in the Monastery *Elnon-St. Amand: Life of St. Amandus*, 7th century apostle of the Belgians, written by the

<sup>171</sup> Cf. J. Garber, *Die karolingische St. Benediktikirche in Mals* (Innsbruck 1915); id., *Die romanischen Wandgemälde Tirols* (1928).

<sup>172</sup> See also *Germania Pontificia* . . . , ed. A. Brackmann, II 2 (Berlin 1927) 118 f.

<sup>173</sup> *Die karolingische St. Benediktikirche in Mals* 27; 60.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. H. V. Sauerland and A. Haseloff, *Der Psalter Erzbischof Egberts von Trier* . . . (Trier 1901).

<sup>175</sup> Cf. F.X. Kraus, *Die Miniaturen des*

*Codex Egberti* . . . (Freiburg im Breisgau 1884) n.l. 2.

<sup>176</sup> Cf. L. Magnani, *Le Miniature del Sacramentario d'Ivrea* . . . (*Codices ex Ecclesiasticis Italiae Bybliothecis* . . . VI, Città del Vaticano 1934); J. Shapley, in *The Art Bulletin* XVII (1935) 408 f. See also my book quoted in note 1, p. 184, note 2.

<sup>177</sup> Cf. Roller, "Eberhard von Fulda und seine Urkundenkopien", *Zeitschrift . . . für hessische Geschichte*, Neue Folge, XIII, Suppl. (1901).

contemporary Monk Baudemundus, later Abbot of Blandin, i.e. St. Peter of Ghent; the codex also contains other writings concerning St. Amandus: Miniatures:

- a) fol. 58v: *St. Amandus*, with square nimbus and Baudemundus with round nimbus, (both called *sanctus* in the inscriptions of the miniature). Both personages have pens in their hands and grasp a scroll of parchment on which their signatures have been written.
- b) fol. 60r: *John*, (later to become Abbot of Blandin, as immediate predecessor of Baudemundus) with square nimbus, which includes the outline of a circular halo, and St. Bertinus (died in 698), Abbot of Sithiu-St. Bertin, with round nimbus. Each holds a pen and a parchment with his signature.

The codex originated in *Elnon-St. Amand* in the 12th century. The above-mentioned subscriptions, reproduced in the two miniatures, occur in the so-called Testament of St. Amandus, which was written by Baudemundus and signed by Amandus, Baudemundus, John, Bertinus and others.<sup>178</sup> I have no definite suggestion from where the painter of the miniature drew his knowledge of the square nimbus, which obviously he considered as a sign of sanctity, as he attributed it to the principal saint of his monastery. He may have found it in an earlier manuscript of *Elnon-St. Amand*, which had a famous scriptorium from Carolingian times.

There are in *Cod. 501* several other miniatures, representing St. Amandus, Baudemundus, and other prelates who signed the testament; some of them may have square nimbi.<sup>179</sup>

A few remarks regarding some changes in the significance of the square nimbus, may supplement the survey given above. Having often been used in portraits of popes and other clerical donors from the 8th to the 12th century, the square nimbus could become a characteristic of clerics in certain liturgical rolls of South Italy. This led to its being misunderstood by some of the Southern Italian illustrators, for instance by those of the *Exultet Roll*, *Cod. Vat. lat. 9820*, (No. 36) and of the *Casanatense Pontifical* and *Benedictio Fontis* (Nos. 34 and 35): they seem to have interpreted it as a strange kind of clerical capuche.<sup>180</sup> But still it may be said that down to the 12th century the Roman use of the square nimbus as a distinctive of donors and of other eminent persons, who were thus distinguished from the saints as well as from ordinary people, survived. Thus it also becomes understandable that in *Cod. Vat. lat. 1202* (No. 41) the teacher of St. Benedict, in the *Casanatense Exultet Roll* (No. 48) Moses and in the *Exultet Roll Cod. Vat. lat. 9820* and in that of *Velletri* the personification of the Church were given the attribute. In the *Valenciennes* manuscript from *St. Amand* (No. 55) there is absolute confusion of haloes and square nimbi. The color of the square nimbi, which in the Roman monuments had usually been bluish, varies outside Rome, especially in the later period.

From the end of the 13th century, we observe something like a renaissance of the non-circular nimbus, but it then usually is no longer a square standing on one side, but either a square or rhombus standing on one corner (I call it lozenge-shaped, for brevity's sake) or a hexagon or even an octagon; this new type of nimbus is used for personifications of virtues and later for saints who lived

<sup>178</sup> See *Acta Sanctorum Februarii* I (Paris 1863) 882 A.

<sup>179</sup> I have not seen the manuscript. The two miniatures mentioned are illustrated and briefly discussed by W. de Grûneisen, *Mémoires présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres* XII 2, pl. 5 and

4. Grûneisen as well as the author of the catalogue of the Library of Valenciennes, (*Catalogue général des manuscrits des Bibliothèques Publiques de France. Départements*. XXV [Paris 1894] 402 f.), do not give an adequate interpretation of the miniatures.

<sup>180</sup> See p. 38 f. and note 153.

immediately before Christ. It is not improbable that its inventor knew the old square nimbus, but nevertheless the two kinds of attributes differ fundamentally. While the so-called square nimbus had no connection with the symbolism of light (see p. 36), the lozenge-shaped or polygonal one, if painted, was golden and therefore obviously was meant to be a special and somewhat inferior halo of light and sanctity; (the persons and personifications thus adorned are usually inscribed with the epithet *sanctus*). Contrary to the assertions of Didron<sup>181</sup> and of other authors, there is no indication that the square itself was generally believed to be inferior to the circle. The comparatively lower rank of the ancient and early mediaeval square nimbi as compared with the round haloes was expressed by the fact that they were not nimbi of light. This holds good also for the 13th century nimbus of Pope Liberius, discussed above (No. 25), which, we may assume, was still square or rectangular, and not lozenge-shaped; for it was, no doubt, copied from the earlier Roman examples.

Durandus of Mende, the elder, the famous liturgical writer of the late 13th century, discussing the square nimbus in his *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum*, follows John the Deacon's explanations of it as an *insigne viventis*, but adds an interpretation of his own, according to which the four angles of the square nimbus signify the four cardinal virtues belonging to the persons distinguished by the attribute.<sup>182</sup> Perhaps we may connect Durandus' interpretation with the fact that in one of the allegorical frescoes of the Franciscan virtues in the Lower Church of S. Francesco of Assisi, which were painted by a pupil of Giotto in the early 14th century,<sup>183</sup> the personification of the Virtue of Obedience has a quadrilateral nimbus, which however is no longer square, but lozenge-shaped. Prudence and Humility, in the same fresco, have hexagonal nimbi, as also Chastity, Purity and Fortitude in the allegory of Chastity, and as the figure of Poverty in the Marriage of St. Francis with Poverty. From that time onward we not unfrequently find representations of virtues with lozenge-shaped or hexagonal nimbi in Tuscan art of the *trecento*; see for instance the frescoes of Taddeo Gaddi in the Baroncelli Chapel of S. Croce in Florence<sup>184</sup> and in the choir of S. Francesco in Pisa,<sup>185</sup> also the reliefs on the bronze doors which Andrea Pisano made for the Baptistery of Florence.<sup>186</sup> The latest occurrence of the nimbus with four angles known to me are the lozenge-shaped nimbi in the frescoes of Lorenzo and Jacopo Salimbeni da Sanseverino in S. Giovanni at Urbino.<sup>187</sup> There they are given to the parents of St. John the Baptist, St. Zacharias and St. Elizabeth, obviously to distinguish them from the saints of the Christian era.

Apart from the general intention of distinction, the reason for the use of hexagonal nimbi should perhaps be sought chiefly in the symbolism of the perfect

<sup>181</sup> *Iconographie Chrétienne* 79 f.

<sup>182</sup> Cf. Durandus of Mende, *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum* (Venice 1599) I 3, 20, fol. 10v: *Cum vero aliquis praelatus aut sanctus vivens pingitur, non in formam scuti rotundi sed quadrati corona ipsa depingitur, ut quatuor cardinalibus virtutibus vigere monstretur, prout in legenda beati Gregorii habetur. The legenda beati Gregorii is, no doubt, the Vita of John the Deacon, which, however, does not connect the square nimbus with the cardinal virtues (see note 40).*

<sup>183</sup> Concerning these frescoes of the so-called Maestro delle Vele (i.e. of the Vaults of the Lower Church of S. Francesco) see H. Thode, *Franz von Assisi und die Anfänge der Kunst der Renaissance in Italien* (Wien 1934; first published 1885) 504 ff., illustrations on p. 326,

344, 443; B. Kleinschmidt O.F.M., *Die Basilika San Francesco in Assisi II* (Berlin 1926) 178 ff.

<sup>184</sup> Cf. R. Van Marle, *The Development of the Italian Schools of Painting III* (The Hague 1924) fig. 193 f.; P. Toesca, *Florentine Painting of the Trecento* (Florence and New York, without year) pl. 83.

<sup>185</sup> Cf. Didron op. cit. 84; Van Marle op. cit. III 334.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. Didron loc. cit.; illustrations for instance in A. Venturi, *Storia dell'Arte Italiana IV* (Milan 1906).

<sup>187</sup> Cf. A. Colasanti, in *Bollettino d'Arte IV* (1910) 409 ff.; Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes* 414; Van Marle op. cit. VIII (1927) 212 ff.

number six. As regards this point, I can advance only rather indefinite suggestions. It seems that in the symbolism of the number six and the hexagon mathematical principles play an even greater role than in that of the square and the number four. The tradition of the six being a *numerus perfectus*, the sum as well as the product of the numbers 1, 2 and 3, can be traced back to antiquity and persisted throughout the middle ages.<sup>198</sup> Since the hexagonal nimbus first occurs in Franciscan allegories, it should be noted that the mathematical perfection of the six is discussed in the works of the great 13th century theologian of the Franciscan order, St. Bonaventure, especially in his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard<sup>199</sup> and in the Hexaëmeron.<sup>200</sup> The title of the latter work, which is permeated by a variegated and original symbolism of numbers, suggests another widespread symbolical significance of the number six, that of the six days of creation.<sup>201</sup>

The (mutilated) verse inscription under the Assisi fresco showing the allegory of Obedience<sup>202</sup> seems however to indicate that the inventor of these allegories—Giotto himself? —<sup>203</sup> intended to connect the hexagonal nimbi with mathematical symbolism in a very special way. It has been mentioned that in this fresco the hexagonal nimbi were given to Prudence and Humility (while that of Obedience is lozenge-shaped). Prudence, a woman with a double face, old and young, looking to the past as well as to the future, has an astrolabe standing before her and holds a mirror in her left and a pair of compasses in her right. The part of the inscription which obviously interprets the compasses of Prudence, runs as follows (according to the transcriptions of Thode<sup>204</sup> and Kleinschmidt<sup>204a</sup>):

quasi per sexti circulum  
agenda cuncta regulat.

Now it should be remembered that the Italian word for compasses is *seste* (plural of *sesta*) which is probably derived from the Latin *sexta* (*pars circuli*). This etymology<sup>205</sup> is based on the observation that the sides of an equilateral hexagon have the same length as the radius of its circumscribed circle. It is not impossible that the inscription<sup>206</sup> originally read *per sexti circinum*, *circinus* being the Latin word for compasses. However this be the relation between the circle and the equilateral hexagon might have something to do with the origin of the hexagonal nimbi.

The octagonal nimbus is found in some Catalonian panels such as the Retable of St. Elizabeth and St. Bartholomew, painted by Grau Gener in 1401, now in the Museu d'Art de Catalunya in Barcelona.<sup>207</sup> In this picture St. Joseph has the octagonal nimbus. Later examples, in which the octagonal nimbus appears as an attribute of Adam, Abraham and Moses respectively, are the Retable of the Transfiguration of Jaume Huguet in the Cathedral of Tortosa and the Retable of the Holy

<sup>198</sup> See the Scholion in St. Bonaventure, *Opera Omnia* I (Quaracchi 1882) 58: references to Euclid (*Element.* IX 36), St. Augustine (*Genes.* ad lit. IV 2), St. Isidore of Sevilla (*Etymol.* III 4, 2). Cf. also St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI 30, Boethius, *De Arithmetica* I 20, St. Isidore of Sevilla, *Liber Numerorum qui in Sanctis Scripturis Occurrunt* 7.

<sup>199</sup> Lib. I, dist. II, art. unicus, quaest. 4, op. cit. I 57: *Senarius autem dicitur primus perfectorum quia constat ex omnibus partibus suis aliquoties, scilicet tribus, duobus et uno.*

<sup>200</sup> Collatio IV 16, op. cit. V (1891) 351, after St. Augustine.

<sup>201</sup> For the symbolism of the six in general, cf. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes* 73 ff.

<sup>202</sup> For the inscriptions of the Assisi frescoes cf. Thode op. cit., Kleinschmidt op. cit.

<sup>203</sup> In the Arena Chapel at Padua Prudence has likewise mirror and compasses, but none of the virtues has a nimbus.

<sup>204</sup> Op. cit. 520.

<sup>204a</sup> Op. cit. II 182a.

<sup>205</sup> Cf. Italian dictionaries.

<sup>206</sup> Thode admits that he had difficulties in reading those inscriptions, and that an ancient manuscript copy in the archives of S. Francesco of Assisi, used by him, is in part erroneous.

<sup>207</sup> Cf. *Catalan Art, from the 9th to the 15th Centuries* (London and Toronto, 1937).



Trinity in the Colegiata of Manresa, painted about 1501 by Huguet's pupil Gabriel Guardia.<sup>199</sup> There existed in the middle ages an elaborate symbolism of the number eight, especially with reference to the resurrection of Our Lord on the eighth week day, a symbolism which may have influenced the octagonal form of many baptisteries;<sup>200</sup> but it is doubtful what the intention of the Catalanian painters was in choosing the octagonal form for the nimbi of Adam, Abraham, Moses and Joseph, except that they wanted to distinguish them from the saints of the new era which began with Christ.

It is very likely that lozenge-shaped and polygonal nimbi were considered to frame a head in a more pleasant way than a square or rectangle. Furthermore we have seen that from the early 14th century the non-circular nimbus was meant to be a halo of light of a minor rank. Now, it is essential to a halo that light shines forth from a centre to a periphery. It can be readily understood that this feature seemed to be fulfilled by a polygon better than by a square; even the lozenge is superior to the square in this respect, for it is a more centralized figure, because its corners form the ends of a cross. Perhaps the development of the lozenge-shaped nimbus was influenced by those circular cross-nimbi of Christ from the earlier part of the middle ages, in which the cross consists of rays, that sometimes transcend the periphery of the circle and thus indicate the corners of a lozenge.<sup>201</sup> It is at any rate a fact that from the 14th century onward lozenge-shaped nimbi as well as lozenge-shaped aureoles<sup>202</sup> were sometimes used also for Christ and God the Father. These nimbi consist either of a full surface<sup>203</sup> or of rays only<sup>204</sup> or of a combination of both.<sup>204</sup>

By way of conclusion I should like to emphasize that in our investigation of the origin and history of the square nimbus we several times had the opportunity of observing a symbolical interpretation of artistic forms. We have seen how the ancient Greek square-shaped hermae were connected with the Hermes-Logos-Tetragonos; how the decorative rectangular or square set-offs of Roman-Egyptian mummy shrouds became signs of perfection and distinction, "square nimbi"; and finally how, in the later part of the middle ages, a new symbolism of the non-circular nimbus was developed, probably through a new connection with the symbolism of numbers, which was at least partly responsible for the use of lozenge-shaped, hexagonal and octagonal nimbi.

<sup>199</sup> Cf. B. Rowland, Jr., "Gabriel Guardia . . .", *The Art Bulletin* XIV (1932) figs. 3, 15, 8 and 2. The representations of Moses by Huguet (loc. cit. fig. 8) and Guardia (fig. 2) are almost identical.

<sup>200</sup> Cf. Sauer op. cit. 78 f.

<sup>201</sup> Cf. for instance Didron op. cit. 78 f.

<sup>202</sup> For lozenge-shaped aureoles or mandorlae see late-Byzantine wall-paintings (cf. G. Millet, *Recherches sur l'iconographie de l'évangile aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles* . . . [Bibliothèque des Ecoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome CIX, Paris 1916] fig. 187, 192).

<sup>203</sup> Cf. Didron op. cit. 66, fig. 22 after an Italian 14th century miniature, representing God the Father; see also the Serbian psalter, written about 1400, *Cod. slav. 4*, of the *Bayrische Staatsbibliothek* in Munich, fol. 192 r, a miniature of Christ where the lozenge-shaped nimbus includes the circular cross-nimbus, published by J. Strzygowski, in *Denkschriften der K. Akad. d. Wissenschaft-*

*ten*, Philos.-Hist. Kl., LII (Wien 1906) pl. 48, No. 111 (I am indebted for this example to the Princeton Index of Christian Art); see finally God the Father in Raphael's *Disputa* and Christ by El Greco in the Cathedral of Toledo.

<sup>204</sup> Cf. for instance Didron op. cit. 36, fig. 7: 16th century miniature.

<sup>205</sup> Cf. for instance some of the miniatures of certain English early 15th century illuminated manuscripts, painted by the Flemish painter Herman Scheerre; they are discussed by Ch. L. Kuhn, in *The Art Bulletin* XXII (1940) 138 ff., see his illustrations figs. 10 and 14. As regards the use in late mediaeval symbolical representations of the lozenge instead of the square or rectangle, see also the drawing of the *lapis in caput anguli*, i.e., the corner-stone that is Christ, in the 14th century Munich manuscript of the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis*, (reproduced after the edition of Lutz and Perdrizet by E. Panofsky, in *The Art Bulletin* XVII [1935] 451, fig. 20).

# The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood

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## Manuscript

*Ms. Paris, B.N. Latin, 16,617, formerly of Sorbonne, No. 1797.* The manuscript measures 265 mm. x 165 mm. It is written on parchment, grouped into sexternios, with a binding of pressed parchment of the 14th or 15th Century. Up to folio 171<sup>r</sup> there is but one column of 35 lines; the subsequent part is written in two columns. The script is a good clear Gothic uninfluenced by cursive.

The manuscript has been dated as belonging to the end of the 13th Century or the beginning of the 14th. L. DeLisle places it at the beginning of the 14th Century. Mgr. Grabmann dates it as from the end of the 13th Century. To establish whether a bookhand belongs to the end of the 13th Century or the beginning of the 14th seems rather difficult. That it could have been written at the end of the 13th Century is quite possible. There are no traits in the script which would lead one to place it indubitably in the 14th Century. However, there are many dated manuscripts of the 14th Century which from paleographical evidence could be attributed to the 13th.

The manuscript contains *Introductiones in Logicam*, ff. 1-23<sup>r</sup>; *Syncategoremata*, 23<sup>r</sup>-46<sup>r</sup>; *De Insolubilibus*, 46<sup>v</sup>-54<sup>v</sup>; *Obligationes*, 54<sup>v</sup>-62<sup>v</sup>; *Petitiones Contrariorum*, 62<sup>v</sup>-64<sup>v</sup>. The three latter are considered by Grabmann as probably also the work of William of Sherwood. There follows the *Summulae* of Lambert of Auxerre, 64<sup>v</sup>-131<sup>r</sup>; an *Ars Opponendi et Respondendi*, 131<sup>r</sup>-161<sup>v</sup>; *De Communibus Artium Liberalium*, 161<sup>v</sup>-171<sup>r</sup>; *De Logica*, 171<sup>r</sup>-183<sup>r</sup>; *Grammatica*, 183<sup>v</sup>-206<sup>r</sup>; *Ars Dictaminis*, 206<sup>r</sup>-224.

This manuscript is designated by the letter P.

*Ms. Digby 55.* Cf. *Catalogi Codici Mss. Bibliothecae Bodleianae, Pars 9<sup>a</sup>, Codices a viro clarissimo Kenelm Digby, Oxford, (1883), col. 57, No. 34.*

The manuscript is on parchment and measures 200 mm. x 140 mm. The writing is in two columns of 40 to 42 lines each. Mgr. Grabmann dates it as belonging to the end of the 13th Century. I would certainly consider it as a good example of 14th Century cursively influenced Gothic, even placing it up to half a century later than Grabmann has done. The form of *d*, of figure 6 *s*, of *a*, all seem characteristic of a well-established 14th Century script.

This manuscript is referred to as O.

The two manuscripts are evidently in close relationship. The Paris manuscript has been carefully corrected; the Oxford manuscript has not been touched. Time and time again the Paris manuscript has deletions with marginal or superscript corrections, where Oxford has the reading which was deleted in the Paris manuscript.

## Edition

I have followed the manuscript of Paris as being the better, especially since it has been so carefully corrected. In a few cases I have chosen the reading of Oxford as the more suitable and have noted it in the footnotes.

I have not noted unimportant variants, such as change of word order, for that is understandable if we take into consideration that an intelligent scribe likely transcribed phrases rather than words.

## References

The references to Aristotle are given to *Aristoteles, Graece, ex recensione I*

Bekker, Berlin 1831 and to *Aristotelis Opera Omnia* ed. A. F. Didot, Paris 1854. The references to Priscian are given to *Prisciani Grammatici Caesariensis Institutionum Grammaticarum Libri XVIII, ex recensione M. Hertzii*, Leipzig 1855, in the *Grammatici Latini, ex rec. H. Keil* vols. II & III. All other references are given in full in the notes.

### Bibliography

J. C. Russell, *Dictionary of Writers of Thirteenth Century England*, London 1936, p. 200. The sources for the limited details which are known to us of the life of William of Sherwood are here listed, I have adopted the spelling of the name from this work. M. Grabmann, *Die Introductiones in Logicae des Wilhelm von Shyreswood*, (Sitzungsberichte d. Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung) Munich 1937 Heft 10. M. Grabmann has, in his introduction to the above edition, given new details and suggestions regarding the authenticity of the various works ascribed to Wm. of Sh. C. Prantl, *Geschichte d. Logik im Abendlande*, Leipzig 1927, Vol. III, pps. 19-24; here is given a very brief analysis of the Syncategoremata of Wm. of Sh. There are a few misreadings in the texts quoted by Prantl, notably *tamen* for *tantum*. Also his theory that 13th and 14th century logic was inspired by Michael Psellus has been discarded; cf. Grabmann *op. cit.* p. 7. The list of treatises on Syncategoremata given by Prantl has been supplemented by Grabmann in *Bearbeitungen und Auslegungen d. Aristotelischen Logik aus der Zeit von Peter Abaelard bis Petrus Hispanus* (Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse nr. 5) Berlin 1937 p. 7.

For the problem of Speculative Grammar and the use of Sophismata cf. G. Wallerand, *Les Oeuvres de Siger de Courtrai* (Les Philosophes Belges t. VIII) Louvain 1913. Mgr. M. Grabmann, *La Somme Theologique de St. Thos. d'Aquin*, transl. by E. Vansteenbergh, (Paris 1930) pps. 86 ff. Here the history of the method followed by 13th c. writers is briefly discussed.

### Syncategoremata

As far as Western Logic is concerned the term syncategoremata seems to have originated with Priscian. cf. G.L. II, 54, 5. *Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos duae, nomen et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se conjunctae plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes syncategoremata, hoc est consignificantia, appellabant.* The reference given by the editor of Priscian is of little help since no indication is given as to the origin of the term; also it presumes that the *dialecticos* refers to a definite school and cites Diogenes Laertius I, 19. There seems no reason to believe that it does not mean a dialectician as opposed to a grammarian even though Priscian goes on to speak of the *stoicos*. Certainly Aristotle treats only the noun and the verb in the *Perihermeneias*. I have been unable to trace the origin of the word in Greek sources. In the recently revised edition of Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexikon* only the verbal form is found with the meaning of co-predicate with a reference to the *De Syntaxi* of Apollonius Dyscolus, in the ed. of I. Bekker p. 201, 5. In older editions of this lexikon, the word syncategorema was found without any reference as is also the case with the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*.

SYNCATEGOREMATA MAGISTRI GUILLELMI DE SHIRESWODE

Quia ad cognitionem alicujus oportet cognoscere suas partes; ideo ut plene cognoscatur enuntiatio oportet ejus partes cognoscere. Partes autem ejus sunt duplices: principales et secundariae. Partes principales sunt nomen substantivum et verbum; haec enim necessaria sunt ad hoc ut cognoscatur enuntiatio. Partes secundariae sunt nomen adjectivum et adverbium et conjunctiones et praepositiones; haec enim non sunt necessaria ad esse enuntiationis. Partium autem secundariorum quaedam sunt determinationes partium principalium ratione suarum rerum; et haec non sunt syncategoremata, ut cum dico 'homo albus', ly albus enim significat quod aliqua res ejus, quod est homo, sit alba.

Quaedam sunt determinationes partium principalium in quantum sunt subjecta vel praedicata, ut cum dico 'omnis homo currit', ly omnis enim, quod est signum universale, non significat quod aliqua res ejus, quod est homo, sit universalis, sed quod 'homo' sit quoddam universale subjectum. Hujusmodi dicuntur syncategoremata, de quibus tractandum est, quia faciunt plurimam difficultatem in sermone.

Dicitur ergo<sup>1</sup> hoc nomen 'syncategorema' a 'sin' quod est 'con' et 'categoreuma' quod est 'significativum' vel 'praedicativum' quasi conpraedicativum; semper enim cum alio jungitur in sermone. Sed quaeritur, cum quaedam sint determinationes subjecti, quare omnia denominantur a praedicato. Dicendum quod praedicatum est pars completiva enuntiationis; omne autem syncategorema attingit aliquo modo subjectum et praedicatum, et propterea a praedicato tanquam a complemento et digniori denominantur syncategoremata. Primo autem tractandum de his quae sunt ex parte subjecti ut de signis et de quibusdam aliis.

OMNIS

Et primo de hac dictione 'omnis' et ad hoc primo de ejus significatione, consequenter de ejus officio. Sciendum quod 'omnis' significat universalitatem, sed quandoque significat eam ut ipsa est rei dispositio et non est syncategorema, et sic aequipollet ei, quod est totum vel perfectum, ut cum dicitur: mundus est omne. Quandoque significat eam ut est dispositio subjecti in quantum subjectum est, et est syncategorema, ut cum dico 'omnis homo currit', ly omnis enim significat quod haec dictio 'homo' universum sit in ratione subiciendi, id est, universaliter subicitur sub praedicato. Substantia igitur infinita, quae finite dicitur per suum [23v] subjectum, est substantia hujus nominis 'omnis'; universalitas autem sua qualitas.

Officium hujus dictionis 'omnis' est dividere subjectum respectu praedicati. Et dicunt quidam quod differenter dividit haec dictio 'omnis' et haec dictio 'unusquisque' vel 'quilibet', quia haec dictio 'omnis' proprie dividit pro partibus secundum speciem et haec dictio 'unusquisque' pro partibus secundum numerum sicut dicit Aristoteles:<sup>2</sup> qui novit omnem triangulum novit secundum speciem; qui novit unumquemque novit secundum numerum. Et dicunt quod partes secundum speciem sunt species, partes secundum numerum sunt individua. Sed contra hoc est quod Aristoteles notat ibidem isoscelem partem secundum numerum quae est species trianguli.

Item si esset ita, non posset apponi haec dictio 'omnis' termino speciali, qualis est haec dictio 'homo', cum non habeat sub se species. Alii<sup>3</sup> dicunt quod pars secundum speciem est aliquod inferius sumptum cum reduplicatione superioris,

<sup>1</sup> om. O.

<sup>2</sup> cf. *Anal. Post.*, I, 5; Didot, Vol. I, p. 126, line 33 ff. (74 a 25).

<sup>3</sup> cf. *Anal. Prior*, I, 36, Didot I, 82, 23 (49 a 26).

ut iste homo, in quantum homo, sit pars secundum speciem ejus quod est homo. et pars secundum numerum sit hoc solum 'iste homo', et dicunt quod pro tali parte secundum speciem dividit hoc signum 'omnis'. Sed contra: si ita esset, tunc non differret dicere 'omnis homo' et 'omnis homo in quantum homo'. Propterea dicendum quod pars secundum speciem est pars quae debetur universali in quantum est universale, et haec est pars secundum quod est habitualiter ens; pars autem secundum numerum est pars actualiter ens et non debetur universali per se. Primo modo pars hominis est homo habitualiter in Sorte sive Sortes et similiter homo habitualiter in Platone, et hae partes sunt nullo homine actualiter existente. Secundo modo est pars hominis homo actualiter in Sorte sive Sortes, et similiter homo actualiter in Platone, et hae partes non sunt nisi homine actualiter existente.

Sciendum ergo quod haec dictio 'omnis' quandoque tenetur proprie et dividit pro partibus secundum speciem, quandoque communiter et dividit pro partibus secundum numerum. Et per hoc solvitur hoc sophisma: sit ita quod tantum asini sint; inde omne animal est asinus; sed omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo est asinus. Prima vera est per positum; secunda necessaria est cum praedicatur ibi genus de specie. Solutio: si haec dictio 'omnis' tenetur proprie in prima propositione, falsa est ipsa; vult enim quod animal habitualiter in Sorte et in Platone et in omnibus aliis habitualiter sit asinus, et hoc est falsum. Si autem communiter tenetur, vera est prima, secunda falsa cum fiat distributio pro partibus hominis actualiter entibus, et non sunt tales per positum. Si autem minor accipiat secundum quod vera est, erit in argumento figura dictionis,<sup>6</sup> eo quod ly animal sumitur pro partibus secundum numerum in prima, et in minori accipitur<sup>7</sup> pro partibus secundum speciem. Vel alio modo paralogismus accidentis,<sup>8</sup> quia secundum quod animal praedicatur de homine non sic de eo praedicatur asinus.

Item regula quod haec dictio 'omnis' quandoque distribuit pro singulis generum, quandoque pro generibus singulorum, vel quandoque pro partibus remotis, quandoque pro partibus propinquis. Et per hoc solvitur hoc sophisma: sit quod de qualibet specie animalis currit unicum individuum; inde omne animal currit.<sup>9</sup> Probatio: homo currit, leo, capra et sic de singulis; ergo omne animal currit; sed omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo currit. Prima multiplex est eo quod potest distribuere ly animal pro partibus remotis sive singulis generum; et sic est falsa, quia tunc distribuitur pro omnibus suis individuis vel pro generibus singulorum sive pro partibus propinquis, et sic non assumitur minor ut patet. Si ergo propositiones sumuntur ut verae sunt, erit in argumento figura dictionis, quod ly animal in prima propositione stetit pro [24r] partibus propinquis et in secunda pro partibus remotis. Vel aliter paralogismus accidentis eo quod ly animal, secundum quod praedicatur de minori extremitate, non sic praedicatur de eo major.

Item regula: hoc signum 'omnis' vult habere tria appellata ad minus. Quod sic probatur: hoc signum 'omne' distribuit pro tota et completa multitudine termini cui adjungitur; quaelibet autem totalitas et completio ad minus consistit in ternario; ergo vult habere ternarium appellatorum, sicut dicit Aristoteles:<sup>10</sup> de duobus hominibus dicimus<sup>11</sup> quod sunt duo vel uterque et non quod sunt omnes. Sed intellige quod, cum distribuit pro partibus secundum numerum, requirit tria appellata actualiter entia, et cum pro partibus secundum speciem requirit tria habitualiter entia vel plura. Super hoc dubitatur: sint tantum duo homines;

<sup>4</sup> om. P.

<sup>5</sup> cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Introductiones in Logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood*, (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Abteilung, Jahrgang 1937, Heft 10), Munich 1937, p. 93; henceforth this work will be referred to as Grabmann.

<sup>6</sup> om. O.

<sup>7</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 94.

<sup>8</sup> currat O.

<sup>9</sup> cf. *De Coelo* I, 1, Didot II, 367, 19 (268 a 16).

<sup>10</sup> dicitur O.

<sup>11</sup> Grabmann p. 82.

propter dictam regulam haec est falsa: omnis homo est coloratus; ergo sua contradictoria est vera: aliquis homo non est coloratus; ergo aliquod animal non est coloratum. Sequitur enim ab inferiori ad superius cum negatione postposita illi inferiori et superiori. Sed contra: haec dictio 'animal' habet sufficientiam appellatorum;<sup>11</sup> ergo solum stat pro existentibus; sed pro existentibus est haec falsa: aliquod animal non est coloratum; ergo simpliciter falsa. Dicendum quod ly homo, secundum quod hic stat, non est inferius ad ly animal; stat enim pro non existentibus, animal pro existentibus. Unde non valet hoc argumentum: aliquis homo non currit; ergo aliquod animal non currit etc.

Item dubitatur an haec dictio 'omnis' possit apponi termino discreto. Et videtur quod sic quia, si Sortes currat, et dicatur 'omnis Sortes currit', sic arguo: nihil est sumere sub subjecto de quo non dicatur praedicatum;<sup>12</sup> ergo hic est dici de omni; ergo bene apponitur haec dictio 'omnis'.

Item dicit Aristoteles:<sup>13</sup> omnis Aristomenes semper intelligibilis est, et sic apponitur termino discreto. Ad primum dicendum quod sub hac negatione 'nihil est sumere' etc., ad hoc ut possimus inferre 'dici de omni', subintelligendum est quod possit ibi sumi multitudo debita ei quod est 'omnis' et haec non est hic.<sup>14</sup> Ad aliud dicendum quod improprie aliquo modo potest hoc signum 'omnis'<sup>15</sup> addi termino singulari; singulare enim, licet sit unum secundum rem, est tamen multa secundum rationem ut albus Aristomenes et grammaticus et musicus est<sup>16</sup> multa secundum rationem, et gratia hujus multitudinis apponitur hoc signum.<sup>17</sup> Et est sensus: omnis Aristomenes semper intelligibilis est pro<sup>18</sup> Aristomenes secundum omne esse suum.

Adhuc quaeritur utrum haec dictio 'omnis' possit addi vere termino habenti unicum<sup>19</sup> solum appellatum ut ei quod est sol. Et videtur quod sic; fit enim demonstratio de sole in primo modo primae figurae; ergo additur ei hoc signum 'omne'. Oppositum videtur, cum exigit tria appellata. Dicendum quod, si ly omnis tenetur proprie et dividat pro partibus habitualiter existentibus, potest addi ei quod est sol, et sic procedit prima objectio. Si autem<sup>20</sup> communiter tenetur, non, et sic procedit secunda. Quaeritur an possit addi praedicato. Quod sic videtur, quia haec est vera: nullus homo est omnis homo. Oppositum videtur quia dicit Aristoteles<sup>21</sup> quod universale praedicari universaliter non est verum.

Item praedicatum stat pro forma; dicit enim Aristoteles<sup>22</sup> quod compositio est eorum quae insunt. Cum igitur praedicatum componitur, praedicatum inest; sed quod inest subjecto non est suppositum praedicati, sed forma praedicati; ergo quod praedicatur est forma vel in ratione formae; sed hoc signum additur alicui pro suis<sup>23</sup> suppositis; ergo non additur praedicato. Et<sup>24</sup> dicendum quod alicui termino, postquam fuerit praedicatum, non potest addi hoc signum, ut volunt hae rationes; potest tamen addi alicui termino per se ut ei quod est 'homo', et hoc totum potest praedicari, ut vult prima oppositio.

Item regula: cum additur 'omne' termino habenti [24v] implicationem, multiplex est locutio eo quod potest distributio uniri totali termino cum implicatione vel sine. Et sic solvitur hoc sophisma; sit quod omnes homines albi currant, et nigri non; inde omnis homo qui est albus currit. Probatur inductive. Inde infertur: ergo omnis homo currit et ille est albus. Contra: prima pars hujus copulativae est

<sup>11</sup> cf. *Anal. Prior* I, 1, Didot I, 40, 5 (24 b 23-30).

<sup>12</sup> cf. *Anal. Prior* I, 33, Didot I, 79, 43 (47 b 24).

<sup>14</sup> ibi O.

<sup>15</sup> om. O.

<sup>16</sup> et O.

<sup>17</sup> cf. *Meta.* V, 2, Didot II, 535, 44 ff. (1026 b 15 ff.).

<sup>18</sup> quia O.

<sup>19</sup> unum O.

<sup>20</sup> om. O.

<sup>21</sup> cf. *Perihermeneias* c. 7, Didot I, 27, 23 (17 b 12).

<sup>22</sup> cf. *ibid.*, Didot I, 27, 10 (17 b 1-2) compositio is equivalent to affirmatio. cf. *infra* p. 72.

<sup>23</sup> om. O.

<sup>24</sup> om. P.

falsa; ergo et ista. Dicendum quod si haec duo 'homo', 'qui est albus' componuntur, sic est oratio composita et vera; si dividantur, tunc est divisa et falsa; distribuitur enim solum li homo, et primo modo distribuitur terminus cum implicatione; secundo modo sine. Primo modo probatur; secundo modo improbat.

Item omnis homo et alius homo sunt. Probatio: Sortes et alius homo sunt, Plato, et sic de singulis; ergo omnis homo etc. Contra: haec locutio significat quod aliquis homo sit alius ab omni homine; ergo ipsa est falsa. Dicendum quod distributio potest includere copulationem et relationem hujus dictionis 'alius', et sic probatur et sic est vera; vel e converso et sic improbat. Et sic falsa<sup>25</sup> Et primo modo debet hoc quod dico 'alius homo' continue proferri cum praedicato et dividi a subjecto ut significetur quod cum praedicato cadit sub respectu distributionis; significatur enim quod li homo stat pro quolibet suorum suppositorum respectu totius quod sequitur. Secundo modo debet dividi a praedicato ut significetur<sup>26</sup> quod non recipit respectum distributionis cum ipso et sic, cum non distribuitur,<sup>27</sup> nullo modo cadit sub distributione, sed distributio sub copulatione et relatione hujus dictionis 'alius'. Dicunt tamen quidam quod prima est falsa et in probatione cadit fallacia figurae dictionis eo quod in singularibus ly alius supponit pro diversis. Sed male dicunt, si sumatur primo modo, quia sic cadit haec dictio 'alius' sub distributione in universali propositione et confunditur; nec est inconveniens, si<sup>28</sup> in singularibus stat pro diversis, dummodo confundatur in universali.

Item sit quod successive moriantur homines. Inde sic: omnis homo moritur quando unus solus homo moritur. Probetur inductive. Deinde sic: ergo omnis homo moritur aliquando, et tunc moritur unus solus homo; sed ista duo sunt opposita; ergo non sunt simul vera. Ad hoc dicendum quod hoc quod dico 'quando' potest teneri infinite, ut sit idem quod 'quandocumque', et semper tunc oratio falsa. Vel potest teneri relative ut referatur ad tempus consignificatum in hoc verbo 'moritur', et adhuc tunc poterit componi cum praedicato ut totum sit unum praedicatum recipiens respectum distributionis, et sic probatur et est vera. Vel potest dividi a praedicato et sic est divisa et falsa et improbat. Primo modo confunditur ly quando ut copulet pro multis temporibus eo quod cadit sub distributione. Secundo modo copulat determinate pro aliquo tempore et significatur quod in illo moritur omnis homo et unus solus homo.

Item hac probata 'omnis homo' etc. inferatur: ergo quando unus solus homo moritur, omnis homo moritur; sed haec est falsa. Dicendum ad hoc: si 'quando' teneretur infinite, tenet processus; sed falsa est praemissa; si autem relative teneretur et esset divisa, adhuc esset falsa, sed<sup>29</sup> teneret processus; si autem composita esset, praemissa vera esset, sed erit in processu paralogismus figurae dictionis a confusa copulatione hujus dictionis 'quando' ad determinatam.

Item regula: non tenet processus a termino postposito distributioni affirmativae ad eundem praepositum. Et sic solvitur hoc sophisma: omnis homo est unus solus homo. Probetur inductive. Deinde: ergo unus solus homo est omnis homo; ergo Sortes vel Plato est omnis homo. Et dicendum quod hic est fallacia figurae [25r] dictionis quia ly unus solus in prima stat confuse; in secunda determinate respectu ejusdem distributionis. Sed videtur adhuc quod prima sit falsa, quia praedicatur oppositum de opposito, quia 'omnis' et 'unus solus' opponuntur. Et<sup>30</sup> dicendum quod si ly unus solus staret determinate, tunc opponeretur ei quod est 'omnis'; sed cum stat confuse, ut scilicet stet pro multis, quorum quilibet est unus solus, non opponitur ei.

<sup>25</sup> add. est O.  
<sup>26</sup> significatur P.  
<sup>27</sup> distribuatur O.

<sup>28</sup> sed O.  
<sup>29</sup> si O.  
<sup>30</sup> om. O.

Item diceret aliquis quod in inductione est fallacia figurae dictionis eo quod ly unus solus stat pro diversis. Dicendum quod hoc non impedit inductionem, dummodo in universali confundatur ad illa diversa, sicut est hic.

Item sit quod Sortes dicat deum esse et Plato dicat aliud verum, et sic de aliis.

Item dicat quilibet te esse asinum. Deinde: ab omni homine enuntiatum est verum; sed quodcumque est ab omni homine enuntiatum est te esse asinum; ergo te esse asinum est verum. Solutio: si sumatur prima secundum quod est vera, incidit fallacia figurae dictionis in processu eo quod commutatur 'quale quid' in 'hoc aliquid', quia ly enuntiatum respicit hoc quod dico 'ab omni', ita quod pro uno suorum suppositorum respicit unum suppositum ejus quod est 'ab omni' et pro alio aliud, et sic deinceps. Et sic pro multis simul sumptis respicit ipsum et sic, cum multa simul sint sicut unum commune et quale, stat ly enuntiatum hic sicut 'quale quid'. Sed in minori respicit ly enuntiatum pro uno aliquo supposito totam multitudinem ejus quod est 'omni', et sic respectu ejus est sicut 'hoc aliquid'. Eodem modo est si in minori diceretur: sed nihil est enuntiatum ab omni homine nisi te esse asinum. Eodem modo hic est: sit quod quilibet homo habeat asinum unum et currat; et burnellus<sup>31</sup> sit asinus communis et non currat. Deinde: cujuslibet hominis asinus currit; sed quicquid est cujuslibet hominis asinus est burnellus; ergo burnellus currit; similiter enim mutatur suppositio hujus dictionis 'asinus'. Dicunt tamen quidam quod hae orationes sunt multiplices eo quod potest judicari locutio penes subjectum locutionis vel attributionis, subjectum attributionis vocantes ipsum nominativum; subjectum locutionis ipsum obliquum; quidam vero converso modo nominant. Sed hoc nihil est quia, cum ly cujuslibet praecedit, ly asinus habet potestatem supra ipsum<sup>32</sup> et sic ab ipso<sup>33</sup> judicanda est locutio.

Item quod sic vel sic judicetur non est ex parte sermonis, sed ex parte nostra tantum.

Item sit quod Sortes videat se tantum et Plato similiter et sic de aliis. Deinde: omnis homo videt se. Probatio inductive. Deinde: sed ly se est idem quod 'omnis homo'; ergo omnis homo videt omnem hominem; ergo Sortes videt omnem hominem; quod falsum est. Dicendum quod etsi<sup>34</sup> ly se idem sit secundum supposita quod 'omnem hominem', tamen ly se et ly omnem hominem diversimode respiciunt hoc quod dico 'omnis homo', et sic respectu ejus sunt diversa, quia ly se pro uno suppositorum suorum respicit unum suppositum ejus quod est 'omnis', et pro alio aliud; sed ly omnem hominem pro tota sua multitudine respicit sua<sup>35</sup> singula supposita ejus quod est 'omnis'. Et causa hujus est quod ly se non habet multitudinem de se, sed ab eo quod est 'omnis'. Et propterea unum suppositum ejus respondet uni supposito ejus quod est 'omnis' et aliud alii. Sed ly omnem propriam habet multitudinem quae respondet singulis suppositis ejus quod est 'omnis'; est igitur hic fallacia accidentis [25v].

Item cum fuerint duae distributiones ex eadem parte locutionis, prima immobilitat secundum. Et sic solvitur hoc sophisma: sit quod tres homines videant omnem hominem et currant; alii autem omnes videant Sortem et non currant. Deinde: omnis homo videns omnem hominem currit. Et est probatio inductive. Inferatur: ergo omnis homo videns Sortem currit; quod falsum est. Dicendum quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis ex immobili suppositione ad mobilem et commutatur 'quale quid' in 'hoc aliquid'.<sup>36</sup> Cum enim terminus stat pro multis, immobiliter stat sicut 'quale quid'; et cum stat pro multis mobiliter,<sup>37</sup> et pro quolibet

<sup>31</sup> also brunellus; cf. *Nigelli Speculum Stultorum*, *Rolls Series*, *Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets and Epigrammists of the 12th century*, Vol. I, No. 59, ed. Wright, p. xx, note 1. Cf. also: *Beiträge Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*. XXI, 11, note 4.

<sup>32</sup> superscript gloss id est nominativum.

<sup>33</sup> s. s. gloss scilicet signum.

<sup>34</sup> licet O.

<sup>35</sup> om. P.

<sup>36</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 93; also Aristotle, *Categoriae* c. 3, Didot I, 5, 3-18 (3 b 10-23).

<sup>37</sup> om. stat—mobiliter O.



illorum stat sicut 'hoc aliquid'. Causa autem hujus immobilitatis est hoc quod in termino distributo non tenet ascensus; et propterea cum homo videns omnem hominem sit in minus quam homo videns Sortem, sequitur enim ad hoc et non convertitur. Si accipitur distributio, non tenebit et sic patet fallacia consequentis.<sup>38</sup> Simile est hic: omnis homo est et omne differens ab illo est non homo quia ly illum in prima refertur ad terminum distributum et sic habet in se distributionem, et in conclusione valet terminum discretum. Unde idem est ac si diceret: quodlibet differens ab omni homine; ergo quodlibet differens a Sorte. Et respondendum<sup>39</sup> sicut prius.

Item Plato videat se et solum<sup>40</sup> et sic de singulis. Deinde: omnis homo videt omnem hominem. Probatio: Sortes videt Sortem; Plato videt Platonem et sic de aliis; ergo omnis homo etc. Deinde inferatur: ergo Plato videt omnem hominem; quod est falsum. Dicendum quod haec 'omnis homo' etc. significat quod quodlibet suppositum ejus quod est 'homo' videt omnem hominem. Cum enim hoc quod dico 'omnis' distribuatur subjectum respectu praedicati, aut tunc invenit ibi hoc quod dico 'omnem', et tunc significat quod hoc totum 'videre omnem hominem' convenit singulis suppositis subjecti, aut hoc quod dico 'omnem' posterius advenit et significat quod 'videre hominem' pro quolibet supposito ejus, quod est 'hominem', reddatur subjecto distributo, ut omnis videat Sortem et omnis Platonem et sic de aliis. Primo modo distributio includit secundam; secundo modo e converso. Et sive sic sive sic semper significatur quod quodlibet suppositum ejus, quod est 'homo', videat omnem hominem. Sed inductive dicitur de quolibet quod videat aliquem, et sic paralogismus consequentis, ac si diceret: Sortes videt aliquem; ergo videt omnem. Eodem modo probatur et improbatur haec 'omnis homo est omnis homo', et eodem modo solvitur.

Item omne caput habens est unum solum caput habens, et sumitur ly omne accusative et adjectivum ejus quod est 'caput' et non del habens. Probatur sic: hoc caput habens etc. et sic de singulis; ergo omne etc. Contra: hic praedicatur oppositum de opposito; ergo locutio falsa. Dicendum quod ly habens in subjecto potest componi cum praedicato vel dividi; semper tamen sub eadem nominatur constructione. Si componatur, significat locutio quod virtus distributionis simul cum ipso attingit praedicatum, et sic confunditur ly unum solum in praedicato, nec praedicatur oppositum de opposito ut dictum est prius.<sup>41</sup> Si dividatur, tunc significat divisio quod virtus distributionis non transit ad praedicatum et non confunditur ly unum solum, et est locutio falsa. Et in probatione [26r] est figura dictionis. quia ly unum solum caput in singularibus semper stat pro diversis et in universali non confunditur. Nec potest ita hoc distingui 'omnis homo est unus solus homo', quia nullo modo potest illa distributio sistere in subjecto, cum non sint ibi<sup>42</sup> duo, quorum unum possit esse distributum et reliquum illud respectu cuius fit distributio sicut hic hoc quod dico 'caput' distribuitur respectu ejus quod est 'habens'. Sed bene valet in hoc sophismate: ab omni homine enuntiatur est verum, et in consimilibus.

Notandum autem cum haec dictio 'omnis' additur termino designanti totum universale, semper tenetur distributive. Sed<sup>43</sup> cum<sup>43</sup> additur termino designanti totum integrale vel totum congregativum, potest teneri collective et valet idem quod 'totum', ut si dicatur 'omnis aqua', id est tota aqua,<sup>44</sup> vel 'omnis populus', id est totus. Quando sumitur in plurali, quandoque tenetur collective ut omnes apostoli sunt duodecim, quandoque tenetur distributive ut possit inferri: omnes, ergo isti. Sed est dubitatio in hoc sophismate: sint Sortes et Plato fratres; Vergilius et

<sup>38</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 100.

<sup>39</sup> respondet O.

<sup>40</sup> Sortem O, corrected from Sortem P.

<sup>41</sup> om. O.

<sup>42</sup> s. s. gloss id est in subjecto.

<sup>43</sup> si tamen O.

<sup>44</sup> om. O.

Plato fratres; Marcus et Cato fratres, et non sunt plures homines. Deinde sic: omnes homines sunt fratres. Probatio: isti sunt fratres demonstratis primis, et isti sunt fratres demonstratis secundis, et sunt fratres demonstratis tertiis, et non sunt plures homines; ergo etc. Deinde inferatur: ergo Sortes et Vergilius sunt fratres; quod falsum est. Dicendum quod insufficienter inducit quia ly omnis distribuit pro omnibus combinationibus quae possunt fieri. Unde cum possint plures fieri combinationes quam tangit inductio, non sufficienter inducit, et in probatione est parallogismus consequentis.

Dictum est sufficienter de hac dictione 'omnis' nec<sup>45</sup> oportet aliquid dicere de his dictionibus 'quilibet', 'quisque', quia ejusdem potestatis fere sunt cum hac dictione 'omnis' secundum quod distribuit pro partibus secundum numerum, et de hac dictione 'quicumque' vel 'quiscumque', quae ejusdem potestatis sunt cum illis, nisi quod habent in se virtutem hujus dictionis 'sive';<sup>46</sup> unde exigunt duo verba ut patet.

### TOTUM

Sed nunc agendum de hac dictione 'totum' de qua sciendum quod quandoque dicit totalitatem alicujus secundum quod res est et aequipollet ei quod est integrum, et est categorema. Quandoque dicit totalitatem alicujus respectu praedicati et est syncategorema et, ut dicitur, valet idem quod 'quaelibet pars' et est signum universale. Et sic procedit hoc sophisma: totus Sortes est minor Sorte. Probatio: quaelibet pars Sortis est minor Sorte; ergo totus Sortes etc. Deinde inferatur: ergo Sortes est minor Sorte.<sup>47</sup> Vel contra: totus Sortes est aequalis Sorti; ergo non minor. Et<sup>48</sup> dicendum quod totus Sortes non aequipollet huic 'quaelibet pars Sortis', sed huic 'Sortes, ita quod quaelibet pars'. Cum enim sit signum universale affirmativum, supponit praedicatum inesse subjecto, et est in probatione fallacia consequentis. Ad contra sciendum quod ipsum procedit secundum quod ly totus est categorema. Sciendum quod quaelibet dictio numeralis potest dicere multitudinem sui adjuncti secundum rem, et est categorema, vel<sup>49</sup> in respectu praedicati vel subjecti et est syncategorema, verbi gratia, si dicatur 'decem homines ferunt lapidem', est sensus primo modo quod homines qui sunt decem ferunt lapidem, et est vera sive conjunctum sive divisim ferunt.<sup>50</sup> Secundo modo significat oratio quod hoc subjectum 'homines' pro decem suppositis respicit praedicatum et significatur quod quilibet [26v] divisim ferat lapidem.

Eodem modo est haec dictio 'infinita' in plurali syncategorema et categorema; potest enim dicere multitudinem etiam<sup>51</sup> infinitam substantiae suae absolute vel respectu praedicati. Ejus autem significationem sic possumus videre; infinita privat finem in numero et sic ponit excessum respectu cujuslibet numeri; unde aequipollet huic 'quotlibet plura'. Unde patet quod non valet haec argumentatio: infinita; ergo duo. Per hoc solvitur hoc sophisma: sit quod viginti trahant navem in comuni, et viginti et unus aliam et sic in infinitum. Inde sic: infiniti homines trahant<sup>52</sup> navem. Probatio: quotlibet plures trahunt navem; ergo infiniti. Prima patet sic: duobus plures trahunt navem, et tribus et sic in infinitum; ergo quotlibet hominibus etc. Deinde inferatur: ergo duo etc.; quod falsum est. Et patet quod non valet haec illatio sicut nec haec 'duobus plures, ergo duo', quia ly infiniti non dicit quod duo vel tres trahunt, sed duobus plures<sup>53</sup> et sic de aliis.

<sup>45</sup> nunc O.

<sup>46</sup> add. alias si; evidently the reading of another ms., cf. pps. 78 and 92.

<sup>47</sup> This sophisma is repeated almost verbatim by Ockham in the Summa Totius Logicae, Paris 1488, fol. 5v a.

<sup>48</sup> om. P.

<sup>49</sup> et O.

<sup>50</sup> ferant O.

<sup>51</sup> om. O.

<sup>52</sup> trahunt P.

<sup>53</sup> om. O.

Item sophisma:<sup>74</sup> infinita sunt finita. Probatio: duobus plura sunt finita<sup>75</sup> et tribus et sic deinceps; ergo infinita etc. Sed contra: hic praedicatur oppositum de opposito; ergo locutio falsa. Dicendum est<sup>76</sup> sicut dictum est: haec dictio 'infinita' potest esse categorema, et sic est falsa; habet enim in se suam substantiam quam multiplicat hoc modo secundum rem. Et est sensus: res quae secundum rem sunt infinitae, illae sunt infinitae. Alio modo potest esse syncategorema, ut dicat multitudinem suae substantiae respectu praedicati. Et est sensus quod res pro multis<sup>77</sup> suppositis respicit hoc praedicatum 'esse finita', et sic probatur. Nec praedicatur oppositum de opposito hoc modo quia multitudo ejus quod est 'infinita' attingit praedicatum et confundit, et stat pro infinitis, quorum quodlibet est finitum, ut patet ex inductione; ergo hoc quod dico 'finita' hoc modo sumptum non opponitur ei quod est 'infinita'. Simile hujus dictum est in hoc sophismate:<sup>78</sup> omnis homo est unus homo.

Praeter signa praedicta sunt alia copulorum distributiva sicut haec signa 'omnis', 'quolibet' sunt distributiva suppositorum. Et est suppositum quod significatur ut 'quid' copulatum, ut 'quale' vel 'quantum'; et sunt hujusmodi signa 'qualislibet', 'quantumlibet' et similia.

Sciendum quod hujusmodi significant accidens definitum in substantia infinita sicut alia adjectiva, et praeter hoc significant ejusdem accidentis distributionem respectu illius substantiae. 'Qualelibet' significat definite hoc accidens, quod est qualitas infinite in quacumque substantia vel supposito et cum hoc distributionem, et aequipollet huic: cujuslibet qualitatis res. Particularia autem quae ei respondent sunt haec 'album', 'nigrum', 'grammaticum' et similia.

Sciendum ergo quod quandoque haec dictio 'qualelibet' est categorema vel syncategorema. Primo modo dicit aliquam rem habere omnes qualitates; secundo modo dicit rem sub qualilibet qualitate recipere praedicatum. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: sint tres qualitates, albedo, grammatica, musica, et Sortes habeat primam et currat; Plato habeat secundam et currat; Cicero tertiam et currat; Vergilius habeat omnes et non currat. Inde sic: qualelibet currit. Probatio: album currit, grammaticum currit, musicum currit, et non sunt plura; ergo qualelibet currit; sed quicquid est qualelibet est Vergilius; ergo Vergilius currit; quod falsum est. Solutio: in prima<sup>79</sup> sumitur ly qualelibet<sup>80</sup> syncategorematicae; in secunda<sup>81</sup> categorematicae; unde est aequivocatio.<sup>82</sup> Vel aliter potest dici quod hoc subjectum 'res' quod intelligitur in hac dictione 'qualelibet' in prima<sup>83</sup> stat confuse tantum respectu suae propriae divisionis vel<sup>84</sup> distributionis,<sup>84</sup> et in secunda<sup>85</sup> determinate. Quod sic patet cum [27r] probatur prima et dicitur 'album currit', ly res ibi intellecta supponit pro uno et in aliis pro aliis. Unde in universali confunditur ly res ita quod pro uno supposito respiciat unum suppositum suae distributionis et pro alio aliud. Sed in minori respicit pro uno supposito totam suam multitudinem distributionis et sic respectu illius stat determinate sicut dictum est in hoc sophismate:<sup>86</sup> ab omni homine etc. Et dicet ad hoc aliquis quod prima multiplex est eo quod ly qualelibet posset componi cum praedicato vel dividi. Et significat compositio quod distributio attingit praedicatum et confunditur ipsum ut stat pro multis, et sic potest reddi huic subjecto 'res' pro diversis suppositis, et sic potest ly res confundi, et est vera. Divisio autem significat quod distributio non attingit praedicatum, et sic stat determinate; unum autem determinatum non potest reddi huic alicui nisi pro uno;

<sup>74</sup> om. P.<sup>75</sup> infinita O.<sup>76</sup> om. O.<sup>77</sup> infinitis O.<sup>78</sup> cf. p. 51.<sup>79</sup> s. s. gloss scilicet in probatione.<sup>80</sup> quale O.<sup>81</sup> s. s. gloss id est in improbatione.<sup>82</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 87.<sup>83</sup> s. s. gloss in majori improbationis.<sup>84</sup> om. O, in margin P.<sup>85</sup> s. s. gloss in minori improbationis.<sup>86</sup> cf. p. 52.

unde subjectum stat pro aliquo uno et sic determinate, et est locutio falsa. Et potest distributio sistere in subjecto et non transire ad praedicatum eo quod in subjecto ipso est quicquid exigit distributio, quia ibi est aliquid quod distribuitur ut hoc, quod dico 'qualitas'; est ibi aliquid respectu cuius stat divisio ut hoc quod dico 'res', ut<sup>67</sup> prius expositum est.

Item sint tantum tres qualitates et Sortes habeat omnes et Plato similiter et similiter Cicero et hoc sciat quilibet de alio, Vergilius habeat tantum albedinem et nihil sciat de aliis, nec alii de ipso.<sup>68</sup> Inde quodlibet qualelibet de quolibet tali scit se esse tale. Probatio: hoc qualelibet,<sup>69</sup> demonstrato Sorte, de quolibet etc., et sic de Platone et Cicerone quia ipsi sunt tales; et similiter Plato et similiter Cicero et non sunt plura qualelibet; ergo quodlibet etc. Deinde: quodlibet<sup>70</sup> de quolibet tali scit etc.; quod falsum est, quia nullus aliorum scit de Vergilio nec e converso. Et dicunt quidam quod ly qualelibet in prima<sup>71</sup> est categorema et aliter non posset distribui per ly quodlibet; in secunda<sup>72</sup> est syncategorema quia aliter non posset descendere ad ly album. Sed patet quod hoc est falsum; potest enim inferri res quod secundum se<sup>73</sup> habet omnem qualitatem; ergo album. Hoc autem fuit ejus expositio secundum quod fuit categorema. Dicendum quod li tali in prima propositione et in secunda fuit idem quod 'qualelibet' et in tertia idem quod 'album'. Unde idem est ac si diceret 'de quolibet qualelibet'; ergo de quolibet albo. Unde cum prima distributio immobilitet<sup>74</sup> secundam, erit fallacia figurae dictionis vel aliter fallacia consequentis ut dictum est.<sup>75</sup>

## UTERQUE

Est adhuc unum signum affirmativum suppositorum distributivum, scilicet 'uterque' de quo nihil aliud dicendum est quam de hac dictione 'omnis', secundum quod distribuit pro partibus secundum numerum, nisi quod dividit solum pro duobus appellatis et solum habet apponi termino cuius communitas terminatur ad duo, ut cum dicitur 'uterque istorum benedicitur', demonstratis<sup>76</sup> duobus non autem tribus.

## NULLUS

Sequitur de signis negativis, et primo de hac dictione 'nullus', de qua sciendum quod quandoque dividit pro partibus secundum speciem, quandoque pro partibus secundum numerum. Et per hoc solvitur hoc sophisma: sit quod nullus homo sit. Deinde: nullus homo est animal. Probatio: nullus homo est; ergo nullus homo est animal. Vel sic: non est aliquid sub homine cui conveniat praedicatum; ergo etc. Sed contra: omnis [27v] homo est animal; haec est vera; ergo haec est falsa: nullus homo est animal. Et dicendum quod probatur secundum quod dividit pro partibus secundum numerum sive pro partibus actualiter entibus; tales enim, cum non sint, non sunt animalia.<sup>77</sup> Improbatur autem secundum quod sumitur pro partibus secundum speciem; pro talibus enim haec est vera: omnis homo etc.

Item potest dividere pro partibus propinquis vel remotis; sed convertuntur illi duo sensus quantum ad veritatem et falsitatem; si enim nullum individuum animalis currit, tunc nec homo nec asinus et sic de aliis et e converso.

Item quandoque est multiplicitas ex negatione hujus dictionis 'nullus' quod potest ferri ad diversa. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: nullo currente crescunt tibi

<sup>67</sup> sicut O.

<sup>68</sup> illo O.

<sup>69</sup> qualibet P.

<sup>70</sup> quidlibet O; add. s. s. qualibet P, om. O.

<sup>71</sup> s. s. gloss id est in probatione.

<sup>72</sup> s. s. gloss id est in improbatione.

<sup>73</sup> om. secundum se O.

<sup>74</sup> immobilitat O.

<sup>75</sup> cf. p. 52; in margin 3 folio ante illud in principio paginae secundae P.

<sup>76</sup> demonstrantur O.

<sup>77</sup> est animal O.

cornua fronte. Probatio: non hoc, non illo et sic de singulis; ergo nullo etc. Deinde inferatur: sed nulli currunt; ergo tibi cornua crescunt. Vel<sup>78</sup> sic inferatur: ergo<sup>79</sup> dum nullus currit, vel si, vel quia nullus currit; quarum quaelibet est falsa. Dicendum quod prima potest esse composita et sic vera et significat compositio quod negatio totum attingit, et sic probatur. Vel potest esse divisa et significat divisio quod sistit in participio, et sic est falsa, et sic improbat. Simile est hoc: nullum caput habens est aliquod caput habens; sumatur ly nullum caput habens accusative et probetur sic: non hoc caput habens est aliquod caput habens; non illud et sic de singulis; ergo nullum etc. Contra: hic praedicatur oppositum de opposito. Vel sic inferatur: ergo quod nullum caput habet, aliquod caput habet.

Dicendum quod omnes singulares propositiones sunt multiplices eo quod possunt esse compositae, ut negatio feratur ad totum ut attingat principale verbum; vel divisae ut sistat in participio. Primo modo falsae, secundo modo verae. Et cum hoc intellige quod ly aliquod caput stet<sup>80</sup> pro diversis. Similiter ipsa universalis potest esse composita, ut negatio ejus quod est 'nullum' attingat totum, et est falsa sicut et singulares suae; vel divisa ut sistat negatio in participio, et tunc ibidem sistit distributio,<sup>81</sup> cum distributio causetur a negatione. Et etiam per hanc regulam quando duo officialia includuntur in aliqua dictione, ad nihil pertinet unum quod non pertinet reliquum; tunc ly aliquod caput in praedicato non confunditur, et sic est processus a pluribus determinatis ad unum determinatum et sic est falsa, et in probatione est fallacia figurae dictionis. Sic ergo universalis omni modo falsa est. Sed obicitur sic: illae singulares sunt verae; ergo, cum singulares respondent universali, habebunt aliquam veram et non nisi hanc ut videtur. Dicendum quod universalis quae eis respondet est haec<sup>82</sup> 'omne caput non habens' etc. ut sistat negatio in participio et distributio transeat ad praedicatum; si autem velit inferre per aequipollentiam<sup>83</sup> 'omne non, ergo nullum', obiciendum est per hanc regulam quod tunc solum aequipollent 'omnis non' et 'nullus', quando negatio ejus, quod est 'non', fertur ad idem respectu cuius fit distributio ejus quod est 'omnis' et e converso; sed sic non est hic ut dictum est.

Item cum fuerit implicatio vel adjectivum ex parte subjecti vel ex parte praedicati multiplex est locutio eo quod potest esse composita ut negatio ejus quod est 'nullus' totum attingat; vel divisa ut non attingat ipsam implicationem vel adjectivum. Sit quod albi sedeant et alii currant. Deinde: nullus homo qui est albus currit; si haec est composita, tunc est vera; sed si ly homo et ly qui dividantur, tunc est falsa, et significat haec divisio scilicet quod nullus homo currat et quod ille sit albus.

Iterum sit quod nullus viderit [28r] albos, sed tantum alios. Deinde: nullus homo videt hominem qui est albus; vera est secundum quod composita est et falsa secundum quod divisa est.<sup>84</sup>

Item dubitatur de hac dictione 'nullus' utrum faciat terminum sibi adjunctum stare pro non existentibus. Et videtur quod sic; rebus enim se habentibus ut nunc sequitur: nullus homo currit; ergo Caesar non currit. Probatio: da oppositum, scilicet quod Caesar currit, et sequitur quod aliquis homo currit, quia ipse non potest currere nisi ipse sit et etiam sit homo. Sed si sic posset inferri, tunc homo supponit pro non entibus ut videtur: sed hoc est contra regulam suppositionum,<sup>85</sup> cum habeat sufficientiam appellatorum.

<sup>78</sup> et O.<sup>79</sup> om. O.<sup>80</sup> stetit O.<sup>81</sup> *marginal gloss* quia tunc fertur distributio ad non habens sicut et negatio, non ad verbum principale quod est est. Et est sensus: habens nullum caput est aliquod caput habens et removel verbum affirma-

tivum et participium potest intelligi negatum et li caput distribuitur respectu participii, ideo respectu verbi.

<sup>82</sup> s. s. *gloss* et est vera.<sup>83</sup> aequivalentiam O.<sup>84</sup> om. O.<sup>85</sup> suppositam O, cf. Grabmann p. 75.

Item eodem modo staret in contraria et contradictoria; et sic pro omnibus praesentibus currentibus haec esset falsa: omnis homo<sup>66</sup> currit. Et dicendum quod bene tenet: nullus homo; ergo non Caesar, nec est ibi locus a toto in quantitate,<sup>67</sup> cum Caesar non sit homo, sicut nec hic: nullum habens oculos videt; ergo nec lignum; et sicut iste terminus 'habens oculos' non supponit pro ligno, sic nec hic homo pro Caesare.

### NIHIL

Item sophisma in hoc signo negativo 'nihil' eo quod negatio posset ferri ad diversa: si nihil est, nihil esse verum est, et si hoc, aliquid est verum, et si hoc, aliquid est; ergo a primo: si nihil est, aliquid est. Dicendum quod haec 'nihil esse est verum' est multiplex eo quod ly esse et ly est possunt componi vel dividi; et significat divisio quod negatio sistat in ly esse; composita autem significat quod negatio transit ad ly est. Primo modo est affirmativa et non sequitur ex priori<sup>68</sup> quia numquam ex negativa sequitur affirmativa quia negatio nihil ponit; affirmatio aliquid ponit. Secundo modo est negativa. Et est sensus: non est verum aliquid esse et sequitur ex praecedenti; et ex hac non sequitur tertia, quae est affirmativa, ratione praedicta. Possent autem hic tangi quaedam difficultates spectantes ad tractatum insolubilem quae usque alias differuntur.<sup>69</sup>

Item regula quod, si fuerint duae dictiones negativae,<sup>70</sup> etiam ex diversa parte orationis, prima immobilitatem secundam, verbi gratia, nihil nihil est. Probatio: sua contradictoria est falsa, scilicet aliquid nihil est; ergo haec est vera. Deinde: ergo nihil nulla substantia est. Contra: aliquid<sup>71</sup> nulla substantia est. Et<sup>72</sup> potest solvi per praedictam regulam assignando fallaciam figurae dictionis vel consequentis eo quod li nihil in praedicato est in minus quam 'nulla substantia'.

Item nihil et chimaera sunt fratres. Probetur inductive. Vel sic: aliquid et chimaera sunt fratres; haec est falsa; ergo haec est vera: nihil et chimaera<sup>73</sup> etc. Deinde inferatur: ergo nihil et chimaera sunt. Contra: nec nihil nec chimaera est; ergo prima falsa. Dicunt aliqui quod prima multiplex est eo quod negatio potest cadere sub copulatione vel supra; si sub, tunc est sensus: hoc ipsum nihil frater est chimaerae, et est falsa; si supra, tunc negat aliquid esse fratrem chimaerae, et est vera; nec sequitur: nihil et chimaera sunt; sed est paralogismus consequentis quia 'esse fratres' est in minus quam 'esse'. Sed intelligendum quod haec dictio 'nihil' non potest esse nomen infinitum; semper enim auctores<sup>74</sup> utuntur ea secundum quod negatio feratur ad aliquid extra et non sistat in hac dictione 'nihil'; unde non est aliquid cui assignari aliquis actus idem. Et propterea non potest esse alterum copulatum per hanc dictionem 'et', et semper cadit negatio super copulationem. Unde prima<sup>75</sup> est vera; secunda est falsa et est in processu<sup>76</sup> fallacia<sup>77</sup> consequentis, ut dictum est. Li contra etiam poterat, quia non<sup>78</sup> contradicit ei<sup>79</sup> secundum quod intelligatur quod 'nihil' cadit sub copulatione.

<sup>66</sup> marg. gloss scilicet li homo staret pro non existente sicut in universali negativa.

<sup>67</sup> marg. gloss sed locus a maiori; cf. Grabmann p. 61.

<sup>68</sup> marg. gloss ex hoc scilicet si nihil est.

<sup>69</sup> This treatise follows immediately after the *Syncategoremata* in the same ms.; the incipit is Circa tractatum de insolubilibus primo sciendum quod hoc nomen insolubile dicitur tripliciter: uno scilicet modo quod nullo modo potest solvi; alio modo quod bene potest solvi quantum est de se propter tamen aliquod impedimentum numquam solvitur; tertio modo quod propter sui difficultatem difficile solvitur. . . . ultimo autem modo intendimus nunc de insolubili.

<sup>70</sup> naetem O.

<sup>71</sup> marg. gloss scilicet qualitas.

<sup>72</sup> om. O.

<sup>73</sup> et chimaera om. O.

<sup>74</sup> In the 12th century auctores usually referred to the classical authors, especially the poets; in the 13th c. the term included also the elementary reading books. It also came to be equivalent to our author. Cf. *The Arts Course at Mediaeval Universities* by L. J. Paetow (Champaign, Ill., 1910), p. 53.

<sup>75</sup> s. s. gloss improbationis.

<sup>76</sup> s. s. gloss improbationis.

<sup>77</sup> paralogismus O.

<sup>78</sup> om. O, add. second hand P.

<sup>79</sup> om. O.

Item sit quod Sortes dicat hominem esse asinum. Deinde: a nullo enuntiatum a nullo vere dicitur. Probatio: quod nullus enuntiat a nullo etc.; ergo a nullo enuntiatum etc. Contra: ab [28v] aliquo enuntiatum a nullo vere dicitur, quia quod Sortes enuntiat a nullo potest vere dici. Solutio:<sup>100</sup> et potest dici quod negatio ejus quod est 'nullo' potest sistere en ly enuntiatum, et tunc remanet principalis compositio negata per aliam negationem vel potest ad principale verbum transire cadendo super aliam negationem ut sit principalis compositio affirmata. Et in primo sensu li enuntiatum habet dividi ab eo quod sequitur; in secundo habet componi; primo modo probatur; secundo modo improbatur. Sed videtur quod cum li nullo cadit sub circumstantia ejus quod est 'a', non potest ferri nisi ad ly enuntiatum. Unde dicunt quidam quod haec 'a nullo enuntiatum' etc. semper est negativa nec contradicit ei haec 'ab aliquo' etc., cum sit similiter negativa. Sed dicendum quod ly nullo semper fertur ad ly enuntiatum; sed hoc dupliciter quia aut prius quam fuerit ordinatum ad ly dicitur aut post; priori modo sistit negatio in illo; secundo modo transit ad praedicatum, et primus sensus repraesentatur per divisionem, secundus per compositionem. Et per hunc modum potest divisio attingere praedicatum in hac 'omne caput' etc., et negatio in hac 'nullum caput' etc. in sensu compositionis, et 'non attingere' in sensu divisionis, et ita in consimilibus.

## NEUTRUM

Est adhuc quoddam signum negativum quod tantum negat pro duobus, scilicet 'neutrum'. De quo tale fit sophisma: neutrum oculum habendo potest<sup>101</sup> videre. Probatio: non sinistrum oculum habendo etc.; ergo neutrum etc. Contra: ergo dum neutrum oculum<sup>102</sup> habes, vel quia; vel si neutrum habes, potes etc.; quod falsum est. Dicendum quod singulares, si sint compositae, fertur negatio ad principale verbum et sunt negativae et falsae; si sint divisae, sistit negatio in participio et sunt verae. Sed ly potes in praemissis copulavit diversas potentias et ly videre diversas visiones. Primo modo bene sequitur haec universalis: neutrum etc.; secundo modo non, sed est figura dictionis; sed hanc universalem 'utrumque oculum non habendo' etc. potest inferre; sed non sequitur: ergo neutrum, sicut plenius dictum est in hoc sophismate: nullum caput etc. Et jam sufficienter dictum est de signis tam suppositorum distributivis quam copulatorum. Unum tamen intelligendum est adhuc, scilicet quod in divisione signi distributivi pro copulatis non licet descendere nisi solum ad species, verbi gratia, qualelibet ergo album et non ergo<sup>103</sup> hoc album. Sed contra: qualelibet ergo quamlibet qualitatem habens; ergo hanc qualitatem habens demonstrata albedine Sortis; ergo hoc<sup>104</sup> album, demonstrato Sorte. Sed dicendum quod ly qualelibet accipitur pro generibus singulorum et non pro singulis generum. Et similiter ly quamlibet<sup>105</sup> secundum quod exposuit ly qualelibet. Et ratio hujus est quia<sup>106</sup> hujusmodi accidentia<sup>107</sup> quae designantur per talia signa 'qualelibet', 'quantumlibet' de se solum<sup>108</sup> dividuntur et multiplicantur usque ad species et non usque ad individua nisi per substantiam.

## PRAETER

Quia jam dictum est sufficienter de signis distributivis, consequenter dicendum de hac dictione 'praeter' exceptiva, tum quia exceptio semper vult cadere super aliquam divisionem et ad eam continuari, tum quia oppositum habet ad ipsam.

<sup>100</sup> om. O.<sup>101</sup> potes O.<sup>102</sup> om. P.<sup>103</sup> add. P.<sup>104</sup> om. P.<sup>105</sup> om. et . . . quamlibet O.<sup>106</sup> quod O.<sup>107</sup> add. est. O.<sup>108</sup> add. modo O.

Quod patet, quia haec dictio 'omnis' dicit totam multitudinem et haec dictio 'praeter' oppositum a totalitate subtrahendo aliquam partem; posset tamen aliqua ratione prius tractari de exclusivis, sed non curandum.

Sciendum quod haec dictio 'praeter' quandoque tenetur additive ut cum dicitur: sex clerici sunt hic intus praeter magistrum unum et etiam magister. Quandoque exceptive, et hoc dupliciter: quandoque diminutive,<sup>109</sup> quandoque instantive; diminutive quando ab aliquo toto significat secundum rem fieri diminutionem ut hic: Sortes habet undecim digitos [29r] praeter unum; instantive quando excipit partem a toto respectu praedicati ut hic: omnis homo praeter Sortem currit; significat enim quod Sortes excipiat ab hoc toto 'omnis homo', non secundum rem, sed respectu praedicati, et sic proprie est syncategorema. Et dicitur teneri instantive quia derelinquit Sortem non currere, quae instat huic: omnis homo currit. Sed dubitatur utrum penitus teneatur aequivoce, cum teneatur exceptive vel additive. Et videtur quod sic, quia 'excipere' et 'addere' sunt contraria et sic ex parte istorum significatorum est maxima diversitas. Oppositum videtur sic, quia in aliis idiomatibus invenimus utrumque sensum per eandem vocem repraesentari; probabile ergo est quod ex parte significatorum sit aliqua convenientia ratione cuius sic per eandem vocem designatur. Et dicendum hoc esse verum. Cum enim dico 'sex praeter magistrum', significat quod etiam magister separetur ab aliis; non dico secundum rem nec respectu praedicati, sed respectu actus numerandi. Est enim sensus: sex non numerato magistro, et sic aliquo modo denotat separationem in omnibus suis significationibus. Est autem sophisma eo quod possit teneri diminutive et est tale: quotlibet praeter duo excedunt unitatem in numero. Probatio: quotlibet excedunt unitatem numero; haec est falsa et non est instantia nisi in binario; ergo facta exceptione erit vera; ergo prima vera. Deinde inferatur: ergo<sup>110</sup> quotlibet praeter duo etc.; ergo tria praeter duo vel quattuor; quod falsum est. Solutio: hoc quod dico 'quotlibet' duplicem habet totalitatem in se; habet enim quoddam totum universale distributum, cuius partes sunt speciales numeri, et ratione suorum suppositorum habet in se totum integrale; in prima<sup>111</sup> ergo tenetur 'praeter' instantive excipiendo a prima totalitate; in secunda<sup>112</sup> tenetur diminutive excipiendo a secunda totalitate, et sic est fallacia aequivocationis.<sup>113</sup>

Item sint tantum decem homines et currant. Deinde: decem praeter duo currunt. Probatio: decem praeter duo sunt octo et octo currunt; ergo decem praeter duo etc. Sed contra: duo currunt vel decem currunt; non ergo decem praeter duo. Dicendum quod ly decem in prima tenetur collective et categorematice et li praeter diminutive; en li contra tenetur le decem syncategorematice et ly praeter instantive.

Item dicunt aliqui quod hoc sophisma habet solvi per hoc quod 'praeter' semper tenetur instantive. Appellat *a* totum Sortem,<sup>114</sup> *b* totum Sortem praeter pedem. Inde *a* est animal, *b* est animal; ergo si *b* est pars *a*, ergo animal est pars animalis. Dicunt enim quod in appellatione *b* oportet quod ly totus teneatur distributive; aliter enim non posset excipere; et tunc est haec falsa '*b* est animal', sicut haec 'quaelibet pars animalis praeter pedem'. Sed sciendum quod li totus potest teneri collective et li praeter non instantive, sed diminutive. Dicunt aliqui quod haec est falsa '*b* est animal', cum *b* sit pars. Sed contra: absconditur pes et vere dicitur quod *b* est animal, sed adhuc non est aliquod animal quod prius non fuit; ergo *b* prius fuit animal; ergo<sup>115</sup> haec est vera: *b* est animal. Propterea dicendum quod *b* est animal et *b* est pars animalis, sed modo diverso; ratione enim ipsius corporis est *b* pars et non ratione animae; non enim est dicere quod tota anima perficit ipsum *a*

<sup>109</sup> divisive O.

<sup>110</sup> om. O.

<sup>111</sup> marg. gloss scilicet in probatione.

<sup>112</sup> marg. gloss scilicet in improbatione.

<sup>113</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 87.

<sup>114</sup> subjectum O.

<sup>115</sup> propterea O.



et ejus pars perficit<sup>116</sup> *b*, sed tota perficit *a* et eadem tota *b*; ratione autem ipsius animae est animal et sic patet quod licet *b* et animal sint idem, non tamen secundum quod respiciuntur ab eo quod est pars sunt idem, sed diversa [29v] quia *b* respicitur ab illo ratione corporis, ratione cujus non est animal ut dictum est, et sic est parallogismus accidentis. Est autem notandum quod, cum haec dictio 'praeter' teneatur instantive, semper vult excipere ab aliqua divisione.

Et est regula quod vult reperire divisionem mobilem et reddere eam immobilem; cujus ratio est quod a divisione excipit aliquam partem respectu praedicati. Sed ita oportet excipi illam partem sicut prius fuit in divisione; ergo in ipsa divisione fuit respectu praedicati. Sed similiter supponebatur una sicut alia; ergo supponebantur<sup>117</sup> omnes partes divisim respectu praedicati; unde mobilis fuit divisio. Sed videtur quod non reddit eam immobilem; potest enim inferri: omnis homo praeter Sortem; ergo Plato. Et intelligendum quod regula vult ne possit inferri in subjecto cum sua determinatione; non enim potest inferri: omnis homo praeter Sortem currit; ergo Plato praeter Sortem currit.<sup>118</sup> Adhuc contra regulam sic: omne animal praeter Sortem currit; sed dicendum<sup>119</sup> quod regula non dicit quin aliquo modo teneat descensus, sed quod non universaliter teneat. Tenet enim solum cum fit descensus ad aliquam partem quae continet partem exceptam ut tetigit exceptio.<sup>120</sup> Sed contra: si nihil praeter Sortem currit, Sortes currit, et si Sortes currit, aliquid currit; ergo a primo: si nihil praeter etc.; ergo a destructione consequentis: si non aliquid currit, non nihil praeter Sortem currit; et si haec, aliquid praeter Sortem currit; ergo si nihil, aliquid; quod falsum est.

Et iterum contra regulam, quia in ultima propositione ly praeter non excipit ab aliqua divisione. Sed dicendum quod non valet hoc argumentum 'non nihil praeter Sortem currit,<sup>121</sup> ergo aliquid praeter Sortem', quia 'non nihil' et 'aliquid' non semper aequipollent, sed quando cadunt super idem. Sed sic non est hic quia ly non advenit post exceptionem et cadit super exceptionem;<sup>122</sup> sed ly nihil cadit sub exceptione. Primo enim est divisio ejus quod est 'nihil' et consequenter ab eo fit exceptio et consequenter advenit negatio ejus quod est 'non'.

Item quando ab aliqua divisione tot excipiuntur quot<sup>123</sup> supponuntur, falsa est locutio vel incongrua. Sed juxta hanc sic parallogizatur: sit quod Sortes videat omnem alium a se et seipsum non videat, et sic de singulis. Deinde: omnis homo videt omnem hominem praeter se. Probatio: Sortes videt omnem hominem praeter se et Plato, et sic de singulis; ergo omnis homo etc. Sed contra: ly se supponit pro omni homine; ergo tot excipiuntur quot supponuntur; ergo locutio falsa. Dicendum quod regula sic habet intelligi: si tot excipiantur et eodem modo. Et sic non est hic, quia multitudo ejus quod est 'omnem hominem' multotiens sumitur virtualiter, sed multitudo ejus quod est 'se' tantum semel, quia li se pro uno supposito excipitur ab hac multitudine semel sumpta et pro alio supposito ab eadem iterum sumpta, et sic bene potest esse quod supposita ejus, quod est 'se' semel sumpta excipiantur a seipsis pluries sumptis. Si autem sic procederet: omnis homo videt omnem hominem praeter se, ergo omnis homo videt omnem hominem praeter omnem hominem, non teneret. Cujus causa dicta est in hoc sophismate: omnis homo videt se; ergo omnis homo videt omnem hominem.

Item simile est: sit quod Sortes videatur ab omni homine alio a se et Plato, et sic de singulis. Deinde: omni homine excepto quilibet homo videt illum. Probatio

<sup>116</sup> om. O.

<sup>117</sup> supponebatur O.

<sup>118</sup> *marg. gloss* quia Plato non est commune a quo aliquid possit excipi et dictio exceptiva semper excipit a toto.

<sup>119</sup> inducendum O.

<sup>120</sup> *marg. gloss* id est exemplum praedi-

ctum scilicet omnis homo praeter Sortem.

<sup>121</sup> om. O.

<sup>122</sup> *marg. gloss* est sensus: non nihil praeter Sortem currit; nulla res currit non praeter Sortem, id est non excepto Sorte et etiam Sortes non currit.

<sup>123</sup> quos O.

per inductionem; inde omni homine etc. Contra: tot excipiuntur quot etc. Et dicendum ut prius [30r], scilicet<sup>124</sup> quod li omni homine semel sumptum excipitur ab eo quod est 'quolibet' multotiens sumpto et sic non eodem modo excipiuntur et supponuntur.

Item quidlibet est quidlibet excepto quolibet praeter ipsum. Probatio: Sortes est quidlibet etc., quia haec est falsa 'Sortes est quidlibet' pro quolibet praeter ipsum; unde facta exceptione pro his erit vera. Sed contra: ly ipsum supponit pro quolibet; ergo tot excipiuntur quot supponuntur. Sed dicendum quod non eodem modo quia ly ipsum semel sumptum excipitur a quolibet multotiens sumpto.

Item regula: terminus designans exceptum non confunditur a divisione a qua fit exceptio; cujus ratio est quod divisio cadit sub exceptione; unde ejus virtus non extendit se super exceptionem. Sed contra: sit quod omne aliud animal ab homine currat, sed homo non. Deinde: omne animal praeter hominem currit. Probatio: omne animal currit; haec est falsa et non est instantia nisi in homine; ergo facta exceptione pro eo erit vera; ergo prima vera. Sed<sup>125</sup> contra: per praedictam regulam ly homine non confunditur; ergo potest inferri: omne animal currit praeter Sortem vel praeter Platonem, et potest dici quod ly hominem non confunditur a distributione sed ab exceptione. Vel melius dicendum quod ly omne potest dividere<sup>126</sup> pro singulis generum vel pro generibus singulorum; si pro singulis generum, tunc li hominem excipitur pro aliquo supposito signato et falsa est locutio; si pro generibus singulorum, tunc non sic excipitur ly hominem sed simpliciter; nec potest<sup>127</sup> descendere, et sic vera esset locutio, nec esset contra regulam. In termino respectu cujus sit exceptio non tenet ascensus nec descensus. Cujus ratio est haec quod omnis exceptiva habet virtutem affirmationis et negationis. Ratione affirmationis non tenet descensus; ratione negationis non tenet ascensus; unde non valet: omnis homo praeter Sortem est albus; ergo omnis homo etc. est<sup>128</sup> coloratum. Sed contra: quaelibet decem praeter duo sunt octo; ergo quaelibet decem praeter duo sunt aliquot; bene tenet iste ascensus. Dicendum quod ly praeter hic tenetur diminutive; est enim sensus quod quaelibet decem diminuta per duo sunt etc. Regula autem intelligitur secundum quod tenetur instantive.

Item universalis in toto falsa non verificatur per exceptionem. Sed contra: quaelibet decem praeter tria sunt imparia quia septem, et tamen haec 'quaelibet decem sunt imparia' est in toto falsa. Dicendum quod adhuc ly praeter tenetur diminutive; est enim sensus: quaelibet decem diminuta per tria sunt imparia. Regula intelligitur secundum quod tenetur instantive.

Item si praejacens est in toto vera, exceptiva est falsa et e converso. Sed contra: quaelibet decem praeter duo sunt paria quia octo, et tamen praejacens est vera, scilicet 'quaelibet decem sunt paria'. Solutio ut prius. Si fuerint plures divisiones et excipiatur ab una et respectu alterius, etiam illa respectu cujus fit exceptio immobilitatur, verbi gratia, sit quod Sortes non videat asinum, sed omnes alii<sup>129</sup> videant burnellum et nullum alium. Deinde haec est falsa: nullus homo videt asinum et haec pro solo burnello; ergo eo excepto erit vera: nullus homo videt asinum praeter burnellum; ergo Sortes non videt asinum praeter burnellum; ergo videt burnellum; quod falsum est. Dicendum quod ly praeter advenit ad ly asinum postquam distribuitur; sed distribuitur per negationem de le nullus; ergo prius advenit ly nullus in [30v] subjecto quam ly praeter in praedicato. Unde ly nullus cadit sub respectu exceptionis et sub negatione quae jacet in exceptione, et est figura dictionis. Et aliter fallacia consequentis quia aequipollet his duobus 'nullus videt asinum alium a burnello', 'non nullus videt burnellum'. Et alia exceptiva<sup>130</sup>

<sup>124</sup> om. O.

<sup>125</sup> om. O.

<sup>126</sup> distribuere O.

<sup>127</sup> licet O.

<sup>128</sup> add. album vel O, deleted P.

<sup>129</sup> asini O.

<sup>130</sup> marg. gloss scilicet Sortes non videt asinum praeter burnellum.

aequipollet his 'Sortes non videt asinum alium a burnello', 'Sortes videt burnellum'. Sed prima primae exceptivae infert primam secundae, sed secunda non infert secundam quia 'non nullus' et 'aliquis' aequipollent; nec sequitur: aliquis: ergo Sortes, sed est fallacia consequentis. Quandoque autem accedit multiplicitas eo quod divisio a qua fit exceptio possit includere aliam, et tunc illa alia immobilizatur per exceptionem; vel includi ab ea, et tunc non, quia non cadit sub exceptione. Et hoc est cum neutra divisio dependet ab alia, verbi gratia, sit quod Sortes videat omnem asinum; alii omnem alium a burnello. Inde haec est falsa: omnis homo videt omnem asinum, et hoc pro solo burnello, quia alios vident omnes;<sup>131</sup> ergo haec est vera: omnis homo videt omnem asinum praeter burnellum; ergo Sortes videt etc.; quod falsum est quia videt burnellum. Et dicendum quod secunda divisio cum sua exceptione potest includere primam et aequipollet his 'omnis homo videt asinum omnem alium a burnello', 'non omnis homo videt burnellum', et sic est vera et immobilizatur prima. Vel potest includi ab ea et sic est falsa et improbatur. Primo modo significat quod 'videre omnem alium' conveniat omni; sed 'non videre burnellum' conveniat omni; secundo modo quod hoc totum 'videre omnem alium et non videre burnellum' conveniat omni.

Item sit quod Sortes et Plato ferant lapidem in communi et quilibet alius per se. Deinde haec est falsa: omnis homo fert lapidem et non nisi pro Sorte et Platone; ergo his exceptis erit vera; ergo omnis homo praeter Sortem et Platonem etc. Sed contra: si li et copulet inter propositiones, tunc est haec copulativa cuius<sup>132</sup> utraque pars est falsa, et sic tota; si inter terminos, tunc significat Sortem et Platonem non ferre lapidem; quod falsum est. Solutio: si copulet inter hos terminos 'Sortem' et 'Platonem', tunc falsa est ut dicit li contra; sed si inter hos terminos 'praeter Sortem', 'praeter Platonem', vera est; tunc enim multiplicatur exceptio per copulationem et divisim excipitur. Et primo modo debent 'Sortem' et 'Platonem' componi; secundo modo dividi.

Item in rei veritate Sortes videt omnem hominem in *a*, in *b* omnem hominem praeter Platonem. Deinde: Sortes bis videbit omnem hominem praeter Platonem. Probatio: haec est falsa 'Sortes bis videbit omnem hominem', et non est instantia nisi in Platone; ergo eo excepto erit vera. Deinde: ergo semel videbit omnem hominem praeter Platonem, et iterum etc. Vel contra: tantum semel videbit etc., scilicet in *b*. Et dicendum quod exceptio potest includere ly bis vel e converso. Si ly bis includat, significat quod 'videre omnem hominem praeter Platonem' conveniat Sorti bis et falsa est; si ly bis includatur, significat quod 'videre omnem alium' conveniat Sorti bis; sed 'videre Platonem' non, et est vera et sic probatur. Primo modo debet hoc totum 'videre omnem hominem praeter Platonem' componi, ut significetur quod hoc totum multiplicatur per ly bis; secundo modo debet ly praeter dividi a residuo, ut significetur quod ly bis non extendit se ad ly praeter, sed e converso.

## SOLUS

Postquam dictum est de signis et etiam de dictionibus exceptivis quae immediate signis [31r] adhaerent. Consequenter dicendum de hac dictione 'solus', tum quia proprie cadit circa subjectum sicut et signa, tum etiam propter oppositionem quam habet cum hac dictione 'omnis'. 'Omnis' enim semper dicit unum cum alio, 'solus' unum non cum alio.

Et quaeritur primo an haec dictio 'solus' sit syncategorema vel non. Et videtur quod non, quia, si dicatur 'Sortes incedit superbus', li superbus significat qualis sit

<sup>131</sup> add. burnellos O.

<sup>132</sup> om. O.

Sortes incedendo et sic, cum dicit qualitatem Sortis, quae est res praedicamentalis, non est syncategorema. Similiter si dicatur 'Sortes comedit solus', significat qualiter li Sortes se habet in comedendo et sic, cum dicat modum Sortis et relationem quae est res praedicamentalis, non erit syncategorema. Praedicamenta enim dicunt res et rerum dispositiones secundum quod res sunt. Et hoc patet aliter quia 'solus' significat 'non cum alio', et sic dicit separationem, et haec est relatio et res praedicamenti. Et dicendum quod cum significat separationem ab aliis secundum rem, tunc est categorema, ut probatum est, ut si dicatur: Sortes est solus; vel in praedicto exemplo ubi significat quod alii separentur a Sorte in actu comedendi. Cum autem significat separationem alicujus ab aliquo in participando praedicatum, tunc est syncategorema ut hic: solus Sortes currit; significat enim quod alii non participant praedicatum. Potest adhuc quaeri quare melius additur termino singulari sive discreto quam communi. Cujus ratio est haec quod in ejus intellectu cadit haec dictio 'alius' quae significat diversitatem secundum numerum in masculino et feminino; in neutro significat diversitatem secundum essentiam;<sup>137</sup> dicit enim numeralem diversitatem, id est, unius singularis ab alio et propterea additur singulari.

Praeterea<sup>138</sup> quaeritur an haec 'solus Sortes currit' sit una vel plures, quia tantum significat quantum haec: Sortes et non alius. Et dicendum quod non; significat enim hoc quod significat ut est dispositio subjecti, et propterea non facit numerum cum subjecto ut diceremus ibi duo subjecta.

Praeterea quaeritur an sit simpliciter affirmativa. Et videtur quod non, cum negatio sit pars significationis ejus quod est 'solus'. Et dicendum quod non; significat enim separationem aliorum ex qua consequenter intelligitur negatio, et hoc non facit orationem negativam. Et si dicat quod Aristoteles<sup>139</sup> definit hanc dictionem per negationem, ergo<sup>140</sup> significat negationem, dicendum quod similiter definit 'dici de omni' per negationem;<sup>141</sup> non tamen significat negationem.

Adhuc quaeritur quare haec dictio 'solus' dicitur magis exclusiva quam inclusiva. Cum enim dicitur 'solus Sortes currit', includitur Sortes sub cursu; alii autem excluduntur. Et dicendum quod hoc est quia inclusio non est ex virtute hujus dictionis 'solus', sed ex virtute suae praejacentis; exclusio autem est aliorum et ex virtute hujus dictionis.

Item regula quod haec dictio 'solus' quandoque excludit generaliter, quandoque specialiter, verbi gratia, solus Sortes currit. Primo modo sensus est: nihil aliud a Sorte currit, ut excluditur generaliter omne aliud a Sorte; secundo modo significat specialiter quod nihil aliud a Sorte currit in eodem genere. Et quaeritur quae sit causa hujus diversitatis. Et dicunt quidam quod hoc est quia haec dictio 'aliud', quae cadit in ejus significatione, dicitur multipliciter, aliud scilicet genere sicut quantitas et substantia et aliud, scilicet specie sicut homo et asinus, et aliud numero sicut Sortes et Plato. Et primo modo facit 'solus' generalem exclusionem; secundo specialem; tertio numeralem. Isti autem dicunt non tantum duos modos sed tres. Sed contra: secundum hoc, cum facit generalem exclusionem, non excluderet [31v] nisi ea quae sunt aliorum generum; quod falsum est quia tunc excluditur omne aliud. Et dicunt quod hoc est ex diversitate praedicamenti, scilicet quod non excluduntur nisi ea quae nata sunt participare praedicatum. Cum ergo praedicatum natum sit inesse omnibus, excludet generaliter omne aliud; et cum sit natum inesse specialiter rebus alicujus generis, excludit specialiter res illius generis. Exemplum primi: solus Sortes est; exemplum secundi: solus Sortes currit. Sed contra: bene dicitur 'solus Sortes est Sortes' et 'tantum homo est risibile', et

<sup>137</sup> om. in . . . essentiam O.

<sup>138</sup> propterea O.

<sup>139</sup> cf. *De soph. Elen.* XXII, 3; Didot I, 299, 33 (178 a 39).

<sup>140</sup> et O, corrected from et P.

<sup>141</sup> cf. *Anal. Post.* I, 4; Didot I, 125, 3 ff. (73 a 28 ff.).

tamen nihil est extra haec subjecta quod natum est recipere haec praedicata; unde secundum illos nihil excluditur.

Item cum eodem praedicato solemus ita distinguere, scilicet quod ferri possit exclusio generalis vel specialis; ergo non est ex diversitate praedicati. Dicendum quod haec diversitas provenit ex hoc quod haec negatio 'non aliud', quae jacet in hac dictione 'solus', potest negare simpliciter vel in genere. Si simpliciter, tunc removet universaliter omne aliud et facit generalem exclusionem; si in genere, tunc removet specialiter alia illius generis et fit specialis exclusio.

Item regula quod non tenet processus ab inferiori ad superius cum fit in subjecto exclusio, verbi gratia, solus Sortes currit; ergo solus Sortes movetur. Secundum<sup>138</sup> hoc procedit hoc sophisma: solus Sortes est idem soli Sorti. Probatio: Sortes est idem soli Sorti et nihil aliud est idem soli Sorti; ergo solus Sortes etc. Contra: ergo solus Sortes est indifferens a solo Sorte; ergo non differens; ergo non differt a solo Sorte. Contra: Plato non differt a solo Sorte; haec est vera; ergo haec est falsa: solus Sortes etc. Dicendum quod in hoc argumento 'solus Sortes est non differens, ergo solus Sortes non differt' est fallacia consequentis, quia 'esse non differens a solo Sorte' est in minus quam 'non differre a solo Sorte', quia hoc convenit soli Sorti; illud autem Sorti et aliis. Sed contra: propositio affirmativa de praedicato infinito et negativa de praedicato finito cum constantia subjecti aequipollent ut hae duae 'Sortes est non albus', 'Sortes non est albus'; ergo hae duae aequipollent 'Sortes est non differens', 'ergo Sortes non differt'; ergo addita utrobique exclusionem aequipollebunt; ergo tenet argumentum.

Et dicendum quod infinitatio et negatio cadunt super idem; tunc aequipollent cum constantia subjecti, sed cum 'non' non, verbi gratia, sit Sortes niger; haec est falsa: Sortes est non homo albus; haec autem vera: Sortes non est homo albus. Et causa hujus est quia, cum negatio infinitans cedit in eandem dictionem cum eo quod infinitatur, necesse est quod solum cadat super unam dictionem; unde in prima negatur solum li homo et propterea falsa est;<sup>139</sup> in secunda negatur ly homo albus. Similiter est in proposito quia in prima negatur ly differens; in secunda hoc totum 'differre a solo Sorte'.

Item regula: exclusio praecedens divisionem reddit eam immobilem. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: a solo Sorte differt quicquid non est Sortes. Probatio: a Sorte differt etc. et non ab alio, quia non a Platone differt etc., quia ipse non differt a se, et sic de aliis; ergo prima vera. Contra: ergo a solo Sorte differt Plato qui non est Sortes; quod falsum est,<sup>140</sup> cum differt a Cicerone. Et dicendum quod li quicquid immobilizatur virtute negationis quae jacet in exclusionem praecedente. Unde est ibi fallacia figurae dictionis; vel aliter consequentis quia ly quicquid est in minus quam li Plato [32r]. Cum ergo procedatur a minus communi ad majus<sup>141</sup> commune praecedente exclusionem est paralogismus consequentis. Quod patet si comparetur affirmativa conclusionis ad affirmativam praemissae et negativa ad negativam, cum tam praemissa quam conclusio resolvitur in affirmativam et negativam.

Item cum fuerit exclusio in subjecto et implicatio in subjecto vel praedicato; multiplex est locutio eo quod possit implicatio cadere sub exclusionem vel non. Exemplum primi: sit Sortes albus et currat, et alii nigri et currant. Deinde: solus Sortes qui est albus currit<sup>142</sup> et nullus alius qui est albus currit, quia nullus alius est albus; ergo solus Sortes etc.; ergo solus Sortes currit et ille est albus; quod falsum est. Solutio: probatur secundum quod implicatio cadit sub exclusionem; improbat secundum quod non cadit sub exclusionem. Primo modo est oratio composita;

<sup>138</sup> per O.

<sup>139</sup> om. O.

<sup>140</sup> om. O.

<sup>141</sup> magis O.

<sup>142</sup> *mag. gloss* probatio; Sortes qui est albus currit.

secundo modo divisa. Exemplum secundi: sint tantum decem homines. Deinde: soli novem homines sunt qui non soli sunt. Probatio: novem homines sunt etc. et non plures sunt, qui non soli sunt, quia decem sunt, qui soli sunt. Contra:<sup>143</sup> ergo soli novem homines sunt et illi non soli sunt. Solutio: dicendum quod probatur secundum quod implicatio cadit sub exclusione; improbat secundum quod cadit extra. Primo modo debet li qui componi cum li sunt praecedente; secundo modo dividi. Dicunt tamen aliqui quod haec ultima 'soli novem homines sunt et illi non soli sunt' multiplex est eo quod copulatio potest cadere sub exclusione, ut significetur quod hoc, quod dico 'novem', vere potest ordinari cum hoc toto 'sunt et illi non sunt soli', immo<sup>144</sup> plures cum eodem toto, et sic est oratio composita et vera. Vel non sub exclusione ut significetur quod soli novem homines sunt et illi non sunt soli. Et sic solvitur hoc sophisma: sit Sortes albus et Plato albior illo et nullo alio. Deinde: solus Sortes est albus et Plato est albior illo. Probatio: Sortes est albus etc. et nullus alius est albus et Plato est albior etc.; ergo solus Sortes etc. Sed contra: haec est copulativa cujus prima pars est falsa; ergo tota. Dicunt quidam quod prima probatur secundum quod copulatio cadit sub exclusione et est oratio composita et vera; improbat autem<sup>145</sup> secundum quod cadit extra et est divisa et falsa. Utrum autem bene dicatur apparebit in tractatu ejus quod est 'et'.<sup>146</sup>

Item adhuc sciendum quod, cum est implicatio in subjecto, dupliciter potest cadere sub exclusione, aut scilicet ex parte ejus circa quod fit exclusio, aut ex parte ejus respectu cujus fit exclusio ut in praedicto exemplo.<sup>147</sup> Primo modo est sensus quod nullus alius a Sorte albo etc.; secundo modo improbat. Et est sensus: nullus alius qui est albus etc. Primo modo debet li qui est albus componi cum li Sortes; secundo modo dividi ab eo et componi cum praedicato. Et est tertius sensus in quo debet ab utroque dividi, scilicet prout implicatio cadit extra.

Item si fuerit duplex exclusio, potest una includere aliam vel e converso. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: sola duo sunt pauciora solis tribus. Probatio: sola duo sunt pauciora tribus et non aliis quia non quattuor sunt sola duo pauciora; ergo sola duo sunt pauciora solis tribus. Contra: ergo duo sunt pauciora solis tribus; quod falsum est quia sunt pauciora quam quattuor. Et dicendum quod prima probatur secundum quod li solis includit li sola; improbat autem e converso. Et primo modo debet li solis dividi a li pauciora; secundo modo componi. Divisio enim significat quod virtus primae exclusionis ibi sistit et non transit [32v] ad aliam, sed e converso; compositio autem significat quod virtus primae attingit secundam. Possumus autem cognoscere quod in probatione secunda includit primam per hoc quod ad secundam habebatur respectus in probatione et quod prima includit secundam in improbatione; patet per hoc quod ad illam habebatur respectus in improbatione. Simile est<sup>148</sup> sophisma: solus nominativus praecedat solum genetivum. Probatio: solus nominativus praecedat genetivum et nullum alium; ergo solus. Deinde: ergo nominativus praecedat solum genetivum; quod falsum est. Solutio quae prius.

Item sciat Sortes<sup>149</sup> septem artes et Plato tres illarum. Deinde: plura sciuntur a Sorte quam a solo Sorte. Probatio: septem sciuntur a Sorte et tantum quattuor a solo Sorte, quia tres sciuntur ab alio; ergo plura etc. Sed contra: septem sciuntur a solo Sorte, quia nullus alius scit septem; ergo tot sciuntur a solo Sorte quot a Sorte. Et potest dici quod haec 'septem sciuntur a solo Sorte' significat quod septem sciuntur a Sorte et septem non sciuntur ab alio, et si li septem teneantur divisim, tunc vult divisio quod una non sciatur ab alio nec alia nec tertia et sic deinceps;

<sup>143</sup> om. O.

<sup>144</sup> et non O. corr. fr. et non P.

<sup>145</sup> om. O.

<sup>146</sup> cf. p. 84.

<sup>147</sup> marg. gloss solus Sortes qui est albus.

<sup>148</sup> om. O.

<sup>149</sup> om. O.

quod falsum est; et si conjunctim, tunc est oratio plures, in parte vera, in parte falsa; et in improbatione est fallacia consequentis a negatione praeposita termino numerali ad eandem postpositam. Arguit enim sic: nullus alius scit septem; ergo septem non sciuntur ab alio. Et est simile: nullus alius videt omnem hominem; ergo omnis homo non videtur ab alio. Supponit autem ista solutio quod, quando li solus postponitur huic dictioni 'septem', non potest eam includere; et utrum hoc sit verum dicetur postea.

Item sit quod Sortes videatur ab omni homine et quilibet alius videat se tantum. Deinde: omnis homo videt solum Sortem. Probatio: omnis homo videt Sortem et non omnis homo videt alium, quia Sortes non videt alium;<sup>150</sup> ergo omnis homo etc.; ergo Plato videt solum Sortem; quod falsum est. Solutio: prima probatur secundum quod ly solum includit divisionem; cadit enim negatio exclusionis supra divisionem in probatione. Procedit autem improbatio secundum quod divisio includit ly solum. Primo modo debet ly solum dividi a praedicato ut significetur quod divisio non attingit ipsum; secundo modo componi. Sed contra: ly solum postponitur divisioni; ergo si accipiamus negationem ab ipso, debet etiam postponi ut sit sensus: omnis homo videt Sortem et omnis homo non videt alium, et erit falsa. Sed contra: dicit Aristoteles<sup>151</sup> quod omne animal habet solum tactum, et si negatio ejus, quod est 'solum', postponeretur<sup>152</sup> divisioni, esset falsa.

Item per hanc rationem non praeponeretur negatio ei, quod est 'videt', cum exclusio sequatur ipsum.

Item cum factus est iste sermo 'omnis homo videt Sortem', si velim significare quod ly Sortem stat respectu divisionis cum praecisione, apponam hanc dictionem 'solus', et si ly solus debeat hoc significare, praecedet negatio suam divisionem et hoc verum est. Unde, licet postponatur divisioni, potest tamen eam includere et secundum hoc potest in penultimo sophismate distingui haec propositio 'septem sciuntur a solo Sorte', quia si li solo includit li septem, sic vera est; et si includatur, falsa. Et quia prior solutio est communior, licet haec sit verior, de ista non curandum.

Item sit quod [33r] Sortes ferat lapidem per se et Sortes et Plato ferant insimul alium. Deinde: solus Sortes fert lapidem. Probatio: nullus alius etc.; ergo solus etc. Contra: Sortes et alius ferunt. Dicendum quod en li contra li et tenetur conjunctim; non autem contradicit nisi secundum quod tenetur divisim.

Item solus Sortes et duo sunt tria. Probatio: Sortes non cum alio et duo sunt tria; ergo solus etc. Contra: Plato et duo sunt tria; non ergo solus etc. Dicendum quod ly solus potest cadere sub copulatione et sic probatur; vel supra et sic improbat; sic enim significat quod nullus alius et duo sunt tria. Sed intellige quod primo modo est categorema, quia tunc est pars subjecti copulati; ipsum autem subjectum prius est copulatum quam ei adveniat praedicatum et secundum hoc ly solus venit in hunc sermonem ante adventum praedicati; et sic non est syncategorema, quia omne syncategorema habet respectum ad praedicatum; secundo autem modo est syncategorema et sic est parallogismus aequivocationis.

## TANTUM

Consequenter dicendum est de hac dictione 'tantum', de qua sciendum quod secundum ejus primam significationem non est syncategorema, sed dicit certam mensuram alicujus actus sicut haec 'multum', 'parum'<sup>153</sup> dicunt incertas mensuras. Et est adverbium quantitatis sicut illa. Cum autem haec ratio mensurae<sup>154</sup> contra-

<sup>150</sup> om. quia . . . alium O.

<sup>151</sup> cf. *De Anima* III, 12 *passim*; Didot III, 474, 7-8 and 475, 9-11 (434 a 28 and 435 a 12-14).

<sup>152</sup> postponetur O.

<sup>153</sup> parvum O.

<sup>154</sup> mensuretur O.

hitur ad rationem subjecti respectu praedicati, vel praedicati respectu subjecti, tunc recipit haec dictio 'tantum' sic denotans mensuram rationem syncategorematis ut cum dico 'tantum Sortes currit', dicit enim quantum de subjecto est sub praedicato, scilicet quod hoc subjectum 'Sortes' est sub illo et non amplius, et sic est dictio exclusiva. Sed dubitatur, cum sit adverbium, qualiter possit determinare subjectum, quia omne adverbium vult ad verbum ferri.<sup>155</sup> Et dicendum quod verum est hoc, sed immediate vel mediate. Haec autem dictio 'tantum' quando determinat subjectum, determinat ipsum respectu praedicati et sic mediate respicit verbum. Sciendum autem quod eodem modo potest excludere generaliter vel specialiter sicut haec dictio 'solus', quia similiter immobilitat divisionem<sup>156</sup> sicut ipsa. Et similiter impedit processum ab inferiori ad superius et e converso. Et similiter in multis aliis conveniunt.

Est autem regula quod haec dictio 'tantum' adjuncta termino numerali excludit majorem numerum et non minorem, ut si dicatur 'tantum tres', non potest inferri: non ergo duo, sed: non ergo quattuor vel quinque. Sed contra: cum sic dicitur, excluditur omne aliud quam tres, sed duo sunt aliud quam tres, quia non sunt tres; ergo excluduntur duo. Et dicendum quod haec dictio 'tantum' excludit non omne aliud, sed quod est aliud respectu praedicati; aliquod autem est praedicatum respectu cuius duo sunt aliud ab eo quod est tres et aliud respectu cuius non. Primo modo excluduntur tam minor quam major numerus; secundo modo tantum major. Exemplum primi: tantum tres sunt tres, vel tantum tres trahunt navem, et sumatur conjunctim. Exemplum secundi: tantum tres currunt.

Item regula quod, cum haec dictio 'tantum' apponitur termino copulato, multiplex est locutio eo scilicet quod potest excludere circa totum vel circa partem, et hoc vel circa primam vel circa secundam. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: tantum verum opponitur falso. Probatio: verum opponitur falso et nihil aliud quam verum etc.; ergo tantum verum etc. Deinde: ergo tantum verum et falsum opponuntur. Contra: album et nigrum opponuntur, et sumatur prima secundum quod excluditur circa li verum. Dicendum quod haec 'tantum verum et falsum' etc. multiplex est eo quod, [33v] possit fieri<sup>157</sup> exclusio circa hoc totum 'verum et falsum'. Et est sensus: non album et nigrum etc. ut excludantur alii termini copulati, et est oratio falsa; vel circa primam partem, et est oratio vera et sequitur ex praemissa. Et est sensus: non album et falsum opponuntur, non nigrum, et sic de singulis.<sup>158</sup> Vel etiam circa aliam partem, et est oratio vera, sed non ad propositum. Et est sensus: non verum et album opponuntur. Similiter est etiam cum adiungitur termino disjuncto ut hic: tantum verum vel falsum est propositio. Contra: album vel verum est propositio; vel sic: verum vel album. Et probatur prout fit exclusio circa totum terminum disjunctum; improbatur autem primo prout excluditur circa partem primam; secundo prout circa secundam. Et similiter est hic: tantum rationale vel irrationale est animal. Contra: rationale vel lapis est animal. Vel contra: lapis vel irrationale est animal.

Item cum adiungitur termino concreto potest excludere ratione substantiae vel ratione qualitatis signatae. Et istud facit diversitatem proprie in talibus concretis, quorum qualitates simul cum oppositis suis possunt inesse eidem; quales sunt 'alter', 'reliquus', 'magister', 'discipulus', 'unum', 'multa'; quae enim divisim sunt subjectum unitatis, eadem conjunctim sunt subjectum multitudinis. Per hoc hoc sophisma solvitur: sint tantum Sortes et Plato et uterque sit magister alterius; inde tantum magister est. Probatio: magister est et nihil aliud quam magister est; ergo tantum etc. Contra: discipulus est. Si fiat exclusio ratione substantiae, vera

<sup>155</sup> cf. Priscian G. L. II p. 56, 3 ff.  
<sup>156</sup> dictionem O.

<sup>157</sup> inferri O.  
<sup>158</sup> aliis O.



est, et sic probatur; aliud enim dicit diversitatem in substantia. Si ratione qualitatis, sic est falsa et sic improbat: tantum alter istorum est.<sup>150</sup> Probatio: quicquid est, est alter istorum. Contra: reliquus istorum est.

Item tantum unum est; probetur eodem modo. Contra: multa sunt. Solutio quae prius. Hic distinguunt quidam quod unum est aequivocum; uno modo enim est principium numeri et sic habet oppositum cum eo quod est multa; secundo modo convertitur cum ente, et sic probatur; alio modo improbat. Sed contra: omnis unitas, ex qua et alia fit binarius, est principium numeri; sed omne quod est tali unitate est unum; ergo omne, quod est, est<sup>100</sup> unum unitate numeri; ergo unum quod est principium numeri convertitur cum ente. Unde sicut haec est vera 'tantum ens est', sic haec est vera 'tantum unum est', etiam secundum quod unitas est principium numeri. Dicunt alii hic esse fallaciam figurae dictionis, scilicet, si dicatur 'quicquid est, est unum, ergo tantum unum est', et hic nihil est quod non sit unum, ergo tantum etc. Unum enim, cum stat in praedicato, stat communiter pro omni uno, sed cum stat in subjecto, stat pro aliquo uno simpliciter; unum est et nihil aliud quam unum est, quia, cum dico 'nihil aliud quam unum', idem est ac si dicerem 'nihil est quod non sit unum'; unde virtutem habet implicationis. Contra: secundum hoc non tenet huiusmodi processus: quicquid est, est homo; ergo tantum homo est. Ad hoc dicunt ipsi quod huiusmodi dictiones 'unum' et 'alter', cum stant in subjecto, volunt stare pro aliquo uno suorum suppositorum; sed haec dictio 'homo' indifferenter stat pro uno et pro multis. Sed contra fiat huiusmodi processus: unum est et nullum non unum est; ergo tantum unum est. Et si dicatur adhuc quod hoc, quod dico 'non unum', virtualiter stat in praedicato, idem enim [34r] est ac si dicerem 'non ens unum', vel quod non est unum. Dicatur quod similiter li unum stat in conclusione quia tantum unum, hoc est, tantum ens unum vel tantum hoc quod est unum.

Item regula: quot sunt dictiones in huiusmodi sermonibus, tot sunt sensus, eo quod li tantum possit excludere circa unum vel circa alterum, verbi gratia, tantum Sortes percutit Platonem; si excludat circa li Sortes, est sensus quod nullus alius percutit etc.; si circa li percutit, est sensus quod Sortes non currit et sic de aliis actibus; si circa li Platonem, est sensus quod Sortes nullum alium percutit.

Item regula quod, cum illud circa quod fit exclusio habet respectum ad diversa, potest respectu illorum fieri exclusio. Et intellige quod circa illud fit exclusio cuius oppositum excluditur; sed respectu illius fit exclusio ad quod fertur negatio. Et hoc verum est tam in hac dictione 'solus' quam in hac dictione 'tantum'. Sic est haec multiplex: navis unum solum potest ferre; si namque fiat exclusio respectu de le potest, est sensus: non potest ferre plura; si respectu de le ferre, est sensus: potest non ferre plura.

Item currant sex homines et sciat Sortes tres illorum currere et non plures. Deinde: Sortes scit tantum tres homines currere; et excludat ly tantum circa li tres. Probatio: Sortes scit tres etc. et non scit plures etc.; ergo scit tantum tres etc. Contra: sed quicquid scitur est verum; ergo tantum tres homines currere est verum. Et dicendum quod per penultimam regulam li tantum potest excludere circa singulas dictiones huius orationis; per ultimam autem etiam secundum quod excludit circa li tres potest excludere respectu de le scit. Et est sensus: non scit plures etc., et sic probatur; vel respectu del currere, et est sensus: scit plures non currere, et sic improbat. Sensus autem provenientes ex hoc quod circa diversa potest fieri exclusio sunt hi: si circa li Sortes, est sensus: nullus alius scit etc.; si circa<sup>101</sup> li scit, est sensus: non dubitat, non ignorat; si circa li tres, est sensus

<sup>150</sup> *marg. gloss* retenta priori positione.

<sup>100</sup> om. O, s. s. P.

<sup>101</sup> contra O.

duplex ut dictum est; si circa li homines, est sensus: non scit tres asinos etc.; si circa hoc totum 'tres homines', est sensus: non scit aliud currere; si circa li currere, est sensus: non scit plures disputare; si circa hoc totum 'tres homines currere', est sensus: non scit aliud. Intellige tamen quod secundum quod excludit circa li homines vel circa hoc totum 'tres homines', potest hoc facere dupliciter, vel respectu del scit ut dictum est, vel respectu del currere, ut feratur negatio ad ipsum. Et similiter circa ly currere, vel respectu del scit ut dictum est, vel respectu del tres ut ibi, et non ad li scit ponatur negatio.

Item sophisma: retenta prima positione tantum sex homines currere est verum, quoniam tantum sex homines currunt; ergo tantum sex homines currere est possibile. Contra: decem currere est possibile et excludat semper circa ly sex. Et dicendum quod in prima potest fieri exclusio, vel respectu del currere, vel respectu del est verum et utroque modo est vera. Et primo modo est sensus: plures homines non currere est verum; secundo modo est sensus quod plures homines currere non est verum. Similiter conclusio multiplex est, sed<sup>162</sup> primo modo vera, secundo modo falsa. Et primo modo sequitur ex prima nec obviat ei li contra ut patet; secundo modo non sequitur, sed est paralogismus consequentis sic: hoc non est verum; ergo est possibile. Et hoc patet si comparetur affirmativa affirmativa et negativa negativae.

Item sophisma: ad 'solum Sortem currere' sequitur 'hominem [34v] currere'. Probatio: si solus Sortes currit, homo currit; ergo etc. Contra: ad alium quam ad Sortem sequitur 'hominem currere'; non ergo ad solum Sortem etc. Dicendum quod prima multiplex est eo quod poterit fieri exclusio respectu del currere, et sic est vera, et sic probatur. Vel respectu del sequitur, et sic improbatur, et est falsa, quia sic obstat ei ly contra. Sed contra: haec dictio 'Sortem' circa quam fit exclusio non habet respectum ad li sequitur; ergo respectu ejus non potest fieri exclusio. Et dicendum quod licet ad ipsum non habeat respectum immediatum, habet tamen mediante<sup>163</sup> li currere.

Item ad 'solum Sortem currere' sequitur 'Sortem currere'. Probatio: ad Sortem currere etc. et non ad alium etc.; ergo ad solum etc. Contra: ad Sortem et ad alium etc. quia, si Sortes et alius currunt, Sortes currit. Dicendum quod prima vera est omni sensu, sed ly contra est multiplex eo quod potest esse compositum vel divisum. Si sit compositum, vera est illa propositio, sed non instat exclusionem nisi teneretur divisum ut dictum est superius. Si sit divisum, sic falsa est illa propositio, ut patet. Causa autem quare<sup>164</sup> sic potest fieri exclusio respectu diversorum est, quod in talibus illud, circa quod excluditur, primo habet respectum ad unum, consequenter ad aliud. Unde si adveniat ei exclusio priusquam istud secundum ordinetur, excludat tantum respectu primi; si autem post, excludit respectu illius secundi; semper enim excludit respectum illius ad quod in suo adventu habet respectum illud circa quod excluditur.

# EST

Cum jam dictum vel determinatum sit de dictionibus syncategorematicis pertinentibus ad subjectum, dupliciter possumus procedere, aut scilicet determinando de his quae pertinent ad compositionem, aut de his quae pertinent ad praedicatum. Et primo modo procedentes primo modo determinemus de hoc verbo 'est', non quia sit syncategorema, sed quia a multis ponitur esse syncategorema.<sup>165</sup> Et illi

<sup>162</sup> om. O.

<sup>163</sup> mediate O.

<sup>164</sup> qua O.

<sup>165</sup> cf. P. Abelard, *Glossae super Peri er-*

*meneias, Beiträge zur Geschichte d. Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Bd. 21, Heft 1, ed. B. Geyer (Munster, 1927), p. 359.

nuntur hinc dicto Aristotelis,<sup>103</sup> scilicet quod 'est' consignificat<sup>107</sup> quamdam compositionem quam sine compositis non est intelligere. Credunt enim quod hoc 'consignificare' sit suum 'significare' et sic solum sit consignificativum et praedicativum sicut syncategorema. Sed contra: verbum est nota ejus quod de altero dicitur; hoc autem est praedicatum; ergo omne verbum est nota vel signum praedicati; ergo hoc verbum 'est' est signum praedicati et non solum compositionis praedicati cum subjecto. Sed dicitur forte quod 'est' non est verbum, sed radix omnium verborum. Sed contra: ex solo nomine et verbo fit propositio; ergo ipsum 'est' est verbum. Dicitur ergo consignificare, non quia cum alia dictione significat et ingrediatur orationem, sed quia cum principali suo significato compositionem significat; ob hoc autem non est syncategorema.

Sed videtur adhuc quod quando 'est' est tertium adjacens, non sit ibi praedicatum, sed solum compositio ut hic: homo est animal, quia in ejus conversa ly animal subicitur tantum. Quia ergo converti sit facere de subjecto praedicatum, debemus dicere quod omnes propositiones haberent idem praedicatum, quia, si praedicetur alterum verbum, convenit resolvere ipsum in suum participium et in hoc verbum 'est', ut homo currit, hoc est, homo est currens; homo ambulat, est ambulans, et sic de aliis. Ad primum dicendum quod, cum dico 'homo est animal', res hujus verbi 'est' specificatur per ly animal; sed haec est natura specificationis quod specificans et specificatum cedant in ipsum specificatum; unde res hujus verbi 'est' cedit in idem cum li animal et praedicando suam rem sicut hic [35r] stat ly animal; unde licet li animal praedicatur, nihilominus li est praedicatur. Ad aliud dicendum quod ut jam patet per diversa adjuncta cedit in diversa praedicata; unde licet in qualibet propositione praedicetur hoc verbum 'est'; non tamen idem erit praedicatum in omnibus.

Sciendum autem quod hoc verbum 'est' quandoque accipitur aequivoce; dicit enim quandoque esse actuale quod debetur actualiter existenti; quandoque esse habituale quod debetur ei quod in se est natura aliqua et natum est habitualiter esse in aliquo singulari, licet non actualiter sit. Primo modo haec<sup>108</sup> est falsa: omnis homo est animal nullo homine existente; secundo modo vera, et sic sumitur in hac 'omnis homo est animal' secundum quod ly omnis dividit pro partibus secundum speciem. Quidam etiam dicunt hanc esse multiplicem eadem multiplicitate 'homo est nullo homine existente'; dicunt enim quod falsa est primo modo, vera secundo modo. Quidam autem dicunt quod in hac et in aliis, ubi 'est' non est tertium adjacens, dicit solum esse actuale; sed ubi est tertium adjacens et est praedicatio superioris de inferiori tenetur aequivoce ut homo est animal; dicit enim esse animal in homine. Cum ergo animal habeat esse secundo modo dictum, potest ibi dicere tale esse et cum etiam quandoque habeat esse primo modo dictum, poterit etiam dicere tale esse. Et hoc satis bene dicitur quia, ut videtur, si sic diceretur 'homo est', dicit hic esse simpliciter et completum; quod quidem homini non inest; si non actualiter, sic nec est aliquid quod trahit ipsum ut dicat esse secundo modo dictum quod est esse diminutivum sicut in alio exemplo.

## NON

Sequitur de hac dictione 'non', et videtur quod debeat esse verbum quia significat divisionem et haec, ut videtur, opponitur compositioni denotatae per hoc verbum 'est', et sic debet esse verbum sicut et ipsum; contraria enim ejusdem sunt generis. Et dicendum quod haec ratio peccat dupliciter, tum quia

<sup>103</sup> *Periher.* c. 3; Didot I, 25, 45 (16 b 24);  
for what follows cf. *ibid.* and *passim*.

<sup>107</sup> significat P.  
<sup>108</sup> om. O.

haec dictio 'non' cum significet divisionem tantum—haec dictio 'est' non significat compositionem tantum ut dictum est prius et sic non significant contraria—tum etiam quia compositio denotata sive consignificata per hoc verbum 'est' non opponitur ei quod est 'non', quia compositio est modus significandi<sup>100</sup> dependenter, ratione cuius exigit sibi nominativum et hoc est illud quo propositio est unum ex suis partibus. Cum autem huic consentit anima, asserit et est affirmatio; cum autem dissentit, deasserit et est negatio. Est ergo compositio hujus verbi 'est' sicut subjectum affirmationi et negationi et opponitur negatio ejus quod est 'non' affirmationi et non compositioni, nisi affirmatio vocetur compositio, et hoc est aliud a compositione hujus verbi, ut dictum est.

Sciendum etiam quod quandoque sistit in uno termino et tunc facit infinitationem; quandoque fertur ad compositionem unius cum alio et hoc dupliciter, aut faciendo negationem in genere, aut extra genus. Sed hoc non provenit ex sua virtute propria, sed ex hoc quod loquentes quandoque coartant suos sermones ad materiam determinatam ut, si intentio sit loqui de animali et dicatur 'nihil aliud ab homine', intelligitur nullum aliud animal, et hoc dictum est circa hanc dictionem 'solutus'; quantum autem [35v] est de se negat pro omni.

Item quandoque tenetur extinctive, quandoque non, verbi gratia, non Sorte corrente tu es asinus; si feratur ad totum, vera est et tenetur extinctive; si sistat in participio falsa est. Similiter haec: tu non es homo qui est asinus; sed melius est, ut dicamus, orationes posse componi vel dividi ut dictum est in praecedentibus.

Item frequenter accidit quod negativa multas potest habere causas veritatis, et tunc si ex illa inferatur aliqua illarum, erit fallacia consequentis. Et sciendum quod eisdem causis, quibus potest affirmativa falsificari, potest etiam negativa verificari. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: tu tantum es asinus, haec est falsa; ergo haec est vera: non tu tantum es asinus; ergo tu et alius estis asini. Dicendum quod prima potuit falsificari, aut quia tu non est asinus, aut quia licet sis asinus, alius tamen est asinus et his duobus potest haec negativa 'non tu tantum' etc. verificari. Cum ergo ex illa inferatur secundus modus tantum sive secunda causa suae veritatis, erit fallacia consequentis. Sed contra: en li tantum jacet una negatio et alia ei expresse praeponeatur; quae duae, ut videtur, debent valere unam affirmationem; ergo sequitur praedicta conclusio.

Sed intellige quod in hac 'non tu tantum' etc. virtualiter sunt duae propositiones et negatio quae ibi jacet virtualiter solum pertinet ad unam illarum. Prima autem negatio pertinet ad totum et sic, cum non pertineant ad idem, non valebunt unam affirmationem. Similiter per hoc solvitur hoc sophisma: plura sunt vera de sibi totidem quam sunt vera de paucioribus se. Probatio: quaecumque sunt vera de paucioribus se sunt vera de sibi totidem, quia tria enuntiabilia sunt vera de paucioribus se, quia de duobus, verbi gratia haec tria 'Sortem esse hominem', 'Sortem esse animal', 'Platonem esse coloratum' sunt vera de duobus, scilicet de Sorte et Platone et sic de paucioribus se. Et similiter tria sunt vera de tribus et sic de sibi totidem ut haec tria 'Sortem esse hominem', 'Ciceronem esse hominem', 'Platonem esse hominem' sunt vera de tribus, scilicet Sorte, Cicerone, Platone. et eodem modo quattuor sunt vera de paucioribus se et quattuor sibi totidem et sic de aliis; ergo quocumque sunt vera etc. Et non convertitur quia duo sunt vera de sibi totidem, et duo non sunt vera de paucioribus se, quia non sunt pauciora; unum enim non est pauciora sed paucius; ergo non e converso; ergo plura etc. Sed contra: infinita sunt vera de sibi totidem et infinita sunt vera de paucioribus se

<sup>100</sup> cf. G. Wallerand, *Les Oeuvres de Siger de Courtrai*, (Louvain 1913), *Les Philosophes Belges* vol. VIII, p. 94. In this work the various modi significandi are discussed.

et infinita non sunt plura infinitis; ergo haec est falsa: plura etc. Dicendum quod hoc verum est, et in probatione incidit fallacia consequentis, quia haec propositio 'quotcumque sunt vera de sibi totidem, tot sunt vera de paucioribus se' potest falsificari, aut quia sit sumere aliquot vera de sibi totidem, quot non sunt vera de paucioribus se vel in maioribus<sup>170</sup> numeris vel in minoribus; unde hoc 'non quotcumque sunt vera de sibi totidem' verificatur his duabus de causis et hanc intelligit cum dicit 'et non e converso', sed haec 'plura sunt vera' etc. habet tantum unam illarum causarum. Dicit enim quod in maioribus numeris sit sumere aliquot vera de sibi totidem et non de paucioribus se, et sic est paralogismus consequentis. Exemplum ejusdem [36r]: sint sex homines tantum et sint albi et tres trahant navem in communi, et illi tres cum quarto trahant aliam, et illi quattuor cum quinto aliam, et illi quinque cum sexto aliam. Deinde: quotcumque trahunt navem, tot sunt albi, et non convertitur, quia duo sunt albi et non trahunt navem; ergo plures sunt albi<sup>171</sup> quam trahunt navem. Contra: tantum sex sunt albi et tot trahunt navem, et est hic paralogismus consequentis,<sup>172</sup> ut satis patet. Quidam tamen dicunt quod haec est falsa 'infinita non sunt plura infinitis', si<sup>173</sup> loquamur de infinitis quae sunt infinita ex altera parte tantum, et sic est in proposito; et propterea solvunt negando ipsam propositionem. Contra hoc autem sunt multae rationes quas ad praesens dimittamus.

Item plus tollit negatio quam ponit affirmatio ut haec 'homo currit' vult solum quod aliquis currat, sed haec negatio 'nullus homo currit' extendit se ad omnes. Sed si sic intelligatur, pari ratione possit dari haec contraria quia, si dicatur 'omnis homo currit', haec affirmatio extendit se ad omnes; negatio autem non nisi ad aliquem. Propterea sic dicamus quod in propositione de praesenti et non ampliandi solum habetur respectus ad praesentes, sed in negativa etiam ad non existentes, quia, si nullus homo currit, ergo nec Caesar, quia si Caesar curreret, tunc Caesar esset et sic esset homo; ergo homo curreret. Ergo a primo: si Caesar currit, homo currit; ergo si nullus homo currit, nec Caesar. Sed contra: si hoc argumentum tenet, tunc ut videtur est ibi locus a toto in quantitate,<sup>174</sup> et tunc ly homo stabit pro Caesare et sic pro non existente. Sed dicendum quod hoc non est verum; quod patet in hoc exemplo: nullus homo, qui actualiter est, currit; ergo nec Caesar quia sequitur: si Caesar currit, Caesar actualiter est et similiter est homo; unde si nullus homo, qui actualiter est, ergo nec Caesar. Et quamvis teneat hoc argumentum, patet tamen quod hic totalis terminus 'homo qui actualiter est' non supponit pro Caesare nec est ibi locus a toto in quantitate; nec in praecedenti, sed magis ab oppositis, quia haec affirmativa 'Caesarem currere' repugnat praemissae in utroque termino, non quia Caesar sit homo, sed quia, si curreret, esset homo; et quia affirmativa repugnat, sequitur negativa.

Item regula quod negatio impedit processus ab inferiori ad superius. Sed contra: unde sequitur: homo non currit; ergo animal non currit, quia, si omne animal, tunc omnis homo. Sed dicendum quod regula intelligenda est, cum negatio attingit illud inferius et illud superius; et sic non est hic; unde non sequitur: non homo currit; ergo non animal currit.

### NECESSARIO, CONTINGENTER

Sequitur de his dictionibus 'necessario', 'contingenter' et sciendum quod haec dictio 'necessario' potest esse categorema vel syncategorema. Si categorema, sic est determinatio praedicati: si syncategorema, tunc compositionis. Et similiter 'contingenter'. Sed contra: compositio nihil est nisi in extremis vel extremo; ergo

<sup>170</sup> *marg. gloss* alias in minoribus.

<sup>171</sup> *s. s. gloss* hoc est sophisma.

<sup>172</sup> *s. s. gloss* scilicet in probatione.

<sup>173</sup> *sed O.*

<sup>174</sup> *cf. Grabmann p. 61.*

si li necessario determinet compositionem, determinat alterum extremorum; sed non subjectum, ergo praedicatum.

Item si 'necessario' sit adverbium, ergo determinat aliquid quod est actus et ut actus; sed compositio verbi in sermone non consignificat ut actus; ergo adverbium non determinat ipsam. Assumptio patet quia res verbi cuius per se est compositio [36v] significatur ut substantia, sed ut actus egrediens a subjecto; istud autem cuius est actus semper significatur ut substantia. Et sic videtur quod ly necessario secundo modo determinat praedicatum sicut et primo modo.<sup>175</sup> Et concedendum sed differenter; primo enim modo determinat verbum ratione suae rei; secundo modo ratione compositionis suae vel in quantum est praedicatum, verbi gratia, si dicatur 'caelum movetur necessario', primo modo significat quod motus caeli sit necessarius; secundo modo significat quod compositio huius verbi cum hoc subjecto sit necessaria. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: anima antichristi erit necessario. Probatio: anima antichristi habebit esse necessarium quia aliquando habebit esse non cessans incorruptibile. Contra: contingenter erit quia possibile est ipsum non fore. Et patet quod probatur secundum quod est categorema; improbatur secundum quod est syncategorema et determinatio praedicati ratione compositionis, quia sic est haec vera: anima antichristi contingenter erit; alio modo falsa.

Item regula quod haec dictio 'necessario' quandoque potest esse nota cohaerentiae, quandoque nota inhaerentiae, verbi gratia, contingentia necessaria sunt vera. Probatio: contingentia sunt vera; haec est necessaria; ergo modificato modo necessitatis erit vera; ergo haec est vera: contingentia necessario sunt vera. Contra: nulla contingentia necessario sunt vera. Et dicendum quod probatur secundum quod li necessario est nota cohaerentiae; improbatur secundum quod est nota inhaerentiae. Quando enim est nota cohaerentiae, significat quod forma praedicati et forma subjecti insimul sunt, et cohaeret in aliquo supposito; et sic stat subjectum quodammodo simpliciter et non pro hoc vel pro illo; et patet quod sic probatur. Quando enim est nota inhaerentiae, significat quod forma praedicati necessario inhaeret alicui et supposito subjecti et stat subjectum personaliter; et patet quod sic improbatur. Et possumus dicere quod haec diversitas provenit ex hoc quod haec dictio 'necessario' potest advenire huic compositioni postquam fuerit terminata ad hoc subjectum, et tunc attingit ipsum subjectum et facit ipsum subjectum stare quodammodo simpliciter, et sic est primus modus; vel potest ei advenire prius, et tunc non attingit subjectum, et erit secundus modus. Et significat primus modus per compositionem huius sermonis, secundus per divisionem. Significat enim compositio quod li necessario cadit supra totum, divisio quod non.

Item quandoque est multiplicitas eo quod haec dictio 'necessario' possit includere hanc dictionem 'solus' sive 'tantum', vel e converso. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: currant Sortes et Plato et Cicero necessario et quartus contingenter et non sint plures. Deinde: tantum tres homines currunt necessario. Probatio: tres homines necessario currunt; ergo tantum tres. Contra: tantum tres homines currunt, hoc est contingens, quia quarto corrente erit falsa, et illo non corrente erit vera; ergo modificato modo necessitatis erit falsa. Et patet quod probatur per virtutem exclusionis et secundum quod li tantum includit: improbatur autem alio modo.

Item sophisma: sola necessaria necessario sunt vera. Probatio: necessaria necessario sunt vera et nulla alia: quod probatur inductive; ergo sola necessaria necessario etc. Contra: sola necessaria sunt vera, haec est falsa; ergo addito modo necessitatis erit falsa. Vel sic contra: contingentia necessario sunt vera quia haec est necessaria:<sup>176</sup> contingentia sunt vera; ergo non sola necessaria. Et dicendum

<sup>175</sup> om. O.

<sup>176</sup> om. P.

quod li necessario potest determinare praedicatum ratione suae rei, et tunc hoc totum 'sunt necessario vera' est unum praedicatum aequipollens huic 'sunt necessaria', et est simpliciter vera locutio. Vel potest determinare praedicatum ratione suae compositionis; et hoc dupliciter, aut includendo ly sola, et sic procedet primum contra, [37r] et sic erit falsa, aut includendo ab ea; et hoc dupliciter, aut notando inhaerentiam aut cohaerentiam. Primo modo 'vera' significat quod suppositis significatis ejus quod est necessarium necessario inest hoc praedicatum et nullis aliis suppositis significatis necessario inest et sic est vera; secundo modo significat quod hoc praedicatum necessario cohaeret cum hoc subjecto et non cum opposito subjecto et est falsa et sic procedit aliud contra, quia sic est vera 'contingentia' etc. ut prius dictum est.

Item quandoque accidit multiplicitas eo quod haec dictio 'necessario' possit includere divisionem vel includi ab ea, verbi gratia, currant omnes homines qui nunc sunt necessario dum sunt, et similiter de futuris hominibus; inde omnis homo necessario currit. Probatio: haec est necessaria 'omnis homo currit'; ergo modificato modo necessitatis erit vera. Deinde: si<sup>177</sup> Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes necessario currit. Dicendum quod in prima li necessario potest includere<sup>178</sup> divisionem, et sic probatur et est vera; vel includi ab ea, et sic improbatur et est falsa. Et significat primus sensus quod haec sit necessaria: omnis homo currit; secundus significat quod quodlibet ejus singulare sit necessarium. Si autem semper velit eam accipere in primo sensu, tunc erit fallacia figurae dictionis ex immobili<sup>179</sup> suppositione ad mobilem;<sup>180</sup> immobilitatur enim dictio virtute modi. Similiter cadit haec distinctio in hoc sophismate: omnis homo de necessitate est animal; sed Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes de necessitate est animal. Sed primo distinguendum sic quod li omnis potest<sup>181</sup> dividere pro partibus secundum numerum vel pro partibus secundum speciem; si pro partibus secundum numerum adhuc potest includere modum vel includi ab eo; si includat modum, significat quod iste necessario sit animal et sic de aliis; si includatur, significat quod haec sit necessaria: omnis homo est animal; et si ponamus quod semper sint multi homines, erit vera; et si ponamus quod possibile sit 'omnis' deficere, erit falsa. Si autem li omnis dividat pro partibus secundum speciem et includat, sic<sup>182</sup> est<sup>183</sup> vera; et si includatur, similiter et significat primo modo quod haec sit necessaria: homo habitualiter in omni supposito suo est animal; secundo quod haec sit necessaria: homo habitualiter in Sorte est animal, et sic de aliis. Sed si ibi est, dicit esse habituale; si ergo sumatur pro partibus secundum numerum et includit, sic tenet argumentum, sed falsa est prima; si includatur, tunc immobilitatur, et cum descendit, facit fallaciam figurae dictionis. Si autem pro partibus secundum speciem, tunc cum descendit ad Sortem, erit aequivocatio eo quod utitur ipso signo ac si staret pro partibus secundum numerum. Vel paralogismus accidentis quia licet li homo sit idem cum Sorte, tamen non sic respicitur ab eo quod est 'esse animal de necessitate'; est enim idem cum Sorte secundum esse suum actuale et sic non est ex necessitate.

### INCIPIT, DESINIT

Sequitur de his dictionibus 'incipit', 'desinit'. Et sciendum quod uno modo sunt syncategoremata, alio modo categoremata, verbi gratia, haec dictio 'incipit' significat inceptionem alicujus actus in subjecto et propterea semper vult quod aliquis infinitivus designans illum actum ei apponatur. Respicit autem quandoque illum actum aut ratione suae rei aut in quantum est praedicabile. Et primo modo respicit

<sup>177</sup> sed O.

<sup>178</sup> add. per O.

<sup>179</sup> mobili O, corr. fr. mobili P.

<sup>180</sup> immobilem O, corr. fr. immobilem P.

<sup>181</sup> om. O.

<sup>182</sup> om. O.

<sup>183</sup> erit O.

illum in aliquo suo particulari; secundo modo simpliciter et in communi. Et primo modo habet naturam categorematis; secundo modo syncategorematis, verbi gratia, sit quod Sortes videat unum hominem a mane usque ad vesperam et alium incipiat videre in tertia hora;<sup>184</sup> tunc poterit dicere vere primo modo<sup>185</sup> quod Sortes incipit videre hominem vel unum hominem; secundo modo non, quia istud speciale<sup>186</sup> 'videre hominem' habet inceptionem in ipso;<sup>187</sup> sed ipsum 'videre hominem' [37v] simpliciter consideratum non habet inceptionem in ipso, sed prius inquit. Sed videtur quod nullo modo sit syncategorema sic quod praedicatur. Est modus indicativus, sed in exemplo praedicto non est alius indicativus quam hoc verbum 'incipit'; ergo ipsum praedicatur; ergo non est syncategorema quia nullum syncategorema est subjectum vel praedicatum, sed magis subjecti vel praedicati dispositio. Ad quod dicendum quod dupliciter est dicere aliquid praedicatum esse, aut secundum formam sermonis et modum construendi, aut secundum rem. Primo modo praedicatur solus indicativus; secundo modo bene praedicatur infinitivus ut in praedicto exemplo. Idem enim est ac si diceretur 'Sortes videt hominem nunc primo', et sic li videre secundum rem praedicatur, et li incipit dicit modum secundum quem praedicatur, et sic habet naturam syncategorematis aliquo modo, non tamen simpliciter et proprie eo quod secundum modum construendi praedicatum est et non dispositio praedicati.

Consequenter quaerendum de expositionibus istarum dictionum. Et dicunt quidam quod quandoque dicunt existentiam in termino, quandoque viam ad terminum ut si diceretur 'Sortes incipit esse albus', primo modo significat Sortem esse in principio albedinis, secundo modo quod sit in motu et via ad albedinem; et etiam quandoque conjunguntur cum permanentibus, quandoque cum successivis. Et sunt permanentia quorum partes sunt simul; cujusmodi est album. Successiva quorum partes non sunt simul; cujusmodi est currere. Et dicitur quod cum permanentibus primo<sup>188</sup> exponitur per positionem<sup>189</sup> praesentis; sed hoc verbum 'incipit' privat praeteritum; desinit autem privat futurum. Sed contra: sit quod Sortes incipit esse sanus et desinit esse aeger; tunc instans inceptionis et instans desitionis aut erunt idem, et tunc in illo erit sanus et aeger, aut erunt diversa, et tunc incipietur tempus in quo non erit sanus nec aeger. Propterea dicendum quod omnis permutatio aut est in rem successivam aut in permanentem; si sit in rem permanentem, ut in sanitatem vel albedinem, tunc quando permutatur, simul habet illud in quod est permutatio, verbi gratia, permutetur<sup>190</sup> ad sanitatem in *a* instanti; tunc in *a* instanti erit sanus et in toto tempore ante est non sanus. Sit ergo *b* ante *a* in quo est non sanus sive aeger; vere ergo dicetur quod in termino *b*, scilicet in *a*, non est aeger vel non est non sanus. Si ergo dicam 'desinit esse aeger vel non sanus', tunc 'desinere' dicit rem esse in termino temporis in quo fuit talis, cum, inquam, in illo termino non sit aeger. Debeo dicere: ergo non est aeger, et tunc simul incipit esse sanum et desinit esse aegrum; sed ly desinit dicit non esse.

Si autem sit mutatio in rem successivam, verbi gratia, in motum, tunc in<sup>191</sup> instanti mutationis non habet motum, sed in toto tempore post; et tunc 'desinit' habet exponi per positionem praesentis et 'incipit' non, quia in *a* desinit esse non movens et est non movens. Similiter in *a* incipit esse movens et non est. Cum ergo

<sup>184</sup> scilicet in hora tertia O.

<sup>185</sup> add. prout incipit tenetur categorematice O.

<sup>186</sup> add. scilicet quod in hora tertia nunc primo inest Sorti O.

<sup>187</sup> add. et ita incipit respicere istum actum videre hominem ratione suae rei ut ratione alicujus particularis videre ut scilicet in hoc particulari quod est videre hominem hora tertia quia nunc primo inest illud videre Sorti; non tamen nunc primo inest Sorti

videre hominem simpliciter et ideo cum dicitur vere hora tertia Sortes incipit videre hominem, non respicit ly incipit istum actum videre hominem in quantum est praedicabile de Sorte quia non nunc primo praedicatur de Sorte hoc quod est videre hominem simpliciter O.

<sup>188</sup> add. modo O.

<sup>189</sup> expositionem O.

<sup>190</sup> permutatur O.

<sup>191</sup> om. O.



omnis inceptio et desitio sit cum mutatione, si sit illa mutatio in permanens, tunc 'incipit' habet exponi per positionem praesentis; 'desinit' autem non, verbi gratia, incipit esse sanus, est et non prius fuit; desinit esse aeger, non est aeger,<sup>192</sup> et hoc sive illud cum quo adjungitur hoc verbum 'desinit' sit permanens vel successivum. Si autem sit permutatio in successivum ut si dicatur 'incipit esse movens', [38r] ly incipit habet exponi per negationem praesentis; 'desinit' per positionem. Sed adhuc potest contingere quod illud cui adjungitur haec dictio 'desinit' non posset esse in termino sui temporis ut si dicatur: desinit esse quiescens; quies enim non est in instanti, et tunc utrumque habet exponi per negationem praesentis.

Est autem regula quod immobilitant divisionem sequentem juxta quam sic paralogizatur: incipiat Sortes scire<sup>193</sup> hoc enuntiabile 'te currere'; deinde Sortes incipit scire quicquid scit. Probatio: scit quicquid scit et non prius scivit quicquid scit; ergo incipit. Deinde: ergo incipit scire deum esse; quod falsum est. Et immobilitatur li quicquid per virtutem negationis del incipit; unde cum descendit, facit fallaciam figurae dictionis vel consequentis, quia ly quicquid est minus quam 'deum esse' et praecedet li<sup>194</sup> negatio en ly incipit sicut hic: incipit videre Sortem; ergo hominem. Intellige tamen quod si ly incipit sit categorema, tunc non respicit sequens in se et in communi, sed ratione rei, et tunc tenent argumenta hujusmodi.

Item regula quod confundunt terminum communem sequentem. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: sit Sortes albissimus hominum qui sunt; sed statim nascatur albior eo. Deinde: Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum. Probatio: est albissimus hominum et non erit; quod patet; ergo desinit. Deinde: aut ergo hominum qui sunt, aut hominum qui non sunt; si hominum qui sunt,<sup>195</sup> contra: semper erit albissimus hominum qui sunt; igitur non desinit esse albissimus eorum; si hominum qui non sunt, contra: non est albissimus eorum; ergo non desinit. Et concedimus hanc expositionem ei quod est 'desinit', scilicet per positionem praesentis quia, sicut<sup>196</sup> dicunt plures licet verius, debet exponi per negationem praesentis et positionem praeteriti ut dictum est. Dicendum ergo quod li hominum state confuse tantum pro entibus et non entibus ratione duplicis temporis in hoc verbo 'desinit', et propterea, cum descendit, erit figura dictionis. Sed videtur quod in probatione sit peccatum, quia ly hominum stetit in prima pro praesentibus, in secunda pro futuris. Et dicendum quod non, quia in conclusione confunditur ad omnia illa.

Item videtur, quod possit dari hoc membrum 'desinit etc. hominum qui sunt', quia hoc praedicatum 'albissimus hominum qui sunt' nunc<sup>197</sup> convenit ei et jam non conveniet. Sed peccat haec ratio per diversam copulationem temporis en ly sunt.

Item videtur quod possit probari oppositum sic: erit albissimus istorum; ergo hominum. Sed non valet quia li hominum stat universaliter virtute superlativi. Sed adhuc sic desinit videre hominem; ergo hominem qui est. A simili in proposito: desinit esse<sup>198</sup> albissimus etc.; ergo hominum qui sunt. Dicendum quod non est simile, quia li desinit ratione praesentis et futuri in ipso confundit li hominum ad praesentes et futuros, et li albissimus facit simul stare pro omnibus conjunctim, ita quod in affirmativa hujus verbi 'desinit' pro praesentibus et in negativa pro futuris; et sic li albissimus et li desinit simul faciunt hunc defectum.

Item sophisma: quod incipit esse desinit non esse. Probatio: quod incipit esse in se capit esse, et quod in se capit esse abicit non esse [38v] et quod abicit non<sup>199</sup> esse desinit non esse; ergo a primo: quod incipit esse desinit non esse; sed quod incipit esse est, et quod desinit non esse non est; ergo quod est non est. Dicendum

<sup>192</sup> om. non . . . aeger O.

<sup>193</sup> om. O.

<sup>194</sup> om. O.

<sup>195</sup> om. si . . . sunt O.

<sup>196</sup> sic P.

<sup>197</sup> om. O.

<sup>198</sup> om. O.

<sup>199</sup> om. O.

quod, si dicant viam ad terminum, 'incipit' habet exponi per negationem ejus cui adjungitur; 'desinit' autem per positionem ejus cui adjungitur<sup>200</sup> ut sit sensus: incipit esse; ergo non est; desinit non esse; ergo non est. Sed si dicant esse in termino, tunc secundum quod dictum est in principio 'incipit' habet exponi per positionem ejus cui adjungitur cum sit permanens; desinit autem per negationem ejus cui adjungitur ut sit sensus: incipit esse; ergo est ens; desinit non esse; ergo non est non ens, quia in termino desitionis est ultima mutatio a non esse in esse, et tunc habetur esse, et propterea in termino desitionis non est non ens. Et ideo haec est falsa: quod desinit non esse non est.

Item simile est hic: quod incipit esse sanum desinit esse aegrum, et in similibus. Item sit Sortes in penultimo instanti vitae suae. Deinde: Sortes desinit esse non desinendo esse. Probatio: Sortes est non desinendo esse, et non erit non<sup>201</sup> desinendo; ergo desinit esse non desinendo esse; ergo desinit esse dum non desinit esse, vel si non desinit esse, vel quia. Et dicendum quod ista dua 'esse' et 'non desinendo esse' possunt componi vel dividi. Si componantur, significat tunc quod fit desitio respectu totius, et est vera, et sic probatur. Si dividantur, tunc significat quod per se et divisim quod desinit esse et implicatur quod simul non desinit esse, et sic est falsa. Et si accipiat eam sicut vera est et velit procedere ulterius, tunc secundum quosdam potest dari hoc: desinit esse dum non desinit esse; sed est multiplex sicut et prima. Secundum alios autem dicendum quod hoc quod dico 'non desinendo' non semper aequipollet ei quod est 'si' vel 'quia' vel 'dum', sed tunc solum quando ly non desinendo dicit tantum tempus praesens. Hic autem non sic, quia virtute duplicis temporis en ly desinit confunditur ad tempus praesens et futurum. Cum enim dico 'est non desinendo', ly desinendo dicit tempus praesens, et cum dicitur 'non erit non desinendo', dicit futurum; sed bene potest dari hoc: Sortes desinit esse et non desinere esse. Intelligendum autem quod melius fieret positio sic: sit Sortes in ultimo instanti vitae suae. Deinde ut prius, et supponit hoc sophisma instantia esse immediate se continua; quod tamen falsum est. Simile est hic: sit Sortes in penultimo instanti ante mortem Platonis. Deinde: Sortes desinit esse ante mortem Platonis. Probatio: est ante mortem Platonis et non erit; ergo desinit etc. Contra: erit post mortem Platonis. Solutio: probatur secundum quod est composita; improbatur secundum quod est divisa. Primo modo fit desitio respectu hujus totius 'esse ante mortem Platonis'; secundo modo respectu ejus quod est 'esse' tantum.

Item sit *a* praesens instans. Deinde: quicquid desinit esse in *a*, post *a* non erit; sed deus desinit esse in *a*; ergo post *a* non erit. Minor probatur, quia est in *a* et non erit in *a*. Dicendum quod, si ly esse et ly in *a* componantur, falsa est prima; si dividantur, falsa est secunda.

Item sciendum quod si teneatur categorematicae, tenet processus ab inferiori ad superius ut hic: incipit esse albus, ergo coloratus, quia tunc respicitur ly coloratus non in se et in communi, sed pro aliqua suarum rerum, et significat quod aliqua res ejus, quod est color, habeat inceptionem in Sorte. Simile est hic: incipit videre Sortem; ergo hominem [39r].

## SI

Determinatis dictionibus quarum officia pertinent ad subjectum et etiam ad praedicatum ratione compositionis et etiam de his, quae, licet uno modo sint determinationes praedicatorum, alio tamen modo sunt praedicata, sequitur de dictionibus pertinentibus ad unum subjectum respectu alterius, vel ad unum

<sup>200</sup> om. desinit . . . adjungitur O.

<sup>201</sup> om. O.

praedicatum respectu alterius, vel ad unam compositionem respectu alterius; hujusmodi autem sunt conjunctiones.

Est autem conjunctio pars orationis indeclinabilis<sup>202</sup> conjunctiva aliarum partium orationis.<sup>203</sup> Et dico 'partium' quia licet jungat orationes, hoc tamen non est nisi in quantum illae sunt partes orationis compositae. Cum ergo praepositio sit etiam conjunctiva partium orationis,<sup>204</sup> quaerenda est differentia inter haec. Ad quod dicendum quod praepositio inventa est ut dicat definite habitudinem quam significat casuale aliquod indefinite; et ideo haec habitudo non est dicenda duorum, sed unius, scilicet casualis ad aliud. Praepositio igitur habitudinem dicit unius ad aliud ut proprie dicamus, et denominemus ipsam a proprio ejus officio.

Conjunctio autem conjungit aliqua quorum neutrum ad aliud habet habitudinem, nec finite nec infinite significatam dico nec consignificatam. Praepositio ergo conjungit aliqua quorum unum aliquo modo principium in se habet ut conjungatur cum alio. Conjunctio autem simpliciter dicit ligamentum aliquorum, quod quidem in neutro est.

Cum autem multae sint species conjunctionum, solum de consecutivis et copulativis et disjunctivis nunc intendimus. Et primo de consecutivis et inter haec primo de hac dictione 'si' de qua Priscianus<sup>205</sup> dicit quod dicit ordinem rerum. Et dicimus similiter quod significat consequentiam; et tunc quaeritur differentia inter haec 'sequitur' vel 'ordinatur' et hanc dictionem 'si'. Ad hoc dicendum quod haec dictio 'si' notat consequentiam secundum quod exercetur ab anima proferentis; alia autem secundum quod concipitur. Unde 'si' dicit aliquam rem sub conditione ad aliam; 'sequitur' autem non, sed dicit harum rerum esse consequentiam.

Item quaeritur quare non additur consequenti cum dicat consequentiam. Dicendum quod non dicit aliquid sequi proprie, sed ad aliquid, scilicet ad antecedens, ferri consequentiam, scilicet consequentis, et ideo antecedenti conjungitur. Videtur etiam quod animal habeat dici antecedens et homo consequens quia animal est prius natura, et sic de aliis. Dicendum quod, cum dico 'antecedens', 'consequens', non dicunt ordinem rerum secundum se, sed ordinem quem habent sub comparatione animae; anima enim, cum haec ordinat, incipit a speciali<sup>206</sup> et ideo est homo antecedens.

Nunc quaerendum est quae sit compositio in conditionali circa quam sit veritas et falsitas. Et dicunt quidam hanc esse circa compositionem ejus quod est 'si' ratione hujus verbi 'sequitur' subintellecti. Sed contra: vox est signum intellectus; ergo vox intellectus principalis; ergo haec vox 'si Sortes currit, Sortes movetur' quantum ad principalem intellectum est propositio; ergo in principali ejus intellectu erit veritas vel falsitas; ergo non solum ratione alicujus subintellecti.

Item dicit Boethius<sup>207</sup> quod cum negatur conditionalis, habet negatio ferri ad verbum consequentis, includendo tamen sub se conditionem; ergo compositio illius verbi fuit principalis compositio; ergo circa ipsam fuit veritas vel falsitas; quod conceditur.

Sciendum tamen quod haec dictio 'si' quandoque respicit totum consequens, quandoque verbum consequentis. Primo modo facit conditionalem; secundo modo categorematicam de conditionato praedicato. Sic solvitur hoc sophisma: [39v] sit Sortes albus. Deinde: album currit, si Sortes currit. Probatio: currere, si Sortes currit, inest albo quia Sorti; ergo album etc. Sed contra: antecedens potest esse verum sine consequente; ergo conditionalis falsa. Et dicendum quod, si ly album et ly currit componatur, significat quod li si totum respicit, et est conditionalis et

<sup>202</sup> videlicet ? P.

<sup>203</sup> cf. Prisc. G. L. III, 93.

<sup>204</sup> cf. ibid. p. 24.

<sup>205</sup> cf. ibid. p. 94, 14.

<sup>206</sup> simpliciori O.

<sup>207</sup> cf. De. Diff. Top. Bk III P. L. 64, 1198 D ?

falsa; si autem dividantur,<sup>208</sup> significat quod li si respicit solum praedicatum, et est categorematica de conditionato praedicato, et significat<sup>209</sup> quod hoc praedicatum 'currere' non simpliciter consideratum, sed sub hac conditione 'si Sortes currit', inest alicui albo, et sic est vera et probatur.

Et solet dici a quibusdam quod primo modo tenetur ly si consecutive, secundo modo adjunctive. Dicunt autem aliqui quod propositio falsa est et in probatione est fallacia accidentis. Et hoc verum est, si probaretur secundum quod est conditionalis et non secundum quod categorematica. Sed videtur quod numquam in talibus possit facere praedicatum conditionatum quia oratio perfecta ad praedicatum, quod est unica dictio, non habet ordinationem et sic non adijungitur<sup>210</sup> ei mediante hac dictione 'si'. Et dicendum quod verbum habet compositionem infinitam et ratione ejus potest habere dependentiam aliquo modo ad orationem perfectam et ordinationem.

Item simile sophisma: verum est falsum si antichristus est. Probatio: verum est antichristum non esse; et hoc est falsum si antichristus est; ergo verum etc. Vel sic: 'esse falsum', si antichristus est, inest cuidam vero, scilicet huic 'antichristum non esse'; ergo verum etc. Contra: antecedit contingens et sequitur impossibile; ergo conditionalis falsa. Et dicendum quod si hoc quod dico 'verum' et 'est falsum' componantur, est conditionalis oratio et falsa; si dividantur, est categorematica de conditionato praedicato et vera.

Item quandoque potest conditionare antecedens cum una oratione vel cum alia, verbi gratia, sit *a* quoddam instans futurum. Deinde: omne necessarium erit verum in *a*; deum esse,<sup>211</sup> si *a* non<sup>212</sup> erit, est necessarium; ergo deum esse, si *a* non erit, erit<sup>213</sup> verum in *a*. Contra: si *a* non erit, nihil erit verum in *a*. Et dicendum quod conclusio multiplex est eo quod haec determinatio 'si *a* non erit' potest ferri ad hoc quod dico 'deum esse', et sic probatur et est categorematica de conditionato subjecto. Vel potest dividi ab eo et est sensus: deum esse erit verum in *a*, si *a* non erit, et est falsa et conditionalis et sic improbat. Quando est implicatio in antecedente, multiplex est locutio eo quod potest cadere sub conditione vel non, ut hic: si Sortes currit, qui est albus, album currit;<sup>214</sup> primo modo est vera, secundo modo falsa.

Item quandoque notat consequentiam simpliciter, quandoque ut nunc rebus se habentibus ut nunc, verbi gratia, si omnis alius a Sorte curreret, est dicere: omnis homo currit si Sortes currit. Et falsa est primo modo, secundo modo vera.

Item quandoque dicit aliquid sequi ad alium necessario ut hic: si Sortes est homo, est animal. Quandoque vere tantum ut hic: si veneris ad me, dabo tibi centum marcas;<sup>215</sup> est enim intentio loquentis quod ventioni vere sequitur datio, non tamen necessario.

Item quandoque notat consequentiam naturalem, quandoque non naturalem. Naturalem ut quando notat consequens sequi ad antecedens ratione alicujus habitudinis unius ad aliud; non naturalem quando notat consequens sequi ad antecedens, non ratione habitudinis unius ad aliud, sed solum propter impossibilitatem antecedentis vel [40r] necessitatem consequentis. Primo modo notat ordinem rerum secundum rem; secundo modo notat ordinem rerum secundum sermonem.

Item quandoque in non naturali consequentia notat consequentiam respectu cujuslibet temporis ut cum antecedens est simpliciter impossibile vel consequens necessarium. Quandoque respectu praesentis vel futuri tantum ut cum antecedens sit impossibile per accidens vel consequens necessarium.

<sup>208</sup> dividatur O.  
<sup>209</sup> significatur P.  
<sup>210</sup> adjungitur O.  
<sup>211</sup> om. O.

<sup>212</sup> add. est O.  
<sup>213</sup> om. O.  
<sup>214</sup> add. et O.  
<sup>215</sup> om. O.

Item quandoque bis ponitur et est oratio multiplex secundum compositionem et divisionem ut hic: si Sortes est, si Plato currit, homo disputat. Probatio: antecedens est impossibile; ergo conditionalis necessaria. Contra: antecedit contingens et sequitur impossibile; ergo conditionalis falsa, quia hoc est antecedens 'si Sortes est', et hoc est consequens 'si Plato currit, homo disputat'. Et dicendum quod hoc 'si Plato currit' potest componi cum hac 'si Sortes est', ut sit totum unum antecedens impossibile, hoc scilicet, 'si Sortes est', 'si Plato currit'; vel potest dividi et erit consequens impossibile. Similiter etiam quandoque ter vel quater ponitur, et est consimilis distinctio.

Item quandoque est multiplicitas eo quod exclusio possit includere conditionem vel e converso ut hic: solus Sortes currit, si Sortes currit. Probatio: Sortes currit etc. et non alius currit etc., quia haec est falsa: alius currit etc.; ergo solus Sortes etc. Contra: antecedens potest esse verum sine consequente; ergo conditionalis falsa. Et sciendum quod ly solus includit in probatione et includitur in improbatione. Et similiter negatio potest includere vel includi ut in hac: non alius currit. Primo modo vera, secundo modo falsa.

Item cum ponitur motus, est multiplicitas ut hic: si Sortes currit, necessario movetur. Si ly necessario includit, sensus est quod haec sit necessaria: si Sortes currit, Sortes movetur; et est vera;<sup>216</sup> si includatur, tunc potest componi cum ly currit et significat quod haec vera est: si Sortes currit necessario, Sortes movetur. et est vera. Si dividatur, tunc significat quod si Sortes currit, necessario movetur. et est falsa. Primo modo est nota consequentiae; secundo modo est nota antecedentis; tertio modo est nota consequentis.

Item immobilitas divisionem in antecedente et non in consequente; unde non sequitur: si omnis homo currit, omne risibile currit; ergo si Sortes currit, omne risibile currit; sed bene sequitur: ergo hoc risibile currit.

Item non licet ascendere in antecedente non distributo, sed tamen licet descendere ut si animal currit, sensibile currit; et non sequitur: ergo si corpus currit etc., sed bene sequitur: ergo si homo currit etc.; e converso in consequente.

Item sophisma: si Sortes necessario est mortalis, Sortes est mortalis; et si hoc, potest mori; et si hoc, potest non esse; et si hoc, potest non esse mortalis; et si hoc, non necessario est mortalis; ergo a primo: si Sortes necessario est mortalis, non necessario est mortalis. Et hinc diversi<sup>217</sup> diversimode dicunt. Possumus tamen dicere quod in antecedente implicatur opposita quia ratione ejus, quod est 'necessario', ponitur necessitas suae existentiae; ratione ejus quod est 'mortalis', ponitur ibi possibilitas ad non esse, nec est inconveniens quod ex ipso sequantur opposita vel etiam suum proprium oppositum. Simile est hic: si omnis propositio est vera, tunc deum esse est verum, et si hoc, tunc sua contradictoria est falsa; et si hoc, aliqua est falsa; ergo si omnis propositio<sup>218</sup> est vera, aliqua est vera.<sup>219</sup> Et<sup>220</sup> intellige quod cum ponere aliquam propositionem esse veram sit ponere suam contradictoriam esse falsam, tunc ponere omnem esse veram est ponere cujuslibet contradictoriam esse falsam, et haec est omnem esse falsam, et sic [40v] implicatur opposita in antecedente.

Est autem illud genus sophismatum quibus tenet processus a primo ad ultimum: si nulla propositio est vera, tantum deum esse non est verum; et si hoc, sua contradictoria est vera; et si hoc, aliqua est vera; ergo a primo: si nulla est vera, aliqua est vera. Et sciendum quod secundum argumentum non tenet nisi supponendo quod aliqua propositio sit; haec autem non supponitur in prima, sed magis sua opposita, quia nullam esse veram est nullam esse, et propterea non tenet a primo ad ultimum. Simile est hic: nullum tempus est, et si hoc, nox est, et si hoc,

<sup>216</sup> om. O. s. s. P.<sup>217</sup> om. O.<sup>219</sup> om. O.<sup>218</sup> falsa O.<sup>220</sup> om. P.

aliquod tempus est; ergo a primo: si nullum tempus est,<sup>221</sup> aliquod tempus est. Dicendum quod secundum argumentum non est necessarium nisi supposito quod aliquod tempus sit et oppositum supponebatur in prima. Dicunt quidam quod non tenet talis processus eo quod in prima est locus a toto in quantitate,<sup>222</sup> in secunda a contrariis,<sup>223</sup> et sic non est continuus processus. Sed contra: quaero an primum antecedens possit esse verum sine ultimo consequente; si non, tenet a primo ad ultimum; si possit, tunc quaero an primum consequens est verum an non. Si non, non tenuit prima argumentatio; si fuerit verum et non ultimum consequens, ut tu dicis, non tenuit secunda ratio. Propterea dicendum quod, si in secunda argumentatione inferat solum ex hac negativa 'dies non est', erit fallacia consequentis, quia numquam<sup>224</sup> ex negativa sequitur affirmativa, sed e converso. Si autem cum ipsa intelligitur haec affirmativa 'aliquod tempus est', tunc in argumento a primo ad ultimum est fallacia accidentis, quia licet hoc, quod dico 'diem non esse', sit idem cum hac 'nullum tempus esse' sicut consequens antecedenti, est tamen diversum ab ea in quantum respicitur ab eo quod est 'noctem esse'; respicitur enim ab eo ratione intellecti ratione cuius fuit diversum a primo et ita penitus est in praecedenti sophismate.

Item si omnis homo est animal, omne non animal est non homo; et si hoc, lapis est non homo; et si hoc, lapis est; ergo a primo: si omnis homo est animal, lapis est. Sed contra: hoc antecedens potest esse verum sine consequente; ergo non tenet. Dicendum quod secundum argumentum non tenet nisi cum suppositione hujus: lapis est non animal. Et propterea licet primum consequens sit idem cum primo antecedente sicut consequens antecedenti, tamen secundum quod respicitur a secundo consequenti non est idem; respicitur enim ab ipso ratione propositionis subintellectae ratione cuius non fuit idem cum primo, non enim subintelligitur in illo, et sic in argumento a primo ad ultimum est paralogismus accidentis vel petitio principii,<sup>225</sup> quia si in secunda argumentatione inferat solum ex hac 'omne non animal' etc., non tenebit argumentum. Si autem subintelligat<sup>226</sup> istam 'lapis est non animal', tunc supponit lapidem esse et sic supponit illud quod debuit ostendere sequi ex primo. Dicunt tamen quidam quod non valet hoc argumentum: lapis est non animal; ergo lapis est, sicut nec hoc: lapis est inanimatum; ergo est. Sed quod hoc uno modo teneat, alio modo non, dictum est in tractatu hujus dictionis 'est'.<sup>227</sup>

## NISI

Sequitur de hac dictione 'nisi' de qua sciendum quod notat consequentiam ad antecedens negatum; componitur enim ex 'si' et 'non'. Et tunc quaeritur quare magis sit conjunctio quam adverbium. [41r] Ratio hujus est quod consecutio cadit supra negationem et est complementum suae significationis. Et tunc quaeritur quare in prima syllaba tangitur negatio et in ultima conditio. Cujus ratio est quod per finem dictionis debet denominari completio<sup>228</sup> suae significationis ut patet in his dictionibus 'albus', 'albedo'. Solet autem dici quod ex hac semper concluditur negative;<sup>229</sup> quod patet falsum, quia bene dicitur 'nisi Sortes sit sanus, est aeger', supposito dico subjecto.

Est autem regula quod quandoque tenetur exceptive, quandoque consecutive. Cum consecutive tenetur, tunc eadem possunt assignari distinctiones de ea quae de hac dictione 'si'. Et est unum sophisma tale: nullus homo legit Parisius nisi ipse sit asinus. Probatio: haec est falsa 'aliquis homo legit Parisius nisi sit asinus',

<sup>221</sup> om. P.

<sup>222</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 61.

<sup>223</sup> cf. *ibid.* p. 70.

<sup>224</sup> om. quia numquam O.

<sup>225</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 99.

<sup>226</sup> intelligat O.

<sup>227</sup> cf. p. 70.

<sup>228</sup> om. O.

<sup>229</sup> naetem ? O.

quia antecedit necessarium et sequitur contingens; ergo haec est vera 'nullus homo' etc. Contra: ergo omnis homo qui legit Parisius est asinus. Et dicunt quidam quod haec est falsa 'aliquis homo' etc.; sed sua contradictoria est haec 'non aliquis' etc., verumtamen haec est multiplex eo quod possit negatio cadere sub conditione vel supra. Si sub, tunc non contradicit primae, quia non cadit supra totam primam. Si supra, tunc contradicit primae, sed tunc 'non aliquis' et 'nullus' non aequipollent, quia negatio ejus quod est 'nullus' cadit sub conditione. Probatio: divisio ejus quod est 'nullus' cadit supra subjectum consequentis et respectu ejusdem; unde videtur quod non attingit antecedens; ergo nec negatio. Sed dicendum quod sicut dictum est superius<sup>230</sup> quod antecedens est sicut determinatio consequentis, potest ergo negatio ejus quod est 'nullus' ferri ad compositionem consequentis dispositam jam per<sup>231</sup> conditionem<sup>232</sup> vel non; et idem dico de divisione ejus quod est 'nullus'. Dico ergo quod si haec duo componantur, vera est locutio; si autem dividantur, falsa. Et est compositio signum quod negatio cadit supra totum, divisio autem non.

Item quandoque tenetur exceptive ut hic: nullus homo nisi Sortes currit; sed tunc est dubitatio inter quae jungat haec conjunctio 'nisi'. Denotat enim consecutionem, et consecutio non est nisi complexorum; hic autem non sunt aliqua duo complexa. Et dicet forte quod cum hoc, quod dico 'Sortes', debet verbum repeti ut sit sensus: nullus homo currit nisi Sortes currat. Sed contra: cum subicietur verbum, significatur quod Sortes currit; aequipollet enim huic: nullus homo praeter Sortem qui currit; sed cum repetitur non aequipollet ei; ergo non significat idem.

Item si habeat officium praepositionis, sicut haec dictio 'praeter', videtur quod debeat esse praepositio. Et possumus dicere quod per hoc, quod dico 'homo', exercetur quidam actus, scilicet supponendi; actus autem exerciti bene intelliguntur licet non expresse significantur, et hic actus habet intelligi cum hoc quod dico 'Sortes', ut sit sensus: si Sortes non supponatur in hac multitudine, tunc nullus homo currit,<sup>233</sup> et accipiat ly si confirmative, et tunc confirmabit Sortem non supponi in illa multitudine respectu praedicati negati. Et sic ex consequenti vult praedicatum ei convenire et habet virtutem exceptionis. Et sic patet inter quae jungat et quod non primo, sed ex consequenti habet virtutem exceptionis, et ex hoc non sequitur quod sit praepositio.

Est autem sophisma: nihil est verum nisi in hoc instanti. Probatio: quicquid est verum, est verum in hoc instanti; ergo nihil etc. Contra: ergo te esse asinum non etc.; ergo est verum in hoc instanti. Et dicunt quidam quod hoc probatur secundum quod ly nisi [41v] tenetur consecutive; improbat secundum quod exceptive. Alii dicunt quod sic supplenda est 'nihil est verum nisi verum in hoc instanti', ut fiat exceptio a subjecto. Sed contra: utrumque dicatur sic: nisi est in alio instanti praeter hoc, et procedit sophisma. Propterea dicendum quod sive teneatur exceptive sive consecutive, vera est locutio. Sed si consecutive, tunc<sup>234</sup> non sequitur quod te esse asinum est verum in hoc instanti; non enim sequitur, si haec sit vera 'si non est verum in hoc instanti, non est verum', quod propterea sit verum. Si autem exceptive teneatur, tunc non licet descendere en ly nihil quia licet exceptio non fiat ab ipso, tamen fit respectu ejus; et sic est in descensu figura dictionis vel fallacia consequentis; quod patet si comparetur affirmativa ad affirmativam et negativa ad negativam. Et est affirmativa hujus haec: aliquod est verum in hoc instanti. Et hoc melius patet in tractatu hujus dictionis 'praeter' ubi dicitur quod exceptio non solum immobilizat divisionem a qua fit exceptio, sed etiam in respectu cujus.<sup>235</sup>

<sup>230</sup> cf. p. 79.  
<sup>231</sup> om. O.  
<sup>232</sup> conditione O.

<sup>233</sup> om. O.  
<sup>234</sup> om. P.  
<sup>235</sup> cf. p. 62.

QUIN

Sequitur de hac dictione 'quin', de qua sciendum quod est dictio consecutiva notans consequentiam alicujus ad antecedens negatum; habet enim negationem in se ut hic: non currit quin moveatur. Est sensus: si non moveatur, non currit. Et est sophisma tale: tu non potes vere negare te non esse asinum. Probatio: tu non potes negare vere necessarium; sed hoc est necessarium; ergo non potes vere negare hoc. Deinde: ergo non potes vere negare quin sis asinus; ergo tu es asinus. Est autem prima multiplex eo quod ly vere potest componi cum li potes vel cum li negare. Primo modo falsa quia veram habeo potentiam negandi quodcumque. Si cum ly negare, hoc potest esse dupliciter, aut in comparatione quam habet ad ante, aut ad post. Primo modo falsa quia significat quod negatio activa non vere egrediatur a me; quod falsum est. Secundo modo vera quia significat quod negatio recepta in rem negatam falsum dicat, et sumatur hoc sensu. Et dicendum quod haec est multiplex 'tu non potes vere negare quod non sis asinus', eo quod hoc verbum 'negare' possit teneri transitive vel absolute. Si transitive, sequitur ex prima, et est hoc totum 'quod non sis asinus' loco unius accusativi et non conjungitur praecedenti sicut antecedens consequenti; unde non habet haec dictio 'quod' virtutem consecutionis; unde non aequipollet ei quod est 'quin' cum procedit ulterius sophisma. Si absolute, tunc est sensus: non potest ita negari quod simul cum hoc non sis asinus, et significat ista duo non posse simul stare 'te negare' et 'te non esse asinum', et sic est falsa et aequipollet ei quod 'quin', quia habet virtutem consecutionis, sed non sequitur ex priori. Et est multiplicitas amphibologiae,<sup>236</sup> quia dicit diversam constructionem ejus quod est 'negare' cum eo quod sequitur. Aliae autem sunt hic distinctiones communes et difficultates speciales de quibus non est hic curandum.

ET

Sequitur de conjunctionibus copulativis, cujusmodi est hoc ipsum 'et', de qua dicit Priscianus<sup>237</sup> quod significat simul esse. Si ergo hoc quod dico 'simul esse' non dicat intentionem syncategorematicam [42r], tunc nec haec dictio 'et'. Ad quod dicendum quod 'simul esse' quod dicitur per hoc ipsum 'et' est duorum praedicatorum in uno subjecto, vel duorum subjectorum in uno praedicato vel duorum praedicatorum in duobus subjectis vel e converso; et constat quod haec ratio syncategorematica est. Dicit etiam quandoque duas determinationes in eodem determinato, quandoque e converso, et juxta dictam diversitatem diversimode copulat, quandoque inter terminos, quandoque inter propositiones, quia nihil aliud est copulare quam significare simul esse; sic patet significatio hujus conjunctionis. Solet autem distingui quod quandoque in eodem sermone potest copulare inter terminos vel inter propositiones ut hic: solius<sup>238</sup> binarii pars est unitas et nullus numerus. Probatio: binarii pars est unitas etc. et non alterius quam binarii pars etc.; ergo solius etc. Contra: haec est quaedam copulativa cujus prima pars falsa; ergo tota. Et<sup>239</sup> dicunt quidam quod probatur secundum quod ly et copulat inter terminos; improbat secundum quod inter propositiones. Sed contra: hic est copulatio actu; ergo copulata actu; sed non sunt hic propositiones actu; ergo propositiones non sunt hic copulae. Dicendum quod hoc quod dico 'et nullus numerus' potest componi cum praecedente vel dividi. Et significat compositio quod negatio ejus quod est 'solus' cadit super totum; divisio autem quod sistat en ly unitas; et primo modo vera, secundo modo falsa; et primo modo exclusio includit

<sup>236</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 89.

<sup>237</sup> cf. G. L. III, 93, 4.

<sup>238</sup> solus O.

<sup>239</sup> om. P.



copulationem; secundo modo e converso. Et licet semper copulet inter terminos, tamen quia secundo modo idem quoad veritatem et falsitatem ac si copularet inter propositiones, dicitur quod copulat inter propositiones.

Est autem<sup>240</sup> alius processus sic: solius binarii etc.; ergo solius binarii pars est unitas et nullus quaternarius. Sed dicendum quod hic est parallogismus consequentis quia nullus numerus est in minus quam nullus quaternarius, et sic ascendit in termino respectu cuius fit exclusio praecedens.

Item concessa habita 'solius binarii' etc. contra sic: ternarii pars est unitas et unitas et illa unitas est nullus numerus; ergo ternarii pars est unitas et nullus numerus. Dicendum quod si ly nullus numerus possit esse terminus infinitus, bene procederet; nunc autem non sicut nec hic: hominem video; sed homo est nullus asinus; ergo nullum asinum video; nec etiam est apparentia.

Item quidam distinguunt hanc dividentes quod ly pars potest construi ex parte ante<sup>241</sup> vel ex parte post. Si ex parte ante, tunc est falsa; et haec est vera: ternarii pars etc. Et est sensus: ternarii pars est unitas, et ternarii pars nullus numerus est. Et potest haec dictio 'pars' supponere pro quacumque parte; non enim confunditur a negatione sequenti. Et dicunt quod si ly pars construat ex parte ante, tunc ly nullus debet poni post ipsum ut nunc dictum est. Si ex parte post, tunc ly nullus debet poni ante ipsum ut sit sensus: ternarii unitas est pars et ternarii nullus numerus est pars, et haec est falsa. Similiter de omnibus superioribus numeris; et sic haec est vera: solius<sup>242</sup> etc. Sed contra: licet construat ex parte post, tamen bene potest praeordinari<sup>243</sup> ad ly unitas; ergo ad ly nullus quod cum ly unitas copulatur. Propterea dicendum quod cum ly et copulat ly nullus cum ly unitas, aut tunc habet ly unitas ordinem cum ly est tantum, aut etiam cum praecedente. Si<sup>244</sup> cum ly est tantum, tunc debet cadere ly nullus solum super ly est, et est [42v] vera; si secundo modo, tunc debet cadere super totum praecedens, et est falsa. Sed si ly pars construat ex parte ante vel ex parte<sup>245</sup> post, ex hoc forte est amphibologia; et sive sic sive sic haec est vera 'solius' etc., dummodo sit composita et exclusio includat. Alia autem est distinctio eo quod ly et possit copulare ly nullus ad ly unitas vel ad ly pars; quae, quia non multum facit ad sophisma, dimittatur.

Item sciendum quod terminus cum negatione non infinitante uno modo potest copulari termino affirmativo, alio modo non potest. Dico, postquam ille terminus affirmativus ordinatus fuerit cum altero respectu cuius debet fieri copulatio; ante autem non potest. Unde bene dicitur: homo currit et nullus asinus;<sup>246</sup> male autem: homo et nullus asinus currit vel currunt. Hujus autem ratio dicta est in hoc sophismate: nihil et chimaera etc.<sup>247</sup>

Item quando haec dictio 'et' bis ponitur, semper tenetur divisim, sed quando semel, quandoque divisim, quandoque conjunctim ut hic: duo et tria sunt quinque. Et primo modo debent li duo et li tria dividi; secundo modo componi. Sed non teneret haec distinctio hic: Sortes et Plato currunt, quia hoc praedicatum non congrue potest significari inesse huic subjecto 'Sortes' vel 'Plato' divisim.

Item cum adiungitur alicui dicto, quandoque copulat totale dictum alicui, quandoque partem ejus, verbi gratia, si verum est duo esse tria et quattuor esse quinque, tu es capra. Probatio: antecedit impossibile etc., sed verum est duo etc., quia hoc dictum 'duo esse tria' et alia<sup>248</sup> 'quattuor sunt quinque'. Et primo modo copulat hoc totum 'quattuor esse quinque' praecedenti; secundo modo solum ly quattuor. Et primo modo debent ly quattuor et ly esse componi; secundo modo

<sup>240</sup> om. P.

<sup>241</sup> *marg. gloss* scilicet quando ponitur ex parte ante.

<sup>242</sup> solus O.

<sup>243</sup> ordinari O.

<sup>244</sup> sicut O.

<sup>245</sup> om. ex parte O.

<sup>246</sup> alius O.

<sup>247</sup> cf. p. 58.

<sup>248</sup> *marg. gloss* scilicet dicta.

dividi. Et concidit<sup>249</sup> aliud, scilicet quod primo modo hoc dictum 'duo esse tria' stat significative; secundo modo materialiter. Simile est hic: si te currere et non currere est verum, tu es capra, quia antecedit impossibile, scilicet 'te currere et te non currere est verum', sed te currere et te non currere est verum,<sup>250</sup> quia hoc dictum 'te currere et te non currere' est verum quia te currere et tu non curris. Et primo modo copulat hoc totum 'te non currere' praecedenti; secundo modo tantum 'te'. Et primo modo debent ly te et ly non currere componi; secundo modo dividi.<sup>251</sup>

Item dubitatur utrum copulativa possit unica negatione negari ut hic: Sortes currit et Plato disputat. Et videtur quod non, quia duae sunt hic compositiones actu quarum neutra alterius est determinatio; igitur duplici indigent negatione; ergo non possunt unica negatione negari. Sed contra: si dicam 'non Sortes currit et Plato disputat', bene concipit animus hunc sermonem sub hoc sensu, ut significatur ista duo non simul esse vera, et tunc patet quod negat ipsam copulativam integram; et licet multae sint rationes ad aliam partem, possumus tamen ipsam concedere. Asseritur enim prima compositio ut<sup>252</sup> ad alteram copulata et sic disponitur aliquo modo per illam ut sit aliquomodo secunda dispositio primae. Si ergo negatio adveniat primae compositioni priusquam<sup>253</sup> fuerit copulata cum altera, includitur a copulatione et debet fieri divisio duarum propositionum, et sistit negatio in prima parte; si autem post, debet fieri compositio, et tunc negat totum ita quod neutra pars per se, et sic poterit concedi distinctio in hoc sophismate: solus Sortes est albus et Plato est albior eo.<sup>254</sup>

Item quaeritur an copulativa sit plures. Quod non videtur quia ly et significat simul esse; sicut ergo non est plures oratio quae dicit [43r] quod una est simul cum alia, sic nec copulativa est plures.

Item si esset haec plures 'Sortes currit et Plato disputat', tunc esset haec plures 'non Sortes currit et Plato disputat'; sed haec non est plures quia illa, quae plures est, potest dividi in duas propositiones ei aequipollentes; sed haec negativa non potest dividi sic; quod satis patet; ergo non est plures. Sed contra: plura ibi subiiciuntur et similiter praedicantur; ergo est plures; quod verum est. Et dicendum ad primum quod ly et significat 'simul esse' ut istud est exercitum, non conceptum; hoc autem quod in copulativa significatur ut conceptum; sunt duae propositiones copulae; significantur tamen ut simul entia et propterea remanet plures. Ad aliud dicendum quod non omnis, quae plures est, potest sic dividi; sed illa super cuius pluralitatem non supervenit virtus alterius dictionis. Sic non est hic quia ly non cadit super totum. Simile est hic 'non si Sortes currit, Plato disputat', quia licet haec sit conditionalis, non tamen potest dividi in antecedens et consequens, quia ly non non cedit cum altero illorum et hoc est quia superveniet compositioni.

## VEL

Sequitur de hac dictione 'vel' quae est disjunctiva conjunctio.<sup>255</sup> Sed qualiter potest disjungere cum illa, quae est conjunctio, debeat conjungere? Et dicendum quod conjungit voces in unum sermonem; res autem disjungit. Hoc enim<sup>256</sup> sentit disjunctiva conjunctio quod ea, inter quae disjungit, simul esse non possunt; unde dicit alterum esse verum, reliquum esse falsum. Sed contra hoc est haec regula quod si altera est vera, tunc disjunctiva est vera. Sed dicendum quod 'vel' quandoque tenetur disjunctive, quandoque subdisjunctive. Primo modo dicit alterum esse verum, reliquum esse falsum; secundo modo dicit solum<sup>257</sup> alterum esse verum nihil tangendo de reliqua parte.

<sup>249</sup> coincidit P.

<sup>250</sup> om. sed . . . verum O.

<sup>251</sup> s. s. gloss et tunc li te currere tenetur materialiter.

<sup>252</sup> om. O.

<sup>253</sup> corr. fr. postquam.

<sup>254</sup> cf. p. 66.

<sup>255</sup> cf. Prisc., G. L. III, 97, 17.

<sup>256</sup> autem O.

<sup>257</sup> om. O.

Est autem regula quod quandoque disjungit duo praedicata respectu ejusdem subjecti, quandoque duo subjecta respectu ejusdem praedicati, quandoque duo subjecta respectu duorum praedicatorum. Primo modo est categorematica de disjuncto praedicato, secundo modo de disjuncto subjecto, tertio modo disjunctiva et secundum hoc quandoque disjungit inter terminos, quandoque inter orationes. Sed videtur quod omnis conjunctio habeat conjungere inter orationes, quia proponit prius quamdam orationem in qua sunt omnes partes orationis praeter conjunctionem et dicit quod, si conjunctio addatur, necesse est aliam orationem sequi. Sed intellige quod Priscianus<sup>228</sup> intelligit hoc modo: si addatur orationi per se loquendo, sequitur alia oratio. Cum autem disjungit inter terminos, non additur orationi, sed termino per se loquendo. Secundum praedictam distinctionem procedit hoc sophisma: omnis propositio vel ejus contradictoria est vera. Probetur inductive. Deinde: sed non omnis propositio est vera; ergo ejus, scilicet cujuslibet propositionis, contradictoria est vera. Vel sic: sed haec 'tu es asinus' est propositio vel ejus contradictoria; ergo haec est vera. Vel sic: omnis propositio vel ejus contradictoria est falsa; ergo quoddam falsum est verum. Et distinguitur hic quod disjunctio potest includere divisionem vel e converso. Si includat, tunc significat praedicatum inesse alteri istorum, scilicet quod est omnis propositio vel cujuslibet contradictoriae; et sic est idem ac si distingueret inter propositiones, et est falsa et procedit primum contra. Si autem divisio includat, hoc potest esse dupliciter, aut distribuendo totum terminum [43v] disjunctum, aut primam partem respectu alterius. Primo modo falsa quia significat quod omne quod continetur sub hoc termino 'propositio vel ejus contradictoria' sit verum, et sic procedit secundum contra. Secundo modo vera, et significat quod iste terminus 'propositio' stat pro quolibet suorum suppositorum respectu totius sequentis. Unde in tertio processu debet hoc totum 'vel ejus contradictoria est vera' esse major extremas; et hoc totum 'vel ejus contradictoria est falsa' esse minor, et debet concludere: ergo falsum vel ejus contradictoria est verum vel ejus contradictoria. Unde si sumantur propositiones in vero sensu, erit in illo processu 'secundum quid' et 'simpliciter'<sup>229</sup> ex omissione determinationum. Dicendum ergo quod ly vel ejus contradictoria potest componi cum ly propositio et significabitur quod hoc totum distribuitur et est secundus sensus. Vel potest dividi ab eo, et tunc aut componitur cum praedicato aut dividitur ab eo. Si componatur cum ipso, tunc significabitur quod istud totum est unum praedicatum recipiens respectum divisionis; et si debeat ex illo sillogizari in prima figura, erit ly propositio medius terminus; totum autem residuum major. Si autem dividatur a praedicato, tunc erit tertius sensus et significatur per hoc quod dividitur a ly propositio quod non distribuitur, et sic nullo modo cadit sub divisione, sed e converso, et sic habet virtutem subdisjunctivae.<sup>230</sup>

Sed videtur quod haec oratio 'omnis propositio' etc. semper debet esse in virtute disjunctivae, quia ly ejus est relativum, non reciprocum; ergo non vult venire in eadem clausula cum antecedente; unde hoc quod dico 'vel ejus' etc. habebit virtutem alterius clausulae. Et possumus dicere quod aliqua una clausula dicitur dupliciter, scilicet vel simpliciter una ut ubi nulla erit<sup>231</sup> conjunctio, et in tali non congrue venit tale relativum simul cum suo antecedente, aut conjunctione una,<sup>232</sup> et sic in una et eadem potest venire relativum cum suo antecedente. Vel possumus dicere quod improprie ponitur hic ly ejus loco hujus relativi 'sui' vel 'sua'.

Item videtur quod falsum sit<sup>233</sup> quod hoc quod dico 'vel ejus contradictoria' debeat ordinari cum praedicato quia ly ejus semper refertur ad ly propositio. Sed dicendum quod licet semper construatur cum ly propositio, differentia tamen est

<sup>228</sup> cf. G. L. III, 160, 16 ff.

<sup>229</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 96.

<sup>230</sup> disjunctione O, corr. fr. disjunctione P.

<sup>231</sup> venit O.

<sup>232</sup> om. O.

<sup>233</sup> add. vel O.

ex hoc quod componatur cum praedicato vel non. Sed videtur quod hoc nullam facit differentiam in intellectu, sed solum in voce. Dicendum quod immo, quia compositio ejus cum praedicato significat quod respectu totius fit divisio. Et est simile hic: omnis homo in quantum ille est homo est animal; haec reduplicatio 'in quantum' etc. secundum Aristotelem<sup>264</sup> in libro Priorum ordinanda est cum praedicato, et tamen ly ille semper construitur cum subjecto.

Item videtur quod in<sup>265</sup> ultimo processu non debeat sic concludi: falsum vel ejus contradictoria est vera vel ejus contradictoria, quia ly ejus in praemissis ferebatur ad ly propositio; in conclusione autem<sup>266</sup> ad ly verum et ad ly falsum. Unde si sic concluderetur, variaretur sua relatio. Et dicendum quod haec variatio non impedit, quia ly verum et ly falsum stant pro eisdem pro quibus stetit ly propositio. Et est simile hic: omnis homo videt se et omnis homo tangit se; ergo tangens se est videns se; bene tenet et tamen ly se ferebatur ad<sup>267</sup> ly homo in praemissis, in conclusione ad ly tangens et ly videns.

Item videtur quod possit probari per inductionem [44r] secundum quod aequipollet disjunctive sicut et alio modo. Sed dicendum quod non quia nec inducit in omnibus singularibus hujus 'omnis propositio est vera', nec in omnibus hujus 'cujuslibet contradictoria est vera'; unde cum infert hanc vel illam, facit paralogismum consequentis. Simile hic: sit quod quilibet homo habeat asinum et quidam currant et eorum asini non, et quidam non currant et eorum asini currant. Deinde: omnis homo vel ejus asinus currit. Probetur inductive. Sed non omnis homo currit; ergo ejus, scilicet cujuslibet hominis asinus currit. Vel sic: sed omnis homo est homo vel ejus asinus; ergo omnis homo currit. Vel sic: omnis homo vel ejus asinus currit; sed omnis homo vel ejus asinus est non currens; ergo quoddam non currens currit; et probetur minor inductive, et penitus distinguendum est hic ut prius.

Item omne animal est rationale vel irrationale. Probetur inductive. Sed non omne animal est rationale; ergo omne animal est irrationale. Et distinguendum hic quod ly vel potest disjungere inter terminos vel inter propositiones. Sed contra hoc obicitur ut prius.<sup>268</sup> Dicendum ergo quod haec determinatio 'vel irrationale' potest componi cum praecedenti vel dividi, et significat compositio quod hoc totum compositum 'rationale vel irrationale' inest omni animali, et sic est vera et sic includit divisio. Et hunc sensum intelligunt qui dicunt quod distinguit inter terminos; divisio autem significat quod 'rationale' insit omni animali divisim vel quod 'irrationale' insit omni. Et sic includit ly vel et significat idem ac si diceret quod disjungeret<sup>269</sup> inter propositiones.

Item quidlibet est quidlibet vel differens a quolibet. Probatio: Sortes est quidlibet vel differens a quolibet, quia Sortes est Sortes vel<sup>270</sup> differens a Sorte; Sortes est Plato vel differens a Platone et sic de aliis. Unde Sortes est quidlibet vel differens a quolibet et eadem ratione Plato est quidlibet vel differens a quolibet et sic de singulis. Ergo quidlibet est quidlibet etc.; ergo quidlibet est quidlibet vel differens a Platone; et ergo Plato est quidlibet vel differens a Platone; quod falsum est. Et dicendum quod haec est falsa: Sortes est quidlibet vel differens a quolibet, et similiter de aliis singularibus. Et in probatione ejus est fallacia consequentis quia non probat hanc sufficienter: Sortes est quidlibet; non enim probat eam nisi pro unico singulari; nec hanc 'Sortes est differens a quolibet', quia deficit in uno singulari, hoc scilicet 'differens a Sorte', et sic non potest inferre alteram istarum divisionum nisi ex singularibus sufficienter sumptis.

<sup>264</sup> cf. *Anal. Prior.* I, 36; Didot I, 82, 23 (49 a 25).

<sup>265</sup> om. O.

<sup>266</sup> vero P.

<sup>267</sup> om. O.

<sup>268</sup> cf. p. 84, *marg. gloss* scilicet supra folio

3° ante istud principium in illo sophismate: solius binarii pars est unitas.

<sup>269</sup> disjungere P.

<sup>270</sup> A long passage out of place in O; it belongs 223<sup>r</sup> col. 1 3rd last line; it is marked vacat.

Item terminus disjunctus aequipollet uni communi quod est commune utrique parti; sed commune non potest inesse actualiter alicui signato nisi pro aliqua parte signata; ergo iste terminus disjunctus 'quidlibet vel differens a quolibet' non potest inesse ei quod est 'Sortes' nisi pro eo quod est 'quidlibet' vel pro eo quod est 'differens a quolibet'; utrumque autem, ut dictum est, insufficienter probatur. Si autem sic diceretur<sup>271</sup> 'Sortes est quidlibet vel differens ab illo', tunc esset multiplex quia, si sit oratio composita, vera est et includit divisio disjunctionem. Et est sensus: Sortes est Sortes vel differens ab illo; Sortes est Plato vel differens ab illo et sic de aliis. Si autem sit divisa, falsa est. Et est sensus quod 'esse quidlibet' inest 'Sorti vel differens ab illo', si 'quodlibet' non<sup>272</sup> insit 'Sorti'; quorum utrumque falsum est. Et similiter haec est multiplex 'quidlibet est quidlibet' etc. Unde si sic inferat: [44v] sed non quidlibet est quidlibet; ergo est differens ab illo, procedit in sensu divisionis; qui falsus est. Si autem accipiat in vero sensu et dicat quod ly illo stat pro 'quolibet', ergo convenit dicere 'quidlibet est quidlibet vel differens a quolibet', erit parallogismus accidentis sicut hic: omnis homo videt se; sed ly se stat pro 'omni homine'; ergo omnis homo videt omnem hominem.

Item cum dictio modalis adjungitur disjunctioni, accidit multiplicitas ut hic: Sortem currere vel non currere est necessarium; si namque li non currere componatur cum<sup>273</sup> praecedenti, significat quod necessitas insit huic toti, et sic modus includit disjunctionem; et si dividatur, significat quod necessitas insit alteri parti divisim. et sic disjunctio includit modum; et est idem ac si disjungeret inter propositiones; primo modo vera, secundo modo falsa. Sed quaeritur circa quod sistit haec necessitas, et dicet forte quod circa ipsam disjunctionem. Sed contra: omnis necessitas est veritas; sed omnis veritas est circa compositionem verbi; ergo omnis necessitas est circa compositionem verbi, et dico veritatem et necessitatem completam. Et dicendum quod et ejus veritas et ejus necessitas est circa compositionem primam, non simpliciter sed ut disjungitur ab alia; sic enim asseritur prima. Eadem distinctio accidit hic: tu scis astra esse paria vel imparia; et etiam hic: astra esse paria vel astra esse imparia scitur a te.

Quaeritur utrum disjunctiva sit una aut plures. Quod non plures videtur; neutra pars disjunctivae assertive affirmatur. Quod non una videtur quia non est ibi unum subjectum nec unum praedicatum quia qua ratione subjectum partis primae dicatur subjectum, eadem ratione subjectum secundae. Et dicendum quod non asseritur ibi prima compositio, nec simpliciter, sed sub disjunctione ad aliam et sic asseritur unum solum et de uno, non tamen simpliciter, sed sub distinctione. Nec est simile de copulativa, licet in ea asseratur pars prima ut simul ens vel copulata cum secunda quia sic asserere primam est asserere utramque. De hoc autem aliter dicitur probabilibus rationibus.

## AN

Sequitur de hac dictione 'an' de qua dicit Priscianus<sup>274</sup> quod significat dubitationem. Et intelligendum est sic, scilicet quod, cum dubitamus, de duobus cui sit consentiendum quaerimus, et talia duo habent conjungi mediante 'an' ut hic: loquar an sileam? Sed tunc est dubium, qualiter ponatur hic 'tu scis an Sortes currat', et inter quae conjungat; si enim significet dubitationem, male adjungitur cum hoc verbo 'scis'. Sed<sup>275</sup> dicendum quod sicut aliquid prius est quaestio et consequenter deducitur in scientiam, et sic bene ordinatur cum hoc verbo 'scis', unde bene dicitur 'tu scis quis currit', sic est de dubitatione. Unde licet dicat dubi-

<sup>271</sup> diceretur O.<sup>272</sup> om. O. s. s. P.<sup>273</sup> om. O.<sup>274</sup> cf. G. L. III, 101, 9.<sup>275</sup> om. O.

tationem, bene tamen ordinatur cum hoc verbo 'scis'. Ad aliud sciendum quod dubitato uno oppositorum, dubitatur et reliquum; et ly an dicit dubitationem hujusmodi 'Sortes currit', et sic satis intelligitur et sua opposita. Unde conjungit inter hanc et suam oppositam. Et quia scire hanc dubitationem an Sortes currat est scire alteram partem contradictoriam, habet virtutem disjunctionis. Et similiter cum ponitur in interrogatione quia interrogatio quaerit de duobus utrum hoc vel illud. Quandoque igitur ponitur in interrogatione et cum quaeritur dubitativa,<sup>276</sup> quandoque ponitur post verbum cadens super dubitationem. Exemplum primi: eloquar, etc.? Exemplum secundi: tu scis an Sortes currat. Quaeritur autem quae sit differentia inter 'an' et 'vel'. Quae talis est quod qui scit an Sortes currat, scit determinate alteram partem; sed qui scit hoc 'Sortem currere vel non currere' non necessario scit determinate alteram. [45r] Et propterea 'an' vocatur electiva conjunctio quia dicit electionem alterius partis determinatae.<sup>277</sup>

Regula est quod haec dictio 'an' semel posita disjungit inter opposita, bis inter proposita. Unde non sequitur: ab eadem semel posita ad eandem bis positam nec e converso, ut si scias Sortem non currere, scis an Sortes currat, nec tamen scis an Sortes an Plato. Et similiter si nihil scias de Sorte, scis tamen quod Plato currit, scis an Sortes an Plato currat, nec tamen scis an Sortes currit.

Item non tenet a contrario in contrarium cum eadem posita quia scis an Coriscus sit albus pro parte negata,<sup>278</sup> dubitas tamen an sit niger quia dubitas an sit similiter in privativis ut de aliquo caeco scis an sit videns, dubitas tamen an sit caecus; sed in relativis et in contradictoriis tenet ut hic: scis an pater sit; ergo scis an filius sit; tu scis an Sortes currat; ergo scis an non currat.

Item non tenet ab eadem praeposita signo universalis ad eandem postpositam, verbi gratia, tu scis an omnis homo sit Sortes. Probatio: tu scis hoc vel ejus oppositum; ergo scis an. Deinde: ergo scis omnis homo an sit Sortes; ergo scis omnem hominem esse Sortem vel omnem hominem non esse Sortem. Hic est paralogismus consequentis sicut hic: scis non omnem; ergo scis omnem non. Sed videtur quod sic possit procedere: tu scis Sortes an sit Sortes; tu scis Plato an sit Sortes<sup>279</sup> et sic de<sup>280</sup> singulis; ergo scis omnem an etc. Deinde ut prius. Dicendum quod in hac inductione est paralogismus consequentis quia haec 'tu scis omnis homo an sit Sortes' valet istas duas<sup>281</sup> sub disjunctione: tu scis omnem<sup>282</sup> esse Sortem vel omnem non esse Sortem. Ubi enim ponitur haec dictio 'an', ibi ponenda est haec dictio 'non'. Neutram autem probat sufficienter quia primae non accipiunt<sup>283</sup> nisi unam singularem; secundae autem accipiunt<sup>284</sup> omnes praeter unam.

Item si sic dicatur 'tu scis an omnis homo sit Sortes an differat a Sorte',<sup>284</sup> erit haec falsa, quia nec scis omnem hominem esse Sortem nec omnem hominem differre a Sorte. Sed si sic dicatur 'tu scis omnis homo an sit Sortes an differat a Sorte', haec est vera posito quod cognoscas<sup>285</sup> omnem et significat quod de quolibet scis ipsum esse Sortem vel differre a Sorte determinate. Et priori modo est haec totalis in se 'omnis homo est Sortes' una pars disjunctionis; secundo modo non, sed disjungit li an inter quodlibet singulare illius divisionis et illud quod sequitur. Multiplicatur enim virtualiter ly an virtute divisionis praecedentis; verumtamen adhuc illo modo multiplex est eb quod hoc, quod dico 'an differat', possit componi cum praecedenti vel dividi. Si componatur, vera est; si dividatur, falsa est et significat idem ac si praeponeretur. Et per hoc solvitur hic processus: tu scis omnis homo an sit Sortes an differat a Sorte; ergo scis an omnis homo etc.,<sup>286</sup> quia procedit

<sup>276</sup> mss. not clear.

<sup>277</sup> cf. Prisc. G. L. III, 98, 25 *passim*.

<sup>278</sup> nigra O.

<sup>279</sup> Plato O, corr. fr. Plato P.

<sup>280</sup> om. O.

<sup>281</sup> om. Sortes . . . duas O.

<sup>282</sup> add. hominem O.

<sup>283</sup> accipit O.

<sup>284</sup> om. a Sorte O.

<sup>285</sup> cognoscat O.

<sup>286</sup> om. ergo . . . etc. O, marg. P.

in sensu divisionis; hic ergo non tenet ab hac dictione 'an' bis,<sup>287</sup> postposita ad eandem praepositam. Simile est hic: habeat quilibet asinum et aliqui currant et eorum asini non; et aliqui non currant, sed eorum asini, et hoc scias. Deinde: tu scis omnis homo an currat an ejus asinus currat. Probetur inductive: sed non scis quod omnis homo currit; ergo scis quod ejus asinus currit, scilicet cujuslibet. Vel sic: tu scis omnis homo an etc.; ergo an omnis homo an, et tunc ut prius. Dicendum quod hoc, quod dico 'an ejus' etc., potest componi cum praecedenti vel dividi. Si componatur, cadit distributio super<sup>288</sup> totum et habeat utrumque 'an' multotiens sumi, ita quod disjungat inter singularia illius divisionis. Et sic vera est et sic probatur, et significatur quod de quolibet singulari scis an currat ipse [45v] an ejus asinus. Vel potest dividi et significatur quod scis alterum istorum divisim: omnis homo currit vel ejus asinus currit, et sic idem est ac si ipsum 'an' praeponeretur et sic procedit utraque contra.

Dicunt autem quidam quod haec vera est<sup>289</sup> divisa, et concedunt hanc 'tu scis omnem hominem currere vel scis ejus asinum currere', et dicunt quod ly ejus refert hoc quod dico 'homo' non sub eodem praedicato, sed sub ejus opposito, quia si referret sub eodem, tunc esset sensus: scis ejus asinum qui currit currere, ut implicetur quod omnis homo curreret, et quod ejus asinus, et sic quod utraque pars disjunctivae<sup>290</sup> erat falsa;<sup>291</sup> quod est contra naturam disjunctivae.<sup>292</sup> Sed si sub opposito praedicato, tunc implicatur quod partes disjunctae non possunt simul stare; quod consonat naturae<sup>293</sup> disjunctivae.<sup>294</sup> Eadem ratione concedunt hanc 'omnis propositio vel ejus contradictoria' etc. secundum quod aequipollet hypotheticae.<sup>295</sup> Sed contra: deum esse vel ejus oppositum est verum;<sup>296</sup> haec est vera et non nugatoria;<sup>297</sup> sed si ly ejus referret sub opposito praedicato, esset nugatio. Est enim sensus quod oppositum hujus dicti 'deum non esse verum' est verum, et sic significaret haec disjuncta: deum esse verum esse verum sive deum non esse verum non esse verum, et sic patet quod esset nugatoria.

Item in proposito ly ejus refertur ad ly omnis homo, et sicut tu dicis 'sub opposito praedicato quod est non currere'; ergo implicat omnem hominem non currere, et sic erit falsa. Propterea dicendum quod refertur ad suum antecedens pro eisdem suppositis pro quibus stetit in priori, non tangendo utrum sub eodem vel opposito praedicato; nec oportet quod partes disjunctae sint impossibiles nisi ubi propriissime est disjunctio.

Item non tenet cum hac dictione 'an' si permutetur relativum a praedicato in subjectum, verbi gratia, mentiatu Sortes vel Plato, sed nescias uter. Deinde: tu scis an de mentiente sit falsum Sortem esse illum.<sup>298</sup> Probatio: si Sortes mentiatu, tunc de mentiente non est falsum Sortem esse illum, immo verum, et refertur ly illum ad ly mentientem.

Item si Plato mentiatu, tunc de mentiente non est falsum Sortem esse illum; non enim est falsum de Platone mentiente, immo de Sorte non mentiente esse falsum Sortem esse illum, scilicet mentiente, quia haec oratio 'Sortes est mentiens' neque est vera neque falsa de Platone, et ita sive Sortes mentiatu sive Plato non est falsum de mentiente Sortem esse illum; omni ergo casu de mentiente non est falsum Sortem esse illum, et hoc scis; ergo scis an de mentiente sit falsum illum esse Sortem. Contra: si Sortes mentiatu, tunc de mentiente non est falsum illum esse Sortem, immo verum; si Plato mentiatu, tunc<sup>299</sup> de mentiente est falsum etc. et nescis quis casus contingat; ergo nescis an etc. Dicendum quod prima est vera,

<sup>287</sup> om. O.<sup>288</sup> supra O.<sup>289</sup> esse O.<sup>290</sup> disjuncte P.<sup>291</sup> vera O. corr. fr. vera P.<sup>292</sup> disjuncte P.<sup>293</sup> vere ? P.<sup>294</sup> disjuncte O, P.<sup>295</sup> cf. Grabmann p. 33.<sup>296</sup> vera O.<sup>297</sup> cf. Grabmann pp. 21, 86.<sup>298</sup> ipsum O.<sup>299</sup> om. O.

sed, cum infert, est paralogismus consequentis sicut hic: de mentiente non est falsum Sortem esse illum; ergo de mentiente non est falsum illum esse Sortem; sequitur enim e converso sicut hic: non est falsum Sortem esse mentientem; ergo non est<sup>300</sup> falsum mentientem esse Sortem.

Item non tenet ab inferiori ad superius cum hac dictione 'an', verbi gratia, tu scis an de mentiente sit falsum Sortem esse illum; ergo scis an de mentiente sit enuntiabile Sortem etc. Contra: si Sortes mentiat, tunc de mentiente est enuntiabile Sortem esse<sup>301</sup> etc.; si Plato mentiatur, tunc Sortem esse illum non est enuntiabile de mentiente, quia non de Platone. Est enim fallacia consequentis ratione negationis ab inferiori ad superius sicut hic: non est falsum; ergo non est enuntiabile.

Item sicut dictum est:<sup>302</sup> non tenet a contrario in contrarium ut hic: [46r] tu scis an de mentiente sit falsum Sortem esse illum;<sup>303</sup> ergo scis an de mentiente sit verum Sortem esse illum.<sup>304</sup> Contra: si Sortes mentiat, tunc de mentiente est verum Sortem esse illum; si Plato mentiatur, tunc de mentiente non est verum Sortem esse illum et nescis quis casus contingat; ergo tu non scis an de mentiente est verum.<sup>305</sup> Et est paralogismus consequentis sicut hic: de mentiente non est falsum; ergo est verum. Sed contra: si loquamur de enuntiabili, bene sequitur: non est falsum; ergo verum; et nunc loquimur de enuntiabili 'et hoc verum est', non tamen sequitur: non est falsum de isto; ergo est verum de isto, verbi gratia, si te esse asinum non est falsum de Platone; ergo est verum de Platone.

## NE

Sequitur de hac dictione 'ne', quae aliquando ponitur interrogative ut: curritne Sortes? Et ponitur pro 'an'. Quandoque ponitur prohibitive et hoc dupliciter, quando scilicet ut per ipsum exerceatur prohibitio; quandoque autem ut ipsum prohibitum ordinetur cum aliquo praecedenti. Exemplum primi: ne curras. Exemplum secundi: volo ne curras. Et sic de ipso est dubitatio in hoc sophismate: tu vis ne tibi concludatur, et caves ne tibi concludatur; ergo idem vis et caves. Et dicunt quidam quod ly ne in prima aequipollet huic 'ut non', et in secunda ei quod est 'ut'; unde non est idem. Sed contra hoc est quod haec dictio 'ne' semper videtur sonare in negationem.

Item sumatur loco ejus hoc quod dico 'ut non', et vera est tam prima quam secunda; caves enim propter hoc ut non tibi concludatur. Propterea dicendum quod in hac 'caves ne' etc., ly caves potest teneri transitive ut sit sensus: caves hoc ne etc., vel absolute et est sensus: caves propter hoc ne etc. Primo modo falsa, secundo modo vera, et debet concludere: ergo idem vis et propter hoc caves.

## SIVE

Sequitur de hac dictione 'sive' de qua sciendum quod ipsa significat disjunctionem cum conditione. Et tunc dubitatur sic: si Sortes currit vel Plato currit, Sortes currit. Probatio: haec est quaedam disjunctiva conditionalis cujus prima pars vera; ergo tota. Et est prima pars haec: si Sortes currit, Sortes currit. Secunda haec: si Sortes currit, Plato currit. Sed cum hic sit disjunctio cum conditione,

<sup>300</sup> erit O.

<sup>301</sup> om. O.

<sup>302</sup> cf. p. 90.

<sup>303</sup> s. s. gloss haec est vera in omni casu quia de mentiente non est falsum Sortem esse illum.

<sup>304</sup> s. s. gloss haec autem non est in omni

casu vera quia si Sortes mentiat, tunc de mentiente est verum Sortem esse illum; si vero Plato mentiatur, tunc de mentiente non est verum Sortem esse illum.

<sup>305</sup> ergo—verum reads ergo tu scis an O; corr. fr. ergo tu scis an P.



aequipollebit<sup>306</sup> huic: sive Sortes currit sive Plato currit, Sortes currit; sed haec est falsa; ergo prima.

Dicendum quod disjunctio ejus quod est 'sive' habet cadere in antecedente et non in consequente et ly si habet cadere super disjunctionem. Sed secundum hoc fuit prima falsa. Fuit enim sensus, si<sup>307</sup> haec disjunctiva est vera: si Sortes currit vel Plato currit, Sortes currit. Primo modo debet illud 'vel Plato currit' dividi a praecedente; secundo modo componi; significat ergo consequentiam alicujus ad aliquam disjunctam et ex consequenti ad utramque partem ejus.

Sit iterum sophisma sic: sit solum asinus albus. Deinde: sive homo sive album<sup>308</sup> sit, animal est. Probatio: 'animal esse' sequitur ad primam partem et similiter ad secundam. Probatio: album idem est quod asinus; sed ad asinum sequitur animal; ergo album. Sed contra: solum lapide existente albo haec est vera 'homo vel album est', nec sequitur quod animal sit. Dicendum quod prima falsa, et in probatione ejus est paralogismus accidentis, quia licet album nunc sit idem in re cum ly asinus, tamen respectu conditionis est divisim; non enim solum respicitur pro eo quod nunc est album, sed indifferenter pro quocumque. Secundum hanc regulam termini positi sub conditione non stant determinate, sed simpliciter. Et in veritate non est haec<sup>309</sup> difficultas hujus dictionis 'sive'.

Tolle peripsema, post pete pulinam, spernis arulam.<sup>310</sup> Expliciunt syncategoremata.<sup>311</sup>

<sup>306</sup> aequipollet O.

<sup>307</sup> om. O.

<sup>308</sup> alium O.

<sup>309</sup> om. O.

<sup>310</sup> om. Tolle . . . arulam O.

<sup>311</sup> Expliciunt syncategoremata magistri Willelmi de Sirewode O.

# The Prohibition of Marriage Against Canons in the Early Twelfth Century

T. P. McLAUGHLIN, C.S.B.

ABELARD, relating in his *Historia Calamitatum* the objections of Heloise to their proposed marriage in 1118 or 1119, states that she appeals to him as a cleric and a canon, *te clericum atque canonicum*, to abandon all thought of such a step.<sup>1</sup> We are not concerned here with the other reasons which Heloise adduces, nor with the order of their importance.<sup>2</sup> Our problem is whether contemporary legislation offers any evidence of a special prohibition against canons<sup>3</sup> as such to contract marriage at this time.

The general law regarding the marriage of clerics at this time is to be gathered from the texts inserted in the *Decretum* and the *Panormia* of Yvo of Chartres about the year 1095, collections already widespread in 1118. A cleric in major orders, priest, deacon or subdeacon, may validly contract marriage but if he does so he loses his benefice; a cleric in minor orders may marry and still retain his benefice.<sup>4</sup>

Does the fact that a cleric is also a canon modify this rule? If the canon is in sacred orders he is bound by the rule regarding these, but if a cleric in minor orders is also a canon is he subject to a special discipline? The words, *atque canonicum* suggest that he is. Are there other texts to support this view? Two series of conciliar decrees, seemingly neglected by the authors of works on the history of marriage and of the law of celibacy, lend credence to the thesis that there existed at the beginning of the twelfth century a special rule forbidding the marriage of canons. The first series is the work of French councils belonging precisely to this period, 1080 to 1114 to be exact, a series in all likelihood well known in the region of Paris. The second group of texts is composed of legislation of English councils between the years 1102 and 1127.

In 1080 William the Conqueror convoked and presided over a council at Lillebonne near Le Havre. Held to make known and to enforce the decrees of the Gregorian reform, this council drew up the following canon: "Presbyteri, diaconi, subdiaconi et omnes canonici et decani nullam omnino feminam habeant".<sup>5</sup> This text certainly refers to canons. Marriage<sup>6</sup> is forbidden to a first group composed

<sup>1</sup> Chap. VII, edit. Migne, P.L. 178, col. 132B.

<sup>2</sup> This problem has recently received excellent treatment at the hands of Etienne Gilson, *Héloïse et Abélard* (Paris, 1938), chap. II, p. 46 ff. and chap. III. See also C. Charrier, *Héloïse dans l'histoire et dans la légende* (Paris, 1933), p. 107 ff., and E. McLeod, *Héloïse* (London, 1938), p. 62 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See first part of note 40.

<sup>4</sup> For this doctrine one may consult the numerous works on the history of marriage and sacerdotal celibacy. Note especially A. Esmein, *Le mariage en droit canonique*, Vol. I, 2nd ed. by R. Génestal (Paris, 1929), p. 313 ff.; J. Freisen, *Geschichte des kanonischen Eherechts bis zum Verfall der Glossenliteratur*, 2nd ed. (Paderborn, 1893), p. 719 ff.;

J. Dauvillier, *Le mariage dans le droit classique de l'Eglise* (Paris, 1933), p. 162 ff.; E. Jombart, 'Célibat des clercs', in *Dictionnaire de droit canonique*, Vol. III (Paris, 1938), col. 134 ff.; E. Vacandard, 'Le célibat ecclésiastique', in *Etudes de critique et d'histoire*, First series, 4th ed. (Paris, 1909), p. 114 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Canon 3, Mansi, 20, 556. Exactly the same text is to be found in Bessin's collection of the councils of Rouen.

<sup>6</sup> In the texts of the period of the Gregorian reform the women with whom clerics associate are referred to in various ways as wives, women, concubines, and a host of other things less respectable. The writers are concerned with a condition of fact which some will describe as marriage. others as

of those in major orders, priest, deacon and subdeacon, and to a second group irrespective of their order, the canons and deans.<sup>7</sup>

Pope Urban II arrived in France in 1095 and in November of that year presided over a council at Clermont in Auvergne. He himself calls it a *concilium generale* and tells us that it was attended by twelve archbishops, eighty bishops and eighty-six abbots. Besides a few Italian and Spanish prelates most of the French bishops were present, among them the archbishop of Sens and his suffragans including the bishop of Paris. After treating some very important matters,<sup>8</sup> the necessity of organizing a crusade, the excommunicating of Philip I of France and the settling of a dispute between the archbishops of Lyons and of Sens concerning the primacy of the former, the council drew up a long list of disciplinary measures. We have not the official text of these canons but at least four versions differing in length and content have come down to us. Moreover, later councils renew the decisions of the council of Clermont and so throw light upon its decrees. We shall now consider the four versions of this council on the subject of the marriage of canons.

1) Ordericus Vitalis (died about 1143) reports the following decree in his *Historia Ecclesiastica*: "Presbyter, diaconus, subdiaconus vel canonicus cujuslibet ordinis, carnali commercio non utatur. Presbyter, diaconus, subdiaconus, post lapsum non ministret".<sup>9</sup> According to this all relationship with women is forbidden to two classes of persons, first to those in sacred orders and second to canons whether they are in sacred orders or in minor orders. The prohibition against married clerics to minister at the altar is directed against the first group only since the canon as such does not perform this office.

2) William of Malmsebury (died about 1143) reports in very brief fashion the decrees of Clermont in his *Gesta Regum*. This is true for the canon touching our subject: "Quod nullus cujuslibet sacri ordinis carnali commercio utatur".<sup>10</sup> Marriage is forbidden to all in sacred orders. Nothing is said regarding the canons.

3) A manuscript belonging to the Laurentian Library at Florence transmits the text of the *Praecepta Urbani papae in Arvernensi concilio*. Our canon takes this form: "Presbyteris, diaconibus, subdiaconibus uxores interdicimus, et qui in inferioribus ordinibus constituti erunt, si uxores habuerint, in canonica non remaneant".<sup>11</sup> The canon forbids marriage to two groups of persons, to those who are in major orders and also to those in minor orders if they wish to retain their canonries.<sup>12</sup> Of those in minor orders who are not canons nothing is said.

4) The so-called *Codex Lamberti*,<sup>13</sup> the most complete version of the decisions of the council of Clermont, contains two canons on our subject. Canon 9: "Ut nullus

concubinage in either the good or bad sense of this term, but all have the intention of putting an end to all relations of clerics with women. It is in this loose sense that I shall use the term marriage, bearing in mind always that a cleric of any order may contract a valid marriage at this time provided there is no other impediment and the conditions necessary for the marriage contract have been complied with.

<sup>7</sup> The deans are clerics, special representatives of the bishop in rural districts. That they, like the archdeacons and rural archpriests, are not always in major orders is clearly indicated by the frequent renewal of the rule obliging them to receive these orders. See, for example, the councils of Rouen, 1072, can. 15; Clermont, 1095, can. 3; Westminster, 1125 (Mansi, 20, 38, 817; 21, 381). Not always successful in obtaining this result, the ecclesiastical authorities attack them from another angle, submitting them to a regulation

peculiar to those in sacred orders. See articles 'Archidiaconus' and 'Archiprêtre' in *Dictionnaire de droit canonique*, I (Paris, 1935), col. 976-978 and 1015; P. Andrieu-Guitrancourt, *Essai sur l'évolution du décanat rural en Angleterre* (Paris, 1935), p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> See Hefele, *Histoire des conciles*, translation Leclercq, V (Paris 1912), p. 396 ff.

<sup>9</sup> Lib. IX, edit. Migne, P.L. 188, 650; edit. Le Prevost in *Société de l'histoire de France* (Paris, 1838-1855), III, 464.

<sup>10</sup> Lib. IV, edit. Migne, P.L. 179, 1294; edit. Stubbs in *Rolls Series*, II (London, 1889), p. 392.

<sup>11</sup> J. von Pflugk-Harttung, *Acta pontificum romanorum inedita*, II (Stuttgart, 1884), p. 161.

<sup>12</sup> See canon of the council of Beauvais, below p. 96.

<sup>13</sup> Lambert, bishop of Arras, present at the council of Clermont.

sacerdos aut diaconus aut subdiaconus, sed et nullus qui canonicam habet, fornicationis sibi copulam adjungat. Quod si quis fecerit, a canonica omnino arceatur".<sup>14</sup> The sense of this text is the same as that of the Florence manuscript. Marriage is forbidden to those in major orders and also—the *sed et* clearly indicates a transition to another category of persons—to all those who hold canonries irrespective of their order. They will lose them if they do not observe the rule of celibacy. Canon 25: "Ne filii presbyterorum, diaconorum vel subdiaconorum canonicorum ad ordines vel alios honores ecclesiasticos promoveantur, nisi fiant monachi vel regulares canonici".<sup>15</sup>

This canon indirectly reveals the prohibition of marriage against certain persons in declaring that their children are ineligible to receive ecclesiastical orders or dignities. They have incurred an irregularity *ex defectu natalium* which prevents their entering holy orders unless the irregularity is removed by becoming a monk or canon regular.<sup>16</sup> Consequently only the first part of the canon interests us. The marriage of what clerics results in an irregularity for the children? The text is a bit awkward to translate. Grammatically the word *canonicorum* may be taken as an adjective modifying all three nouns preceding. In such case the text means that marriage is forbidden to all major clerics who are at the same time canons. But this cannot be the meaning for at this date marriage is forbidden to major clerics whether they are canons or not. Or the word *canonicorum* may qualify only the noun nearest it, *subdiaconorum*. Then the decree forbids marriage to priests and deacons and also to subdeacons when these are at the same time canons. This interpretation is possible because there is some hesitation at this time concerning the subdeacons. Though usually included with the priests and deacons in the prohibition, they are sometimes omitted by texts which would seem to imply that they may not be submitted to the same rule of celibacy as the two higher orders.<sup>17</sup> However I do not think this is the probable interpretation. *Canonicorum* should be taken as a noun and the *vel* should follow instead of precede the *subdiaconorum*. This interpretation, according to which marriage is forbidden to priests, deacons, subdeacons and canons, is supported by a text from the council of Poitiers.

This council, held in the year 1100 and attended by two papal legates and eighty bishops and abbots,<sup>18</sup> renewing in its last canon many of the decrees of the council of Clermont, declares: "De castitate presbyterorum, diaconorum, subdiaconorum et canonicorum . . . et quidquid . . . Urbanus . . . in Claramontensi concilio constituit nos apostolica auctoritate tenenda praecipimus".<sup>19</sup> Direct reference is here made to the council of Clermont and the word *canonicorum* is used as a noun. The *et*, corresponding to *vel* in the preceding text, is placed after and not before *subdiaconorum*. Thus both the council of Poitiers and the *Codex Lamberti* version of the council of Clermont forbid the marriage of canons.

In 1114 a council assembled at Beauvais. It was presided over by the Pope's legate and attended by the archbishops of Sens, Rheims and Bourges and their suffragans.<sup>20</sup> The synod renewed the decisions of previous councils and one of its canons, recalling the decree of Urban II in the council of Clermont, states: "Nullus sacerdos, vel diaconus, vel subdiaconus, sed et nullus qui canonicatum habet,

<sup>14</sup> Mansi, 20, 817.

<sup>15</sup> *Id.*, 818. In the editions, the final clause of the text, evidently corrupt, reads: nisi monachus vel canonicus fuerit; nisi vel fiant monachi vel regulares canonici. Génestal on p. 17, note 1, of the work quoted in the next note, proposes a correction substantially the same as mine.

<sup>16</sup> See R. Génestal, *Histoire de la légitima-*

*tion des enfants naturels en droit canonique* (Paris, 1905), p. 14 ff., 80 ff.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Dauvillier, *op. cit.*, p. 164 ff.; Esmein, *op. cit.*, I, 330 ff.; Freisen, *op. cit.*, p. 741 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Some place the number much higher. Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, V, 468.

<sup>19</sup> Canon 16, Mansi, 20, 1124.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, V, 548.

fornicationis sibi copulam adjungat. Quod si quis fecerit, a canonicatu arceatur".<sup>21</sup> This decree also prohibits marriage to the three major orders of clerics as well as to all canons. The text is the same as the canon 9 of the *Codex Lamberti* except that it has the forms *canonicatum*, *canonicatu*, in place of *canonicam*, *canonica*.

Mention should be made of another text of this period concerning the marriage of canons. Yvo, bishop of Chartres and the greatest authority of Canon Law at the time, is asked by Gualo, bishop of Paris, to decide what is to be done about a certain canon of his diocese who has married. Yvo replies that there is no doubt regarding the validity of the marriage but that the canon is to be deprived of his benefice. The letter which does not bear a date belongs to the years 1104-1115.<sup>22</sup> Yvo does not reveal the rank of the canon in question. Esmein in his excellent work on marriage in Canon Law holds that he is at least a subdeacon.<sup>23</sup> I question the validity of this conclusion.<sup>24</sup> As just remarked, the letter itself does not state that he is in major orders. Yvo says that on account of his marriage the canon will descend from a higher to a lower order but the rest of the letter clearly indicates that he means that he will fall from a higher state of perfection.<sup>25</sup> Esmein appears to have reasoned in this way: At this time a cleric in major orders who marries loses his benefice whereas one in minor orders retains his.<sup>26</sup> Now according to Yvo this canon loses his benefice. Therefore he was in major orders. The conclusion is erroneous because the major premise is incorrect. In view of the texts which we have just seen the argument should run as follows: A cleric in major orders who contracts marriage loses his benefice whereas one in minor orders retains his unless he is at the same time a canon. Now the cleric in question who loses his benefice is at the same time a canon. As such he loses it regardless of whether he is in major orders or not. We are therefore unable to infer from the loss of benefice that he is a major cleric. The text cannot be alleged against what I have been attempting to establish, namely, that there is a special prohibition against canons as such. It may even favor this thesis. I am of the opinion that this canon is only a minor cleric. Reading the literature of the period<sup>27</sup> one receives the impression that it is customary to indicate the rank of a major cleric, priest, deacon or subdeacon, while those in minor orders are referred to simply as clerics, without mention of the particular minor order which they have received.

Yvo has treated the case of a canon who marries. The case of a man already married who wishes to become a canon is dealt with in a contemporary letter addressed by Manasses de Châtillon, archbishop of Rheims, to Lambert, bishop of Arras.<sup>28</sup> A certain Walter, he says, was admitted to the clerical state since there existed no canonical impediment. Now he wishes to be promoted to a canonry. Such a promotion is not unreasonable nor is it opposed to justice since it is common knowledge that his wife has committed adultery and has married another. Invoking

<sup>21</sup> Mansi, 21, 125. The canons are not numbered.

<sup>22</sup> Ep. 218, P.L. 162, 221. The text is too long and diffused to be reproduced here. Yvo was bishop of Chartres from 1090 to 1115 and Gualo bishop of Paris from 1104 to 1116.

<sup>23</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, 329, note 2: 'Il n'est point douteux que ce chanoine fût au moins sous-diacre'. Dauvillier, *op. cit.*, p. 162, seems also to assume that the canon is in major orders.

<sup>24</sup> Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 70, note 1, likewise hesitates to accept Esmein's opinion. 'C'est possible, mais rien ne le prouve'.

<sup>25</sup> The fact that Yvo gives only this general reason against the marriage of clerics and that he makes no appeal to special arguments against those in major orders would seem to

imply that the canon in question is only in minor orders.

<sup>26</sup> Esmein states this clearly elsewhere. See note 4.

<sup>27</sup> For example the numerous letters of Yvo. The correspondence grouped under the name of Lambert, bishop of Arras (1093-1115), witnesses to the same usage. Ep. 7, 96, 107 designate as *sacerdotes* or *presbyteri* certain persons mentioned by name. In Ep. 121 we find *Rogerus diaconus*, and in Ep. 86 *Drogonem subdiaconum*. Others have *Guagonem clericum* (Ep. 87); *D. clericum* (Ep. 100); *Robertum clericum* (Ep. 84); *istum clericum* (Ep. 37). See P.L. 162, 647 ff.

<sup>28</sup> P.L. 162, 669, Ep. 57 of the collection of Lambert. The date is 1096-1106. Manasses is Lambert's metropolitan.

scriptural authority which permits the repudiation of an adulterous wife while denying the husband the right to remarry as long as she lives, Manasses claims that the cleric is free to become a canon.<sup>29</sup>

Here we have the case of a cleric in minor orders who contracts marriage. According to the law of the time he may legitimately do so and still retain his benefice. But now his marriage is an obstacle to his becoming a canon. If the cleric were already in sacred orders the same question would have arisen when he received them. The fact that it has not and that his freedom to receive sacred orders has not been established indicates that he is still in minor orders.

The text clearly implies that the married state and the canonical dignity are incompatible.

In this section we shall mention briefly a few English decrees of the same period which throw light upon the legislation of the French councils. A national council<sup>30</sup> assembled in London in 1102 promulgated the following canon: "Ut nullus archidiaconus, presbyter, diaconus, canonicus uxorem ducat, aut ductam retineat; subdiaconus vero quilibet qui canonicus non est, si post professionem castitatis uxorem duxerit, eadem regula constringatur".<sup>31</sup> The first part of the canon forbids marriage to priests and deacons as well as to archdeacons and canons, these last irrespective of the order they have received. The second part of the text makes it clear that canons as such are bound by the rule of celibacy. At the time of Lanfranc a great part of the English clergy were married and it required a century to introduce the law of celibacy. In the council of Winchester in 1076 Lanfranc was obliged to relax the Roman rules regarding clerical marriage,<sup>32</sup> and during the century following many dispensations were granted by the Holy See. The above text prohibits marriage to all subdeacons, a class often treated more leniently than the other higher orders. In declaring that subdeacons who are not canons are bound by the same law as priests and deacons it appears to be promulgating a new regulation for the English clergy but clearly implies that it is an old regulation that subdeacons who are canons are forbidden to marry.<sup>33</sup>

The first six canons of another council held in London in 1108 recall the decree of 1102 as applying to priests, deacons and subdeacons. If they marry they will be removed from both office and benefice, pronounced infamous, and if they remain obdurate will be excommunicated. The seventh canon then states: "Eadem sententia archidiaconos et canonicos omnes complectitur".<sup>34</sup> Thus archdeacons and canons are bound by the same rule as those in major orders. The council goes on to decree that the concubines and chattels of priests, deacons, subdeacons and canons who transgress this law will be turned over to the bishop.<sup>35</sup>

The canons are placed alongside of clerics in major orders by two legatine councils held at Westminster in 1125<sup>36</sup> and 1127.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Cum frater Galterus canonicus et absque legali contradictione in clericatum admissus sit, eum in canonicum promovere nulla repugnat ratio vel iustitia contradicit, cum uxorem ipsius moechatam esse, alteri etiam viro nupsisse nemo qui dubitet. Ut enim juxta Apostolum loquamur, postquam uxorem suam moechari rescivit, libera ei omnino eam dimittendi et quodlibet votum exsequendi tantum in Domino data est potestas, praeter hoc quod ea vivente alteram ducere non potest.

<sup>30</sup> See C. R. Cheney, 'Legislation of the Medieval English Church', in *Eng. Hist. Review*, L (1935), p. 208.

<sup>31</sup> Canon 4, Mansi, 20, 1151; Wilkins, I, 382.

<sup>32</sup> See Z. N. Brooke, *The English Church and the Papacy* (Cambridge, 1931), p. 128.

<sup>33</sup> Already in 1076 the council of Winchester had decreed: Decretum est ut nullus canonicus uxorem habeat (Mansi, 20, 459; Wilkins, I, 367).

<sup>34</sup> Mansi, 20, 1230; Wilkins, I, 388.

<sup>35</sup> Canon 8: Omnia vero mobilia lapsorum posthac presbyterorum, diaconorum, subdiaconorum et canonicorum tradantur episcopis et concubinae cum rebus suis velut adulterae.

<sup>36</sup> Canon 13 (Mansi, 21, 332; Wilkins, I, 408): Presbyteris, diaconibus, subdiaconibus, canonicis uxorum, concubinarum et omnium feminarum contubernia inhibemus.

<sup>37</sup> Canon 5 (Mansi, 21, 356; Wilkins, I, 410):

These texts show us the same prohibition against the marriage of canons in England as we found in France. English bishops certainly assisted at some of the continental councils which we have mentioned. Professor Brooke has found in English documents the canons of many French councils, among them those of Clermont of 1095 which contained precisely such a prohibition of marriage.<sup>39</sup>

The texts studied<sup>39</sup> seem then to provide some canonical basis for Heloise's plea that Abelard, cleric and also canon, abandon all thought of marrying. There is no evidence whatever that Abelard had received major orders at this time nor that he was a canon regular.<sup>40</sup> We know that he was a canon and it has not been proved that as such he did not hold a benefice. It is reasonable to suppose that it was

Presbyteris, diaconibus, subdiaconibus et omnibus canonicis contubernia mulierum illicitarum penitus interdiximus. Quod si concubinis, quod absit, vel conjugibus adhaerent, ecclesiastico priventur ordine, honore, simul et beneficio.

<sup>39</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

<sup>40</sup> We note also a passage in the *Liber de Vita Christiana* composed by Bonizo of Sutri between 1089 and 1095. He says marriage was forbidden to priests, deacons and subdeacons and then adds: Cetero vero clericis in aliis ordinibus constitutis, ne conjugali serviant copule, interdictum non legimus, *excepto his qui sua sponte canonice se iugo regulae submiserunt*. Lib. V, cap. 77, edit. Perels (Berlin, 1930), p. 203. This text can hardly be used as an argument in support of our thesis because Bonizo may be referring here to canons regular.

<sup>40</sup> For us there is no question of the texts studied referring to canons regular. They are concerned with secular canons whether members of chapters or not. As yet the constitution of cathedral chapters during this period has not received sufficient study. The recent article, 'Chapitres de chanoines', by P. Torquebiau in the *Dictionnaire de droit canonique* (Paris, 1939), col. 530-595, is wholly inadequate for the period extending from the ninth to the end of the twelfth century. It seems that about the year 1100 there is attached to the cathedral a group of canons composing the cathedral chapter, another group of clerics outside the chapter but designated as canons, and a third group who are clerics but not canons. See P. Imbart de la Tour, *Les élections épiscopales dans l'Eglise de France du IX<sup>e</sup> au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1890), p. 517; E. Roland, *Les chanoines et les élections épiscopales* (Aurillac, 1909), p. 45; E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 57. Note that Yvo speaks of the liberty of the church of Notre Dame de Bourgmoen at Blois, *ejus canonicorum et aliorum clericorum* (P.L. 162, 289C). In spite of frequent attempts to compel all these persons to lead the common life it is evident that they do not comply with the wishes of the popes and other reformers such as Peter Damian. See the latter's works, *De communi vita canonicorum* (P.L. 145, 503 ff.), *Contra clericos regulares proprietarios* (P.L. 145, 481 ff.) and *Sermon LXIX* (P.L. 144, 201). They are the holders of prebends and owners of private property. As a result we find from the end of the eleventh century the clerics of

some churches grouped together and living under a rule based upon that of Saint Augustine. Because they live under a rule which, however, is not a monastic one they are called canonici regulares and numerous texts distinguish them from the canonici saeculares. Both before and after becoming pope, Gregory VII worked to establish this form of clerical life closely resembling that of the monks and his successors continued the work. See G. Morin, 'Règlements inédits du pape saint Grégoire VII pour les chanoines réguliers', in *Revue Benedictine*, XVIII (1901) 177-183; W. Levison, 'Eine angebliche Urkunde Papst Gelasius' II für die Regularkanoniker', in *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, kanon. Abteil.* VIII (1918) 27-43. These rules of the popes for the canons regular and others composed by other men such as that of Petrus de Honestis (P.L. 163, 703 ff.), and many other texts indicate that these canons lead the common life in monasteries, do not hold prebends and do not possess private property as do those canons in the texts which we have studied above. They are canons but it is never said of them that they hold canonries as do the texts referring to the marriage of canons. For example, the *Codex Lamberti* says *qui habet canonicam*; William of Malmesbury uses the expression *canonias* (or *canonicas*) *emerunt* (*Gesta Regum*, lib. IV, edit. Migne, P.L. 179, 1294; edit. Stubbs, II, 392); Ordericus says *ecclesiasticae dignitates vel canonicas* (*Hist. Eccl.* lib. IX, edit. Migne, P.L. 188, 650; edit. LePrevost, III, 464). The Laurentian M.S. has in *canonica non remaneant*. The *Codex Lamberti* and the council of Beauvais have a *canonica (canonicatu) arceatur*. Urban II in the council of Piacenza, 1095, (Gratian, D. 70, c. 2), distinguishes *canonici praebendarii* from other clerics. Like the monks the canons regular are said to have made a profession. See Gratian, C.19.q.3.c.3, letter of the same pope. These regular canons are bound by the law of celibacy in the same way as the monks. The texts which we have alleged make no mention of monks nor of regular canons but have in mind only secular clerics in general and among them the *canonici saeculares*. Finally, the date of most of the above decrees regarding the marriage of canons and the localities where they were drawn up excludes the possibility of their referring to the canons regular.

attached to his office of director of the schools of Paris: *te quidem Parisius scholis praesidente*.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Héloïse, Epist. IV, P.L. 178, 195A. This does not mean that Abelard was necessarily a member of the cathedral chapter, nor that his office is to be identified with that of the *scholasticus* of the chapter. Following M. Gilson (op. cit., p. 57-58), I am of the opinion

that Abelard was one of the clerics of the second group mentioned in the preceding note, that is a cleric attached to the cathedral and carrying the title of *canonicus* on account of the office he exercised but outside that college of canons called the chapter.



# The Use of Prohibitions by Clerics Against Ecclesiastical Courts in England

G. B. FLAHIFF, C.S.B.

HISTORIANS of mediaeval English law and institutions have sometimes spoken of the writ of prohibition to court christian<sup>1</sup> as a weapon of wonderful power in the hands of the common law courts in the long struggle they waged with their chief rivals, the ecclesiastical tribunals.<sup>2</sup> The statement may be quite true; nevertheless, the very language in which it is couched could mislead one into the conclusion that here is one more front along which the struggle between State and Church was waged, with laity on the one side, lined up against clergy on the other. More careful and more detailed research tends now to show that the issue between Church and State in the Middle Ages was much less clear-cut than had long been supposed; indeed, the issue as thus conceived is really a modern problem.<sup>3</sup> All too many exceptions cut across this preconceived classification for it to be maintained as categorically as has been done in the past.<sup>4</sup> Not that men in the Middle Ages failed to distinguish between spiritual and temporal, between secular and sacred; but it does not follow that they envisaged Church and State as a dichotomy. In reality, they were much more conscious of belonging to a same single society, even though it had a two-fold aspect. Laity and clergy alike constituted, from one point of view, the Church; and the same laity and clergy constituted, from another point of view, the State. Only in this sense were there two 'societies,' one of which looked after spiritual, the other temporal interests. Cleric or layman, one had many advantages to derive from his membership in both of these and he would turn now to one now to the other, as his need or interest dictated. Any rivalry or struggle was not really between two societies, but between the representatives of two orders, the spiritual and the temporal, in their efforts to determine where lay the dividing line between secular and ecclesiastical affairs. Meanwhile, the ordinary members of society, less skilled in theoretical distinctions, were much more likely to have recourse now to Church authorities, now to those of the State, according as recourse to the one or to the other promised more to their advantage in the particular case.

In judicial matters this certainly holds true. There were numerous cases where

<sup>1</sup> The expression 'court christian' to designate an ecclesiastical tribunal is time-honored in English usage. Since writers in our language took over the term from the legal French of the late Middle Ages, it has been used regularly to refer to the Church's courts in mediaeval England. Like 'gild merchant' it will probably always be preferred to the more prosaic modern designation.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. H. D. Hazeltine, 'The Early History of English Equity,' *Essays in Legal History*, ed. Paul Vinogradoff (Oxford, 1913), p. 277.

<sup>3</sup> 'Opposer simplement l'Eglise à l'Etat, dans la société du Moyen Age, c'est commettre un véritable abus de langage; c'est transporter au XIIIe siècle l'Etat centralisé et l'Eglise fortement unifiée de l'époque moderne' (G. LeBras, 'Le Privilège de clergie en France dans les derniers siècles du

Moyen Age,' *Journal des Savants*, n.s. XX, 1922, p. 259). Professor LeBras points out that mediaeval publicists with their taste for strong contrasts have done much to create this illusion of a necessary and constant antagonism (*art. cit.*, p. 164).

<sup>4</sup> F. W. Maitland was one to react against the old view; cf. *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England* (London, 1898), p. 73. This is one of the traits that Professor LeBras has noted as characteristic of Maitland's feeling for reality; see his splendid appreciation of Maitland's work, 'Le Sens de la vie dans l'histoire du droit: l'oeuvre de F. W. Maitland,' *Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale*, II (1930) 395. For another excellent statement of the true situation, see F. M. Powicke, *Medieval England* (London, 1931), p. 129.

laymen as well as clerics had recourse to an ecclesiastical court because that court alone had cognizance of the matter involved. On the other hand, there was a recognized sphere of purely temporal affairs in regard to which cleric and layman alike had to turn to the secular courts. If the question at issue left some room for doubt, even suspect, as to which court was competent to deal with it, the party seeking redress would almost certainly betake himself to that tribunal from which he hoped to gain the most. There is evidence to show that laymen availed themselves of ecclesiastical courts when it was to their advantage.<sup>5</sup> And clerics made use of the secular courts, if they could help themselves thereby.

It is not the purpose of the present article to deal with this question as a whole, but merely to examine in some detail its application at one point, namely in the use made by clerics of the writ of prohibition, especially in the thirteenth century. The case of ecclesiastics making use of an expedient provided by the secular authority against Church courts is not without interest. For the writ of prohibition was issued in the king's name, upon the complaint of someone being sued in a Church court, and it restrained proceedings in that court on the ground that the matter at issue did not belong to ecclesiastical jurisdiction.<sup>6</sup> The inevitable result was to limit the number of cases tried before the courts christian. Now since the writ was, for the most part, issued only at the request of the defendant in the ecclesiastical action,<sup>7</sup> one is tempted to assume that it must therefore have been laymen who thus blocked the work of a Church court. Such an opinion has even been voiced by competent authority.<sup>8</sup> Yet, the truth of the matter is that clerics as well as laymen did use the writ of prohibition to save themselves from a suit in court christian, although the case of laymen, as might be surmised, was decidedly more common. Such action was undoubtedly motivated by the immediate practical interest of the particular cleric involved, but his procedure could not but arouse the ire of his ecclesiastical superiors who, viewing the whole situation from a better vantage point, foresaw that the repeated use of prohibitions would necessarily limit the scope of their jurisdiction. They were not slow to express their disapproval and by threats and sanctions to place obstacles in the way of such procedure. What happened as a result of their insistent efforts provides the most intriguing fact about this whole development: the means whereby a detour was found to circumvent the opposition of the Church leaders and permit clerics still to avail

<sup>5</sup> Norma Adams, 'The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian,' *Minnesota Law Review*, XX (1936) 279, 288; her note 72 on p. 288 refers to a case in *Bracton's Note Book*, ed. F. W. Maitland (London, 1887), II, 291, No. 351, where a layman explains that he had recourse to the court christian 'because justice is there to be had more speedily.'

<sup>6</sup> The writ prohibiting the plea in court christian was not without its sanction. If the judges and plaintiff failed to obey the prohibition, a writ of 'attachment' was then issued on the complaint of the defendant, obliging the offenders to appear before the king's justices to show why they presumed to ignore the prohibition. This plea in the king's court was therefore a 'prohibition plea,' being sued against one who had failed to obey a royal prohibition; it did not deal directly with the matter of the original plea in court christian.

Very little has been written on the writ of prohibition. The best account that we have of its nature, its use and general historical development is in the article of Miss Norma Adams cited above. Helpful information will likewise be found in Professor

Hazeltine's article cited in n.2; in Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (5th ed., London, 1773), III, 113-114; and more especially in E. Friedberg, *Die Grenze zwischen Staat und Kirche und die Garantien gegen deren Verletzung*, 3 Abt. (Tübingen, 1872), pp. 741 ff. The writ of prohibition was the subject of the thesis which I presented at the Ecole des Chartes (Paris) in January, 1935, for the diploma of *archiviste-paléographe*; further work has been done on the thesis with a view to publication, but at present there is in printed form only the abstract setting forth the chief conclusions: G. B. Flahiff, 'Le Bref royal de prohibition . . . 1187-1286,' *Positions des thèses, Ecole des Chartes, 1935* (Paris, 1935), pp. 79-88.

<sup>7</sup> Adams, *art. cit.*, p. 277; Flahiff, *art. cit.*, p. 85.

<sup>8</sup> F. de Zulueta, 'William of Drogheda,' *Mélanges de droit romain offerts à Georges Cornil* (Ghent, Paris, 1926), p. 649. Miss Adams makes no mention of the case, although she does deal with the converse of laymen recurring to courts christian.

themselves of the writ without suffering the dire consequences with which they were threatened.

The first part of this article will deal with the early use of prohibitions by clerics and the opposition aroused thereby in the thirteenth century. The second part will treat of the later development of a new expedient in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

## I.

How early the writ of prohibition originated is not known. That it was in use by the early 1180's is evident from entries in the Pipe Roll for 1182-1183, recording that two men were amerced for suing pleas (i.e. judicial actions) of a secular nature in court christian.<sup>9</sup> It is in all probability one of the numerous writs which first appeared in the middle years of Henry II's reign. Two forms of it are included in the treatise on the laws of England attributed to Glanvill (ca. 1187),<sup>10</sup> and pleas arising out of failure to accede to a writ of prohibition are among the usual ones in the earliest<sup>11</sup> extant plea rolls of the *Curia Regis*.<sup>12</sup> These latter provide us with our richest source of information regarding prohibitions. The entries occurring there presuppose of course that the prohibition has not been obeyed<sup>13</sup> and introduce us to the plea in the royal court where the person who delivered the writ of prohibition to the court christian now sues the other party or the judges for not heeding the king's injunction. But they serve our purpose well, for it is the plaintiff in this plea of prohibition in whom we are interested, to see if he is sometimes a

<sup>9</sup> *The Great Roll of the Pipe of the Twenty-Ninth Year of the Reign of King Henry II*, Publications of the Pipe Roll Society, vol. XXXII (London, 1911), pp. 12, 15. The Pipe Roll or Great Roll of the Exchequer for each year of a sovereign's reign recorded the yearly accounts of the sheriffs and other accounting officers of the Exchequer. Hence the fines, or more correctly 'ameracements,' paid for contraventions would be entered there. The similarity of the entry in the case of these two men with that of later ameracements stated to be for suing a plea in court christian contrary to a prohibition makes it possible to infer that the present entry refers to suing in spite of a prohibition.

<sup>10</sup> *De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae*, Yale Historical Publications, Manuscripts and Edited Texts, vol. XIII (New Haven, 1932), lib. IV, c. 3; lib. XII, c. 21.

<sup>11</sup> The first entry mentioning a prohibition specifically is for 1200 (*Curia Regis Rolls*, vol. I, London, 1922, p. 164), but two earlier ones for 1196 and 1198 seem to be of the same character (*ibid.*, pp. 21, 103). As in the case of most Chancery and Exchequer records, judicial records, too, in England are preserved for us on rolls, not in registers. None of these 'plea rolls' are older than 1194.

<sup>12</sup> The *Curia Regis* was in its earlier and wider sense applied in Anglo-Norman times to a select assembly convoked by the king to aid him and exercising both legislative and judicial functions. We are interested here in the latter only. In the *Curia Regis* were tried all pleas immediately concerning the king and the realm. The existence of distinct departments of the *Curia Regis*

seems to be indicated at a very early date. Thus, before the end of the twelfth century, complaints of a fiscal nature were referred to the Barons of the Exchequer (who, nevertheless, formed a part of the *Curia Regis*), while pleas of the crown together with common pleas were decided by the justices specially appointed for that purpose. The 'plea rolls' of the *Curia Regis* contain the minutes or records of judicial proceedings before the latter justices. They are preserved in the Public Record Office at London. The 220 odd rolls covering the period to the close of Henry III's reign are all classified under the shelf mark KB 26/. It is beyond question that fairly early in Henry III's reign a distinction was made between pleas heard before the king, or before the 'King's Bench' (concerning him more directly), and the common pleas heard before the 'Bench of Westminster.' But it is less clear at just what precise date two separate courts can be distinguished. Hence it is only with the rolls for the reign of Edward I that a division is made in classification between the rolls of pleas heard before the 'King's Bench' (KB 27/) and those of common pleas, or pleas heard before the 'Court of Common Pleas' (CP 40/).

<sup>13</sup> Only if the prohibition is disobeyed does the case come within the cognizance of the king's court, and then only as proceedings against one who has ignored the king's order (see above n.<sup>9</sup>). If the prohibition is obeyed, the case is dropped and there will be no entry whatsoever in the rolls of the king's court. The minutes of the ecclesiastical court alone could therefore acquaint us with cases where the prohibition is obeyed. Unfortunately, we have no such minutes for this period.

cleric. We may anticipate the answer at once. The evidence of the records leaves no possible doubt: he is indeed a cleric, not only sometimes, but in a relatively surprising number of cases.

The roll for the Hilary term of the year 1200 shows us the prior of Kirkham Abbey in the rôle of plaintiff against the abbot of Kelso for having drawn him into a plea in court christian about the church of Newton.<sup>14</sup> The case is not an isolated one, it is but the first of a long series. Others of a like kind are to be found in the following years of John's reign,<sup>15</sup> while it would be tedious to list those which occur throughout the long reign of Henry III. Suffice it to say that the clerical plaintiff in a prohibition plea continues to appear, if not with startling frequency, at least with marked regularity, averaging some three or four each year.<sup>16</sup>

The question suggests itself at once: just who are these clerics who sue pleas of prohibition in the king's court? Significantly enough, prelates of the Church are missing from their ranks; they consist exclusively of members of the lower secular clergy and representatives of monastic houses. Chaplains, vicars and rectors of churches are there in good numbers, but not the higher officers and dignitaries of the hierarchy. Religious, usually the prior or abbot of some monastery, are yet more numerous than the lower secular clergy, roughly in the proportion of two to one.

As to the matter involved in the original action in court christian, which has been prohibited, it is usually characterized in the writ of prohibition as secular in nature, dealing with advowson (the right of presentation to the living of a church),<sup>17</sup> or lay fee (non-sacred immovable goods in general), or debts and chattels that are non-testamentary and non-matrimonial; on which grounds the action is prohibited. But in those instances where the details of the case throw some light on the question, it is usually found that the so-called 'lay' matter has sufficient connection with things spiritual to leave considerable doubt as to the competent authority.<sup>18</sup> In other words, most of these cases lie within 'that debatable land which is neither very spiritual nor very temporal.'<sup>19</sup> A considerable portion of that land, however,

<sup>14</sup> *Curia Regis Rolls*, I, 143.

<sup>15</sup> In 1201, the prior of Huntingdon appears as plaintiff (*C. R. Rolls*, II, 5); in 1206, the abbot of St. Agatha's at Easby, near Richmond (*C. R. Rolls*, IV, 133); in 1206 again, the monks of St. Georges-de-Boscherville in Normandy (*C. R. Rolls*, IV, 299-300); in 1210, the prior of Kirkham once more (*C. R. Rolls*, VI, 110).

<sup>16</sup> The publication of the plea rolls for the reigns of Richard I and John, under the direction of the Deputy-Keeper of the Public Records, was completed with the seventh volume in 1935. For the reign of Henry III, one volume only has so far appeared, that for the years 1219-1220 (*Curia Regis Rolls*, vol. VIII), published in 1938. For the rest of Henry III's reign and for that of Edward I to 1285, recourse has been had to the original rolls at the Public Record Office. Although I have not consulted all the rolls for every year, I have examined carefully all for each fifth year and others at random by way of control. *Bracton's Note Book* provides a few examples of a clerical plaintiff in a prohibition plea: III, 495, No. 1467 for the year 1220; II, 551-552 for 1225; II, 618, No. 808 for 1233; II, 625-626 for 1233. The *Placitorum Abbreviatio* (Record Commission, London, 1811) contains three: p. 101 (rot. 8) for 1224, p. 108 (rot. 14d) for 1241, p. 152 for 1260. The entries in the plea rolls for a given county have in several cases been published by local groups or local Record

Societies (thus, for Lincolnshire, Staffordshire, Lancashire, Northumberland, Yorkshire, Leicestershire, Bedfordshire, Somerset), but I have found no instances of the particular type of plea in which we are here interested.

<sup>17</sup> Henry II had asserted in the Constitutions of Clarendon (1164), c. 1, that this was matter for the court of the lord king; it was regarded in England as an immovable, that is, real property. Even the ecclesiastical leaders were forced to accept the situation in the course of the thirteenth century (see below n.<sup>27</sup>). On this point of jurisdiction England differed from other countries of Western Europe.

<sup>18</sup> The circumstances surrounding the matter at hand could easily alter the character of an action in regard to that matter. For example, a deed that of its own nature is quite secular could become a matter of spiritual cognizance by the circumstance of sacrilege; or goods that are not at all sacred in themselves could become so by the fact of being oblations due to a church, etc. Several such examples will be found in the cases cited in n.<sup>28</sup>. Miss Irene Churchill has already noted how easily a same wrong could appear to belong to the jurisdiction either of the Church or of the king, according to the particular point of view (*Canterbury Administration*, London, 1933, I, 534).

<sup>19</sup> F. W. Maitland, *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England*, p. 56.

would soon be lost to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, if the attempt to try such cases in Church courts were to be frustrated constantly by recourse to a writ of prohibition. Little wonder then that the higher authorities in the Church should take it amiss when not only laymen, but even the very representatives of the Church in the person of the lower clergy, interfered with their cognizance of such cases by suing out writs of prohibition to stop procedure in courts christian.

It is therefore no surprise to encounter among the earliest protests made by the prelates of the Church against the overzealous use of prohibitions a denunciation of ecclesiastics who employ such methods. The first voice to be raised is that of the great bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste, whose figure dominates the English Church in the middle of the thirteenth century. In a veritable pamphlet, published among his letters and dated with some probability as of the year 1236, Grosseteste reviews the chief grievances of the Church against the encroachments of the temporal power. A section of his pamphlet deals expressly with abuses arising out of the writ of prohibition, and specific reference is made to the case of clerics who sue out the writ in order to halt an action against them before ecclesiastical judges. As a result of such procedure, he says, the whole matter comes to an impasse: Church law prevents secular justices from hearing the plea which is spiritual, while the royal prohibition prevents the spiritual judges. But the suggestion is made that a remedy could easily be applied, if the bishops would only take canonical sanctions against clerics who seek writs of prohibition.<sup>20</sup>

The Bishop of Lincoln is undoubtedly the inspirer of a further list of grievances addressed in the following year (1237) by the English clergy to their lord the king. The complaints appear to have been drawn up as a sequel to the council of London in which Grosseteste had taken a prominent part. It would be hard to mistake his hand in the noticeable resemblance between these grievances and those expressed in his own pamphlet of the previous year. Among them occurs once more the case of clerics who make use of prohibitions. The clergy have in mind particularly a prohibition to prevent some personal action against a cleric in court christian. In this case, they maintain, the king's writ of prohibition should have no force whatsoever, and they proceed to adopt Grosseteste's suggestion by urging canonical pains against the cleric who sues the writ in this and in other cases.<sup>21</sup>

Surely the concern of the bishop of Lincoln and then of the other bishops of England assembled in council is sufficient evidence that clerics were availing themselves at this period of writs of prohibition and that therefore the silence of William of Drogheda on the subject, even though he was lecturing at Oxford about this same time, cannot be interpreted to mean 'that the danger of a clerical defendant moving for a writ of prohibition could generally be neglected.'<sup>22</sup> His silence is

<sup>20</sup> *Epistolae Roberti Grosseteste*, ed. H. R. Luard (Rolls Series, London, 1861), p. 227: 'Laico etiam impetente clericum, vel clerico impetente clericum, super catallis, ad instantiam clericum qui impetitur prohibet dominus rex ne hujusmodi causam descendant iudices ecclesiastici; ex quo, ut supra, accidit hujusmodi causam nunquam posse descendi; non enim descindetur a iudice seculari, canonicis statutis hoc inhibentibus, neque ab ecclesiastico iudice, obstante regia prohibitionem. Sed huic morbo facile possent medelam adhibere praelati, canonicam ultionem exercentes in clericos hujusmodi prohibitionem impetrantes.' (The punctuation of the first part of this text in the Luard edition made it almost incomprehensible; hence I have taken the liberty of altering it).

<sup>21</sup> *Annales de Burton*, an. 1237, published in *Annales Monastici*, ed. H. R. Luard (Rolls

Series, London, 1864), I, 254: 'Item petunt [archiepiscopi, episcopi et clerici] quod clerici non conveniantur in actione personali quae non sit super re immobili coram iudice saeculari, sed coram iudice ecclesiastico; et quod prohibitio regis non currat quo minus hoc fieri non possit. Item quod innovetur poena in canone statuta contra clericos qui impetrant in hoc casu prohibitionem domini regis ad iudices ecclesiasticos et in omnibus aliis in jure prohibitis.' The canonical penalty referred to would appear to be the excommunication pronounced at the provincial council of Oxford in 1222 against any violator of the Church's liberties (Wilkins, *Concilia*, London, 1735, I, 585).

<sup>22</sup> F. de Zulueta, *art. cit.*, p. 469. Professor de Zulueta's article contains the best account we have of William of Drogheda.

probably due rather to the fact that he was not interested primarily in the quality of the defendant in the ecclesiastical plea, but in the effect of the royal writ of prohibition, by whomsoever it might be sued, on the action of the ecclesiastical court; his treatise is, after all, one on canonical procedure.<sup>23</sup>

The protests voiced by Church leaders refer evidently to an unjust use of the writ of prohibition. Later ecclesiastical documents will distinguish specifically between licit and illicit prohibitions;<sup>24</sup> but already it is clear that the prelates recognize many prohibitions as thoroughly justifiable. Their ire is aroused against those clerics who do not trouble themselves at all about the question of liceity but use the writ simply because they find it to their advantage. Undoubtedly there were occasions when a cleric, impleaded in an action in court christian, realized that the matter involved was certainly not of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and so, out of a strict sense of justice, caused it to be prohibited.<sup>25</sup> But there were likewise many less disinterested motives that might prompt him like any other man to seek a prohibition. Because of the differences of procedure and jurisprudence in the two courts, a clerical defendant might consider that his chances of winning a particular suit were better in the king's court than in that of the Church. Again, whether he was wrong or not in whatever led to judicial proceedings against him in the first place, he could always recover damages at least if he could show that the action against him in court christian was not of a spiritual nature. And, finally, the mere suing of the writ of prohibition, which was easily to be had, was often enough to cause ecclesiastical judges to drop the case before them, even though it was truly spiritual.<sup>26</sup>

Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine in what measure writs of prohibition were sought by clerics from pure motives, or in what measure they would be recognized by ecclesiastical authorities as quite licit. Anyone who has handled the plea rolls knows how often the first steps of a plea are recorded, but its conclusion, if ever it was terminated in court, has not been entered. This, of course, deprives us of the details necessary to judge whether the cleric who moved for a writ of prohibition was justified therein or not. And even when the end of the plea is recorded and the judgment in the king's court on the justice of the prohibition stated, it does not always follow that ecclesiastics would have agreed with the decision.<sup>27</sup> Hence the quasi-impossibility of knowing in every instance whether a prohibition was licit or illicit. That the good faith of a clerical defendant seeking a writ of prohibition was in some cases suspect, is illustrated by the plea rolls

<sup>23</sup> William of Drogheda's *Summa Aurea* has been published by L. Wahrmund in a series of texts on canonical procedure: *Quellen zur Geschichte des Römisch-Kanonischen Processes im Mittelalter*, Band 2, Heft 2 (Innsbruck, 1914). His references to prohibitions in England are to be found on pp. 65-67.

<sup>24</sup> H. Cole, *Documents Illustrative of English History in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Record Commission, London, 1844), p. 367 (the document is probably Archbishop Pecham's and of the year 1279; see below n.<sup>25</sup>); cf. *Registrum Epistolarum Fratris Johannis Peckham*, ed. C. T. Martin (Rolls Series, London, 1882), II, 687.

<sup>25</sup> See below n.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Once an action was prohibited, the judges had three courses open to them: 1—continue to hear the plea, in which case they would have to appear in the king's court in a prohibition plea to show why they had presumed to do so; 2—seek a writ of consultation and have the king's justices decide whether they

were justified in continuing to hear the plea; 3—abandon the case altogether. No wonder that the last course was frequently followed, when either of the first two necessarily involved time, trouble and expense for the judges without hope of indemnification! It is undoubtedly this fact that rendered the writ of prohibition, innocent enough and justifiable in itself, so powerful a weapon and placed ecclesiastical courts at such a marked disadvantage.

<sup>27</sup> Although the English Church came in the course of the thirteenth century to tolerate the king's claim to exclusive jurisdiction over advowsons (cf. Wilkins, *Conc.*, I, 728; *Ann. Mon.*, I, 424); it was not so in the early years of the century. Hence a prohibition to stop ecclesiastical judges from hearing a plea of advowson (e.g. in 1210, *Curia Regis Rolls*, VI, 110) would be justified in the eyes of civil authorities but not so in those of the Church. So too for many other cases, touching on tithes, defamation, breach of faith, etc.

themselves,<sup>22</sup> just as evidence of the contrary too is to be found there;<sup>23</sup> but we cannot say how often it was the one and how often the other.

There can be no doubt, in any case, that clerics did avail themselves, for one reason or another, of the king's writ of prohibition, and that their doing so was no exceptional happening. As compared with the total number of prohibition pleas in the rolls of the king's court, the figure for cases where the plaintiff is a cleric is perhaps relatively small;<sup>24</sup> still there are consistently a few each year. In a third or so of such cases, the king's court recognizes the ecclesiastical character of the original plea and sends it back to the court christian; in another third, lack of information prevents our determining whether the prohibition could be considered licit or not. It follows therefore that in at least that first third—more probably in a good half—of the cases of a clerical defendant suing out a writ of prohibition it is question of an illicit one. While it would be misleading to exaggerate the importance of these figures, they do, nevertheless, help us better to understand the zeal of the English hierarchy in their attempt to check clerics who had recourse to prohibitions. The bishops certainly viewed the abuse as grave enough to draw from them repeated warnings and protests yet later in the thirteenth century.

Church councils of the 'period of baronial reform,' at Merton in 1258 and at Lambeth in 1261, were still dealing with the case of a clerical defendant seeking

<sup>22</sup> An instructive case is that of the prior of St. Frideswide's, Oxford, moving for a prohibition to halt the action of the abbot of Dorchester against him. According to the prior it is question of a debt of a non-testamentary and non-matrimonial nature. But, answers the abbot, the true state of affairs is as follows: the former abbot of Dorchester quitting his monastery had squandered the goods of the house and, coming finally to St. Frideswide's, left there the 48 marks which still remained. The present abbot has therefore instituted an action against the prior of St. Frideswide's, as cleric against cleric, to recover goods carried off from his monastery. After verifying the facts, the royal justices do not hesitate to send the case back to the ecclesiastical court (*Bracton's Note Book*, II, 551, No. 719; Bracton himself is in accord with the justices on this decision, as appears from his note on the case and likewise from his *De Legibus*, fol. 408).

In 1225, a certain Christina tries to recover, before the bishop of Worcester, movable goods taken from her by a chaplain of the diocese; the chaplain sues a writ as against a plea of lay fee; but, when the parties come into the king's court, the bishop himself confirms Christina's story of a personal action against a cleric in a plea not involving lay fee; and so the chaplain finds himself amerced for his false claim (KB 26/90 m. 1d; a plea should be heard normally in the court having jurisdiction over the defendant, as Bracton observes in the *De Legibus*, fol. 401: 'Verum est quod sive laicum sive clericum velit quis convenire, debet adire iudicem et sequi forum rei').

In 1239, the prohibition obtained by the abbot of Woburn is proved to be fraudulent by the evidence of the minutes from the court christian, presented by the abbot himself, since they show that it is question of movable goods willed to a widow by her dead husband (KB 26/120 m. 23).

The Master of the Hospitalers of St. Bar-

tholomew at Bristol has obtained a prohibition as against a plea of lay chattels; but the defendant in the prohibition plea (the abbot of St. Augustine's in the same city) shows by the evidence of the bishop of Worcester that his original action had to do with violence to a monk of St. Augustine's (KB 26/115B m. 14d; A.D. 1234).

<sup>23</sup> A writ of prohibition against a plea of advowson would have to be considered as licit, once the English clergy admitted the king's claim to exclusive jurisdiction in this matter. Already in 1231, when Master Nicholas of Evesham institutes an action for all the tithes of a certain church (which action is regularly assimilated to one of advowson) and is halted by a prohibition as against advowson, he makes no attempt to deny the nature of the ecclesiastical action and defends himself only on the ground of not having proceeded after the prohibition (KB 26/109 m. 14). It may be presumed that, in the majority of cases where the defendant in the king's court is content to deny simply the *post prohibitionem* and makes no effort to justify his action in court christian because of its matter, the non-ecclesiastical nature of the original plea is admitted. Certainly this would hold for a case of the year 1220 from *Bracton's Note Book* (III, 405, No. 1467), where the person who has sued the writ of prohibition proves the lay character of the chattels in question by means of the minutes of the ecclesiastical court and letters from the judges of that court. Other equally obvious cases are to be found; e.g. *Placitorum Abbreviatio*, p. 108.

<sup>24</sup> In the rolls for the year 1225 there are 22 prohibition pleas and in only 3 cases is the plaintiff (i.e. the one who moved for the prohibition) a cleric; in 1250, there are 47 and only 3 clerics; in 1260, 43 and only 5; sometimes there is but one for a complete year, as in 1220 and 1230. These figures may be taken as suggesting the general average.

a writ of prohibition. The decisions of the councils presuppose that the use is a fraudulent one where the true nature of the action in court christian has been misrepresented. The penalties to which clerics who practice such deceit will be liable are described in considerable detail.<sup>31</sup> Apparently ecclesiastical authorities still could not, at this date, ignore the danger of abuse of prohibitions on the part of their subordinates; nor could they ignore it even two decades later.

A document of about the year 1279, which is probably Archbishop Pecham's, is the fullest single expression we have of the ecclesiastical attitude towards the writ of prohibition.<sup>32</sup> Systematically it distinguishes with care between licit and illicit prohibitions; among illicit prohibitions it distinguishes further between those where the person suing the writ is deemed to be in good faith and those where he is obviously in bad faith. Then it goes on to state at length the sanctions to be taken against such as employ fraudulently the king's writ of prohibition. Clerics suing for the writ are considered under both headings: those in good faith and those in bad. The penalties that await them include excommunication, deprivation of all present benefices and exclusion from any future ones during a period of three years.<sup>33</sup> Pecham's own register has preserved for us a citation addressed in the following year, 1280, to a priest of Winchester diocese who had sued writs of prohibition against the judges of a spiritual court.<sup>34</sup> There can be no doubt therefore that in Pecham's time also ecclesiastical defendants still availed themselves of the writ of prohibition and that Church authorities were vigorously opposed to such procedure, at least if, in their eyes, it tended to prejudice the jurisdictional rights of the courts christian. What success did the prelates meet with in checking the abuse?

The plea rolls for the reign of Edward I grow bulkier and bulkier, pleas of all kinds more and more numerous. This is true of prohibition pleas as of others. The rolls for the year 1280, for instance, contain sixty prohibition pleas, the largest number noted up to that date for a single year. Yet in only one of all those sixty pleas is the plaintiff a cleric:<sup>35</sup> therefore, but one single case of a cleric who sued a writ of prohibition! In 1285 again, there occurs but one case of the sort, and even this one is doubtful.<sup>36</sup> The obvious conclusion would appear to be that the pressure,

<sup>31</sup> *Annales de Burton*, an. 1258 (*Annales Monastici*, I, 417-418): Wilkins, *Concilia* (London, 1737), I, 751. On the relation between these two councils, see C. R. Cheney, 'Legislation of the Medieval English Church,' *English Historical Review*, L (1935) 402-406.

<sup>32</sup> Cole, *Documents* . . . , pp. 367-368. Although the document is not dated, it is found in the only known manuscript between two other documents of Pecham of the year 1279; moreover, it follows immediately upon the list of excommunications pronounced by Pecham at Reading in 1279, the first one of which was directed against the abuse of prohibitions, so that our document seems almost to be a commentary on this particular excommunication.

<sup>33</sup> 'Inter prohibitionum regiarum genera merito credimus distinguendum:

Aut sunt mere licite utpote quas de rebus et personis ad regium forum mere spectantibus ad iudices ecclesiasticos emanare contigerit: in quo casu a iudicibus easdem suscipiendum decernimus reverenter.

Alie autem que in sua forma juxta propositum concedentis prima facie videntur licite, utpote de quibusdam transgressionibus in genere pro laicis impetrare quas, cum inspecto exitu dum ad usum pertrahuntur, illicita (Cole: illicite) illicitas facit abusus

impetrantis. In quo casu . . . Si autem clericus fuerit hujusmodi regie prohibitionis abusus eo ipso tamquam ecclesiastice libertatis violator juxta tenorem Oxoniensis concilii per dominum Stephanum editi, ut prediximus, sententiam excommunicationis incurrat; at tamen nichilominus penam adicimus ut etiam beneficiis ecclesiasticis preoptentis careat ipso jure et etiam per triennium fiat inhabilis ad alia beneficia hujusmodi optinenda, nisi per nos cum eo fuerit misericorditer dispensatum . . .

Aut sunt omnino in forma sua illicite utpote si super rebus mere spiritualibus vere officium ecclesiasticum mere contingentibus sunt concepte; in quibus casibus eas ab omnibus iudicibus ecclesiasticis decernimus penitus esse respondendas . . . Ipsum quoque impetratorem littere regalis hujusmodi sive laicus sive clericus penis superius memoratis decernimus subjacere, licet evidencius in hoc casu quam in superiori delinquere dinoscatur et ideo majori pena dignus videretur . . . (Cole, *Documents* . . . , p. 367).

<sup>34</sup> *Registrum* . . . Peckham, ed. Martin, III, Appendix, p. 1064.

<sup>35</sup> CP 40/32 m. 43 (see above n.<sup>12</sup> on CP 40/rolls).

<sup>36</sup> CP 40/57 m. 35d.



which had been brought to bear by the councils, was having its effect and clerics were now more chary about recurring to writs of prohibition. And such was the state of affairs, as far as external appearance goes. In reality, however, it is not quite so. Clerics were still availing themselves of the king's writ, and in larger numbers than ever; but a subterfuge had been found to shield them from the fulminations of their superiors. It is this further stage in our study which has now to be dealt with. Replacing the old, the new procedure was to become definitive in the writ process of the fourteenth century.

## II.

A text from the council of Merton in 1258 gives us our first inkling of a less straightforward procedure on the part of a cleric seeking a writ of prohibition. The ecclesiastical authorities have just prescribed sanctions against the ordinary case already described, when they go on to extend them to a further possibility. It sometimes happens, they observe, that a third party is seen to intervene and remit or have remitted the writ of prohibition, whereas it is evident that the person in whose favor it was obtained is really responsible for this roundabout procedure. Penalties are to be imposed in this case, just as though the defendant in court christian had done everything himself.<sup>37</sup>

This intervention of a third party in an attempt to shield the defendant of the ecclesiastical action leaves no trace in the plea rolls of the close of Henry III's reign. Only in the time of Edward I do we begin to meet, and now with regularity, a prohibition plea where the original defendant in court christian is not the plaintiff before the king's court. Two things are noteworthy about all cases of this type: first, the original defendant turns out in every instance to be a cleric or a religious; secondly, the king himself always appears in the rôle of plaintiff in the prohibition plea.<sup>38</sup> To be perfectly correct, it is necessary to say rather that an attorney 'sues for the king.' But it is just this detail that provides a valuable clue to the real situation, for the attorney is frequently none other than the very cleric or religious who was impleaded in the ecclesiastical action.<sup>39</sup> The subterfuge veils but thinly the actual state of affairs, even though the formalism of the courts may have rendered it a sufficient protection for clerics moving for a prohibition.

What seems in reality to have happened in these cases is as follows: the cleric still sued out the writ or had it sued, but in such manner that his name would not appear upon it; instead of his name being cited as the one who reported the alleged attain to the king's jurisdiction, a vague phrase was found: 'As we have learned from the report of several persons' (*Sicut ex relatu plurium accepimus*); so that, to all intents and purposes, the prohibition has emanated spontaneously from the king,<sup>40</sup> who would therefore be plaintiff in the subsequent plea in the royal court. One or two examples will illustrate the procedure.

<sup>37</sup> *Annales de Burton*, an 1258: 'Idem fiat etsi tertius veniat ex transverso et porrigat seu porrigi faciat prohibitionem talem, dum tamen ille eam verbo vel facto ratificat, pro quo apparuerit impetrata' (*Annales Monastici*, I, 418). The same is repeated at Lambeth in 1261 (Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 751).

<sup>38</sup> CP 40/32 m. 83d (1280): the king proceeds against those who have taken action in court christian against the abbess of Wilton in spite of a prohibition. Other cases in 1280 where the king appears as plaintiff instead of the ecclesiastic who was defendant in court christian are: the king instead of the prior of Michelham against the abbot of Bayham (CP 40/33 m. 18); the king instead of the

vicar of Middleton, Norfolk (CP 40/34 m. 23); the king instead of Richard of Cantilupe, cleric (CP 40/34 m. 31). And in the year 1285: the king instead of the prior of Lanthony (CP 40/57 m. 18); the king instead of Richard of Somerton, chaplain (CP 40/58 m. 53); the king instead of an unnamed chaplain (CP 40/59 m. 24); the king instead of William Mortimer, cleric (CP 40/59 m. 36); the king instead of the abbot of Roche (CP 40/60 m. 19).

<sup>39</sup> CP 40/33 m. 18; CP 40/34 m. 31; CP 40/59 m. 24, etc.

<sup>40</sup> Of their very nature all writs were, in theory at least, a direct intervention of the royal will and prerogative. Certainly it was

In 1277, the abbot of Bayham instituted an action in court christian against the prior of Michelham concerning the advowson of the church of Hailsham in Sussex. A writ of prohibition was sued out against the action. We are not told by whom or in whose name, but the evidence given before the king's court in the subsequent prohibition plea states explicitly that the prior himself delivered the writ in the church of St. Mary's, Southwark, where the ecclesiastical court was sitting, on the feast of St. Clement (Nov. 23). The case was not adjourned and a plea of prohibition followed before the king's justices. The record in the plea roll gives the king's name as plaintiff, indicating that the prior's name did not appear on the writ as having moved for the prohibition; in fact, it is stated in the usual formula that the king learned of what was going on *ex relatu plurium*. Nevertheless, it is the prior who 'sued for the king' when the plea was first heard in the royal court.<sup>41</sup> Again, in 1284, Adam, prior of Hatfield Peverel (dependency of St. Alban's) was trying to recover the sum of 100 solidi from a certain cleric, Roger of Somerton, in an action before the abbot of Waltham and the prior of Dunstaple. On November 29, as the ecclesiastical court sat in the church at Hatfield Peverel, Roger himself presented a royal prohibition to stop the action against him. Prior Adam, the plaintiff, continued to sue his plea, however, with the result that he was summoned before the king's justices to explain. Once more the king, not Roger of Somerton, was plaintiff in the prohibition plea, although in this case it was not Roger who sued for him.<sup>42</sup>

The text from the Council of Merton referring to this new way of proceeding does not intimate that it was used exclusively by clerics;<sup>43</sup> nor does the second ecclesiastical statement which we have on the subject.<sup>44</sup> Yet in every case found in the plea rolls it is question of a clerical defendant in the original action in the Church court. It is possible of course that this new method, especially while still somewhat exceptional, was in theory available to laymen as well as to clerics; but from the time that it became at all normal, its use seems to have been restricted to ecclesiastics. The earliest form of the writ itself is to be found in a register of writs dating from the beginning of Edward I's reign and it presupposes a clerical defendant.<sup>45</sup> Better still, the rubric written in above this new writ clearly betrays its purpose: *Prohibitio clericis ne videantur convolasse ad vetitum examen*.<sup>46</sup> The obvious conclusion would seem therefore to be that the penalties imposed by ecclesiastical authorities had proven particularly effective in the case of the lower clergy, over whom they would have a better hold than over the laity, so that it had become a dangerous proceeding for clerics to sue in the normal way for a writ of prohibition.<sup>47</sup> But the ingenuity of the king's court, or some one of the

thus that they originated, although very early in the evolution of the writ system a distinction came to be made between regular action, where writs issued almost mechanically as of course (*de cursu*) at the request of a subject, and prerogative action, where the writ still represented more truly a direct intervention of the royal will (cf. G. B. Adams, *Origin of the English Constitution*, New Haven, 1912, p. 97). Fitzherbert would point out, around the year 1500, that in the case of prohibition writs of advowson, debts, etc., ordinarily considered as *de cursu*, the king himself could sue them, should he so wish: 'Et le roy poet suer cest brief luy-mesme, comment que le plee en court christian soit entre deux comen persons, pur ceo que le suite est en derogation de son corone' (*La Nouvelle Natura Brevium*, London, 1567, fol. 40). In the thirteenth century, however,

the initiative seems regularly to have been taken by one of the king's subjects, unless of course the action in court christian involved the king as one of the parties (e.g. the case of the advowson of a royal chapel).

<sup>41</sup> CP 40/33 m. 18 and CP 40/36 m. 117d (1280).

<sup>42</sup> CP 40/58 m. 53 (1285).

<sup>43</sup> Cited above, n.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>44</sup> See below p. 111.

<sup>45</sup> The form of this writ is given below, n.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>46</sup> British Museum, *Additional Manuscript* 38821, fol. 10.

<sup>47</sup> In the fourteenth century the exclusively clerical character of this writ leaves no room for doubt. It is clearly attested to in the registers of writs. A register of the year 1344 or thereabouts states: 'Quando attachiamen-tum fit pro clericis tunc dicitur: *Sieu: ex relatu plurium accepimus*' (Oxford, Bodleian

king's justices," had found a detour and evolved a new form of prohibition which would shield them from the sanctions ordinarily taken by their superiors.

It must not be thought that ecclesiastical leaders were duped. The Merton text is evidence to the contrary. Moreover, the document from the early years of Pecham's pontificate, which has been mentioned already,<sup>49</sup> shows the archbishop to be perfectly aware of what was taking place. The prelates were bending every effort to counteract the effects of the new procedure and to make clerics in this case likewise liable to the penalties inflicted on those who abused the writ of prohibition to the detriment of the Church's jurisdiction. In this document, Archbishop Pecham, after distinguishing between licit and illicit prohibitions and renewing the sanctions already taken at Lambeth in 1261,<sup>50</sup> goes on to treat of the case—and it often happens, he interjects—where the person, who has sought the writ of prohibition or in whose favor it was sought, dissimulates having moved for it, so that a bailiff only in the rôle of messenger delivers the royal prohibition as if the king himself were proceeding *ex officio* in the case. How are these people to be dealt with? Pecham goes on to outline the following steps which are to be taken against them.

If the person in whose favor the writ of prohibition has issued is present before the ecclesiastical judge, he is to be questioned at once; if he is not present, then he is to be summoned and obliged to appear. In either case, once he is present, the judge must place him on his oath to state the truth as to whether he procured the illicit prohibition from the royal chancery or made use of it, even though he personally may have done no more than command it or merely approve of it. If he confesses, he will be punished in the manner already explained; if he denies everything, then he should at least be obliged to swear that he will for the future make no abusive employ of the prohibition. It may happen that, although the party desists, the king himself will continue to sue the prohibition; if so, which God forbid, it will be necessary to proceed against the sovereign in the way described at the council of Lambeth (1261).<sup>51</sup> Should the party in presence of the ecclesiastical judge decline to make any answer to the questions put him or refuse to take the oath, his conduct will be interpreted as tantamount to a confession and he will be punished in the usual way. Likewise, if he fails to appear after being summoned three times, his guilt will be presumed and sanctions taken.<sup>52</sup>

It is difficult to estimate the exact degree of success that attended these measures taken by the clergy. Probably it was very small indeed, since there is evidence

Library, *Rawlinson Manuscript C. 454*, fol. 321v), while in the margin opposite another *ex relatu plurium* form of writ is found the note: 'Prohibitio de catallis et debitis pro rege: non concedatur nisi impetrans fuerit ad minus infra sacros' (fol. 324). The one possible exception to this rule is the prohibition against a plea of trespass in court christian; the case leaves some room for doubt. An *ex relatu plurium* form of this prohibition appears as early as 1294 and the formula refers specifically to both parties as laymen (Cambridge University Library, *Ms. Ll. IV. 17*, fol. 271v); yet a register of about 1300, after giving the ordinary form of prohibition against a plea of trespass, adds immediately: 'Si sit clericus, tunc: Sicut ex relatu plurium' (British Museum, *Harley Ms. 858*, fol. 130). So also in later registers, e.g. Bodleian, *Rawlinson Ms. C. 292*, where the ordinary form is given and then, under the rubric, *Aliter pro clericis*, there follows the *ex relatu plurium* form (fol. 24). And this

becomes standard: Bodleian, *Western Ms. s.c. 27692*, fol. 19-19v (reign of Edward II); Bodleian, *Rawlinson Ms. C. 459*, fol. 247; etc.

<sup>49</sup> Maitland speaks of the rôle of individual justices in getting new writs made; see Pollock and Maitland, *The History of English Law* (2nd ed., London, 1911), I, 196.

<sup>50</sup> See above, p. 108.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 748.

<sup>53</sup> Cole, *Documents* . . . , pp. 367-368. A synod held at Exeter in 1287 likewise refers specifically to this new practice, when speaking of the abuse of prohibitions. It has just condemned the practice of one cleric drawing another into a personal action in the secular courts, and then goes on: 'Et quamquam non suo nomine sed alieno ad vetitum examen clericum trahi procuraverit; nichilominus eum, qui taliter in fraudem legis committit, predictis poenis decrevimus involutum' (Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 148, cap. xxx).

of a marked and continuous progress in the use of the new writ in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The multiplication of forms of the writ in contemporary registers bears witness to this on the one hand, as do likewise, on the other, the repeated complaints voiced by the clergy, protesting against the new usage in the matter of prohibition. These complaints were addressed to the king, or to parliament, just as the grievances of the bishops in 1237 had been. The further light which they throw on the practice is considerable. Thus a series of grievances presented to the king at some date between 1279 and 1284, contains the following:

Prohibitio impetratur, non expresso nomine impetrantis, sub ea forma: *Ex relatu plurimorum intelleximus etc.*, quae judici et parti dirigitur, et intitulum in cauda literae ex parte regis, porrigiturque per aliquem ignotum laicum; et si iudex procedat ulterius, vel pars prosequatur, sequitur attachiatio, nec potest iudex coram iustitiariis uti jure communi, scilicet de lege facienda cum manu tertia, si neget se contra prohibitionem venisse, sed dicunt iustitiiarii: *Rex est pars*. Et tunc, sive velit sive nolit iudex vel pars, ad inquisitionem procedent.<sup>53</sup>

The king's reply is curt in the extreme: if anyone seeks such writs, he says, without a just reason, they will be punished; but he in no way withdraws the writ itself.<sup>54</sup> The answer would give but scant satisfaction to the hierarchy, who at almost the same time were making the observation that the good faith of the defendant in court christian who sued for a prohibition was suspect in practically every instance.<sup>55</sup>

Some years later the same complaint was made again, referring this time more specifically to the heart of the abuse as seen by churchmen, namely that, even if the king's court after long delay did finally relinquish the case in favour of the court christian, it was impossible to obtain satisfaction or damages from the offending party, since the writ of prohibition did not bear the name of the one who was really responsible for its being issued. Once more we have the king's reply, but he evades this vital point and confines himself to reviewing the means already provided to correct abuses in regard to prohibitions. There are, for instance, consultors who may be approached, once a prohibition has been received, and who will decide whether it ought to be observed or not; moreover, if injurious use is made of prohibitions, the offenders will be punished by fine or imprisonment; and, finally, the bishops are always invited to bring with them to parliament any of these fraudulent prohibitions that they may be examined. But such a reply was deemed insufficient. It failed to touch upon the question of damages for those who had suffered inconvenience and expense as a result of the prohibition plea. The clergy therefore came out flatly and petitioned the king to refrain henceforth from according this *ex relatu plurium* prohibition in the case of private citizens.<sup>56</sup> The presence of this prohibition in all fourteenth century registers of writs without exception is proof that the clergy's request was not acceded to; quite on the contrary, the particular forms of the writ became steadily more numerous and more diversified.

<sup>53</sup> *Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers*, ed. J. Raine (Rolls Series, London, 1873), p. 70. These grievances are probably of the year 1280, since some of them are reproduced textually in 1309 among articles which are said to have been presented to the king before, in the parliaments of 1280 and 1300. It is Raine who has assigned the extreme dates of 1279 and 1284.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>55</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 118; the statement is found among another group of grievances,

dating from 1285.

<sup>56</sup> The original complaint, the king's reply and the new petition of the clergy are all found among grievances stated in 1309, but they are there said to have been proposed in earlier parliaments of 1280 and 1300; now this particular complaint is not to be found among those of 1280 which are preserved for us (cf. n.<sup>53</sup>); this one would seem therefore to date from 1300 (Wilkins, *Conc.*, II, 317-318). The reference in the text to 'private citizens' is meant to distinguish from the case where the

The Register of Writs is for the most part an extremely arid collection of documents. Yet its growth and the stages whereby it reached its definitive form provide the materials for a vivid and interesting story.<sup>57</sup> Nowhere is the steadily increasing popularity of the *ex relatu plurium* writ of prohibition more strikingly portrayed than in the Register as it evolves at the close of the thirteenth and in the fourteenth centuries. From the one single form of exceptional use in registers dating from the first years of Edward I's reign, we can watch it branch out into other common forms, still somewhat exceptional nevertheless, and then pass into the group of writs which are of current use and to be had for the asking. Finally we see it ramify into a score and more of *ex relatu plurium* writs, differentiated by slight modifications of form and usage. It remains to indicate the chief steps of this development.

The earliest register known to contain the new *ex relatu plurium* prohibition dates, as has been already mentioned, from the very beginning of Edward I's reign, between 1272 and 1274.<sup>58</sup> It contains but one example of the writ, addressed to ecclesiastical judges who, as the king has learned from the report of several persons (*velut ex relatu plurium accepimus*), are hearing in court christian a plea of debts and chattels having nothing to do with wills or marriage, wherein a certain prior is defendant; the writ prohibits the judges from continuing to hear the said plea.<sup>59</sup> A footnote adds that, with the necessary alterations, the same writ should be sent to the plaintiff; this is in accordance with Bracton's advice to address prohibitions to both judges and plaintiff in order to make assurance doubly sure.<sup>60</sup> That the writ should refer to debts and chattels is quite natural; the vast majority of prohibition pleas at this period have to do with alleged cognizance of lay chattels and debts by spiritual courts.<sup>61</sup> The most significant fact to show the exceptional nature of the *ex relatu plurium* form is that it is classified among the *de praecepto* writs, not among the *de cursu* ones which issue as a matter of course for the mere asking and paying for them. *De praecepto* writs are always of a more unusual sort covering those cases which cannot be considered as normal or routine and require a special order (*praeceptum*), after the particular circumstances have been explained, before they issue from the chancery.<sup>62</sup> That the new prohibition should be found in this class of writs is therefore clear proof of its exceptional character at this date.

Several registers of the next decade or so are almost identical with the one just mentioned; at least, in the matter of the *ex relatu plurium* writ there is no change:

king might use such a writ against an action in which he himself was directly concerned (cf. n.<sup>60</sup>) and about which he had learned *ex relatu plurium*.

<sup>57</sup> See F. W. Maitland, 'The History of the Register of Original Writs,' *Harvard Law Review*, III (1889-1890) 97-115, 167-178, 212-225; republished by H.A.L. Fisher, *Collected Papers of Frederick William Maitland* (Cambridge, 1911), II, 110-173.

<sup>58</sup> See above, p. 110. This register is identical in order and form of writs with the Cambridge University one (*Ms. Ee. I. 1*) described and analyzed by W. S. Holdsworth in *A History of English Law*, II (3rd ed., London, 1923), pp. 613-615. It might be noted that the date of these registers coincides with that of the first records in the plea rolls witnessing to the existence of the new writ.

<sup>59</sup> *Rex tali archidiacono et ejus commissario salutem. Cum placita de catallis et debitis in regno nostro, que non sunt de testamento vel matrimonio, ad coronam et dignitatem nostram pertineant, et talis, velut ex relatu plurium jam accepimus, priorem de*

*M. super catallis et debitis hujusmodi trahat in placitum in curia christianitatis, vobis prohibemus ne placitum illud ulterius tenere presumatis in curia christianitatis, presertim cum hujusmodi placita ad nos et non ad alium pertineant in regno nostro. Teste etc. . .*

*Fiat alia (prohibicio) parti ne sequatur sub eadem forma, mutatis mutandis (Add. Ms. 38821, fol. 10).*

<sup>60</sup> Bracton, *De Legibus*, fol. 405b.

<sup>61</sup> In 1275, 29 out of 36 prohibition pleas heard in the court of common pleas were about debts and chattels; in 1280, 45 out of 49. It was not always so: in 1230, 20 out of 45 had had to do with lay fee and only 14 with debts and chattels.

<sup>62</sup> On the distinction between *de cursu* and *de praecepto* writs in general, see A. E. Stamp, 'The Court and Chancery of Henry III,' *Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait*, ed. Edwards, Galbraith, Jacobs (Manchester, 1933), pp. 306-308; on the same in prohibition matter, cf. Flahiff, *Le Bref royal de prohibition*, p. 81.

one form of it only, relating to debts and chattels, and classified among the *de praecepto* writs.<sup>61</sup> The first notable change appears in a register of the late 1280's, which, while it retains the writ which appeared in the earlier registers, introduces a second form of it to prohibit an advowson plea in court christian; and, this time, the writ is found among the ordinary *de cursu* prohibitions relating to advowsons.<sup>62</sup> From then on an *ex relatu plurium* form begins to appear in each of the three traditional *de cursu* prohibition groups: advowson, lay fee and chattels. This is the normal case in registers of the last years of the thirteenth century.<sup>63</sup> Soon the writ of attachment, which issues against those who do not obey the prohibition in order to bring them before the royal justices, accompanies the *ex relatu plurium* writs, just as it had the ordinary ones in earlier registers.<sup>64</sup>

Thus, by the beginning of Edward II's reign, the *ex relatu plurium* form has taken a normal and permanent place alongside the usual *de cursu* writs of prohibition. While an occasional one will still find its way into the *de praecepto* group, as some exceptional circumstance involving a clerical defendant arises, nevertheless, for the most part, the development of the *ex relatu plurium* writ merely parallels henceforward that of others in the prohibition section throughout the fourteenth century. This growth is characterized by the making of finer distinctions which result in numerous ramifications; thus, for instance, a single *ex relatu plurium* prohibition of advowson no longer suffices, there must be in addition others to cover the specific cases of a vicarage, a chapel, a prebend, a hospital, etc.<sup>65</sup> But this particular development is not peculiar to the *ex relatu plurium* writ; henceforth, its history is merged with that of the Register of Writs until the latter reaches its definitive form. The special interest of the *ex relatu plurium* type, historically at least, ceases with the first quarter of the fourteenth century. The 'subterfuge' has triumphed to such an extent that by that time it is a recognized part of the normal writ machinery of the realm.

Ecclesiastical authorities are obliged willy-nilly to tolerate it, as they had been forced a century earlier to accept the writ of prohibition itself; it contains no intrinsic injustice and there is no attain, on the surface in any case, to the principles of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, even if it does give a great practical advantage to the royal courts. Probably the prelates would continue to see therein a serious grievance leaving the way open to abuses, but the general situation could not but be accepted.

Is there any compensating factor? No obvious one, perhaps, yet it is quite possible that ecclesiastical judges were now finding the system of consultation a more workable one than at first. The subject cannot be treated here at length, but it is significant to find that the same registers which confirm the solid footing gained by the *ex relatu plurium* prohibition bear witness to a remarkable growth in forms of the writ of consultation.<sup>66</sup> While they are not restricted to cases where a clerical

<sup>61</sup> The following registers are of this type: Oxford Bodleian Library, *Rawlinson Ms. C. 331*, fol. 1-18v (ca. 1272); Cambridge University Library, *Ms. Ll. IV. 18*, fol. 94-146 (ca. 1281) and *Ms. Ee. I. 1*, fol. 194-211 (ca. 1282); British Museum, *Add. Ms. 34194*, fol. 1-40 (ca. 1286). The *ex relatu plurium* writ may still be lacking in some registers, e.g. Brit. Mus., *Harley Ms. 409*, fol. 1-44 (ca. 1278).

<sup>62</sup> Cambridge Univ. Libr., *Ms. Mm. I. 27*, fol. 13-13v; the whole register is contained on fol. 7-28v.

<sup>63</sup> Brit. Mus., *Harley Ms. 575*, fol. 143-192v (ca. 1292); Cambridge, Trinity College, *Ms. O. 2. 58*, fol. 85-158v (ca. 1299).

<sup>64</sup> Brit. Mus., *Harley Ms. 858*, fol. 74-119v (ca. 1303) is the earliest example that I have

noted; on fol. 82 the rubric is accompanied by an interesting note: 'Attachiamendum de eodem (de catallis et debitis) pro clericis. Notandum est quod in isto breve de attachiamiento non dicitur: "Si talis fecerit te securum," quia fit pro rege.' Other similar registers are: Bodl. Libr., *Rawlinson Ms. C. 246* (ca. 1310) and *C. 310* (ca. 1310).

<sup>65</sup> Bodl. Libr., *Rawlinson Ms. C. 292*, fol. 21v-22 (ca. 1318) contains all these; so too do *Rawlinson Ms. C. 459*, fol. 244-245 (ca. 1318) and *Rawlinson Ms. C. 666*, fol. 138v-139 (ca. 1327) etc.

<sup>66</sup> The practice of consulting royal justices or other officers commissioned for the purpose, as to whether ecclesiastical judges may proceed with an action that has been pro-

defendant has sued a writ of prohibition, they come nevertheless by the middle of the fourteenth century to cover most of the situations dealt with by *ex relatu plurium* prohibitions. It may well be that courts christian were finding this an adequate remedy and safeguard, whether the one who moved for the prohibition happened to be cleric or layman. Such a conclusion would need to be substantiated, but meanwhile the coincidence between these parallel developments is certainly interesting and worthy of note.

From the foregoing study, we may safely conclude that clerics did avail themselves of the king's writ of prohibition in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Technically they had as good a right to it as any lay subject of the king, but they were more open to the sanctions taken by their ecclesiastical superiors to prevent abuse of the writ. The Church authorities would never deny that clerics could in all justice make use of prohibitions, but they maintained that well nigh every recourse thereto was in fact abusive. The pressure which they brought to bear had such good effect that in the late years of Henry III's reign clerics were actually suing fewer writs of prohibition for fear of coming under the sanctions taken against their illicit use. But about this same time some ingenious justice, it may reasonably be supposed, was evolving a new form of the writ wherein the name of the party suing did not appear. It was in the first years of Edward I's reign that the new writ came into current use, as is evidenced by the plea rolls, the registers of writs and the complaints of the clergy. These were really the decisive years. By 1285 or 1290 its place and use became firmly established. Already in the first quarter of the fourteenth century it was quite as normal and as variegated as any other part of England's rich writ system. The leaders of the Church had come to tolerate the practice, while yet renewing their protests against abuses.

It is evident therefore from these results that ecclesiastics as a class were not all opposed to the use of prohibition. From the beginning, the lower clergy and religious availed themselves of it, if it promised something to their advantage. While the repeated recourse to prohibitions by laity and clergy alike would tend necessarily to extend the field of royal jurisdiction, there were nevertheless many, even among the clergy, who viewed this writ less as a weapon in the 'struggle' between secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction than as a remedy or expedient in a particular court action. Hence it would be incorrect to speak of a clear-cut issue between the clergy and the king, and yet more so between Church and State, in the history of the writ of prohibition. The true situation is much more that of subjects of the king, lay and clerical, profiting by an advantageous practice offered to them by the royal courts, while the dispossessed courts christian, as represented by the prelates, do all in their power to counteract the effects of such a practice. The case is certainly not one of the spiritual as such

hibited, certainly existed in the thirteenth century. Bracton speaks of it (*De Legibus*, fol. 405b); the *Note Book* furnishes at least one reference to it (ed. Maitland, II, 679, No. 877). The register of William Wickwane, archbishop of York, contains an example of the form dating from 1286 (ed. W. Brown, *Surtees Society Publications*, No. 114, Durham, 1907, p. 43, n. 144); and the royal *Statutum de Consultatione*, fixing certain details in the usage, dates from the parliament of 1290 (*Statutes of the Realm*, Record Commission, London, 1810, I, 108). Nevertheless,

the first example that I have been able to find in a register of writs is of the year 1318 or thereabouts (Bodl., *Rawlinson Ms. C. 292*, fol. 25v-26). This register contains only two forms of consultation, but within twenty years there may be found as many as sixteen and twenty-four (Bodl., *Rawlinson Ms. C. 667*, fol. 35v-40 and Bodl., *Western Ms. s.c. 3712*, fol. 39-45v). I hope to treat the history of the writ of prohibition more fully at a later date; meanwhile, see I. J. Churchill, *Canterbury Administration* (London, 1933), I, 531-534.

opposed to the temporal as such. Indeed, this is true of so many supposed 'conflicts' between spiritual and temporal in the Middle Ages. Even in crises of major importance, regarded generally as classic examples of the 'quarrel between Church and State,' the dividing line does not lie, for the people of the time, between ecclesiastics on the one hand and laymen on the other; it cuts, almost without exception, through both orders in society, leaving clergy and laymen on one side opposed to clergy and laymen on the other,<sup>66</sup> even though we can now see, and some at that time, too, saw, that spiritual interests were ultimately at stake. The Controversy of Investitures, the conflict between St. Thomas Becket and Henry II,<sup>70</sup> the attitude towards royal absolutism whether in England or in France, are cases in point. It is a situation which can only properly be appreciated, if we recall that mediaeval society, unlike that of to-day, was essentially a single organism and that even these great disputes were more of the nature of family quarrels than warfare between sovereign parties.

<sup>66</sup> The articles of Professor Gabriel LeBras cited above (n. 3-4) insist strongly on this fact; cf. also his essay on 'Canon Law' in *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, ed. Crump and Jacob (Oxford, 1926), p. 341.

<sup>70</sup> Professor Powicke has made the point in regard to English crises, in *Medieval England* (London, 1931), pp. 141-142; cf. pp. 129, 201.



# The Canzone d'Amore of Cavalcanti According to the Commentary of Dino del Garbo<sup>1</sup>

## TEXT AND COMMENTARY

OTTO BIRD

(CONCLUDED)

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### III

P. 166, ll. 5-8:<sup>2</sup>

Division of the stanza: In this stanza Guido undertakes to answer the next two questions he has proposed, namely those concerning the virtue and the power of love. Hence it is divided into two parts according as he treats first the virtue of love and secondly the power of love, which he begins in line 35, *di sua potentia segue spesso morte*.

P. 166, ll. 8-14:

In the first part of the stanza Guido says that love is not a virtue but comes from the operation of a certain virtue. However, it should be known that there are three kinds of virtues in the soul. Thus there are certain virtues in the soul which are its natural powers; there are many of these, but the soul is the root of them all, such as intellect, will, phantasy, estimation, memory, the particular and common sensitive virtues, the sensitive appetite and those vegetative virtues which nourish the body.

Since Guido says that love is not a virtue, but comes from one (line 29), Dino begins his analysis by showing in how many senses *virtus* is used, and he does this by enumerating those things which we call by this name. Consequently, he

<sup>1</sup> See MEDIAEVAL STUDIES, Vol. II, pp. 150, sqq.

<sup>2</sup> References to pages and lines refer to the edition of the text of the Commentary in M.S. Vol. II, l.c.

is thus determining the most general signification of *virtus*. But the most general signification is, as St. Thomas says, the perfection of a potency (*Sum. Theol.* 1-2, 55, 1c). But the perfection of a thing is primarily concerned with the ordering of a thing to its end; thus etymologically, a perfection is that which has been thoroughly achieved, a *per-factum*. In the case of a potency, however, it is its act which perfects it and is its end, and hence a potency is called perfect according as it is determined to its act. But there are some potencies which are determined to their acts in themselves; these are the natural powers of the soul, and hence as such they are called *virtutes*. The rational powers of the soul, however, are not determined to one, (as we have seen, p. 199), but are related indeterminately to many. These powers are determined to their acts by *habitus*, as we shall see, and as such are the human virtues, the intellectual and moral virtues, which we shall have to consider after we see what Dino has said about the natural powers, (for this whole development cf. St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*). Thus we have here the principle according to which Dino determines the signification of *virtus*. For immediately after considering the natural powers of the soul, Dino turns to the intellectual and moral virtues; cf. *infra*.

Concerning the virtues which are the natural powers of the soul, we can distinguish them according as they pertain to the rational, sensitive or vegetative soul. In the sensitive and rational souls, however, we can further distinguish the powers according as they are apprehensive or motive powers; for, as we have seen (p. 186), according as the apprehended form is apprehended as good, it moves the appetite towards it. But no such distinction can be made in the case of the vegetative soul, since it is not cognoscitive as are the other apprehensive powers. Therefore, in the rational soul there are, as Dino says, the powers or virtues of intellect and will, which are respectively the apprehensive and motive powers of that part. In the sensitive soul the apprehensive powers are distinguished, as we have seen (p. 194), according as they are interior or exterior powers. Thus, of the interior powers Dino enumerates the phantasy, estimation, memory and common sense, whereas the exterior powers are the five particular senses, (cf. p. 194). The appetite, however, is the motive power of the sensitive soul, which we have already considered on p. 186. Finally in the vegetative soul are those powers which nourish the body and make it grow and generate.

P. 166, ll. 14-17:

There are also certain virtues in the soul which are called the intellectual virtues, and these are wisdom, understanding, science, art and prudence. There are also certain others called the moral virtues, such as temperance, liberality, fortitude, magnanimity and the like.

As we have just seen (p. 199), the rational powers of the soul are not determined to one but are related indeterminately to many; they are not naturally determined to their act as the powers of the sensitive soul are for instance, but are somehow in potency to all things. Consequently they need something to determine them so as to bring them into act, and that which accomplishes this is the *habitus*. For *habitus*, as Aristotle says, is a disposition according to which one is either well or badly disposed (*Metaphys.* V, xx, 1022b10-12). Consequently, according as the rational soul is well disposed to act well, its potentialities are determined to act; hence *habitus* has been called a "perfectant of potency" (cf. V. J. Bourke, *Habitus as a Perfectant of Potency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Thesis submitted for Ph.D at the University of Toronto, 1938). But *habitus* is then a *virtus*, for as we have seen, a *virtus* is that which perfects a potency. The rational soul, however, is divided into intellect and will; hence as

a habitus determines one or the other to act, it will be respectively an intellectual or moral virtue. Thus those habitus which dispose the intellect to act well are the intellectual virtues, whereas those disposing the will to act well are the moral virtues, (cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* 1-2, 56, 3c). The intellectual virtues, which Dino enumerates here are those Aristotle gives in his discussion of them in the *Ethics* (VI, ii, 1139b16), namely, wisdom, understanding, science, art and prudence. These, however, as St. Thomas says in his commentary on this passage, (*In Ethic. Nic.*, VI, lect. iii-iv, n.1142-83), can be divided according as they are ordered to the necessary or the contingent. Thus, wisdom, understanding and science are concerned with the necessary, whereas art and prudence are concerned with the contingent. Furthermore, those concerning the necessary can be further divided according as they are concerned with the truth of principles or with the truth of that which follows from principles. Thus, wisdom and understanding are concerned directly with principles, while science is concerned with that which follows from those principles; in other words, the first are indemonstrable, the latter demonstrable. Wisdom, however, is distinguished from understanding in that it is concerned with the apprehension of principles of being, whereas understanding is concerned with the apprehension of principles of demonstration. Science, on the other hand, is concerned with the truth of those conclusions which are deduced from these principles. Concerning those which are concerned with the contingent, they are divided according as they are concerned with making or doing. Thus, art is the "recta ratio factibilium", whereas prudence is the "recta ratio agibilium".

We have seen, then, that virtue can refer either in general to the powers of the soul, or more particularly to the intellectual virtues. There remains, however, a third signification, namely the moral virtues, which most properly are called virtues and which is the sense in which virtue is usually taken today. These are the virtues, as has been said, which perfect the appetite; for inasmuch as the appetite somehow participates in reason, since by reason it can restrain and reprimand the operation of the appetite, it can conform itself through these virtues or habits to the rectitude of the reason. Thus, the moral virtues restrain and rectify the passions of the appetite. These virtues, as Dino says, are liberality, fortitude, temperance, magnanimity and the like. All of the moral virtues, however, can be reduced to four general or principal ones, which are the cardinal virtues. Thus, since rectitude of reason with respect to actions and passions is the root of all these virtues, there is one virtue which pertains to this rectitude, that is prudence. Concerning actions, since there are some that have no limit within reason, such as buying and selling and the like, there is a virtue which constitutes an equality of rectitude, that is justice. Concerning the passions, however, since they can be repugnant to reason in a two-fold way, there are two virtues. Thus, those passions such as concupiscence, hope, anger and the like, which imply motion towards the object, are restrained and reprimanded according to rectitude by temperance, which, hence, is the virtue of the concupiscible appetite. Those passions, on the other hand, such as fear, hate and the like, which imply motion away from their object are restrained and made firm according to reason by the virtue of fortitude, and, hence, is the virtue of the irascible appetite, (Cf. St. Thomas, *In Ethic. Nic.*, II, lect. viii). Thus, prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude are the principals of the moral virtues, as those from which all the rest flow.

Consequently, having seen that virtue can refer to either the powers of the soul, or to the intellectual or moral virtues, it is immediately apparent that love is not a virtue. For, as Dino says, love is not a virtue as a natural power of the soul nor as an intellectual or moral virtue. Love is a certain passion of the appetite, just as anger and sadness are.

P. 166, ll. 20-31:

Thus it is evident that love is not a virtue as a natural power of the soul, nor as an intellectual or moral habit. But it is a passion of the appetite like anger or sadness, which are not virtues but passions of the appetite. Yet although love is not a virtue, it proceeds from one, which is what Guido says in line 39, *ma da quella viene*. But love proceeds from a virtue which is an intellectual habit, although it has been said that love is in some sense in the possible intellect. Nor does it proceed from a virtue which is a moral habit, for such virtues are in the appetite as regulated by reason, whereas the love of which we speak here, although it is in the appetite, it is not regulated by reason. Therefore, love must come from a virtue in the sense that virtue is taken as some power of the sensitive soul.

Having considered the various senses of *virtue*, it is plain that love cannot be a virtue. For it cannot be a virtue in the sense of a natural power of the soul, since there is no faculty in the soul such as love inasmuch as love seems to be that which results from the operation of some faculty of the soul; (cf. p. 187). Nor can love be a virtue in the sense of an intellectual habit, for although love can in some sense be said to reach the intellect, it does not exist there properly as a passion, as we have seen (p. 199). Nor can it be a virtue in the sense of a moral habit, for although it participates in and is subject to the will, as we have seen (p. 192), it may at times be without the regulation of reason; cf. *infra*. Consequently love is not a virtue. But as Guido says, it proceeds from one. To proceed from a virtue, however, can only refer here to that which comes from a virtue in the sense of a natural power of the soul, for the same arguments that show love cannot be a virtue in the sense of an intellectual or moral habit also show that it cannot proceed from either of these as from a virtue. What then is the power from which love proceeds?

P. 166, l. 31-P. 167, l. 3:

Love proceeds from the operation of a power of the sensitive soul, for, as has been said, love is a passion of the sensitive appetite which arises from the apprehension of a form first by the exterior and then by the interior senses. Whence there is a two-fold sensitive passion in love, namely a cognoscitive and an appetitive passion, for the motion in the appetite follows upon the apprehension of a cognoscitive power. But although the operation of the sensitive cognoscitive powers is necessary to give rise to love, love does not properly exist in the cognoscitive power as in a subject; but it exists, as all the passions do, in the appetitive power. For in cognition there is only the motion of things to the soul, whereas in the appetite there is the motion of the soul to the thing; for we know a thing according as it is in us, whereas we desire (*appetimus*) it as it is in itself. Thus the Philosopher says in his *Metaphysics* (VI, iii, 1027b26) that the good and bad, which are the objects of the appetite, are in things, but the true and false, which are the objects of the intellect, are in the soul.

Since we have seen that love comes from a virtue in the sense of a natural power of the soul, Dino now determines whether that power is a cognoscitive or an appetitive power. We already know that love comes from a seen form, as Guido says (line 21); hence it would seem that love comes from a cognoscitive or apprehensive power, since the power of sight is such a power. Yet we have also seen that love is a passion of the sensitive appetite, at least that is the interpretation we have given to love as *d'alma costume* (line 20); consequently love would seem in this case to come from the appetite. Thus our problem is to know what power Guido is referring to when he says of love, *non e vertude ma da quella viene*. Nor is the answer given in the following line, which completes the reference of the relative, for all Guido says is, *ch'e perfectione*, and this can refer to any power of the soul as it is in act and operation; cf. p. 184.

But since both the apprehensive and appetitive powers of the soul concur in giving rise to love, our problem is to see how they operate together and to which one love properly belongs. Thus Dino notes that the soul suffers from both the cognoscitive and appetitive power in having the passion of love. For every motion in the appetite arises only after an apprehension of some cognoscitive power, for, as we have seen (p. 186), the operation of the appetite is that of being moved by the appetible object according as it is apprehended. Thus, as Aristotle says, when something is sensed as delectable or sad, it is pursued or avoided (*De anima*, III, vii, 431a9); but the appetite is the motive power of the soul. Therefore it is the appetite which moves following upon an apprehension of the delectable or sad. But love certainly is some sort of a motion towards a delectable object, as we shall have to consider more in detail further on; therefore love is in the appetite as consequent upon an apprehension of a delectable form. Dino, however, adds a reason why this should be so by saying that in the operation of the appetite the motion is from the soul towards the thing, whereas in cognition or apprehension the motion is from the thing to the soul. For in cognition the end is attained when the soul has become the thing intentionally, that is when we have grasped the form of the thing and are knowing it (cf. p. 196). Thus the perfection of the cognoscitive power consists in the thing-to-be-known coming to be intentionally in that power—it is “tending towards” that power as an *intentio*. But the perfection of the appetite consists in reaching the thing towards which it moves or in escaping that from which it flees. But this is plain from the fact that the object of the appetite is the good, which is in things, whereas the object of cognition is the true, which is in the mind; (Aristotle, *Metaphys.* VI, iii, 1027b26 and cf. St. Thomas, *In metaphys.* VI, lect. iv, n. 1240: “Apparet etiam ex his quae hic dicuntur, quod verum et falsum, quae sunt objecta cognitionis, sunt in mente. Bonum vero et malum, quae sunt objecta appetitus, sunt in rebus. Item quod, sicut cognitio perficitur per hoc quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente, ita appetitus quicumque perficitur per ordinem appetentis ad res appetibiles.”) Therefore since love is the motion toward a good, it will properly belong to the appetite. For although the sensitive cognoscitive powers contribute in causing the passions, they do not move us towards the thing thus apprehended; they present the apprehension which the appetite follows, and thus give rise to the passions. Thus the cognoscitive powers concur in causing a passion by disposing the soul to move towards the thing they apprehend, but that motion itself is accomplished by the operation of the appetite.

P. 167, ll. 3-12:

But this appetite in which love has its being in the sensitive and not the rational appetite; for as we have seen love is not properly located in the intellect as a passion and hence is not to be located in the rational appetite. This is what Guido adds in saying, *ch'e perfectione, che si pon tale, non rationale ma che sente dico* (lines 30-31).

Since then we have seen that love is not a virtue but comes from one in the sense that it comes from the motion of the appetite, all that remains is to determine which appetite this is. For as we have seen (p. 186), there are two appetites in the human soul, the rational and the sensitive appetite. The rational appetite or the will is that power which follows upon the apprehension of reason, whereas the sensitive appetite is that which follows upon the apprehension of the sensitive powers. But that love is not a passion of the rational appetite is evident from what Guido has already said concerning the cause of love. For he says (line 21) that it comes from a seen form; but sight is one of the powers of the sensitive soul, and consequently, as arising from the apprehension of a sensitive power, love

comes from the sensitive appetite. And this is what Guido means in saying that it comes from a virtue, *ch'e perfectione, che si pon tale, non rationale ma che sente dico*.

Love, then, is not a virtue but it comes from one, namely the sensitive appetite. It is not a virtue either as a moral or intellectual virtue or as a power of the soul; but it comes from one in the sense that the appetite, in following after the apprehension of the cognoscitive powers, gives rise to love. But Guido goes on to say that love comes from one 'which is a perfection which is posited as such not rationally but which senses' ("ch'e perfectione che si pon tale non rationale ma che sente dico"). By perfection, as we have said above, the scholastics signified act or actualization. Thus, Guido would be saying that love comes from a virtue which is in act, that is in operation; cf. St. Thomas, *In Ethic. Nico*, V, lect. xiv. n.1056: "Passio est effectus actionis." But since this virtue is the appetite, love comes, then, from the appetite when it is in operation. Its operation, however, is either a motion towards or away from a thing; therefore, love arises from the motion of the appetite towards a thing and, thus, belongs, as we shall see later, to the concupiscible part of the appetite. Since, however, the appetite is two-fold, namely rational and sensitive, Guido adds finally that love comes from that virtue which is posited as such not by the rational, but by the sensitive soul; it comes from the sensitive appetite. Therefore, at the same time that he answers the question concerning the virtue of love, Guido also gives a final answer to his first question concerning the place love is located in. For since love is properly a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite; consequently, love is located in the heart, which is, as we have already seen (p. 191), the seat of the sensitive appetite. It is only in certain respects that it can be said to be in the memory or the intellect; for it is in those places not as a passion, but only as that apprehended form, which, when followed by the appetite, will give rise to love as a passion. The memory and intellect as apprehensive powers dispose the appetite to love, but only the appetite can give love its proper being. Therefore, love properly has its being in the appetite, and thus Guido says that it is not a virtue, but it comes from one, which is not rational, but sensible.

Then when Guido says, *fuor di salute giudicar mantiene*, etc., he would show that the appetite, in which love is, is not regulated by reason, since it does not follow the judgment of right and sound reason. For this appetite follows the judgment that something is lovable and delightful which is not so at all. Therefore he says, *fuor di salute*, i.e. this passion makes man's judgment unsound, since the judgment of one in love is not sound but corrupt. For one in love judges wrongly, which is what Guido declares in saying, *che la 'ntentione per ragion vale*; for the intention of judging is valid, i.e. right, when it is accompanied by good reason. But he who is in love discerns badly what is loved (*amicum*), i.e. the lovable, for according to right reason it may not be lovable at all; thus Guido says, *discerne male, in cui e vinto, amico*.

Not only is love not located in a rational part of the soul, but it can at times actively oppose the reason; for, as Aristotle says (*Ethic. Nic.* I, xiii, 1102b17), the sensitive appetite is not regulated by reason but rather runs away from it. This is seen from the fact that vehement passion corrupts our power of judgment so that we judge a particular thing as a good to be obtained, although it may be only an apparent good of the *hic* and *nunc* and not an ultimate good at all. Such a judgment is unsound; it is *fuor di salute* because it has failed to take into account the ultimate and universal good. But this is due then to a falling away from reason, for only the reason can grasp the ultimate and universal good, since it only can grasp the universal. Consequently insofar as a passion can impede the reason from considering a particular good in the light of universal good, it leads the reason to make an unsound judgment. But this can occur when the

appetite overcomes the reason and determines it to the particular good towards which it moves, thereby corrupting the reason by determining it *ad unum*, since it is by nature undetermined, as we have already seen (cf. p. 199). For as Aristotle says (*De anima*, III, xi, 434a8-15), it is the work of the reason to deliberate whether one should do this or that, which demands that it be free to consider many in order to choose the best. Consequently if it is determined to the consideration of one thing, it will no longer be able to accomplish its work. But this happens when the appetite overcomes the reason (434a13); in the old Latin translation, "*vincit autem et movet aliquando appetitus deliberationem*" (in St. Thomas, *In de anima*, p. 271), where the *vincit* recalls the *vinto* of Guido's line. The appetite, however, can overcome and impede the work of the reason in three ways, as St. Thomas says (*Sum. Theol.* 1-2, 77, 2): First, by distracting the reason from its work by the intensity of its passion; thus a man violently in love cannot consider anything but his beloved, as Guido himself says in lines 51-53. Secondly, by bringing the intellect to consider a singular thing when its proper object is the universal, and thirdly by altering the body so that the reason is tied down and can no longer exercise its act, as when one becomes mad with love and loses the use of his reason. Consequently, thus impeded, any judgment concerning the object of the passion will be unsound, for it will not be the result of the deliberation of the reason and hence will not concern the general and ultimate good but only the particular good apprehended by the appetite. Thus Guido says that love has an unsound judgment in that it is not regulated by reason, and it is reason that renders the intention of the judgment valid (*che la n'tentione per ragion vale*). For unless the reason has been able to deliberate concerning the greatest good which should be strived for, which is our moral *intention* as the term of our action, any judgment of a good is unsound, since, being without reason, it will be the judgment of the desire and pleasure of the moment. Thus as St. Thomas says (*Sum. Theol.* 1-2, 12, 2, ad 3): "*hoc nomen intentio nominat actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem*;" lacking the ordination of reason, the intention will no longer be right, as Dino says, and consequently any judgment of a good to be striven for will be unsound and corrupt. But as we have seen, an excessive passion will overcome and impede the work of the reason, and hence love, as an excessive passion, will prevent any sound judgment concerning that person who is the object of love; thus lovers have been known to swear to the beauty and virtue of their ladies, although those ladies in other eyes were far from beauty or virtue. But this is always noted by the mediaeval doctors in their treatment of love as a disease, known as *hereos* (cf. *infra*); thus Arnoldus de Villanova says: "*et graece dicitur heroys, idest domina rationis, nam heroys est corrupta scientatio qua iudicatur apprehensum delectabilius aut excellentius esse quam sit*," (quoted in J. L. Lowes, "The Loveres Maladye of Hereos" in *M.P.*, XI, 1913-14, p. 496). And this is what Guido declares in saying, *discerne male, in cui e vinto, amico*; where *ragion* of the preceding line is subject of *e vinto* and *amico* in its derivative sense is to be taken as the object of *discerne*. Thus this line sums up the two preceding ones by saying that love, in whom reason is overcome, discerns, i.e. judges, badly that which is loved.

P. 167, ll. 27-45:

Then when Guido says, *di sua potentia segue spesso morte*, he would show what the power of love is, i.e. what love is able to induce into the body. By *power* here he understands that one which induces the most intense effect love is capable of. For this passion can alter the body so much that it often causes death which is the most terrible of things. But the way love causes death is stated by Guido in, *se forte la vertu fosse impedita*, by which he means that love kills when it is so vehement that it impedes the work of the vegetative or vital virtues of the soul.

which conserve life and its operation in the human body. Thus we see that those, who are excessively in love and cannot satisfy their desire, dry up until they are consumed away and are dead; this however happens not only to those in love but to all having a vehement cogitation and solicitude of the soul. For they thereby have their vital virtues impeded, which are said to help the contrary way, i.e. which conserve life which is the contrary of death; which is what Guido declares in saying, *se forte la vertu fosse impedita, la quale avita alla contraria via*.

Having seen that love is not a virtue but comes from one which often is opposed to and impedes the work of reason, we can now turn to consider the fourth question concerning the power of love, by which we are to understand the most intense effect which love can cause in the body. This however is death, which, as Guido says, often follows from the power of love; for as Aristotle says (*Ethic. Nic.* III, vi, 1115a26), death is the most terrible of all terrible things. But this results *se forte la vertu fosse impedita*, where by *vertu* we are to understand, according to Dino, either the vegetative or vital virtues of the soul. These virtues are two of the three powers of the animal soul as considered purely biologically and hence as enumerated by the doctors of medicine. Thus Avicenna in his *Canon* divides the animal soul into the natural or vegetative, the vital and the animal powers. The natural power is the same as the vegetative soul as considered in psychology and concerns itself with nourishment, growth and reproduction. Likewise, the animal power is equivalent to the sensitive soul and is divided into the exterior and interior powers which we have already considered (p. 194). But the other power, the *virtus vitalis*, differs from any we find enumerated in psychology. Thus Avicenna describes it (*Canon*, I. Fen I, Doct. 6, cap. i, pp. 70b-71a): "Vitalis vero virtus est illa, quae spiritus esse conservat, qui sensus et motus vehiculum existit, et ipsum reddit aptum ad eorum impressiones recipiendas, quum ad cerebrum pervenit, et facit ipsum potentem dandi vitam." Hence it is clear that the presence of the *virtus vitalis* is necessary for life, inasmuch as it conserves the vital spirit on which so much depends. This *spiritus* in general is the medium through which the soul carries out its operations (cf. infra) and is threefold, natural, animal and vital. The natural spirit is the instrument of the vegetative soul, the animal spirit of the sensitive soul, whereas the vital spirit is that by which life is carried out from the heart through the whole body (for this see the convenient summary of Avicenna made by St. Albert in *Sum. de Creat.* P. II, q. 78, sol.). But life itself depends on a proper balance of all the bodily elements which insures the operation of the various powers and spirits of the soul so that, as Avicenna says (op. cit. IV, Fen. II, Tr. I, cap. 94, vol. 2, p. 100b): "Mors autem et vita significantur per dispositiones virtutis." This balance or proportion according to which the body is constituted leads of course to the doctrine of the humors of the body. For as St. Albert summarizes (*loc. cit.*): "Corpus autem dico mixtum et complexionatum et organicum et compositum. Est enim commixtio elementorum in humores, et commixtio humorum in complexiones. Compositio vero corporis organici est ex membris diversis et solidis respondentibus viribus animae perficientibus eam." But the two qualities which must be present for life are, as Aristotle says (*De long. et brev. vitae*, cap. v, 466a18), the hot and moist, and whenever one of these is exhausted the body dies. Thus extreme fear can cause death, since those who suffer fear grow cold in the upper parts so as to cause the heat to retreat and to finally be extinguished by being forced into so small a space wherein death results (Arist. *De respir.* xx, 479b22). Likewise excessive love can cause death, although for the opposite reason, since, as Dino says, love causes a drying and desiccating of the body, whereby, the heat, being no longer held in proper proportion by the moist, consumes the body until it is dead; it literally withers away. Consequently, by destroying the porportion of the qualities in the body by an excess of the hot,



love impedes the proper operation of the virtues or powers of the body until even the power of life is destroyed. Whence Guido says that death follows if this virtue is impeded which aids the contrary way, i.e. the way contrary to death—life. But this virtue must then be the *virtus vitalis* since ultimately it is the one conserving life, and so contrary to death. Thus when this virtue is impeded by love causing an excess of hot in the body, its proper operation of conserving life is impeded and it gives way to its contrary death, whence love has achieved here the greatest effect it possibly can, in that it not only impedes the work of the reason, as we have seen above (p. 162), but even impedes the power of life so that death results, as the mediaeval doctors noted, (cf. Gordonius, quoted in Lowes, *op. cit.*, p. 501: “nisi herosis succurratur in maniam cadunt aut moriuntur.”)

P. 167, l. 46-P. 168, l. 3:

When Guido says, *non perche opposta natural sia*, he would show that love does not cause death as a natural contrary to life, as some diseases are, for instance the natural complexion of disease, which causes death because contrary to the good complexion which life demands.

Although love does at times cause death, it is not naturally opposed to life as a complexion which will not support life, such as disease has for instance. But by complexion we are to understand, as we have just seen, a mixture of the elemental qualities, as mixed in the bodily humors. Thus blood is the hot and moist, phlegm the cold and moist, yellow bile the hot and dry, and black bile the cold and dry; cf. Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, VIII, ed. I, Muller, Leipzig, 1874, pp. 667 sq. and Avicenna, *Canon*, I, Fen. I, Doct. 4, cap. 1, vol. I, p. 20<sup>b</sup>. But the proportion these take together make up the bodily complexion, which as making a perfect mean is best suited for life. Thus Avicenna says, (*De anima*, P. IV, cap. v, f. 21ra): “Complexio autem est medium inter contraria; medium vero non habet contraria. Et ideo aptatur plus ad recipiendum vitam; unde complexio quo magis accesserit ad medium complexionatum aptius fiet ad recipiendum augmentum perfectionis vitae. Cum vero temperatissimum fuerit, ita ut contraria aequalia sint in eo, et operentur aequaliter: coaptabitur perfectioni vitae rationalis similis vitae coelestis; haec autem aptitudo est in spiritu humano.” Consequently in this line Guido is saying that love does not directly destroy this complexion established in the body as diseases do. By nature love is not opposed to the maintenance of this complexion. Consequently love is not properly a disease, as Arnoldus de Villanova notes in his medical treatise (quoted by Lowes, *op. cit.*, p. 497, n. 2): “Antea tamen est sciendum quod licet in rubricis capitulorum superius amorem heroyeum morbum vocaverim nequaquam tamen morbus proprie dicitur. Morbus etenim est innaturalis dispositio seu contra naturam membri existit nocumentum: aut quod ex dicta mala dispositione sequitur ad actionem virtutis operantis in organo sic contra naturam dispositio provenienti nomine morbe accidens appellatur. Amor igitur cum non sit mala dispositio membri: sed potius nociva actio seu mala virtutis operantis in organo.” Thus love is only *per accidens* a disease inasmuch as it is a bad or harmful action of one of the powers of the body. But, as has been said, love is such an excessive desire of the appetite that it corrupts the reason. Consequently, since reason is the specific difference of man, it acts as a disease in corrupting the good of man, as Guido says in the next line. And at times it even leads to death in the end. Consequently it remains to be seen how love can cause death when it is not naturally opposed to life.

P. 168, ll. 3-19:

Love causes death inasmuch as it twists man, i.e. removes him, from his perfect good and from a good and perfect natural disposition, which is what Guido declares when he says, *ma quanto che da buon perfecto tortoe*. For an excessive love turns man away from the good of his natural disposition so that he tends towards melancholy, as the writers on medicine say. But it does this because of the vehement cogitation connected with it and its solicitude concerning the beloved. Whence its power is distracted from the work of nutrition inasmuch as when one power is acting with intensity, the others are prohibited from exercising their proper activities. But since love causes the *virtus animalis* to act with great intensity, the operation of nutrition is diminished and weakened so that the body loses its good natural disposition and tends towards a bad and diseased disposition until finally the body is consumed and dies. Therefore love kills not because it is by nature directly opposed to life, but because it distracts the *virtus naturalis* from its proper nutritive operations.

Thus love does not cause death because it is a natural opposite to life, for, after all, it results from a natural act of a natural power of the soul, namely the sensitive appetite. Yet, as we have seen, it does overcome the reason and so has an unsound judgment. Consequently it turns man away from his perfect good inasmuch as it keeps man from the use of his reason, which is the proper *differentia* of man, so that he can no longer judge concerning the universal and ultimate good but is held to the particular good apprehended by the sensitive appetite. But not only does excessive love impede the operation of the reason, it also impedes the work of the nutritive power; the lover no longer has any desire to eat, but mopes about until he finally may be completely consumed by his passion, so that Avicenna for instance says (*Canon*, III. Fen. I, tr. IV, cap. 23, vol. I, p. 494a): "*Haec aegritudo (amor) est sollicitudo melancolica similis melancoliae*." But the reason for this is the same as that for the impeding of the reason; the intensity of the lover's feelings distract all his powers except those concerned with his beloved—namely those of the *virtus animalis*, whose manifestation we shall have to consider under the effects of love (cf. *infra*). Consequently, man is not only turned away from his perfect good, which can be assured only through the perfect operation of the reason, but he is also deprived of a good and perfect natural disposition, i.e. the perfected condition of the *virtus naturalis* or *vegetabilis*, which can only be assured through perfect nutritive operations. Therefore, deprived of these operations which are necessary to the life of man, man may because of his excessive love finally come to death, since he is thus turned away from the good that is necessary for the perfection of the *virtus vitalis*.

For a discussion of these three *virtutes* mentioned here, see above.

P. 168, ll. 19-24:

Then when Guido says, *per sorte non puo dire huom ch' aggia vita*, he would show that it is not by chance that love causes death, as one might think; for chance is not a firm and stable thing, since it is the cause of its effect not *ut in pluribus*, but *in paucioribus*, which is what Guido would say in, *che stabilita non a signoria*.

Having said that love does at times cause death, although not as causing it from its nature, since it is not naturally opposed to life, Guido proceeds here to determine further the kind of causality love exercises upon the body in causing it to die, by saying that it does not happen from chance. Thus he is exhaustively eliminating the kinds of causality that love could exercise so as to cause death. For since love does not kill from its nature, not being naturally opposed to life, Guido has thereby eliminated it from the sphere of necessary causality, which is the act flowing

from the nature of a thing (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphys.* V, v, 1015a20). Consequently it must lie in the sphere of contingent causality. But, as St. Thomas says (*In de interpret.* I, cap. ix, lect. xiii, n. 9), there are three kinds of contingent causality. The first is that where an effect happens *ut in paucioribus*; i.e. one which rarely and for the least part happens, which is the result of chance or fate, as for instance a man finding a treasure while digging in the earth. Secondly there is that whose effect follows *ut in pluribus*, i.e. one which usually and for the most part happens, since it flows from the nature of the thing exercising the causality, though not necessarily, as for instance a man turning grey when old. Finally there is that whose effect follows *ut in utrumlibet*, i.e. one which is no more determined to happening than to not happening, and this is the kind the will exercises, since only a rational creature can be undetermined with respect to a thing, as we have seen (cf. p. 199). Consequently, since chance is a contingent cause *ut in paucioribus*, its effect is one that rarely happens; it is not a stable and firm thing, whence Guido says that "it cannot be said that man loses life through chance, *che stabilita non a signoria*, i.e. because stability has no rule over chance. But since love often causes death, there must be a stability in the causality it exercises such as to produce this effect *ut in pluribus*; and this cannot be given by chance, whose effects are all *ut in paucioribus*.

P. 168, ll. 25-38:

We see that love often produces this effect, namely that of causing the death of the person who vehemently perseveres in it. We also note that he who can forget his love can return to his natural disposition, whence the doctors of medicine say that the best cure of this passion is to distract the man from thinking about his beloved so that he will forget it. Furthermore the fact that love often kills is a sign that love does not kill from chance but somehow from its nature. Yet the fact that one can be cured of this passion merely by forgetfulness without the need of any external medicines is a sign that love does not kill as a natural contrary; so it must kill in some other way. But Guido signifies this in saying, *a simil puo valere quando huomo oblia*.

Finally in this last line of the stanza Guido shows that death is produced as an effect *ut in pluribus* by saying that one can become well again by forgetting, which is quoted as the best cure of love-sickness by the medical writers. Thus Avicenna says, (*Canon*, III. Fen. I, Tr. IV, cap. 24, vol. 1, p. 494b): "Illud enim facit eos fortasse oblivisci delectationis eorum, aut ingenietur, ut ipsi diligunt aliud ab eo, quod diligunt, quod fit ex eis, quae lex permittit. Deinde cogitatio ipsorum a secundo abscindatur, antequam confirmatur, et postquam obliti fuerint primi." But if love can be cured merely by the lover forgetting about it, this is a sign that this power of love to cause death cannot come from it naturally; for if it did, its effect, i.e. death, would follow of necessity unless the application of external medicines should prevent it. Consequently this power of love must be that of a *causa ut in pluribus*. For we have seen that it is not one of necessity as following from the nature of the thing, nor does it come from chance as a *causa ut in paucioribus*, since, as Guido says, chance has not the stability to satisfy the production of this effect by love. But it cannot be that of a *causa ut ad utrumlibet*, for this belongs only to rational natures, and, as we have seen at the beginning of this stanza, love is not located in a rational power but in the sensitive appetite. Hence it remains that love causes death as a *causa ut in pluribus*, which means that for the most part this sort of excessive love causes death in the lover, although if he can come to forget it, he can become well again and so avoid this most terrible of all effects.

P. 168, ll. 39-44:

Division of the stanza: In this stanza Guido proceeds to consider two other of the questions he has asked about love. Thus he first determines the essence of love, and secondly shows what motions love has, i.e. the alterations it can cause in the body, beginning at *Move cangiando colore* (1.46).

P. 168, l. 45-P. 169, l. 8:

Therefore in the first part Guido would say that the essence of love is a certain passion in which the appetite has a vehement desire to be joined to the beloved; which is what Guido says in, *quando'l volere e tanto ch'oltra misure di natura torna*, i.e. there is such a desire in love to be joined to its beloved that it is beyond measure, or natural term; for this desire in love is so great that it seems to be infinite, whence it has no term such as natural things are measured and terminated by.

Dino writes then in commenting upon the first lines of this stanza, that the essence of love consists of a certain passion in which the appetite has a vehement desire to be joined to the thing loved. Guido's words, however, are that its *esse* is when its desire is so great that it is turned beyond the measure of nature (*L'esser'e quando'l volere e tanto ch'oltra misura de natura torna*). Hence, as it is evident that Dino has supplied considerable to Guido's words, it remains to be seen whether he is justified in such an expansion. In the first place, the initial word of the line is not *essenza*, but *essere*; whence it would appear at first sight that Guido is speaking not of essence, but of existence. In the beginning stanza, however, in positing his questions, Guido states that he intends to determine *l'essenza* of love, and at the present moment we have arrived at the place where that question should be answered. As we have seen, there is nothing before this line that would answer this question, nor is there anything after it. Consequently, *l'essere* here must be used so generally as to include essence as well as existence, or else it is synonymous with *essenza*. It is evident from Dino's words that the latter is the case, nor is he exceptional in taking it thus. For there was a long tradition to such usage, and it was not until the time of St. Thomas that a clear distinction was made between *essentia* and *esse* (Cf. Roland-Gosselin, *Le "De ente et essentia"*, Etude II, p. 137, sq.). Consequently, Guido as well as Dino in this place is adhering to the old tradition which made no sharp and clear distinction in the use of *essentia* and *esse*. But, furthermore, whereas Guido only says that it has a desire which is so great that it is beyond all natural measure. Dino says that it is a passion in which the appetite has a vehement desire to be joined to the thing loved. Thus, it is evident that Guido's words correspond to only two words in Dino's statement of the definition, namely, *vehement desire*. In other words, Guido gives a truncated definition of love, whereas Dino by expanding that gives the complete one; thus, whereas Guido gives only the formal cause, Dino enumerates all four causes of love. The appetite is the matter which receives the form of a vehement desire when the thing loved effects it so that it desires to be joined to that thing; thus, the material, formal, efficient and final causes have all been stated. It was not necessary for Guido to state all the causes inasmuch as he has stated before that love is in the appetite and that it comes from a seen form. Furthermore, the formal cause alone, since it is the most specific of the causes, is usually sufficient to note the essence of a thing. Consequently, at this time Guido states only one of the causes of love.

P. 169, ll. 8-27:

The reason why love has such a desire in the appetite to be joined to its beloved is because the beloved is as an end for him who loves and the proper perfection of the appetite. But every thing desires infinitely to be joined to its end, whence the Philosopher says in his *Politics* that every art and knowledge desires to know its end without limit. Thus love has so great a desire to be joined to its beloved that it is beyond the measure of any natural term because it is a desire to which there is as it were no limit. And where this passion is, there is also a continuous worry over the beloved, which is what Guido says in, *poi non s'adorna di riposo mai*. Furthermore what is here said concerning the definition of love agrees with what Avicenna gives as a definition. For he says that love is a melancholy worry, similar to melancholy, in which a man is led to an excitement of thought over the beauty of certain forms and figures until he gets a desire for that thing. And Ali Abbas says that love is a worry of the soul over that which is loved and a perseverance of thought about it.

Love, then, has a desire so great that it is beyond all natural measure because it is as it were infinite and is not limited by any term as natural things are. Thus, for instance, the eye in the act of seeing is limited by the object seen as its term, whereas the appetite in desiring is infinite in its desire as any art or knowledge is infinite in its desire to know its end; thus the art of medicine for instance is infinite in its desire for health (Arist. *Polit.*, I, iii, 1257b25). But there is such a desire in the passion of love, because the thing which is loved is as the end for him who loves and as the proper perfection of the appetite. It is the end inasmuch as that loved object is the source of delight which the lover looks upon as his whole happiness, and, since delight perfects operation as the end, it, in the case of love, perfects the appetite. Cf. Bernardus Gordonius in his *Lilium medicinae*, (cited by Lowes, *op. cit.*, p. 499): "unde cum aliquis philocaptus est in amore alicuius mulieris, ita fortiter concipit formam et figuram et modum quoniam credit et opinatur hanc esse meliorem, pulchriorem, magis venerabilem, magis speciosam, et melius dotatam in naturalibus et moralibus quam aliquam aliarum: et ideo ardentem concupiscit eam, et sine modo et mensura opinans si posset finem attingere quod haec esset sua felicitas et beatitudo." Hence, since there is an insatiable desire for delight, it can in one sense be said that the desire in love is infinite. However, as Dino points out, it is the desire and not the appetite that is infinite, for the appetite is limited by its proper object, the appetible. But the desire which arises from the appetite moving towards its object seems infinite, and there is a continuous solicitude over the loved thing; whence Guido says that, when desire is so great that it is beyond all natural measure, then there is never any repose (*poi non s'adorna di riposo mai*).

For if there is no natural term to this desire, there can never be any rest, for, as Aristotle says (*Phys.* III, ii, 202a4), rest is the term of a motion; consequently in this passion there is the continual motion of desire which comes to no rest except that of death, as we saw in the last stanza. Thus we have here the connection with what has gone before in stanza III. For love deprives man of his perfect good (line 39), because it is the essence of love to have no natural term to its desire (line 44); for if this desire is without end, then no *per-factum* can be realized, since its realization would be that of repose in an end achieved. Consequently this passion leaves one in a continuous disturbance over the beloved.

As Dino points out, what is here said concerning the nature of love is in full agreement with what the medical authorities say in their treatment of the subject. Thus Avicenna writes in the *Canon*, III. Fen. I, Tr. IV, cap. 23, vol. 1, p. 494a: "Haec aegritudo (scil. excessive love) est sollicitudo melancolica similis melancoliae, in qua homo sibi iam induxit incitationem cogitationis suae super pulchri-

tudinem quarundam formarum, et figurarum quae insunt ei. Deinde adiuuat ipsum ad illud desiderium eius, et non consequitur." And Haly filius Abbas, *Liber totius medicinae* . . . , Theorice IX, cap. viii, p. 104vb: "Amor autem est anime sollicitudo in id quod amatur et cogitationis in id ipsum perseverantia."

P. 169, l. 28-P. 170, l. 4:

But it should be noted, for the sake of a more perfect understanding of what is here said about love, that love can be taken in a twofold sense. In one way, taken generally, it is that passion by which the appetite is inclined and moved towards some thing which seems good because of the pleasingness of its actions. But Guido is not speaking of this sort of love in this poem, since it is concerned with many things that it is not his present intention to treat of. Thus love between friends is of this sort here which is not the same as that spoken of; for although whoever is a friend is loved by another, not everyone who loves is loved in return, and so although all friendship (*amicitia*) is accompanied by love, not all love is accompanied by friendship. But the second way that love can be taken is more particularly as that passion which is so vehemently impressed on the appetite that it can only be removed with difficulty. It is that passion which properly concerns venereal acts, in which there is great fury and intemperance, since man is inclined towards these acts by his natural appetite. And this is the kind of love Guido is concerned with in this poem, which because of the vehemence of its impression alters the body contrary to what is natural to it; whence the body is said to be diseased by love and is treated as such by the medical writers under the name of *amor ereos*.

Here Dino makes the old distinction between *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* so that we may make sure of our understanding of what Guido has to say about love. This is the distinction between loving a person for himself and loving him for the good you can get from him. Cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theo.* 1-2, 28, 1c: "Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem: cum enim aliquis amat aliquid, quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquid amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum: unde apprehendit eum, ut alterum se, in quantum scilicet vult ei bonum, sicut et sibi ipsi; et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse (*Arist. Ethic. Nic. IX, iii, 1166a31*). But if friendship demands that we take our friend's good as our own good, there must be a special connection between us in virtue of which the good of the one is the good of the other, since we could not have this good in common unless there were some equality between us, (*Arist., ibid. VIII, v, 1157b29-1158a*). Consequently, as Dino notes, there must be reciprocity, for a friend, says Aristotle, is one who loves and is loved in return, (*ibid.* and *Rhet. II, iv, 1381a1*); and whether that friendship be for virtue, pleasure or utility, which are the three kinds of friendship (*Ethic. Nic. VIII, i, 1155b19*), there is always this reciprocity. With love (*amor concupiscentia*), on the other hand, there is no essential need for this reciprocity; we can still love without being loved in return; for we love that person for our own good, and he may or may not return our love without necessarily stopping our desire. Thus as Dino says, although all friendship is accompanied by love, not all love is accompanied by friendship: For in friendship the good of the friend is our own good, as for instance that of partners in business, whereas in love the good of the one need not necessarily be the good of the other, as it may be to the good of the beloved not to yield to the lover, although her refusal be his frustration.

But now it is evident that it is this second kind of love that Guido is considering in this poem. For the vehemence of this love, especially as frustrated, is such that it completely alters the condition of the body, until it may even lead to death,

as we have seen. Thus it has all the characters of a disease and has been treated as such by the medical authorities under the name of *ereos*. It is the name for the lover's malady, and has a long and curious history which has been traced by J. L. Lowes in "The Loveres Maladye of Hereos", in *Modern Philology*, XI (1913-14), pp. 491-546. Ultimately derived from the Greek *eros*, it became distorted in Latin to such forms as *ereos*, *hereos*, *heroys* and *hercos*, and denotes the mania or mad desire of a lover for the object of his affection. The disease was discussed by a long line of mediaeval physicians (Prof. Lowes quotes treatments of the subject from the time of Constantinus Africanus in the eleventh century down through Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*), and like any disease was written up according to its symptoms and cure. Its symptoms are the various effects of love which are noted in this poem—loss of appetite and even of life, weeping and wailing, swooning and blushing, and the rest of the characteristics of courtly lovers, all are noted down by the doctors. But we shall have more occasion to return to this when we come to the effects of love.

But in thus distinguishing these two kinds of love, Dino is defending Guido's definition. For in this poem Guido is not concerned with love as it is taken generally; he is concerned with that love which is accompanied with violent desire. Therefore, in stating the essence of love, it is necessary for him to give only the distinguishing characteristic of it, namely, its violent desire. For in the remainder of its definition it agrees with love as it is generally taken; it is a passion in which the appetite is moved towards an object apprehended as good because of its pleasingness.

P. 170, ll. 5-15:

In *move cangiando colore* (line 46), Guido begins his consideration of the motions of love, i.e. of the various alterations which it is able to cause the body to undergo. Thus love causes the body to change now to this color and again to its opposite, at one time to laughter, at another to weeping; which Guido declares in *move cangiando colore, riso in pianto*. Likewise it turns the lover at one time to joy and hope and at another to fear and desperation, as Guido declares in *et la figura con paura storna*—that is to say, it at times makes the face of the lover like that of a joyful man.

Here of course are the usual symptoms of the courtly lover, which are fully listed by the medical authorities as symptoms of the disease of love-sickness. Thus Avicenna, for instance, in his *Canon* (III. Fen I, Tr. IV, cap. 23, vol. 1, p. 494a): "Et signa quidem eius sunt profunditas oculorum, et siccitas ipsorum, et privatio lacrymarum, nisi quum fletus adest, et motus continuus palpebrarum risibilis, quasi aspiciat aliquid pulchrum delectabile: aut audiat rumorum iucunditatem aut laetificetur. Et est spiritus eius plurimae intersectionis, et reversionis, et si multae elevationis, alteratur dispositio ipsius ad risum, et laetitiam et ad tristitiam et fletum, quum amoris cantilenas audit, et praecipue quum fit rememoratio repudii, et elongationis, et sunt omnia membra eius arefacta praeter oculos: quoniam ipsi sunt cum sua profunditate graues, magni, et palpebrae sunt grossae propter vigilias ipsius, et ploratus eius, qui fit cum singultu euaporans ex capite eius, et in eius figuris non est ordo. Et pulsus ipsius est pulsus diuersus absque ordine omnino: sicut est pulsus habentium taedium, et eius quidem pulsus, et dispositio ipsius alterantur, quum fit rememoratio eius, quod diligitur et proprie quum obuiat ei subito, et possibile est ex hoc significare, quis sit ille qui diligitur, quum non confitetur ipsum." But for many more references to this doctrine cf. Prof. Lowes, *op. cit.*

P. 170, ll.15-31:

But all these diverse alterations happen to the lover because of the diversity of his imaginations which represent the object of his affection to him. For at one time they will represent that on account of which he will take joy, be happy and have hope, whereas at another time they will represent that which will cause him to be afraid, saddened and made desperate. Consequently the natural heat and spirit of the body is moved diversely, so that at one time it moves *ad intra*, at another *ad extra*, now partly *ad intra* and again partly *ad extra*, according to the diversity of the passions he undergoes. And from this diversity arises the diversity of his color, so that he is now one color and now another, having at one time a face of fear and then one of laughter or of joy. Whence Guido says, *poco soggiorna*, i.e. such an one rests little in any one, since the diverse apprehensions he has of the object of his desire will cause him to change suddenly from one passion to another, and he will rest for only a little in any one of them, as is further declared in the line beginning, *la nuova qualita* (line 50).

Here then we have the explanation, from the ancient physiological doctrine of bodily movement, why the lover undergoes so many different changes. It is because of the activity of the *spiritus*, which we have just seen Avicenna talking about and which still survives in our expression "animal spirits." For according to the mediaeval opinion on the subject, which stems from Aristotle, it was through heat, spirit, and blood that the organs were prepared for motion, since all motion ultimately is one of going out from the heart or taking refuge in it, for the heart was considered to be the center of motion. Cf. St. Albert, I *De motibus animal.*, Tr. II, cap. ii, t. 9, p. 271b: "per calorem et spiritum et sanguinem praeparantur organa ad motum: haec autem in omni motu animalium videmus aut a corde protendi, aut ad cor refugere." The office of the spirit in this work is to serve as a vehicle for the power of the heart; thus, the spirit is generated in the heart and proceeds from it. In moving and causing motion it seems similar to the animate principle, and this is because it is the instrument of the soul and life in carrying out its power, just as the natural heat of the body, which is a principle of life. Cf. St. Albert, *De motibus progr.*, Tr. II, cap. vii, t. 10, p. 344b-345a: "Insuper etiam cum virtute sua cor moveat, oportet illius virtutis habere vehiculum quod est spiritus: et ideo necesse est spiritum et in corde generari, et a corde procedere . . . Spiritus autem videtur in movendo et causando motum aliquid simile habere cum primo animali sive animato principio: et hoc ideo est quia . . . est instrumentum animae et vitae et vehit virtutem ipsius et movet in formae vitae et animae sicut et calor naturalis." The motion of the spirit, however, is determined by the natural heat of the body, which, in turn, is determined according to the apprehension which the soul has. Thus, when the apprehension is of some good which gives pleasure, it has the power of heat in the body, which, as it were, causes the heart to expand so that the spirit courses out to every member of the body. But when the apprehension is of some evil which is formidable and sorrowful, it has the power of cold, so that the spirit contracts into the heart as in a refuge. Cf. Arist., *De motu*, vii, 701b20-32; viii, 201a1-7, and St. Albert, *De motibus progr.*, Tr. II, cap. iv, t. 10, p. 339b): "et quoad hoc species et intelligentia gratia voluptatis potentiam habet calidi, et per effectum est calida: so quod in membra delectantia protendit spiritum et sanguinem, quorum utrumque est calidum. Et contra autem species formidabilis et tristabilis dicitur frigida: eo quod per fugum spiritus et sanguinis ad cor membra destituta frigescunt." Also cf. St. Albert, I *De motibus animal.*, Tr. II, cap. iv, t. 9, p. 274b-275a. In all of this account St. Albert is much indebted, in fact often word for word, to Avicenna, *De anima*, P. IV, cap. v-vi, (20vb-22rb), which are called there "De editione et additione Avohaveth". The same is also found in somewhat expanded form in the 1608 edition of the *Canon* under the title of "Dispositiones



cordium et speciebus eorum". Borgnet also notes that the same is found in Avicenna's *Ethica*, VII, lect. 12 (cf. *Opera s. Alberti*, t. 9, p. 275), but I have not been able to see this. According, then, as the apprehension is the cause of heat or cold in the body, the various passions and alterations are caused in the body. For from the permutation which this causes in the heart there follows a great difference in the flesh of the whole body, so that there is redness and pallor, trepidation and fear, and other accidents of this sort as well as their contraries (Arist. *and*. St. Albert, *loc. cit.*). Therefore, just as hot and cold are the two contraries from which the passions arise, so all the passions can be reduced to two which correspond to these contraries. These, according to St. Albert, are anguish (*angustia*) and delight (*delectatio*); anguish follows upon the cold which is produced in the body by the apprehension of some evil, and delight follows upon the hot which is produced by the apprehension of some good. Each of these, however, can concern the present and future. Anguish which is happening in the present is sadness; that which is seen to be coming in the future is fear. Delight in something present is joy (*gaudium*); that which is seen to be in the future is hope. Cf. St. Albert, I *De motibus animal.*, Tr. II, cap. iv, (t. 9, p. 274b): "Differentiae autem potentiae passionum et secundum Andronicum et secundum omnes Peripateticos sunt quatuor, scilicet timore, et tristitia, et concupiscentia, quam quidam spem vocant, et delectatio sive gaudium, quae quidem licet quatuor sint, tamen in causis naturalibus et motibus ad duo reducuntur quae nos angustiam et delectationem possumus appellare. Angustia enim est ex praesenti ad futuro, et delectatio similiter." But the difference as to whether the object of joy or anguish is present or future will consequently cause a difference in the motion of the spirit as it expands and contracts from the heart into the body. Thus, we are brought back to Dino saying that the cause of the passions and alterations in the body is the diverse motion of the natural heat and spirit as it moves at one time *ad extra*, and another *ad intra*, now partly *ad extra* and again partly *ad intra*. The motion completely *ad extra* will seem, then, to be that which follows upon the apprehension of a present good, for then the heart is warm because of the presence of its object of delight; and this motion is called joy (*gaudium*). But that motion which is only partly *ad extra* will be that following upon the apprehension of some future good, for then the heart will be warm since it is in sight of the good it desires, but it will not be so warm as it is when its good is present, and consequently, it does not move its spirit completely *ad extra*; and this motion is called hope. The motion completely *ad intra*, on the other hand, will be that one which follows upon the apprehension of a present evil, for then the heart contracts as before the object of anguish; and this is sadness (*tristitia*). But that motion which is only partly *ad intra* will be that following upon the apprehension of an evil lying in the future, for in sight of such an object the heart will contract its spirit, but not so much as before a present evil; and this motion only partly *ad intra* is called fear. Finally, as the lover rests secure in the delight of the object of his desire, he has the feeling of happiness (*laetitia*); but if he should give up hope of ever obtaining that object, he will rest secure, but in the most abject of states, for then, he will be in despair or desperation. Therefore, the man with the "lovers malady of hereos" is, as Dino says, at one time joyful, happy and full of hope and at another time sad, fearful and desperate. Moved thus according to these diverse passions, he is now one color and again another, at one time he has the face of a person in fear and at another that of one in joy, now he is laughing and again he is weeping. Whence, Guido says truthfully that such a person has little rest (*poco sogniorna*). For, as Dino says, such a man rests little in his thoughts inasmuch as the diverse apprehensions he has of the object of his desire will cause him to change suddenly from one passion to another, and he will rest for little only in any one of them. These things Guido continues to describe in line 50, beginning *la nuova qualita*, but he

interrupts the progress of his thought to say something of the sort of persons who have this kind of love.

P. 170, l. 32—P. 171, l. 15:

But beginning with *ancora di lui vedrai* (48), Guido adds what sort of men this passion is most frequently found in, by saying it is usually found in noblemen, who are such because they are great and powerful, either from their birth, wealth or the power they wield among men. There are three reasons why this sort of love should happen most frequently to this sort of man. The first one, which seems to be the best, is that such men are not distracted by their work from having such thoughts, whereas others (*populares*), having to turn their thoughts to the work that is necessary for their life, have no time for such thoughts and are greatly distracted from the worry and vexation that occurs in this passion; so noblemen have this passion most frequently because they alone can afford it. But another reason follows from this, for if noblemen can best afford it, they can more easily attain their desire, and the ability to attain one's desire determines in a large part what one will choose to desire. For although love can make the appetite its slave because of the strength of its impression, nevertheless, at the start man is free to choose it or not; consequently, since one will choose that which he can more readily attain, noblemen rather than others will choose to follow this passion, since they have the wealth and power to acquire what they desire. Finally since noblemen have power and wealth, they are more apt to be loved in return, and so we have a third reason why this passion is more often found among noblemen; for love is perfected more and more firmly implanted in the lover when he knows his love is returned. Whence it is well said by Guido that this passion is most often found among men of worth.

Dino's argument here is sufficiently clear without any further comment. Yet it can be pointed out here that some of the mediaeval writers on *amor ereos* explained *ereos* as meaning *nobilis*. Thus Gerardus de Solo (c. 1320) in his commentary on the ninth tract of the *Liber Almansoris* says: "et talis vocatur amor ereos, id est, amor nobilis a nobilitate dictus: quia multum fortis amor: quia milites magis conuenerunt habere istam passionem quam alii." (Quoted in Lowes, *op. cit.*, p. 510). Or again Arnaldus de Villanova in his *Tractatus de amore cui heroycus cominatur* (f. 215): "Dicitur autem amor heroycus quasi dominalis non quia solum accadat dominis: sed quia aut dominatur subiiciendo animam et cordi hominis imperando aut quia talium amantium actus erga rem desideratam similes sunt actibus subditorum erga proprios dominos. quemadmodum etenim hi timent domini maiestatem offendere et eisdem fideli subiectione seruire conantur ut gratiam obtineant et fauorem: sic ex parte alia proportionatur circa rem dilectam heroyci afficiuntur amantes." (Quoted in Lowes, *op. cit.*, p. 497). And in the literary tradition it is always those of noble birth who have this passion so that it came to be known as courtly love.

P. 171, ll. 16-31:

Then when he says, *la nuova qualita muove sospiri*, etc. Guido resumes what he had declared before in *poco soggiorna*. For he would show why it is that a man who has this passion rests little in any passion, whether in joy, sadness or in fear; and likewise he rests little in any consideration other than that of his beloved. Along with this he also shows why a lover is always sighing so much. For when the lover renews the apprehension he has of his beloved, whose species is conserved in his memory, it causes him to sigh; thus when the lover, in doing or considering something, suddenly comes upon the thought of his beloved, he sends forth sighs. This happens because this sudden renewal of his apprehension causes an anguish about the heart because of the sudden diverse motion in the bodily heat and spirit, which is the cause of sighing.

Here then Guido resumes his determination of the effects of love, and, more particularly, shows why a lover has little rest, which is one of the most common symptoms of love as noted in all the medical works on the subject. But, as Dino says, the lover rests little either in any one passion or in any thought other than that of his beloved. Consequently the *nuova qualita* of Guido's line is to be taken as referring to both the alterations which love causes in the body and the various apprehensions the lover has of his beloved, which, as we have seen, are the causes of the various alterations. For both the alterations and the apprehensions are in the genus of quality as certain modifications of the subject (cf. Aristotle, *Categor.*, viii, 8b25) and each is *nuova* inasmuch as the lover is continually suffering diverse alterations because of the diverse apprehensions he has of the object of his desire. But because of the diversity of these alterations and apprehensions the lover is always sighing; (cf. text of Avicenna, *supra*) whence Guido says, *la nuova qualita muove sospiri* (line 50). This happens because the diversity of these apprehensions causes a diversity of motions in the bodily heat and spirit; thus at one moment the lover will apprehend something in his beloved that will give him reason to hope that he may have success and so his bodily heat is increased and his spirits are high, but then he will apprehend something that will give him reason to fear that he will never have any success, and his bodily heat will be lowered with the consequent lowering of his spirits. Consequently he is always in a dither of apprehension and his sighing is only the expression of this commotion in the continual rising and lowering of his bodily heat and spirits.

P. 171, l. 31-P. 172, l. 2:

This is the reason why such a man cannot think steadily about other things or steadily imagine anything other than his beloved. For when a man, in whom love is fully actualized, is thinking about other things, he will suddenly come upon the apprehension of the object of his desire. This happens because the species of his beloved is kept in the memory in such a way that, although it is there in potency when he is not thinking about it, yet it is there in a potency that is very close to act; whence on the slightest alteration it is brought into act so that he can think about it only and nothing else. Thus anything else this man might have been thinking about is completely disrupted and his thoughts are completely distracted from anything except his beloved. And this is what Guido refers to in saying, *et vuol ch'uom miri non fermato loco*, i.e. this passion makes man unable to think steadily about anything; *destando si ella*, i.e. the species of the beloved being aroused, which has been kept in the memory; *la qual manda fuoco*, i.e. which species causes an inflammation, an inflammatory motion in the spiritual and natural heat of the body. But this motion, in coming to the cogitative power, necessarily forces man to think about it; whence Guido says, *ymaginar non puote huom che nol pruova*, or better yet, *che il pruova*. Therefore the man who has experienced such a passion cannot steadily imagine anything other than the image of his beloved, and consequently cannot steadily think about anything else, since the imaginative power serves the cogitative by representing to it the image of the thing which that power will think about and judge.

Since love is accompanied with a continuous worry over the beloved, as we have seen the doctors say, the lover is unable to imagine or think about anything else, which is what Guido is saying in these lines (51-53). This is one of the common signs of love and likewise has been noted by the doctors: Thus Valescus of Taranta in his *Philonium* writes: "Quando ergo ipsa apprehendit species rei dilectae: tunc eas praesentat aliis virtutibus scilicet rationi et memoriae. et iterum isto modo sibi: et ita continue nocte dieque stant amantium animae ita quod nil aliud perfecte imaginari possunt et deus scit quomodo ratio tunc operatur," (Lowes, *op. cit.*, p.

506). Or again as in the XIVth century Arabic treatise, *Hayat al-Hayawan*, by Ad-Damiris: "When ardent love becomes strong, it becomes love-madness . . . in which state there is no room left in the mind of the lover for anything but the picture of the object of his ardent love," (quoted in Lowes, p. 517). Thus in these lines Guido says that love wills *ch'uom miri non fermato loco*, i.e. the lover cannot contemplate, i.e. with his mind and so he cannot think, any fixed place, i.e. he cannot keep his mind for long on anything, other than, of course, his beloved. Thus St. Albert says in his commentary on the *Ethics* (VII. Tr. II, cap. 11, vol. 7, p. 502b): "Constat enim nullum aliquid posse intelligere delectatione venereorum. Transponit enim mentem, et extasim facit animae venereorum amor. Transposita autem mens intelligibilibus non studet, eo quod mens occupata circa unum, abstrahitur circa alterum."

But the reason for this is given by Guido in the immediately following lines. For he says the lover cannot think steadily about anything *destando si ella, la qual manda fuoco*, i.e., once the quality which is the apprehended species of the beloved is awakened, it causes great heat in the body so that the spirits of the body are greatly heightened, as we have seen, and taking up all the lover's attention, make it impossible for him to think of anything else. For the heat, which this apprehension of the beloved causes, moves the spirits and sends them out to every part of the body, even into the cogitative power, as Dino says, until all that man's powers are concerned with it and nothing else. Thus Guido adds *ymaginar non puote huom che il pruova*, and thereby proves his first statement that man cannot think about anything else. For if he cannot imagine anything else, he certainly cannot think of anything else, since, as we have seen, the intellect is dependent upon the imagination for the sensible form from which the active intellect abstracts the intelligible form and deposits it in the possible intellect, whereupon the intellect knows the thing. Consequently since the image of the beloved is impressed with such intensity that the lover cannot imagine anything else, he is thereby restrained from thinking of anything else, and his whole attention is given over to a passionate consideration of his beloved.

P. 172, ll. 3-23:

Finally beginning with *et non si muova perche allui si tiri*, Guido adds some words of advice concerning this passion. Thus he says first that no one should come to this passion to adhere to it, because, when it is well impressed in all its fervor, it makes a complete slave out of the lover so that no liberty remains to him. Therefore he says further that no one should adhere to this passion thinking he will find either solace or joy therein, for, as has been said, there is much anguish, sadness and fear in such a passion, and thus Guido says, *et non si giri pertrovarvi gioco*. Finally one should not adhere to this passion hoping to find there either great or little wisdom, for in love there is neither wisdom nor discretion, but as if in revenge there is fatuousness and foolishness; hence it has been said on the authority of Avicenna that this passion is a melancholy solicitude similar to melancholy; whence Guido says *ne certamente gran saver ne poco*. For by this he would show that astuteness and prudence are not worth anything to the mind vehemently impressed with the passion of love, for it has lost all liberty and is made subject to the thoughts of its beloved. Therefore Guido advises well in saying that no one should allow himself to adhere to this passion, since there is neither utility or solace nor wisdom and virtue in it. But these are the things by which a man is moved to do something, and consequently by showing that love is deprived of them, he shows that one should not look for love.

Finally, having considered the power and effects of love, Guido can conclude this stanza with some words of advice concerning our attitude towards this passion. Thus he says that no one should allow himself to be attracted to it, *et non si muova*

*perche allui si tiri*; and in the two following lines gives his reasons. For he says that no one should come to love expecting to find either joy or wisdom, *et non si giri pertrovarvi gioco, ne certamente gran saver ne poco*. But as Dino says, in taking up Aristotle's analysis in the *Ethics* (VIII, ii, 1155b17-21), man is attracted to something only if it is useful, pleasant or good. But useful can be taken to mean productive of some good or of pleasure, and consequently we are left with the pleasant and good as the things which attract man. Hence Guido in saying that love has neither joy nor wisdom has eliminated love as a thing attractive to man, for joy follows from having obtained the pleasant while wisdom follows from obtaining the good. Therefore Guido can conclude that no one should allow himself to be attracted by this passion, for, as is evident from the power and effects of love, no one will ever find there either joy or wisdom; and it is thus that the doctors describe it, as Gordonius, for instance in his *Lilium medicinae*, (Lowes, *op. cit.*, p. 502): "Amor est mentis insania, quia animus vagatur per inania, cerebri doloribus permiscens pauca gaudia."

V

P. 172, ll. 24-30:

Division of the stanza: In this stanza Guido considers the last two questions he had asked about love. First he shows where that pleasingness comes from that leads one to love. Secondly he shows whether or not love can be apprehended by sight, beginning in *et non si puo cognoscier per lo viso* (line 63). The first of these parts is further divided according as Guido first states whence love derives its pleasingness and then, secondly, goes on to add another property of love about which he has not yet spoken in *certo non puo soverto stare* (line 59).

P. 172, ll. 31-45:

In the first part Guido says that the species of the visible thing, which causes love when apprehended by the appetite, is apprehended as like, fitting and proportional. It is such an apprehension which makes a thing pleasing so that love is aroused for that thing in the appetite; for nothing is displeasing except when it is unlike and unfitting, and is the cause of hate just as the like and fitting is the cause of love. Therefore the pleasingness which is the cause of love comes from a thing being apprehended as like and fitting, which is what Guido says in *di simil tragge complexion lo sguardo, che fa parere lo piacere* (line 57-58). And it is significant that Guido says *che fa parere*, for, although it may seem pleasing and so lovable to the lover, in reality and according to a judgment ruled by reason it is not so at all, just as it often happens that something seems good which is not in reality good at all.

Concerning the pleasingness of love, then, Guido says that the look takes its complexion from the like, which makes the pleasure appear certain, ("*Di simil tragge complexion lo sguardo, che fa parere lo piacere certo*"). Here it should be noted first that Guido is speaking of the apprehensive and not the appetitive power of the soul upon which love is consequent; thus, he says that *lo sguardo* takes its complexion from the like, thereby referring us back to the second stanza (1.21) where he says that love comes from a seen form. In commenting upon this, it will be recalled that Dino said that love is caused from the apprehension of a visible form which is comprehended as pleasing ("*sub ratione complacentiae*"). Hence, in this place we are concerned with this pleasingness which embraces the form seen so that the appetite is induced to love. From this, then, it appears evident

that *complezion* here is to be understood in its root sense as an embrace. Therefore, our initial understanding of the line is that the apprehension which causes love, namely the form seen, embraces that object as something to be loved. It remains to be seen, however, why that object is embraced as something to be loved.

The object is embraced as something to be loved because it is apprehended as like (*simil*), which is what makes it seem pleasing. By this we are to understand, according to Dino, that the *species* of the visible thing, upon the apprehension of which love is caused in the appetite, is apprehended as like, fitting and proportional (*similis et convenientis et proportionalis*). It is such an apprehension which makes a thing seem pleasing so that love for that thing is caused in the appetite. Therefore, love is aroused in the appetite for that thing which, on being seen, pleases. But such is the beautiful, as St. Thomas says; cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I. v, iv, ad 1: "pulchra enim dicuntur, quae visa placent." But the beautiful is that which is duly proportioned, since sense delights in things which are duly proportioned, as in things like to it; for sense and every cognoscitive power is a certain *ratio*; cf. St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*: "unde pulchrum in debita proportionem consistit; quia sensus delectantur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus, nam et sensus ratio quaedam est; et omnis virtus cognoscitiva." For in every instance of knowing there is a likeness between the knower and, known inasmuch as the form in both is the same, being that of the known, and differs only in the kind of existence it has in each, having *esse intentionale* in the knower and *esse reale* in the known. However, this much happens in every apprehension of a beautiful thing, and, yet, not all such lead to love. We have, then, to seek a more specified sense of *simil* to know how such an apprehension leads to love. Inasmuch as the thing apprehended is, in Dino's phrase, fitting and proportional in the arrangement of its parts, it is beautiful, and, consequently, pleasing. But inasmuch as it is *like* it arouses love, for as St. Thomas says, likeness is the cause of love. Cf. Thomas, *Ethic. Nic.*: VIII, iv, no. 1588: "Similitudo autem est per se causa amicitiae." (Cf. also *Sum. Theol.* I-II. xxvii, iii. c., for a full discussion of which vide H. D. Simonin, *Autour de la solution thomiste du probleme de l'amour* in *Archives*, VI, (1931), pp. 246-270). Likeness, however, inasmuch as it concerns passion can be taken in two ways according as it is taken from the part of the passion or from the part of that in which the passion terminates; cf. St. Thomas, *In metaphys.* V, xii, No. 918: "Et propter hoc similitudo non solum attenditur secundum convenientiam in qualitate, sed secundum convenientiam in passione. Quod quidem poste esse dupliciter. Aut ex parte passionis, aut ex parte ejus ad quod passio terminatur." From the part of the passion there is a likeness in love between lover and beloved, that is, there is if the love is reciprocated. But since the love of which we are speaking in this poem can exist without being returned, as Dino has said (p. 188), and furthermore, since we are concerned here with that apprehension which is the cause of love, this likeness in suffering the same passion is not the one we are seeking for at present. Consequently, the likeness must be from the part of that in which the passion terminates. According to this then, in the case of love the likeness which the lover apprehends in that which will be his beloved is that in which this passion will be terminated, namely union with the beloved. Thus, upon apprehending a beautiful form which will arouse love, one further apprehends it as one to which one would be united. In this way, even though it be an unrequited love, there is still a likeness between lover and beloved in that, if the beloved would relent, a union might be realized between them. For although the beloved is relentless, she still holds all the delight the lover prays for. It is by reason of this that St. Thomas says likeness is the cause of concupiscent love inasmuch as there is a likeness in that one has in potency and inclination that which the other has in act; cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I-II. xxvii, iii, c.: "Alio modo (scil. est similitudo) ex hoc quod unum habet in potentia et

in quadam inclinatione illud quod aliud habet in actu . . . Sed secundus modus similitudinis causat amorem concupiscentiae vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis, quia unicuique existenti in potentia, in quantum huiusmodi, inest appetitus sui actus, et in ejus consecutione delectatur, si sit sentiens et cognoscens."

It should be recalled here, however, that Guido is speaking in this place only of the apprehension and not of the motion towards this object which the appetite initiates following upon this apprehension. For as it is that which on being seen pleases, it is beautiful, which has reference to the apprehensive power. But inasmuch as this pleasing form is desired, it is apprehended as good, so that the appetite moves towards the thing, which motion generates love. It is the same thing in each case that is apprehended, but it is apprehended under different reasons; cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I, v, iv, ad 1: "dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subjecta quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam; . . . sed ratione differunt; nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum; est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt; et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam." But in love it is the likeness which is apprehended in the thing seen that offers reason for its being both beautiful and good. For being like to the lover, that form will please him, and, consequently, be judged beautiful, whereas by being pleasing, it will be apprehended as that to which he would be united in order to realize his pleasure, and, thereby, be judged as good, with the result that the appetite will move to acquire it and, thus, give rise to love. Whence, Guido can with reason say that love's look takes its complexion from the like, which makes it appear to be pleasing. For as St. Thomas says, *In Ethic.* IX, V, (1167a5), No. 1824: "delectari in aspectu alicujus mulieris est principium amationis ejus, nullus enim incipit amare aliquam mulierem nisi prius fuerit delectatus in ejus pulchritudine." And, as Dino explains, nothing is displeasing except as it is apprehended as unlike and unfitting; such an apprehension moves one to hate that thing, whereas that apprehended as like and fitting moves one to love.

It should be noted, however, as Dino points out, that Guido says that the like is that which makes love's look *appear* to be pleasing, ("che fa *parere* lo piacere"). For although the form seen may appear pleasing to the lover and consequently, to be loved, nevertheless, that thing according to truth and the judgment of reason may not be such at all. For things often appear good which are not really good (*simpliciter*) at all. Thus, as has been seen above in considering the judgment of the lover, the lover's judgment is unsound because his reason is impeded by his passion so that he holds himself to only the apparent good and is unable to judge whether that which he loves is the real good and, consequently, a thing to be loved. Therefore, in using the verb *parere* in this line, Guido is bringing together what he has said about the judgment of love, ("fuor de salute giudicar mantiene"), with what he says here about that pleasing apprehension which leads to love. It is the good apprehended which the lover desires, but there is no certainty that it is the real good he desires, for his very power of judgment is rendered unsound by his passion.

P. 172, l. 46-P. 173, l. 4:

Then when Guido says *certo non puo coverto stare*, etc., he goes on to add and account for another property of love. He says that a lover who has love in all its fervor cannot conceal his passion, since such a man cannot refrain from talking about his love and his beloved and betraying all his acts and customs those of the lover; whence Guido says *certo non puo coverto stare, quando e si giunto*, i.e. when it is thus vehemently impressed.

After we have seen all the different effects of love and especially the inability of the lover to think about anything except his beloved, we cannot wonder now at the lover's inability to conceal his love. The symptoms are all too obvious and can be spotted in a moment. In fact the mediaeval doctors were so certain of these symptoms and so skilful in interpreting them that they claimed to be able to discover even the name of the beloved and all about her. Thus Avicenna (*Canon*, III. Fen. I, Tr. IV, cap. 23, vol. 1, p. 494a) tells us to take the lover's pulse and, as we are taking it, to name over the names of various women and their attendant circumstances; and when the pulse takes an inordinate leap we may be sure we have discovered the name of his beloved. Thus by asking the appropriate questions we can come to know everything concerning the object of the lover's desire. Hence we really have here the mediaeval version of the lie detector.

But to return to Dino's interpretation, there seems to be no real reason for reading *certo* with this line rather than the preceding one. In fact from what has just been said above about the significance of *parere* it would seem that this significance would be all the more apparent if *certo* were taken with it; at the inception of love pleasure appears certain because of the beauty of the form apprehended, although that certainty is only apparent.

P. 173, ll. 4-14:

The reason why this passion cannot be concealed is given by Guido when he says *non gia selvaggi la belta suo dardo*. For by this he means that *la belta*, i.e. the thing which appears beautiful to the lover and leads him for that reason to love it, does not have a *dardum silvestrem*, i.e. dull and weak; but by *dart* here Guido is referring to that stimulus which this passion gives to the lover to act. For the beloved stimulates the lover so much that he is forced to speak and do things which betray his passion.

But as is now evident, Dino is having considerable difficulty in interpreting this line. For he wants to understand the line as saying that beauty's dart is so savage that it forces the lover to betray his passion. And yet the line reads that beauty's dart is *not* now savage, *non gia selvaggi*. Consequently Dino is forced to read *selvaggi*, not as savage, but as dull and weak, and therefore is evidently taking the *silvestrem* in its root meaning of wooden, for a wooden dart certainly would not be so very savage.

But this really seems to be stretching the point a little too far and there does not seem any real reason for not keeping *selvaggi* as meaning savage. Then this line would read, taking it along with the preceding and following lines, that love cannot stay concealed because, since beauty's dart is not savage to the lover, he being schooled in fear, he is not afraid to show his love; in fact he cannot help but show it, since love so moves his spirits (line 62) that he can think about nothing else. Consequently our conclusion would be the same as Dino's, namely that beauty's dart is in reality very savage because of all its effects, and yet we would still be maintaining the apparent reading of the line in understanding that to the lover beauty's dart does not appear savage at all; but to the contrary seems to bring him certain pleasure (line 58). Thus if the beauty apprehended seems to contain certain pleasure for the lover, it certainly will not seem savage to him, and he will never maintain that it is anything else than his greatest blessing. But once the lover has been hit by the dart of beauty, and has begun to love, his judgment is corrupted and he may be completely deceived concerning the real effect of his love. Consequently to a dispassionate observer, the effect of beauty's dart upon our lover may be so very savage indeed that we can conclude, as Guido has, that there is neither joy nor wisdom in love (lines 55-56), although it is completely



impossible for the lover to see this now that he is under the influence of beauty's dart, for to him it does not appear such at all.

But there is a more philosophic reason according to which it is perfectly true that beauty's dart is not savage; for by distinguishing sharply between the beautiful and the good, and hence between the apprehensive and appetitive powers of the soul, it becomes apparent that the savage effects of love are to be attributed to an appetitive disorder, as we have seen, and not to anything in the apprehensive powers. Consequently beauty as proper only to the apprehensive power will not be the cause of the savage effects of love; but love and all its effects will be the result of an inordinate desire in the appetite. Consequently beauty's dart is not savage because, as we have seen, beauty, as that which upon being seen pleases, has reference to the apprehensive power alone and, consequently, as such, is pleasing and not savage. But inasmuch as this beautiful thing is apprehended as good, it becomes the object of the appetite and arouses desire, which in its effects can be very savage, as has been witnessed in the case of the lover. Therefore, although it is not savage, nevertheless, it is a dart which beauty has; for according as that beauty is pleasing, it may incite the appetite to apprehend it as good and to desire it. Thus, as Dino says, *dardo* is used here to signify the stimulus or incitement (*stimulus*) of this passion; it is the beauty of the form apprehended that goads one on to apprehend it as good and, then, to suffer all the savage effects of the desire for it. For although as an apprehension alone, it is not savage, love having, as Guido says in line 24, no power in the intellect, yet since it is so ready to incite the appetite to desire it as good, it can fittingly be called a *dardo*. As such, then, to continue with Dino, it incites the lover to this passion, so that, being so strongly impressed by it, he is forced to go about saying and doing things which do not in any way conceal his love.

P. 173, ll. 15-23:

Love stimulates the lover so much that he has no fear in speaking about and thus manifesting his passion so that he thereby runs into great danger; for it often happens that lovers get killed because of talking of their love for such or such a woman. Yet lovers are so stimulated by their passion that they give no consideration to fear and danger and take no pains to foresee it, which is what Guido says in *che tal volere per temere e sperto*.

The fearlessness of love is well known and as such it was noted down by the mediaeval doctors in their treatments of love. Thus Gordonius for instance writes in his *Lilium medicinae*: "et tunc movetur totum corpus spreto ordine rationis, et currit de nocte et de die per viam et in via, spernendo calorem et frigus et omnia pericula cuiuscunque conditionis sint; cum iam amplius non potest quiescere corpus." And as Dino notes, this fearlessness often gets the lover into all kinds of trouble, sometimes even leading to death, since, not being afraid of anything, he does not take any precaution in what or to whom he speaks of his love.

P. 173, ll. 23-30:

The cause of this is added in *consegue merto spirito ch'e punto*, i.e. by merit of this it follows, namely that the lover cannot conceal his passion and is fearless with respect to any danger, because the spirit, which is the instrument of the soul, is so disturbed by the species imagined and apprehended of the beloved that it necessarily causes the lover to talk and act in such a way that he betrays his passion. For, as is declared in natural science, the alteration in the spirit, brought about by strongly apprehended and imagined species, is the cause of motion in us.

Thus in this line we get the ultimate cause for the lover being unable to conceal his passion as well as the reason for his fearlessness. And here, as in the case of the other effects of love, it is due to the commotion caused in the bodily spirits by the various apprehensions the lover has; (cf. pp. 193-99, for the work of the spirit). Consequently, as Guido says, all this happens because of the spirit which is stung, *ch'e punto*, thereby carrying out the metaphor he began with his statement about beauty's dart. For it is the beauty apprehended that stings the spirit until it alters the body with its motions *ad intra* and *ad extra*, such that the lover cannot possibly conceal his passion. Yet the beauty ultimately leading to such disastrous consequences as death does not seem at all cruel and savage to the lover; in fact it is because it is so pleasing that it attracts, only thereafter to bring about this passion of love and all its dire effects, which we have been considering throughout the last three stanzas.

P. 173, ll. 31-42:

Then when Guido says, *et non si puo cognoscer per lo viso*, he begins to speak about the last thing he had proposed concerning love, for he would show whether love can be known and comprehended by sight. But this part is divided into two parts according as he first answers this and then goes on to give another property of love, beginning in *fuor d'ogni fraude*. Thus in the first part he says that love is not a thing which can be known by sight, as white or other colors can, for color is the proper object of sight. But love concerns a different accident than color and consequently is not a thing apprehended by sight; which is what Guido says in *et non si puo cognoscer per lo viso, compreso bianco in tale obiecto cade*.

Yet, although love cannot be concealed and even though it follows upon the apprehension of a beautiful thing, nevertheless, love cannot be known by sight. Thus, in line 63 Guido begins his consideration of the last question he had proposed, namely, whether love can be known by sight, ("*et s'uomo per vedere il puo mostrare*"). He says that love cannot be known by sight, which falls upon such an object as white comprises, ("*et non si puo conoscer per lo viso, compreso bianco in tale obiecto cade*"). By this he means, as Dino explains, that love is not a thing which can be known by sight, such as the color white or any other color. For the power of sight is concerned with color, since, as Aristotle says, color is the object of sight; (cf. Arist., *De ani.*, II, vii, 418a28:) whereas love is concerned with some other accident than color, since it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.

P. 173, l. 42-P. 174, l. 10:

When he says, *et chi bene aude forma non si vede*, Guido would show that love cannot be comprehended by sight because of the nature of the beloved. For although it might seem that love has the beauty of color and figure and the like, which can be apprehended by sight, Guido shows that this is not true. Therefore he says, *et chi bene aude*, i.e. whoever well understands and knows that the form, such as love is, cannot be seen by reason of the beloved. For love proceeds from something which is without color, divided and cut off from all beauty and obscure according to medium—an unsightly thing in some of its parts and sometimes completely cut off from light, i.e. from any beauty whatsoever. For we see often that one is beloved who actually has neither comeliness nor beauty, although she seems so to her lover. Hence love cannot be discerned by sight, as Guido says in *per che li mena che da lui procede, et fuori di colore esser diviso, absciso mezo obscuro luce raude*.

Here again Dino appears to be having grave difficulties in interpreting Guido's meaning, but he is not entirely to blame, since the text is very obscure at this point.

As is evident, Dino takes these lines (65-68) as the reason Guido gives as explaining why love cannot be seen by sight. But the only reason he can find here for love not being seen by sight is the fact that love often seems to concern a person whose looks would never warrant love and so he takes these lines as a rather lengthy way of saying that love is blind. Thus all that Guido says about love being *fuori di colore*, *absciso mezo obscuro*, *luce raude* is taken by Dino as meaning that love concerns an unsightly thing that is without beauty. And yet color, medium and light are all terms that are used in analysing the act of sight, as we have seen, and furthermore it has just been said at the beginning of this stanza that love is somehow connected with the beautiful, which is that which on being seen pleases. Therefore it seems necessary at this point to locate something in the genesis of love which is beyond the grasp of sight and consequently is deprived of all that is necessary for sight to function, and yet at the same time to provide for the apprehension of the beautiful as a necessary step.

We can do this, however, by returning to the distinction we have already used between the apprehension of the beloved as beautiful and as good. For it is not the apprehension of the thing as beautiful that moves the appetite to desire it, but the apprehension of that thing as good, since the good is the object of the appetite. Consequently, since love is a passion of the appetite, it does not occur until there is an apprehension of the thing as good, and this apprehension, as we have seen may be corrupt and arouse desire for a thing which in reality is not desirable at all. But we have also seen that the movement of the appetite depends upon a prior apprehension of sense and is realized when that apprehension is pleasing. But this is the beautiful and, as pleasing to the sight, it is apprehended as colored, since color is the object of sight. Thus the apprehension of the beautiful, as that which pleases upon being seen, is necessary as disposing the appetite to desire. But this does not happen until the appetite apprehends that thing as good, and it is this apprehension which can allow all that Guido says here about the incapacity of love to be seen by sight. For in the apprehension of a thing as good by the appetite there is no question of sight, inasmuch as such an apprehension is a judgment of the interior powers of the soul, which are removed from the apprehension of the exterior senses. Therefore as that from which love proceeds is the apprehension of the thing as good, it can be said that love's form cannot be known by sight. But to turn to Guido's text, we find that he says that love's form cannot be seen because it produces there that which proceeds from love ("perche li mena che da lui procede"), namely its effects; but the source and mode of their production is such as to remove it entirely from being an object of sight. For being divided from all color and cut off in an obscure medium it is without light ("et fuori di colore esser diviso, absciso mezo obscuro, luce raude"). But these are such that they negate all the requisites for sight. For inasmuch as love is divided from all color, it lacks that which will make it an object of sight. Furthermore, as it is cut off in an obscure medium, it lacks that which is necessary to make a colored thing, supposing love were such, visible, namely, as we have seen, an actualized *diaphanum*. Finally, it is removed from the only thing which could actualize the medium so as to render visible the object of sight, that is, *light*; whence Guido says light is taken away from it ("luce raude"). Therefore, since that from which love proceeds, namely the apprehension of a thing as good, has none of those things which are necessary to realize the operation of sight, Guido says that love is not a thing which can be known by sight.

Therefore, since that from which love proceeds is the apprehension by the appetite of a thing as good, which in itself is separated from actual sight, it is possible for a person to be loved who is not actually comely or beautiful, albeit in the eyes of the lover, who has judged her as a desirable good, she will appear beautiful, since love has now become something which is not concerned with mere

bodily sight. And thus it is that love is called blind, for it apprehends, not according to the intention of the beautiful, but according to that of the good; and since this judgment can be very corrupt, for the reasons we have already seen, we are brought back in the end to all that Dino has to say about these lines.

P. 174, ll. 10-21:

Finally when Guido says, *fuor d'ogni fraude dice*, etc. he adds another property of love which he has not as yet mentioned. Thus he says that when this love is perfect, it is completely without fraud with respect to the beloved, since there is perfect fidelity without any fraud in all that it thinks and does to please the beloved, for when a lover has the desire to defraud his beloved, his love is not perfect. But he who is truly possessed by love would never think of displeasing his beloved or of attempting any violence towards her, for in so doing he would not attain that which he so greatly desires, namely to be joined to his beloved: whence Guido says, *fuor d'ogni fraude che dice degna in fede*.

But although love is blind and is conceived in darkness, the lover is not led by this to deception and fraud, as we might expect him to because of his excessive desire to obtain his beloved, which as St. Thomas says (*Sum. Theol.* 2-2, 118, 8, c), is the cause of fraud, which is the practice of deception to acquire the desired end, (*op. cit.* 2-2, 55, 5, c). But because the beloved is as the end which the lover desires, he maintains all fidelity to her and would not think of deceiving her, since thereby he would fail in reaching the end he has set his heart on.

P. 174, ll. 22-40:

Guido gives the cause of this when he says, *che solo di costui nasce merzede*. For love is the only passion which will cause the beloved to have mercy. Therefore, the lover who is greatly afflicted with this passion is continuously desirous that his beloved will have mercy on him, for as Aristotle says, mercy is sadness and compassion over the evil of another which is undeserved. But, as has been said before, the lover has much sadness and anguish because he is not joined to his beloved; and consequently he desires his beloved to have mercy and compassion on him for all that he suffers unworthily. For thus she will be more ready to grant his desire. Therefore in order to arouse her mercy he perpetrates no fraud towards her but lives in complete fidelity. For he is fearful that she will not have mercy on him and thereby keep him from ever gaining his desire; whence Guido says, *che solo di costui nasce merzede*.

Here then Dino gives the reason for the lover being so *degn* in *fide* that he is *fuor d'ogni fraude*. For he is anxious to persuade his beloved to have mercy upon him so that she will be more ready to assent to his demand. But mercy, as Aristotle says (*Rhet.* II, viii, 1385b10), is sadness and compassion over the evil of another which is undeserved. Consequently to prove to his beloved that the evil he endures from love is understood, the lover is careful to preserve his worth in his lady's eyes and so never ventures to deceive her, for in this way he may excite her to have mercy upon him. For by exciting her mercy the lover will be exciting her love for him, since mercy arises from love; cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* 2-2, 30, 2, c: "Hoc (scil. apprehensio miseriae alienae) autem contingit . . . per amorem. Quia enim amans reputat amicum tanquam seipsum, malum ipsius reputat tanquam suum malum; et ideo dolet de malo amici sicut de suo. Et inde est quod Philosophus in 9 *Ethic.*, cap. iv (1166a8), inter alia amabilia ponit hoc quod est condolare amico." Consequently, if the lover can obtain his lady's mercy, he is in a fair way of obtaining all he desires. Hence a two-fold reference is possible in this last line since that from which mercy arises can be either love or the undeserved evil

suffered by the lover implied in *degnà in fede*. But since both are necessary for the existence of mercy, there is no contradiction in admitting both, which thereby of course deepens the significance of the line.

### RITORNELLA

P. 174, ll. 41-43:

Here in drawing to a close, Guido shows the sufficiency of what he has said. But since his meaning is manifest, there is no need to expound it.

Thus with Dino we have come to the end of our way, and, as he does, we can leave the ritornella to stand by itself—albeit perhaps with a keener feeling for, and a greater hesitation to number ourselves among those *persone ch'anno intendimento*, to whom Guido has left his poem.

### CONCLUSION

Now that we have considered in detail Dino's commentary, we can turn to see how it can help us to a general understanding of the poem. In so doing, we shall be able at the same time to criticize Dino's interpretation and thereby make some evaluation of its worth.

Concerning the first and introductory stanza, it will be recalled that Dino divided it into three parts according as Guido first states his general intention in writing this poem in lines 1-4, then, secondly, chooses the audience he is addressing in lines 5-9, and finally in lines 10-14 states in particular what problems he is going to consider. Thus in the opening lines Guido lays down his reasons for writing this poem and thereby prepares his reader for the kind of poem this is going to be. First, in saying *Donna mi priega* (line 1), he tells us why he is writing; he writes because a lady is asking him to, and this is sufficient reason here, as Dino points out, because his subject is the passion of love, which usually has a woman for its object, and further perhaps because he is in love with this lady and would write this in her honor. However, since he says *priega* rather than *commanda*, for instance, he implies that he is not writing in the heat of passion and in complete submission to this lady's will, but, quite the contrary, he is master here and she is begging (*priega*) him to tell her about love; in other words Guido implies here that he is going to speak as a master, and, as is evident from the rest of the poem, as a master of natural and moral philosophy. Thus by an acute analysis of this word *priega* Dino has shown how Guido has forestalled the criticism of those who decry the poem for not being an eloquent expression of his love—something it was never intended to be; for he speaks here as a master, i.e. one who is asked, not commanded and, consequently, his answer claims to be something of a scientific treatise, and, as he says in line 5, demands *conoscente* for its readers. Yet because he says it is a lady, a *donna*, who has asked this of him, he implies that her petition is one that he must answer inasmuch as a *donna* is one who is worthy and knows what she is about.

Then in the next two lines (2-3) Guido states the object of this lady's petition and thereby determines the subject matter of his poem. Thus he says that a lady has asked him to speak *d'uno accidente, che sovent'e fero, et e sì altero, ch'e chiamato amore*. His subject here then is love, which is an accident, i.e., as Dino notes, not a subsistent thing, but one which adheres in another as a subject—a passion of the soul; which can come to and then depart from the person having it—as Guido says in line 42 it can be forgotten; and which has its source in something external to the lover—*vien da veduta forma*, as Guido says in line 21.

Furthermore this accident of which he is going to speak is *fero*—it can even lead to death, as Guido says (line 35), and *altero* because of the effects it produces by altering the body, which are given in the fourth stanza; this love then is a 'high and mighty' accident.

But if Guido is going to speak as a master on the subject of love, he is going to try to arrive at the truth about his subject. Therefore his poem will serve a further purpose than merely that of satisfying his lady's request, since it will also show the nature and effects of love to those who are ignorant of it and deny it; whence Guido adds in line 4, *si chillo nega, possa il ver sentire*. Thus in these four lines Guido has succeeded in stating his general intention: Because a lady has asked him, he will speak as a master, from the principles of natural philosophy, on the passion of love, in order to satisfy this lady's request as well as to show its nature to those who deny it.

Having thus stated his general intention, Guido begins in line 5 to declare the kind of audience he is addressing. Thus he says that for this present matter (*al presente*), namely the nature and effects of love, he wants men of understanding and knowledge (*conoscente chero*), for no other sort could bring understanding to it, since they would not understand the demonstrations from natural science which he is going to use in his analysis of his subject (*che senza natural dimostramento non o talento di voler provare*). Such at least is Dino's interpretation, but there seems to be some doubt about it. For it may be that *senza natural dimostramento* means no more than that Guido is not addressing those "who have no natural experience" of love, i.e. those who have not been taught by nature what love is. And this reading bears more authority in that it enables us to better understand what Guido means when he says, *si chillo nega, possa il ver sentire*, which, as has just been said, Dino interpreted as the final statement of Guido's general intention. But there are obvious difficulties in reading it thus; for Dino has to force the literal sense of the line to read that "if anyone is ignorant of the nature of love, he can learn the truth about it from this poem", and thereby stretches the meaning of *nega* and *sentire*. But if we keep the reading of *senza natural dimostramento* just mentioned, as meaning "without natural experience of love", this line, which Dino mistook for the last of the general intention, obviously appears to be the first of that part where Guido determines his audience. Thus Guido begins here by saying that "if anyone denies love, there is nothing for him to do but wait until he has sensible experience (*sentire*) of it", and such therefore are not the kind he is addressing in this poem. But he seeks here men who have some knowledge of love (*conoscente*), since he has no hope that one *de basso core* could bring knowledge and understanding (*conoscenza*) to such a subject (*ad tal ragione*), for such an one is without any natural experience of love, (*ch'e senza natural dimostramento*). And this is in keeping with what Guido says in the fourth stanza about love being found most among *gente de valore* (lines 48-49), so that *gente de valore* are opposed to *uom de basso core* as the *conoscente* to him *ch'e senza natural dimostramento* of love. Thus the section from lines 4-8 can more readily be taken as a proper part in which Guido names the kind of audience he is addressing in this poem.

Finally in the remaining lines of this stanza Guido declares in particular what problems he is going to consider about the passion of love. Thus he states eight things he is going to try to show about love, and in each of the following stanzas he answers two of these questions:

1. *la dove posa.*
2. *chi lo fa creare.*
3. *quale e sua vertu.*
4. *et sua potenca.*
5. *l'essenca.*

6. *ciascuno suo movimento.*
7. *el piacimento che'l fa dire amare.*
8. *et s'uomo per vedere il puo mostrare.*

But since the import of these questions will become clear as we consider Guido's answers to them, there is no need here to consider them any further.

In the second stanza then Guido begins to answer these questions he has posed. Thus he starts off by saying, *in quella parte dove sta memoria prende suo stato*, and thereby appears to have answered his first question concerning love, namely, *dove posa*. However, inasmuch as he immediately makes an analogy which shows how love is in the memory, this answer is not without its qualifications; it is not complete. For the analogy Guido makes shows from the activity of light on the diaphanous how love is in the memory; thus he says that in that part where memory is it takes its state, so formed as the diaphanous by light from an obscurity (*si formato come dyaphano da lume d'una obscuritate*). This refers of course to the commonly accepted doctrine of light enunciated by Aristotle in his *De anima*, and Guido appears to be using it to say that love is in the memory in the same way that light is in the *diaphanum*. This *diaphanum*, however, as its name shows, is the transparency which is the medium of sight; thus air and water, for instance, are diaphanous. In itself it is without light, but it is apt to receive and retain the light from a luminous body, as the air does from the sun in daytime. Yet since it is not by its nature light, once it is no longer in the presence of a luminous body it is dark or obscure. It is the light from a luminous body which forms it as diaphanous and brings it out of its obscurity, just as it is the appearance of the sun which makes the air to be transparent after the obscurity of night; whence Guido says *formato come dyaphano da lume d'una obscuritate*. But although light is in the diaphanum, it is not there as in its proper matter; for if it were, the diaphanum would always be light. But light properly belongs to a luminous body, and since it is obvious that the luminous body itself is not materially in the *diaphanum*, it must somehow be there in another way—in another mode of existence. Therefore certain of the scholastics said the luminous body exists in the diaphanum in a pure formal way, i.e. as completely separated from its matter; and hence they said *intentionaliter*; and by being there in this way it actualizes the diaphanum—it makes it to be light—so that it can serve as the medium in which the visible object is rendered visible. Thus it can properly be said that the luminous body *informs* the diaphanum with the form of light.

Now however we know sufficient about light and the diaphanum to see how this explains love and the memory. Guido says that in the memory love takes its state, so formed as a diaphan by light, i.e. love's state in the memory is formed as a diaphan is formed by light; love is acting upon the memory whereas the diaphan is acted upon by the light. Consequently our analogy is that love is to the memory as light is to the diaphanum, where the apparent difficulty of its statement lies in Guido's expressing the one side of his analogy as active and the other as passive, with the result that the subject of *si formato* appears to be *love*, whereas it actually is *stato*; for it is love's state as formed in the memory which is likened to the diaphan formed by light. But what then is the state of love in the memory? Since it is like that of light in the diaphan, it is some sort of intentional existence; it is there as the form or *species* of that from which love comes—the image of the beloved. And just as light *informed* the diaphan, so this form *informs* and perfects the memory, for it gives the memory something to work upon. Consequently, as thus interpreted by Dino, Guido has a twofold reason for saying love is in the memory as light is in the diaphan. First, love is in the memory as the form or image of that which causes love and hence is there intentionally just as light is in the diaphan. Secondly, this form perfects the memory by giving it something to remember, just as the form as light of a luminous body perfects the

diaphan by making it light; and in each case before being informed, the memory and the diaphan were obscure—the diaphan literally so, the memory analogously. Thus Dino enables us to understand this metaphor and thereby shows that (1) *stato* can refer to both the form causing love and the light actualizing the diaphan, since both have an intentional existence, (2) *formato* can apply to both memory and diaphan as referring to their realization by being *informed*, and (3) *obscuritate* likewise can apply to both as signifying, analogously, their state before being informed by their proper forms.

However, as Dino further points out, since love is in the memory only as the form of that from which love arises as a passion of the sensitive soul, it is obvious that this is not the complete answer to our question of *dove posa*. But in that case the problem, which Dino has left completely untouched, remains as to why Guido should have bothered to say that love is in the memory. Of course Guido may mean by this no more than that many memories are necessary before love arises;<sup>3</sup> something of a denial of love at first-sight. However since love is in the memory not as a passion of the soul, but as the form or species of that which causes love, we are considering love at this stage as it exists in the apprehensive powers of the soul, and not as it exists in the sensitive appetite. Consequently we are engaged in considering love in the line of its conceptual development, which receives its fullest expression in lines 21-28 of the poem. Thus it may be that memory here is necessary for the completion of sensitive apprehension, which of course is necessarily prior to the motion of the appetite. Thus we may have here a reference to the Augustinian memory, which is not exclusively concerned with the reproduction of the past, but has an active part in the production of a present perception. It is that which holds together the isolated moments of sensation so as to produce a completed and unified sense perception. Consequently, since love comes from a seen form, as Guido says (1.21), memory is necessary as that which unites the various impressions that make up any one perception. Hence Guido can say that love is in that part where memory is, since it is in the memory that the visible apprehension is completed, which causes love to arise in the appetite.

Furthermore Guido would have another reason for saying here at the start that love is in the memory, for just as love is properly in the sensitive soul and yet participates in the rational soul, so the memory belongs properly to the sensitive soul and yet accidentally also to the rational soul. Consequently, by saying love is in the memory Guido will thus be showing that love is of the same character as the memory, namely that of belonging properly to the sensitive soul and yet participating in the rational one. And according to Dino's interpretation, it is the work of this stanza to determine the position of love in these two respects. Thus by this statement here Guido is able to show generally what he is going to determine in particular about love, namely that it is in that part which participates in both sense and intellect.

In the next line, however, Guido says that "it comes from Mars and makes its rest" (line 18), which offers considerable difficulty because of the uncertainty of the antecedent of *it*. Dino takes it to refer to love and, consequently, takes this as the beginning of the second part of this stanza, where Guido tells us the cause of love in answer to the second question, *chi lo fa creare*. Therefore he interprets this line as giving the intrinsic cause of love, since some men are more apt because of their natural disposition to have this passion than others. But the natural ordi-

<sup>3</sup> Thus some of the mediaeval doctors would have maintained this as necessary, since they held that this passion arose from "*frequentia videndi vel sentiendi rem desideratam sub*

*circumstantiis placentibus*" (Arnaldus de Vilanova, cit. by Lowes, *op. cit.*, p. 496, n. 3). But if frequency is an essential part, then it is evident that memory is also essential.



nation of the stars has much to do with the determination of a man's natural disposition. Consequently Dino quotes an astronomical authority to show that those born under Mars are by nature exceedingly lustful and hence very apt to have this passion of excessive love; and he takes this to be Guido's meaning in this line. It was evidently the best Dino could do, although his uncertainty is shown in the disruption it causes in his interpretation of the immediately following lines; for by this interpretation he is forced to say that this line marks the proper beginning of the second part of this stanza. But it is obvious that the next line (19) is the proper beginning, for Guido says here, *egli'e creato*, and thereby says that love is a caused thing before he proceeds to show *how* it is caused. Consequently our line about Mars is forced back into the first part and must therefore be somehow connected with memory and light and obscurity.<sup>4</sup> But what this connection is is another question, and we cannot be too harsh with Dino for trying to make the best of an obvious bad deal, for like so much of the poem this line is admittedly obscure.

With line 19, however, it is clear that Guido is beginning the second part of the stanza, where he answers the question *chi lo fa creare*. For he says here, *egli'e creato* and thereby shows that, since love is a caused thing, it is proper to ask what its cause is, which he accomplishes in line 21 by saying, *vien da veduta forma*. However, before stating the cause of love, Guido further specifies his subject so that we may be certain of what it is he is going to give the cause. Thus he says that love *a sensato nome, d'alma costume et di cor volontate* (lines 19-20). But by having a *sensato nome*, it seems fairly clear that Guido means to say that love is a sensitive thing, whereby we understand *sensato* to be functioning as a transferred adjective referring to what the *nome* signifies rather than the *nome* itself. Thus besides being a caused thing, we now know that love is a sensitive thing. But then Dino proceeds to add that it is *d'alma costume* and, as Dino says, further specifies that love is a passion.<sup>5</sup> But this becomes evident if we take *costume* as the Latin *mos*, or for that matter our English word *habit*, for the ambiguity of these words manifests the way in which this can be understood as passion. For this word can signify either a virtue (the scholastic *habitus*) or a customary or habitual action. But a moral virtue is something referring to the appetite and consequently it is possible to take *costume* here as meaning that love is something which belongs to the appetite and hence is a passion; and, as we have seen there is authority for the use of the word in this sense. Then for the other sense of *costume* there is the possible implication that love is also connected with many memories of the beloved, since Guido has said that love is in the memory. But in a poem it is possible to maintain both readings and it may be that Guido meant us to feel both of them, although at this point I think *costume* as signifying a passion is the more prominent. For Guido immediately adds *et di cor volontate*, and, since Aristotle says, the passions are certain motions of the heart, there is authority for Guido saying that love is a desire of the heart. However, since we have taken *costume* as *mos* in referring to the appetite, then as *mos* we should expect to find some mention of love's participation in reason, for, as properly signifying a moral virtue, *mos* refers to the appetite as it is apt to obey reason. Consequently there is a rightness in Dino's feeling that Guido was also implying in this line that love, at least in its inception, is subject to reason, since we are free to love or not to love.

<sup>4</sup> The manuscript authority, at least in numbers, supports the reading of a feminine article in this line—*la quale* (vide the critical edition of Arnore, *Le rime di G. Cavalcanti*, Firenze, Sansoni, 1881, p. 5). Consequently it would seem to refer back to *obscuritate*. But I am unable to fit this in with the under-

standing I have of the first three lines. I had hoped to find some place for this *obscuritate* in the Arabic development of the Aristotelian theory of light, but so far my search has failed.

<sup>5</sup> For the meaning of "passion" cf. pp. 189 sqq.

This implication also gives Guido more reason for calling love a *costume*, taking this as *mos*; for although strictly speaking it is improper, nevertheless since love, like a moral virtue, pertains to the sensitive appetite as subject to the will, it has the same characteristics of a moral virtue. And this enables us to account for the progression of the stanza up to this point. For we have now accounted for both the possibilities that existed in saying love is in the memory, which allowed love as the form of the thing causing love to be in both the sensitive and rational souls. Love is in the sensitive soul in virtue of being properly a passion of the sensitive appetite (*sensato et d'alma costume*), and yet it also reaches the intellect inasmuch as it is subject to the will, which is the rational appetite (*volontate*). But having thus gotten to the intellect, Guido now proceeds in the following lines to analyse the nature of love as it is in the intellect at the same time he gives the cause of love, and thus is able to achieve something of a rounded whole out of this stanza.

Having stated that love is a caused thing, specified as a sensitive passion located in the heart and yet subject to the will, Guido can now turn to consider what the cause of this is. Thus he says *vien da veduta forma che s'intende, che prende nel possibile intellecto, come'n subiecto, loco et dimoranza* (lines 21-23). The cause of love then is a seen form which finally reaches the intellect. But not any form seen will give rise to love and therefore Dino explains here that this form must be apprehended as pleasing, as Guido himself says in the first of the fifth stanza. Furthermore, Guido is talking here about the apprehensive part of love only, i.e. the work of the apprehensive powers of the soul which lead the appetitive power to move towards acquisition, whereupon love arises. For he speaks here of the form as *s'intende*, which can be taken literally as "intends itself", since a thing in being known, whether by sense or intellect, is "tending towards" the knower as the form or *intentio*, as the scholastics said, and is that in and through which the thing is known. After the thing has thus been apprehended and known, if it is judged as a good to be acquired, the appetite moves to acquire that thing, thereby giving rise to the passion of love. Here however Guido is concerned only with the form from which love arises as it exists in the apprehensive powers of the soul; he is talking about the knowledge which must precede love. Thus he says that it begins in the external senses and comes finally to rest in the possible intellect, which is the highest of the apprehensive powers of man, since the thing is here intellectuated in its most pure form as abstracted from all matter and is known according to its essence.<sup>8</sup> Consequently since the intellect is the highest and last of the apprehensive powers, Guido says that this form of the thing for which love is conceived comes finally to the intellect *et dimoranza*, as in the final place of intellectual knowledge. There this form stays as in its subject, for, having reached the intellect, it is a concept.

However, it is obvious that as a concept love differs from what it is as a passion; for as a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite and hence a material thing, whereas, as a concept, it is in the intellect and completely abstracted and liberated from matter and its conditions. Therefore in the final lines of this stanza Guido considers the condition of love as a concept in the intellect. Thus he says, *en quella parte mai non a posanza* (line 24), for it is obvious that love as a sensitive passion can have no place or power in the intellect; it is not the passion of love but only the apprehension of that from which love will arise that is in the intellect. For the intellect is immaterial, whereas a sensitive passion is material; whence Guido says *perche da qualitate non discende* (line 25). For by *qualitate* here Guido signifies those first qualities which compose the elements of all material things—

<sup>8</sup> For the order in knowledge from the external senses to the intellect, cf. pp. 194 sqq.

the hot and cold, the dry and moist. Consequently, being immaterial, the operation of the intellect is not such as would satisfy a sensitive and hence material and corruptible passion. But as Guido says *risplende in se perpetuale effecto*, for, as immaterial, it is not corruptible and consequently its effect, which is the production of the immaterial and universal concept, is perpetual. Therefore its end is not any corporeal delight such as a sensitive passion has but it is knowledge; as Guido says in *non a dilecta ma consideranza* (line 27). Consequently, the intellect can never give any likeness to this passion of love such that it could keep it as a passion, (*non puo largire simiglianza*); for an incorporeal and incorruptible power such as the intellect can have no likeness to a corporeal and corruptible thing such as love. Therefore love as a passion does not have any place or power in the intellect.

We have then in the second stanza seen the answers to the first two questions which Guido asked. In answer to *dove posa*, we have found that love is somehow in the memory, and in answer to *chi lo fa creare*, we have found that a seen form is somehow the cause of love. These are not however either unqualified or complete answers to these questions; and already in the course of this one stanza we have found that love is not only in the memory but is also somehow in the heart as well as the intellect and, concerning the second question, we have found that the causality of the seen form does not remain merely sensitive but also reaches the intellect, so that there is something intellectual as well as sensual to love. Yet as intellectual, it is not proper to love as a passion except as the apprehension which must necessarily precede the motion of the appetite. In one sense then an answer has been given in this stanza to these two questions, but in another sense these answers will be in the course of qualification and completion throughout the rest of the poem. Therefore in proceeding with the rest of the poem we shall not only be answering new questions as they arise, but we shall also be completing our answers to the questions that have gone before.

Having considered love as it is in the intellect alone Guido, now turns in the third stanza to consider love as it exists as a passion in the sensitive appetite.<sup>7</sup> Therefore he begins by locating love in the sensitive appetite and thereby answers the third question, *quale e sua vertu*. Thus Guido says *non e vertude ma da quella viene ch'e perfectione*. But, as Dino points out, *virtus* is used in three senses to signify a natural power (or faculty) of the soul, an intellectual or a moral virtue. Yet it is evident from what Guido says that love cannot proceed from either an intellectual or a moral virtue. For it has just been said that love as a passion has no place or power in the intellect and, consequently, it cannot come from an intellectual virtue; nor can it come from a moral virtue, since such is regulated by reason and Guido says presently that love is not regulated by reason. Therefore love must come from a virtue in the sense of a power or faculty of the soul. But since it has already been said love is a passion of the sensitive appetite it is evident that this is the virtue or power from which love comes, and that it is sensitive is said by Guido immediately after in *che si pon tale non rationale ma che sente* (lines 10-31). But he also says here that it comes from a virtue *ch'e perfectione*, by which he means it comes from a power of the soul which is in act, since a perfection is the actualization or realization of a thing; but love would come from the appetite when it is in act or operation inasmuch as "passio est effectus actionis". The act of the appetite however is either a motion towards or

<sup>7</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *In de anima*, I. lect. x, n. 162: "Et ideo haec: amor, odium, gaudium et huiusmodi, possunt intelligi, et prout sunt in appetitu sensitiva et sic habent motum corporalem conjunctum: et prout sunt in intel-

lectu et voluntate tantum absque omni affectione sensitiva, et sic non possunt dici motus, quia non habent motum corporalem conjunctum."

away from a thing, but, as Guido says later (line 43), love is a desire, and, consequently, it belongs to the appetite in its motion towards the acquisition of a thing.

Therefore, at the same time that Guido answers the question concerning *quale e sua vertu*, he also gives the final answer to his first question concerning the place love is located in. For since love is properly a passion of the sensitive soul, it is in the sensitive appetite and, consequently, is in the heart, which is the seat of the sensitive appetite. It is only in certain respects that it can be said to be in the memory or the intellect; for it is in these places not as a passion but only as that apprehended form, which, when followed by the appetite, will give rise to love as a passion. The memory and intellect as apprehensive powers dispose the appetite to love, but only the appetite can give love its proper being as a passion. Therefore, love properly has its place in the appetite, and thus Guido says that it is not a virtue, but it comes from one, which is not rational but sensible.

Not only is love not located in a rational part of the soul, but it can actively oppose the reason. This is seen from the fact that vehement passion corrupts our power of judgment so that we judge a particular thing as a good to be obtained, although it be only an apparent and not an ultimate and real good. Thus Guido says of love that *fuor di salute giudicar mantiene* (line 32) and adds by way of reason that *la n'tentione per ragion vale* (line 33). For insofar as there is an unsound judgment, the reason must be impeded from considering a particular good in the light of the universal and ultimate good. But this happens because the appetite has overcome the reason and determined it to consider only the particular good which the appetite has apprehended, and thus has impeded the proper operation of reason. Consequently, thus impeded, any judgment concerning the object of the passion will be unsound, for it will not be the result of the full deliberation of the reason and hence will not concern the general and ultimate good but only the particular good apprehended by the appetite. Therefore the intention of the judgment is no longer right because it is not the result of the full and free consideration of the reason, which determines the rightness of human judgments. As a consequence, the excessive passion of love, by overcoming the reason, will prevent any sound judgment concerning that person who is the object of love; the person suffering this passion, since his reason is overcome, will be unable to give a sane and sound judgment on whether his beloved is truly and ultimately worth loving; as Guido says, *discerne male, in cui e vinto, amico*.<sup>8</sup>

However, if love overcomes reason, we should expect to find further evil consequences, since reason is the proper perfection of man. Nor are we disappointed. For Guido immediately adds, *di sua potenca segue spesso morte*, and thus answers his fourth question, *quale e sua potenca*. For by *potenca*, according to Dino, Guido means the most terrible effect love is capable of, and this is certainly death. And, as we have seen, Guido has authority for saying this in the medical treatments of love as a disease, which offer many parallels to what Guido says in this and the following stanza.<sup>9</sup> But, having said that love can cause death, Guido proceeds

<sup>8</sup> The modern editions usually read *vizio* for *vinto*. The majority of manuscripts, however, have *vinto* (cf. Arnone, *op. cit.*, p. 7), and now with Dino's help it appears that *vinto* makes a better and more consistent reading. I think the doubt about the line has arisen because *amico* as the direct object is so far removed from its verb *discerne*, but punctuation readily remedies this and allows *ragion* to be taken as the subject of the dependent clause. But cf. pp. 162-166.

<sup>9</sup> It is of course impossible to say whether Guido actually used or knew of these medical

analyses of love. As Prof. J. L. Lowes says in his article on the subject (*op. cit.*, p. 543), "It would be going to extremes to assert that the conventional treatment of the effects of love in mediaeval and Renaissance literature is wholly drawn from the *signa* of the medical books. There was *mutual* influence—a sort of osmosis—of course. That the medical writer levied tribute, now and again, upon the poets is clear enough from the use (for example) made of Ovid by Gordonius and Valescus. And that both poets and physicians drew alike upon the notorious truths of experience

in the remaining lines of this stanza to give the cause of this. Thus he says that love causes *se forte la vertu fosse impedita* (line 36) and then in the following line specifies that *vertu* as *la quale avita alla contraria via*. This evidently, since it aids the way contrary to death, must be the *virtus vitalis* which is that power, posited by the medical authorities, which maintains the proper proportion in the bodily elements so as to insure the proper operation of the various powers which are necessary to life (cf. pp. 123-125). But the two elements which must be present for life are the hot and the moist, for whenever one of these is exhausted, the body dies. But excessive passions can cause a disruption of the proportion of these elements and finally lead to death. Thus extreme fear can cause death, since those who suffer fear grow cold in the upper parts of the body, which causes the bodily heat to retreat and finally restricts it so much that it is suffocated, whereupon death results. Likewise excessive love can cause death, although for the opposite reason, since, as Dino says, love causes a desiccating of the body, so that the bodily heat, being no longer held in proper proportion to the moist, consumes the body until it literally withers up and dies. Therefore love causes death by destroying the proportion of the qualities in the body by an excess of heat so that the operation of the *virtus vitalis*, which conserves life, is impeded and death results.

But having said how love can cause death, Guido goes on to determine the kind of causality love exercises in causing death. Thus he says first that it is not a natural and therefore necessary causality, for love kills *non perche opposito natural sia, ma quanto che da buon perfecto torte* (lines 38-39). Love does not cause death then because it is by its nature opposed to that condition of the body which makes for life, as diseases are for instance. Consequently the medical writers go to considerable pains to show that love is not properly a disease; for a disease is an unnatural disposition harmful to the powers and organs of the body, whereas love is not a bad disposition of the body, but is a harmful action arising from the operation of a power in the body. But this action is harmful because it turns man away from his perfect good. As has been said, love corrupts the reason; consequently since reason is the specific good of man, it acts as a disease in destroying the good of man. Furthermore, it also impedes the operation of the *virtus vitalis* so that the nutritive and sensitive powers of man are no longer able to function properly. Therefore it has all the effects of a disease and even at times leads to death, although by nature it is not a disease and so does not kill because naturally opposed to life. A sign of this is given in the last line of this stanza (42), where Guido says a man can be made well again if he forgets his love; for if it were naturally a disease, something more than forgetfulness would be needed to cure him, else the disease would run out its natural course contrary to life and thus lead to death.

But if love does not cause death according to the necessity of nature, its causal efficacy must lie in the realm of contingent causality. Of this sort there are three types: One of them is that whose effect is caused *ut in paucioribus*, as the scholastics said, i.e. for the least part, and such is the causality of chance. Love however does not kill after this fashion, according to Guido, since he says, *per sorte non*

admits no question. But with all such allowances the outstanding fact of the clearly formulated and widespread medical doctrine has to be reckoned with. Whatever their latter fate, the chapters 'de amore qui hereos dicitur' were never born to blush unseen in their own day. They constitute precisely the sort of medical lore that always filters

through into lay thought and speech, and, with due recognition of the fact that *hereos* is not the only influence involved, the mediaeval literature of love must none the less be re-read in its light." Nor should we wonder at this medical influence upon literature after witnessing in our own time the use authors have made of the Freudian doctrines.

*puo dire huom caggia vita* (line 40),<sup>10</sup> thereby correcting the impression of *forte* in line 36. His reason is stated in the next line when he says, *che stabilita non a signoria* (line 41); for since chance brings about its effects *ut in paucioribus*, there is not sufficient stability in it to account for this power of love. Therefore, Dino infers that Guido must be implying that love's efficacy here must be that of a cause *ut in pluribus*, i.e. that which happens for the most part. For we have seen that death from love does not follow from the necessity of nature, nor does it come from chance as a cause *ut in paucioribus*, since chance has not the stability to satisfy the production of this effect by love. On the other hand, it cannot be a cause *ut ad utrumlibet*, which is the only other type of contingent causality, whose effect is undetermined and therefore proper only to reason and the will, whereas love is not rational but sensitive. Therefore it remains that love must cause death according to the causality of a cause *ut in pluribus*, which means that unless checked in some way, love will lead to death. However, Guido gives us in the following line one of the commonest checks to love's producing this effect, which is given by the physicians as one of the cures of this excessive love. Thus he says, *a simil puo valere quando huomo oblia*, i.e. when a man forgets his love he can be well again, where the *valere* is to be taken in its Latin sense of "to be well or healthy" and the *a simil* as "again" in the sense of "like what he was" before he incurred this passion of excessive love.

Since Guido has just shown what love does to man by turning him away from his perfect good (line 39), he is naturally led to the statement of the essence of love, whereby he answers his fifth question. For the essence of love is stated by Guido in the beginning of the fourth stanza as *l'esser'e quando 'l volere e tanto ch'oltra misura di natura torna*. But since man's perfect good lies in the realization and perfection of his nature, insofar as love twists man from his perfect good it turns him away from the proper measure of his nature. Thus the connection is established and the progression shown between the third and fourth stanzas. Concerning the statement of the essence then, it is formally equivalent to the one given by the physicians in their treatises. Their full definition, as Dino gives it, is that love is a passion in which the appetite has a vehement desire to be joined to the thing loved. Guido's statement here then is a truncated version of this definition. For whereas the doctors state all four of the causes, Guido gives only the formal cause; thus, completely, the appetite is the *matter* which receives the *form* of a vehement desire when the thing loved *affects* it so that it desires to be joined to that thing as its *end*, and all the causes are given. But it was not necessary for Guido to state all of them here inasmuch as he has stated before that love is in the appetite and that it comes from a seen form; furthermore, the formal cause alone is usually sufficient to note the essence of a thing, since it is the most specific of the causes. But love has a desire which is beyond all natural measure because it looks upon its object, the beloved, as its end—its felicity and beatitude—and anything has an infinite desire to be joined to its end. Or again it is beyond the natural measure of man in that it sets up the object of the appetite as the end of man whereas, since man is what he is by virtue of his reason, this is not the proper end of man and consequently does not befit the "measure" of man.

However, insofar as it is beyond all natural measure in the sense of being exceedingly vehement and as it were infinite, it is clear that love can never have any rest, for rest is the term of motion; whence Guido, along with the medical

<sup>10</sup> Most of the modern editions take this *caggia* as *ch'aggia*, but, as is evident, for the interpretation given here our reading is pref-

erable, as derived from *cadere*, with the Latin sense "to lose".

authorities, says, *poi non s'adorna di riposo mai* (line 45). Consequently, this passion leaves one in a continuous disturbance over the beloved, which expresses itself in the usual effects of love, whereupon we have come to the answer to Guido's sixth question, *quale e ciascuno suo movimento*. Thus he says that it moves changing color, from laughter to weeping, and distorts the face with fear, and on the whole has little rest (lines 46-48), all of which are noted down by the physicians as signs of love. But since it occupies so much of one's time, as Dino says, this sort of love is found most among people of worth, as Guido says in lines 48-49, and moral writers have always claimed that idleness, which only those of "worth" can afford, is the occasion for much "burning lust". Likewise love is accompanied by much sighing, as Guido says in *la nouva qualita muove sospiri* (line 50), but here he assigns the cause as *la nouva qualita*, which governs the two following lines as well as this and the preceding ones. This, as Dino says, refers to the then common physiological doctrine of bodily movement. For all bodily movement, and these alterations here are types of movement, was held to be due to the activity of the *spiritus*, which still survives in our expression "animal spirits". This, or rather these for there were several kinds of them, were physiological entities, generated in the heart, which controlled the action of the nerves, muscles and arteries of the body. The motion of the spirit, however, is determined by the natural heat of the body, which in turn is determined according to the kind of apprehension the soul has. Thus when the apprehension is of some good which gives pleasure, it has the power of heat in the body—the form of the lady seen is literally a "hot number"—and it causes the heart to expand so that the spirit is sent coursing out to every member of the body, thereby causing those expressions we take as signs of joy and pleasure. But when the apprehension is of some evil which is formidable and sorrowful, it has the power of cold, so that the spirit contracts into the heart as in refuge and thereby leaves the body with all those expressions of fear, sadness and despair. The lover, however, as is common knowledge, is always thinking about his beloved, although he has many different apprehensions of her. According then to the different apprehensions he has, the spirit is affected—it is stung, as Guido says in line 61—in many different ways, thereby causing many different alterations in the body, such as those enumerated here by Guido. Consequently, the *nuova qualita* mentioned here can be taken to refer to both the alterations which love causes in the body and the various apprehensions the lover has, which, as we have seen, are the causes of the various alterations; for both the alterations and the apprehensions are in the genus of quality as certain modifications of the subject and each is *nuova* inasmuch as the lover is continually suffering diverse alterations because of the diverse apprehensions he has of the object of his desire. But this diversity causes a diversity of motions in the bodily heat and the motion of the spirit, which expresses itself in sighing. Although these apprehensions are diverse, however, they are all about one object, the beloved, for, as the doctors said, this passion is accompanied by a continuous worry over the object of its desire, so that it is unable to consider anything else; whence Guido says *et vuol ch'uom miri non fermato loco* (line 51), i.e. the lover cannot keep his mind on any one thing other than, of course, his beloved. And the reason for this is given by Guido in the following line by *destando si ella, la qual manda fuoco*; for once the quality which is the apprehension of the beloved is aroused it causes great heat in the body so that the bodily spirits are aroused and completely distract him from the thought of anything else, because he cannot imagine anything else, since the intellect depends upon the imagination as its matter. Thus Guido says, *ymaginar non puote che il pruova* (line 53).

Finally, having considered the power and effects of love, Guido concludes this stanza with some words of advice. Thus he says no one should allow himself to

be attracted to it (line 54) and then in the next two lines gives his reasons. For he says one should not come to love expecting to find either joy or wisdom (lines 55-56). But, as Dino points out, these are two qualities which make a thing attractive, and consequently, lacking these, this passion is not in itself an attractive thing and hence should be avoided.

But if this love is not attractive in itself, it is necessary to point out why people are ever attracted to it. Therefore, Guido turns to this problem in the fifth stanza by showing where love gets its pleasingness and thereby answers his seventh question of *el piacimento che'l fa dire amare*. Thus he says *di simil tragge complexion lo sguardo che fa parere lo piacere certo* (lines 57-58).<sup>11</sup> But here it should be noted first that Guido is speaking of the apprehensive and not the appetitive power of the soul upon which love is consequent. For he says that *lo sguardo* takes its complexion from the like and thereby refers us back to the second stanza (line 21), where he says that love comes from a seen form. But not any form seen will cause love; so here he specifies the quality of the form which arouses love. Thus he says the look which makes pleasure seem certain takes its complexion from the like. Consequently, it is the apprehension of a form as "like" which pleases the lover and arouses love in him. But that which on being seen pleases is the beautiful, which is characterized as being like, fitting and proportional. Thus we have accounted in one sense for the pleasure which follows from the apprehension of the "like". But there is a further meaning in the *simil* here in that likeness, or as we would say affinity, is said to be the cause of love. Likeness, however, insofar as it concerns a passion can be taken in two ways according as it is taken from the part of the passion or from the part of that in which the passion terminates. On the part of the passion, there is a likeness in the passion of love between lover and beloved, i.e. there is if the love is reciprocated; whereas taken from the part of that in which the passion terminates, there is a likeness between lover and beloved in the end desired by the lover—namely union with the beloved. For even though his is an unrequited love, there is still a likeness in that, if the beloved would relent, a union might be realized between them; for although the beloved is relentless, she still holds all the delight the lover prays for. It is by reason of this that St. Thomas says likeness is the cause of concupiscent love inasmuch as there is a likeness because one has in potency and inclination that which the other has in act.

Therefore, the *simil* in this line offers the connection between the apprehension of the apprehensive or cognoscitive powers and that of the appetitive power. For in love it is the likeness apprehended in the thing seen that offers the reason for its being both beautiful and good. For as it is that which on being seen pleases, it is the beautiful, which refers to the apprehensive power, whereas by being pleasing, it will be apprehended as desirable and as that to which the lover would be united in order to realize his pleasure, and consequently it is judged as good, with the result that the appetite will move to acquire it and thereby give rise to the passion of love. It is the same thing in each case that is apprehended, but it is apprehended according to different respects; as beautiful it is apprehended under the aspect of form and as good under the aspect of end, so that there is first an *assimilation* of lover to beloved in the intentional order of knowing which pleases him so much that he desires to consummate that assimilation by actual physical union. Consequently, it is the delight in seeing the lady that leads the lover to desire the pleasure of union with her. However, it should be noted that

<sup>11</sup> As has been said (cf. p. 139-140), Dino understands *certo* with the following line, although without any good reason; in fact, as we have seen, his interpretation of this

line is strengthened by the inclusion of *certo*. Consequently, I am not following his reading here.



Guido says *lo sguardo che fa parere lo piacere certo*. For although the form seen may appear pleasing to the lover and consequently lovable, nevertheless in reality it may not be such at all. For, as has already been said, the judgment of the lover is unsound because his reason is impeded by his passion so that he holds to the apparent good as ultimate and therefore expects certain pleasure from it, although in reality it is only apparent. Therefore, in using *parere* in this line, Guido is bringing together what he has said about the judgment of love (lines 32-34) with what he says here about the pleasing apprehension which leads to love.

Since the pleasure of love seems certain to the lover, he has so violent a desire to attain it that his love cannot be concealed; whence Guido adds, *non puo coverto stare quando e si giunto* (line 59). Nor is this to be wondered at, when love produces all the different effects that have been noted and prohibits the lover from thinking or imagining anything except his beloved; the symptoms are all too obvious and can be spotted in a moment. Here, however, Guido appears to be giving his reasons for the inability of love to conceal itself in a different form; for he says in the following lines, *non gia selvaggi la belta suo dardo, che tal volere per temere e sperto, consegue merto spirito ch'e punto* (60-62). Thus love cannot stay concealed because, since beauty's dart is not savage to the lover, he is not afraid to show his love, being schooled in fear; in fact he cannot help but show it, since love so moves his spirits that he can think about nothing else.<sup>12</sup> Thus if the beauty apprehended seems to contain certain pleasure for the lover, it certainly will not seem savage to him, and he will never maintain that it is anything else than his greatest blessing. But once the lover has been hit by the dart of beauty and aroused to love, his judgment is corrupted, and he may be completely deceived concerning the real effect of his love. However, there is a more philosophic reason according to which it is true that beauty's dart is not savage; for by distinguishing sharply between the beautiful and the good, and hence between the apprehensive and appetitive powers of the soul, it becomes apparent that the savage effects of love are to be attributed to an appetitive disorder and not to anything in the apprehensive power—thus Guido has said it is a desire beyond all natural measure (lines 43-44). Consequently beauty's dart is not savage because beauty, as that which upon being seen pleases, has reference to the apprehensive power alone, and consequently, as such, is pleasing and not savage. But inasmuch as this beautiful thing is apprehended as good, it becomes the object of the appetite and arouses desire, which in its effects can be very savage, as we have already seen. Therefore, although it is not savage, it is a dart which beauty has; for according as that beauty is pleasing, it can incite the appetite to apprehend it as good and thereby arouse a desire which has very savage effects. It is the beauty of the form apprehended that goads one on to apprehend it as good and thereby to lead one to suffer all the savage effects of the excessive desire to obtain it. In fact it stimulates the lover so much that he has no fear in showing his love to all the world; whence Guido says *tal volere per temere e sperto* (line 61). But the cause of this as well as that of the inability of love to conceal itself is given by Guido in the next line, for he says, *consegue merto spirito ch'e punto*. The spirit, as we have already seen, is the cause of the other effects of love, since the various apprehensions the lover has stir up such a commotion in the bodily spirits that the body is altered in so many ways that the lover cannot hope to keep his passion concealed. Consequently, as Guido says, all this happens because of the

<sup>12</sup> Dino wants to interpret *selvaggi* as meaning, not savage, but dull and weak, for he holds that beauty's dart is most savage in its effect upon the lover. But I think Dino's conclusion about these lines can be main-

tained without thus stretching the text by taking it that beauty's dart does not seem savage to the lover, although it may actually be so. But cf. *infra*.

spirit which is stung, *ch'e punto*, and thereby carries out the metaphor he began with his statement about beauty's dart. For it is the beauty apprehended that stings the spirit until it alters the body so much with its various motions that the lover's passion cannot possibly remain concealed. Yet the beauty ultimately leading to such disastrous consequences as death does not seem at all cruel and savage to the lover; in fact it is because it is so pleasing that it attracts, only thereafter to bring about this passion of love and all its dire effects, which we have been considering throughout the last three stanzas.

From what has been said here about the inability of love to conceal itself it might be supposed that love is something that can be seen by sight. Thus Guido has prepared the way for answering his eighth and last question, *s'uomo per vedere il puo mostrare*. But whatever our expectations, Guido answers here, *et non si puo conoscer per lo viso, compreso bianco in tale objecto cade* (lines 63-64). Consequently, love cannot be seen because it is not of the nature of whiteness, or any color, which, as Aristotle says, is the proper object of sight. Therefore, since love is not a colored thing, it cannot be known by sight. Then in the immediately following lines Guido goes on to give in more detail the reasons why love cannot be seen. Thus he says, *chi bene aude*, i.e. he who understands well, *forma non si vede* (line 65), i.e. the form of love, which is what makes it to be what it is—its essence<sup>13</sup> which is the source of its effects. For love taken in itself according to its essence produces (*perche li mena*) its effects (*che da lui procede*) as a thing divided from all color, in an obscure medium, and cut off from light (*fuore di colore esser diviso, absciso mezo obscuro, luce raude*). But these are the very elements that are necessary for the possibility of seeing. For inasmuch as love is divided from all color, it lacks that which will make it an object of sight; and as having an obscure medium, it lacks that which is necessary to make a colored thing visible, viz. an actualized diaphanum or illuminated medium; and finally it lacks that which is capable of actualizing the medium so that a colored thing could be seen—viz. light. Therefore taken in itself and apart from its effects, which are of course visible, love has none of the essentials for sight and consequently cannot be seen. But since love is a passion of the sensitive appetite caused by the apprehension of a good, it is clear that it is beyond any concern of sight, for it is located in an interior power of the soul which follows upon an apprehension which is beyond the concern of any external sense such as sight. And therefore Guido says *non si puo conoscer per lo viso*.

But although love is in its essence cut off from light, it does not follow the ways of darkness; whence Guido concludes this stanza by saying, *fuor d'ogni fraude che dice degna in fede*, although it must be admitted that the connection of this with what has gone before is manifestly weak, and there does not seem much reason for adding this here. Anyhow, in the next line Guido gives the reason for love being so *dega in fede* that it is *fuor d'ogni fraude* by saying, *che solo di costui nasce merzede* (line 70). For since the end of love is union with the beloved, it will endeavor to arouse the mercy of the beloved, which, since it arises from love, will help in obtaining the desired end. But mercy is sadness and compassion over the evil of another which is undeserved. Consequently, to prove that the evil endured is undeserved, love maintains itself *dega in fede* and hence is *fuor d'ogni fraude*, for otherwise it has no hope of attaining its end.

Since Guido has now answered all the questions he asked in the first stanza, he has reached the end of his poem. Therefore in the ritornella he dismisses it by

<sup>13</sup> Dino, however, takes *forma* here to refer to the beloved object, and hence takes all the following to refer to this rather than to love

itself. But this is really to neglect the whole force of these lines.

sending it off to those *persone ch'anno intendimento* to whom he has addressed his poem. And although Dino has not assured us completely of belonging to that class, he has at least given us a better claim to our aspirations. For to the extent that he has enabled us to grasp with fuller consciousness the problems which the interpretation of this poem raises, he has undoubtedly aided us to a fuller understanding of the poem itself. In addition to this he has presented us on the whole with a generally consistent interpretation, and that in a poem as obscure as this one of Cavalcanti's is a contribution that cannot be denied.

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# The Doctrine of Divine Ideas and Illumination in Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln

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IN his opusculum entitled very significantly *De Unica Forma Omnium*, Robert Grosseteste<sup>1</sup> tells us that God is the first form and the form of all things. For,

<sup>1</sup> Little material is available to enable us to reconstruct the early life of Robert Grosseteste. His biographers, Matthew of Paris (*Historia Anglorum*, ed. Madden [Rolls Series, London, 1866, 1869] Vol. 2, p. 376; Vol. 3 passim) and Nicholas of Trivet (*Annales* ed. Hog. [London, 1845] p. 242) for instance, agree in naming Suffolk as the locality of his birth. The *Flores Historiarum* (ed. Luard, [Rolls Series, London, 1899] Vol. 2, p. 242.) which commonly bears the name of Matthew of Westminster designates Stradbroke as the exact place. Very little is known of his parentage or early training but it would appear that he was of rather humble origin. It is even uncertain whether the name Grossthead or Greathhead or Grosseteste was inherited from his father or given him as a result of some physical peculiarity. Certain contemporary evidence bears out the first view—for Stevenson (*Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln*, [London, 1899] p. 3 and p. 3 note 2) tells us that before he became Archdeacon he used the signature 'Master Robert Grosseteste'. Matthew of Paris and Trivet speak of it as a cognomen in terms that suggest the name was given to him for purely personal reasons. 'Nominatus est a pluribus Grossum Caput' says Trivet (*Annales*, p. 242); and Matthew of Paris speaks of him as 'Roberto cognomento Grosseteste' (*Historia*, Vol. 2, p. 376). He was better known at the time as Robert of Lincoln.

We can only approximate the date of Robert's birth. In 1199 Guillaume de Vere, Bishop of Hereford, speaks of him as *magister*, and the conjecture is made that he must have been 24 or 25 years of age at that time. As he died in 1253 and Roger Bacon (*Compendium Studii. Opera inedita* ed. Brewer [Rolls Series, London, 1853], p. 472) mentions the length of his days—*propter longitudinem vitae et viae mirabiles quibus uses est*. This would tend to lend credence to the theory that he was born in 1175.

Robert reached Oxford some time before 1196, and probably after receiving some training from the school of Lincoln. There is unfortunately no record of the studies that he pursued but he seems to have studied canon law, the liberal arts and probably medicine. These studies are indicated in a letter of Giraldus Cambrensis (*Epist.* 18. *Opera* ed. Brewer [Rolls Series, London, 1861] p. 249) recommending Robert to Guillaume de Vere in 1199. When Guillaume died in 1199 it is possible that Robert went to Paris to com-

plete his studies—he is mentioned as doing so, at any rate, by Bulaeus (*Hist. Univ. Par.* Vol. 3, p. 260) in spite of the fact that no contemporary evidence is extant to corroborate the claim.

Early in the thirteenth century at any rate, we once more find Robert back at Oxford. At that time he was made chancellor or more properly, *Magister Scholarium* or *Magister Scholarum*—for the first official mention of a chancellor at Oxford would not appear to come until 1214. However the period is a bit vague inasmuch as it was the time of the Great Interdict which severely affected Oxford, entailing as it did the dispersal of most of the professors and students of the University. In 1224 at the invitation of the provincial of the Franciscans he extended his academic efforts to include special lectures in theology to the Friars Minor. The period 1200-1232 and especially 1214-1232 is that of his greatest intellectual activity, an activity for which Roger Bacon has such high regard. (cf. *Compendium Studii* ed. Brewer, p. 469; *Opus Tertium* ed. Brewer, p. 33, p. 70, p. 472; *Opus Majus* ed. Bridges, Vol. 1, p. 108. Stevenson, *Op. cit.* pp. 50-52.)

Grosseteste managed to carry on as well rather extensive ecclesiastical assignments, being Archdeacon of Leicester and rector of St. Margaret's, Leicester. In 1232 he was forced by ill health to resign most of these duties. After recovering he was appointed to the See of Lincoln in 1235. He must now have been close to 60 years of age. He was consecrated in June at the Abbey Church of Reading and in February of 1236 enthroned in Lincoln Cathedral. He immediately set about instituting a reform in his diocese, usually with a firm hand and a severity that often brought him into conflict with the Crown and the Holy See. He managed, however, in spite of all his episcopal duties to devote some time during the years 1240-1243 to the task of translating certain Greek works procured from Athens by John Basingstoke who, along with Nicholas the Greek, was his chief collaborator in the work, and he even managed to continue an active interest in the welfare of the University of Oxford.

After two visits to Lyons and a great deal of controversy and dispute with both King and Pope his health once more failed him and he died at Buckden in the summer of 1253 in the company of his friend, the learned Dominican John of St. Giles.

For the purpose of this study we have exam-

he says, if He is to be form at all, He must be the first one as well as the last.<sup>2</sup> Such a view, he goes on, is defensible not only on the authority of St. Augustine but also on the evidence of reason arguing from the very nature of form.

According to St. Augustine it is impossible to look upon anything mutable so as to grasp it with the senses or by the mind's gaze unless it be held firmly by some form of numbers. If they are removed, everything will lapse into nothingness once more. We must grant, then, as beyond shadow of doubt that there is some eternal and immutable form in order that such changeable things may not be cut short but may, rather, be carried through time with measured movement. This form is neither contained and, as it were, diffused in place nor varied in time. But by it all mutable things can be formed, fulfill their genus and perform their numbers of places and times. Every mutable thing, then, must be formable—and incidentally, just as we call that changeable which can be changed, so also do we speak of the formable as that which can be formed.

Now nothing can form itself, since nothing can give to itself what it does not have—and the whole purpose of a thing being formed is that it may have a form. If it has the form, then there is no need of it receiving it. But if, on the contrary, it lacks the form, it must receive it from another. Nothing, then, can form itself—body and mind, as mutable things, are formed by a certain unchangeable and ever constant form: *Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed. But thou art always the selfsame; and thy years shall not fail.* (Ps. 101, 27). This form, persevering in itself, is the providence by which mutable things subsist and are governed that they may be fulfilled. If it did not exist, neither would things. But that providence is God Himself. He must, therefore, be form and the first form that constitutes things in being.<sup>3</sup>

This conclusion, based on the authority of St. Augustine, is just as necessary when considered on the basis of reason itself. Let us examine the *ratio* of form. Humanity, we say, is the form of man. It is that whereby he is the kind of thing that he is. Form, then, must be taken as that which makes a thing what it is. Now in the case of God, He is what He is—in other words, He is the very deity by which He is God. Therefore, God must be form since He is that which makes Him what He is, i.e. form.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, the form is the completion or perfection of a thing. God, however, is incompletable completion and unperfectible perfection—He is, in short, unformable form. Thus, man, soul, house, etc. are called beautiful, but take away this and that, i.e. the subjects of beauty, and see if you can conceive the beautiful itself, *ipsum formosum*. If you can, you will see that it is God and that He is not

ined the following works of the Bishop of Lincoln: *De Artibus Liberalibus*, *De Generatione Sonorum*, *De Sphaera*, *De Generatione Stellarum*, *De Cometis*, *De Impressionibus Aëris*, *De Luce seu De Inchoatione Formarum*, *Quod Homo Sit Minor Mundus*, *De Lineis*, *De Natura Locorum*, *De Iride*, *De Colore*, *De Calore Solis*, *De Differentiis Locabilibus*, *De Impressionibus Elementorum*, *De Motu Corporali*, *De Motu Supercaelestium*, *De Finitate Motus et Temporis*, *De Unica Forma Omnium*, *De Intelligentiis*, *De Statu Causarum*, *De Potentia et Actu*, *De Veritate*, *De Veritate Propositionis*, *De Scientia Dei*, *De Ordine Emanandi Causarum*, *De Libero Arbitrio*. All these are edited by Ludwig Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Vol. 9. Münster, 1912). We have also used the extracts published from the commentary *In Libros Analyticorum Posteriorum*

*Aristotelis* by Etienne Gilson in *Pourquoi S. Thomas a critiqué S. Augustin* (Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age. Vol. 1, Paris, 1926, pp. 1-126). Moreover, we have consulted the typescript of the text of the *Hexameron* which is being prepared for publication by Rev. J. T. Muckle, C.S.B. For a complete list of the works of Robert Grosseteste, the student can now consult the scholarly study of S. Harrison Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste* (Cambridge, University Press, 1940).

<sup>2</sup> *De Unica Forma Omnium* p. 107. Unless otherwise indicated, we cite the edition of L. Baur, *Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters) Vol. 9, Münster, 1912.

<sup>3</sup> St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 11, 16-17, PL. 32, 1264-5.

<sup>4</sup> *De unica forma omnium*, p. 108.

beautiful by another form but that He is the very beauty of all beautiful things. Thus, when we hear the expression "God is form, beauty or truth", we do not ask what these things are. If we were to do so the cloud of imagination would obscure and disturb the serenity that enlightens us in the first instant that those things are even mentioned. Therefore, we should try to cling to that first glance, for in it we see that God is beauty. And being beauty, He is and is of Himself called form.<sup>5</sup>

Just what does this mean? How, precisely, is God the form of all things? It is certainly not as a substantial part imparting completion to things in such wise that each thing would be composed of God and matter. No. God is the *exemplar* form of all things. It is in this sense that the life of a good man whom we seek to imitate and whom we take as our model, may be called the *forma vivendi* of our own lives. It is the form that the artist looks to and seeks to imitate in producing a likeness. The cobbler, for example, looks to a wooden foot in order that he may on that pattern fashion a sandal. In this case, the wooden foot is called the form of the sandal. So, too, in a more general sense that is called form to which matter is applied so that it may be formed, for when a form—for instance, a silver seal—is impressed in matter—let us say, wax—the matter receives a form imitative of the form with which it is impressed. Thus, when the artist has in mind the likeness of a thing he wants to make, and when he looks to it in his artistic production, that mental likeness is called the *forma artificii*.<sup>6</sup>

In order that we may gain a more exact notion of the way God is the exemplar and form of things, let us try to imagine three things: first, the form of the thing to be made as existing in the mind of the artist—i.e. in building a house the architect or builder looks to the form or likeness of the house that he has in his mind and seeks to imitate it in the materials he uses—; second, imagine along with this—*per impossibile*—that there is in the artist so powerful a will that it alone and by its own efforts is able to apply the matter to that form and fashion the house by that application; and third, imagine that the materials or matter out of which the house is made is so fluid that it cannot by its own capacity remain in the shape it receives. In such a case, the artist must be powerful enough not only to apply the form to matter, but in doing so he must be able to keep the form there by applying it as long as the house remains a house. Now if we do these three things, we shall catch a glimpse of the manner in which the exemplar which is God, operates. And just as the likeness in the artist's mind constitutes and is his art, so also does the form of God constitute His Art and Wisdom. Thus the Word of God is the form of things. For it not only is the model God uses, it also makes the forms (*efficiens et formans*) things, besides conserving them in being.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, as St. Augustine tells us in his first Homily on John's Gospel, when a builder constructs an arch he first has one in his mind. And the arch in his mind is not the one beheld by the eyes of his body. It is invisible, steadfast and incorruptible, only becoming visible, changeable and corruptible when it appears in the final work. In the art of the artist, then, the arch is said to live and to be life with the life-giving power of the artist's soul. So also does the Wisdom of God contain all things before they are made, and so also do things live and enjoy life in God.<sup>8</sup> But when they do so, they are said to exist in their reasons eternally present in the divine mind. Plato, Seneca tells us,<sup>9</sup> calls ideas—those things from which everything is made and in accordance with which they are formed. They

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 108-109.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* p. 109.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 109-110.

<sup>8</sup> St. Augustine, *In Joan.* 1, 17. PL. 35, 1387.

<sup>9</sup> *Epistolae Morales*. Ep. 58 and 65 ed. Gummere (Loeb Classical Library, London, 1930) Vol. 1, pp. 396, 398, 448.

are, he goes on, immortal, immutable and invariable, being merely the eternal exemplars of things to be made.<sup>10</sup>

It is in this sense that Grosseteste tells us the uncreated reasons of things exist from all eternity in the first cause or first light. They are knowledges of things to be made in the first cause. They are the creative and formal exemplars of things, being principles not only of knowing—in consequence of which God is called the first light—but also of being.<sup>11</sup> Thus it is that God is not only the first form but also the first cause and first light. And He is all of these not only in the order of being but also in the order of knowing. For on each level of knowing, as on each level of being, we find reflections of God's exemplary causality and of the light which is the first cause.

For example, in the order of the angels, or as Grosseteste sometimes calls them, the Intelligences,<sup>12</sup> we find that they are created lights—in *luce creata quae est Intelligentia est cognitio et descriptio rerum creaturarum sequentium ipsam*<sup>13</sup>—which oftentimes cast their rays on the human intellect and through their mediation—but with the power of the first cause—corporeal species proceed into being.<sup>14</sup> The light, then, of God in the order of being finds reflection in the light of the angels. And in addition the first form and the ideas of God find reflection in the self-same Intelligences. For the knowledge of things consequent on the angelic order, which are in the minds of the angels, are exemplars, causal reasons or created ideas of things to be made later.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the angel is well equipped with light and ideas to act as God's intermediary between Himself and things.

Not to be outdone, the corporeal order itself reflects the divine light as a cause of being. For it is through the activity of light that matter receives its extension and bodies are made bodies. The form that first comes to matter to constitute body—the first corporeal form or corporeity—is light. It is *per se* diffused into every part in such wise that from a point of light a sphere of light, and indeed a great one, is generated instantaneously. And it is upon corporeity that the extension of matter in three dimensions follows. Now both corporeity and matter are in themselves simple substances and without dimension, and it was impossible to induce one simple thing (form) into another (matter) except by multiplying it and diffusing it at a single instant into every part. And since form itself cannot quit matter and matter cannot be emptied of form, it extended matter as it diffused.<sup>16</sup>

It is precisely this sort of activity that belongs to light (*lux*)—namely, to diffuse itself and instantaneously spread out in every direction. But whatever it is that performs this task for matter, it must either be light itself or something performing the job to the extent that it shares in light—which, of itself, would do the work. Therefore, either corporeity is light, or it is something inducing dimensions into matter to the extent that it shares in light and acts through the power it gets from light. But it is impossible for the first form to induce dimensions into matter through the power of a form consequent upon it. Thus light cannot be a form consequent upon corporeity. Rather, it is corporeity itself.<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, wise men consider the first corporeal form to be of greater dignity, of a more excellent and nobler essence than the rest, and more like those separated forms which stand apart. But light (*lux*) is more dignified than any other corporeal thing and most closely resembles separately existing forms (i.e. the Intelligences).

<sup>10</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio*, c. 5, pp. 167-168.

<sup>11</sup> *In Post. Anal.* 1, 7. ed. E. Gilson, *Op. Cit.* p. 94, note 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Voluisti insuper a me scire quod sentiam de intelligentiis*, h.e. de angelis. *De Intelligentiis*, p. 112.

<sup>13</sup> *In Post. Anal.*, 1, 7. ed. E. Gilson, *Op. Cit.* p. 94 n. 1.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *De luce seu de inchoatione formarum*, p. 51.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 51-52.



Thus it is only fitting that light should be the first corporeal form. It multiplies itself and stretches out equally in every direction, and in so doing at the beginning of time it pulled matter apart into a mass as great as the *machina mundi*.<sup>18</sup>

A simple finite thing, however, does not generate an unfolded quantity (*quantum*), and hence the extension of matter could not be made through the finite multiplication of light. A thing which is infinitely multiplied must be generated by a finite quantity because the thing produced by the infinite multiplication of anything else infinitely exceeds that from whose multiplication it is produced. Now the simple is not infinitely exceeded by the simple. Only a finite quantity infinitely exceeds the simple—for an infinite quantity infinitely exceeds the simple an infinite number of times. Therefore, light, being simple in itself, must extend matter into dimensions of finite magnitude when it is infinitely multiplied.<sup>19</sup>

By this extension light spreads out into a spherical form, so that the extreme parts of matter are more extended and, as a result, more rarefied than the parts nearer the centre. And when the extreme parts have been rarefied to the limit, the inner parts will still be susceptible of greater rarefaction. At the extremes matter is fully rarefied—in the outermost sphere its possibilities are filled to the utmost. It is incapable of further impression. Thus at the extremity of the sphere the first body, called the firmament, is formed. It has in its composition only first matter and first form. And being thus formed of matter and light (*lux*), the firmament expands its light into the centre of the whole from all sides. And light (*lux*) being the perfection of the first body, naturally multiplies itself from the first body and is thereby diffused into the centre of the whole. But form cannot be separated from its matter, so that in diffusing from the first body it extends itself along with the spirituality of the matter of the first body.<sup>20</sup>

In this way a spiritual body or bodily spirit (*lumen*) proceeds from the first body and passes instantaneously from the body of the first heaven to the centre. Its passage, incidentally, is not such as we understand when we say some one thing (*aliquid unum numero*) suddenly passes from heaven to the centre. Rather, its passage is by its multiplication and infinite generation. And as this *lumen* spreads from the first body to the centre it gathers into a mass existing below the first body. And since the first body could not be lessened (since it is complete and invariable) nor its place vacated, it was necessary that in the *congregatio* the outermost parts of the mass be extended and spread out. Thus it became rarefied in its extremes and quite dense in its innermost parts. And in those outermost parts the second sphere was thereby fashioned. And as the *lumen* born of the first body completed the second sphere and left within it a denser mass, so also the light (*lumen*) of the second sphere perfects the third sphere and leaves a denser mass within it. Thus does the process continue until nine spheres are completed and there is gathered within the ninth sphere a dense mass—the matter of the four elements.<sup>21</sup>

The last sphere, that of the moon, produces a *lumen* out of itself and by its light it collects a mass contained beneath itself. And in collecting, the outermost parts of this body become quite subtle and segregated. The power of this light, however, was not great enough to divide its extreme parts out to the limit, and consequently some sort of imperfection remained within the mass along with the possibility of receiving union and division or separation. Fire was generated in the usual way out of the highest part of this mass, and from fire, air. And finally, air generated a corporeal spirit and a spiritual body to produce water and earth. In this way were completed the nine celestial spheres and the four 'terrestrial' spheres or

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* p. 52.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* p. 52.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 54-55.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* p. 55.

elements. In this development every superior body, according to the light generated from it, is the species and perfection of the following body. And even as unity is in potency all following numbers, so the first body is by the multiplication of its light every following body. The species and perfection of all bodies, then, is light. But a more spiritual and a simpler light perfects the higher bodies whereas a rather corporeal and multiplied light perfects lower things.<sup>22</sup>

The lower bodies share in the form of higher bodies and, therefore, they are receptive of motion from the same incorporeal motive power by which the higher body is moved. In this way the incorporeal power of intelligence and soul, which moves the first and highest sphere, also moves all the lower celestial spheres.<sup>23</sup> Both intelligences and souls are present to or in their bodies *sine situ et sine loco*—except in the sense that the soul is said to be in the heart or in the brain alone wherein its motions are exercised. The angel moves the body it assumes as a soul would which was not united to the body it existed in, nor its existing perfection but rather its *rector, motor, agens* and *patiens ad motiones eius*. The angel, then, moves its assumed body as a minister. It accomplishes this movement in an ineffable manner but one resembling somewhat the manner in which the soul moves the body. For the soul moves the grosser members by the nerves and muscles, it moves these by bodily spirits and it moves them directly and solely by affection—by an absolutely incorporeal, natural and voluntary appetite. The soul's appetities are its purely incorporeal motions whereby it directly moves that which in bodies approaches nearest to incorporeity—*spiritus corporeus* or *lux*. So also the angels move their assumed bodies by affection, first moving the subtlest part of the body and thereby, all the rest.<sup>24</sup>

The heavenly spheres thus moved are complete and are not receptive of rarefaction or condensation since the light within them does not incline the parts of matter away from the centre to rarefy them nor to the centre in order to condense them. Thus, the celestial spheres cannot receive motion up or down but only in a circle from the intellective power that moves them by corporeally turning its gaze back on itself and thereby turning the spheres with bodily revolutions. The elements, on the contrary, being incomplete, may be condensed and rarefied, and hence naturally moved up and down.<sup>25</sup> Now the higher bodies are not only moved by an intellective power—the celestial power also educes from potency to act such forms present in matter as those of the plants and animals. It does not educe the intellective soul from potency to act. Such souls are directly and immediately produced by the first form.<sup>26</sup>

In this way, the light and form—i.e. the exemplar form containing the ideas of things in His Wisdom and Word—which constitute the first cause are reflected in the light and ideas of the Intelligences or angels, as well as in the light and forms of bodies, both celestial and terrestrial. And the motive activity of the first apprehensive form imparting motion to all things is reflected in the angels moving their assumed bodies and intellective souls moving their bodies. All this is true of the order of being, and it is none the less true of the order of knowing. But in the second part of our discussion let us not begin with God, but in truly Plotinian fashion work our way back from the soul itself.

Grosseteste's own treatment of formal causality will, I am sure, constitute an excellent summary of the first part of our treatment of the Bishop of Lincoln's thought. In his opusculum *De Statu Causarum* he tells us that the formal cause, or simply form, is spoken of in many ways. In general, however, form is either

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 55-56.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p. 57. Cf. also *Exameron* in Ms. Brit. Museum Royal 6EV fol. 147v. sqq.

<sup>24</sup> *De Intelligentiis*, pp. 115-116.

<sup>25</sup> *De Luce seu de inchoatione formarum*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>26</sup> *De statu causarum*, p. 125.

substantial or accidental. Accidental form is in some one of the nine genera in regard to substance. It is not the formal cause of substance because a cause—and especially a formal cause—is prior in nature to the thing it causes, and all accidents are posterior in nature to substance. Substantial form may also be spoken of in many ways: either absolutely or secondarily (*in respectu*)—absolutely as the substantial form of substances, secondarily as whiteness is called the substantial form of a white object.<sup>27</sup>

In the absolute sense of the word substantial form may be considered as an exemplar separated from the thing and not that by which the thing is; as that which is conjoined to a thing to make it what it is and not as an exemplar; or as an exemplar which is at the same time that by which the thing exists. In this latter sense form is not conjoined to things but is abstract, simple and separate. It is the first form which, Grosseteste admits, it is difficult to explain and which we have seen is God as first cause and Wisdom containing the reasons and ideas of all things.<sup>28</sup>

In addition to these various kinds of form, there is also another class: the form of Intelligences or angels. These are united to the supercelestial bodies as motor to moveable thing, and it is not because they understand only with the intervention of a corporeal power—as in the case of rational souls. For these latter are not only joined to the human body as motor but also as understanding by means of a bodily power. Such forms or souls can only understand with the aid of a phantasm which is the act of a sensitive power.<sup>29</sup>

Now in knowing with the aid of a corporeal power's act, the rational soul does not undergo the active influence of that power as passive recipient. For we have already seen that the soul is in the body as *motor*, *rector agens in ipsum* and *patiens AD motiones ipsius*—and I think we should pay particular attention to this latter expression. It is *patiens AD motiones*, not *patiens A motionibus*. And in discussing the manner in which the angels and souls suffer, Grosseteste tells us that even though the soul were in the body as a spirit not united to it, it would still be able to suffer certain *affectus AD illud*. All the more reason, then, is there for saying that the soul when joined to the body in a certain way, may suffer when its body is moved in any way. But passions are not only painful—they are also pleasant. And it is apparent that a good spirit can suffer in a delightful or pleasant manner from—and again it is *ad*—the corporeal motions towards which it is well disposed.<sup>30</sup> For the soul suffers a pleasant passion when it senses the mean, a painful or unpleasant one when it senses the extreme. That suffering, however, in every case is always *AD motiones corporis*. And although incorporeal substances can act in bodies as the more noble on the less noble, yet bodies cannot act in incorporeal substances because the more ignoble cannot act on that which is more noble. And an incorporeal substance, even though unformed, is more noble than any body. Moreover, Grosseteste assures us most enthusiastically—we may presume—that St. Augustine is of the same opinion, and he quotes the *De Musica*<sup>31</sup> to substantiate the statement.<sup>32</sup>

We may safely conclude, then, that the soul in the body cannot suffer from the corporeal, although it must suffer when the body suffers. The soul necessarily suffers when the body becomes warm or cold, but there is no corporeal action on it. Rather, when the occasion necessary for action in it arises, the soul suffers. It is much the same thing that happens when a mirror is moved—there is the occasion necessary for the movement of the rays reflected from the mirror, yet

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* p. 124.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* p. 124-125.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* p. 125.

<sup>30</sup> "ad quod bene afficitur". *De Intelligentiis*,

p. 118.

<sup>31</sup> St. Augustine, *De Musica*, VI, 5, 9. PL. 32, 1168.

<sup>32</sup> Grosseteste, *De Intelligentiis*, pp. 118-119.

when the mirror is moved it does not move the rays. They move themselves. So we must conclude that the soul moves itself in suffering *ad motiones corporis*.<sup>33</sup>

If this be true, if the soul does not suffer and yet cannot understand without phantasms or the activity of a sensitive power—and here we are, of course, speaking of the use of reason—is any knowledge (*scientia*) possible without the assistance of the senses? To such a question Grosseteste answers in the affirmative—*dico tamen quod possibile est quamlibet scientiam esse absque sensus adminiculo*.<sup>34</sup> All sciences are eternally in the divine mind. And not only is there present there a certain knowledge (*cognitio*) of universals but also of singulars—although the divine mind knows singulars in the manner of universals because it knows all singular essences in an abstract fashion.<sup>35</sup>

The reason for this is simply that God is a just retributor and knows how to balance rewards and punishments with merits and failings. But if He knows how to do that, He must know rewards and punishments. And these are individual actions. Therefore, God knows singular things. Moreover, since He is the creator of single things, He must necessarily know them. In God it is the same thing to create, speak and know. He must, then, know individual things if He makes them.

Yet even that is not all. No one will make an instrument well unless he knows what the instrument is for, both *per se* and *per alium*. For an iron-worker would not make an ax well unless he were instructed by a wood-worker who could tell him the kind of object that hews wood. If he were not thus instructed but still managed to make a good ax, it would be purely by chance. And God does nothing by chance. Now to apply this example. Since the senses and imagination are instruments to comprehend singulars, then the one that fashioned these senses and imagination knew what singulars are either *per se ipsum* or *per alium*. God could not not know them through another, for "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been His counsellor, and hath taught Him"? (Isaias 40, 13). He must then, know individual things through Himself. Thus a knowledge of singular things and events must be present in the divine mind<sup>36</sup> even though they are known abstractly. We do not know the singularity of *this* moisture unless we mix it with accidents; God knows its singularity in the purity of its essence without severing it from its accidents. In similar fashion, the Intelligences receive irradiations from the first light, God, and in that light they see all universal and singular things that can be known. And in the reflection of that Intelligence upon itself it knows things after it, since it is their cause, as we have seen. Consequently, there is some knowledge in these beings which lack senses.<sup>37</sup>

Similarly, the highest part of the human soul, called the intelligence, which is not the act of any body and which does not require any corporeal instrument for its proper operation, would have a complete knowledge without the aid of the senses through the irradiation received from the higher light if it were not clouded and weighed down with the weight of the body. It will have that knowledge when it has laid the body aside, and some may, perchance, already have it—namely, those who through love have been loosed from the phantasms of the body. But because the purity of the soul's gaze is clouded and burdened with a corrupt body, all the powers of man's rational soul are occupied with the mass of the body and cannot act, being asleep and senseless as it were.<sup>38</sup>

Now since the senses act in time (*cum processu temporis*), through the manifold meetings of the senses with sensible objects the reason is mingled with sensible things and wakes up, so to speak. It is brought down in the senses to sensible

<sup>33</sup> *De Intelligentiis*, p. 119.

<sup>34</sup> *In Post. Anal.* 1, 14. ed. E. Gilson, *Op. Cit.*

p. 96, note 1.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* c. 2. pp. 152-160.

<sup>37</sup> *In Post. Anal.*, 1, 14. ed. E. Gilson, *Op. Cit.*

p. 96 n. 1.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

objects as in a boat. And once reason has been awakened it begins to divide and especially, to inspect the things that were confused in the senses. Thus for example, sight confuses color, magnitude, figure and body, since in its judgment (*judicium*) all these are accepted as one. But reason awakes to divide color off from magnitude and figure from body. Then it separates figure and magnitude from body so that by division and abstraction it comes to a knowledge of the substance of body by laying aside magnitude, figure and color. But reason does not know this is actually a universal until after it has made this abstraction from many individual things, and one and the same thing found in many singular things by its judgment presents itself to the reason. This is the way it searches out an incomplex universal from individual things with the aid of the senses. For while our soul's eye is still unpurified we may attain an experimental universal only with the ministerial assistance of the senses. And the abstraction that is made is hardly an Aristotelian one, we may add.<sup>39</sup>

It must be clear, then, that if any sense is lacking in a person whose mind's eye is occupied with the weight of a corrupt body, the incomplex universals searched out from the singulars of that missing sense are also missing. And there is also lacking the complex experimental universal taken from those singulars. Consequently, such a person will not have the knowledge and demonstrations erected on the universals thus sought. When reason is asleep within us it does not act until after it has been awakened by the operation of the sense. The reason, incidentally, why the soul's gaze is clouded by a corrupt body is that its *affectus* and *aspectus* are not separated off one from the other. For the soul's gaze only reaches out to and lays hold of those things to which its love and affection devote themselves. Therefore, since the soul's love and affection are turned to the body and the snares of the body, they drag along with them the soul's gaze and turn it from its own light, a light which is related to the soul as the sun is related to the external eyes. In this way the mind's gaze is necessarily turned towards darkness and laziness until, going out in a certain fashion through the external senses into the sensible light, it receives after a fashion a vestige of the light that is native to it (*lucis natae ad ipsum*). And being once aroused it tries to rise to that light. It commences to seek its proper light, and insofar as its love turns from corruptible bodies, the soul's gaze is turned to its own light and it finds itself once more—*intantum reperit ipsum*. Even Plotinus could ask for little more.<sup>40</sup>

Therefore, as in the order of being the first light was reflected in the angels and the corporeal universe with causal effect, so also is it reflected with causal efficacy in the lower orders in the act of knowing. For the angel sees in the radiations from the first light, the highest part of the soul; the intelligence may have a complete knowledge in an irradiation received from a higher light; the reason may have universal knowledge if it turns to the light proper to it; and the senses may see individual things in an external sensible light. Yet even that is not all. The exemplar in God, reflected causally in things in the order of being, is also reflected causally in lower intelligences and reasons in the various orders of knowing. For the universals that we have found in reason knowing through the senses are principles of knowing and may be seen in the various orders of intelligent being as light may also be found in them.<sup>41</sup>

It is possible for a pure intellect separated from phantasms to see the first light—which is the first cause—and with the universals as principles to know the uncreated reasons of things existing eternally in that first cause. For the knowledge of things to be caused, insofar as they are eternally in the first cause, are the

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

reasons and formal exemplary causes of those things. They are creative and are what Plato called the ideas, as we have seen. In short, they constitute the archetypal world. In themselves they are genera and species, and principles both of knowing and being. Consequently, when a pure intellect is able to fix its gaze on them, it knows created things in them most truly and clearly. And not only does it know created things but also the very first light itself in which it knows them.<sup>42</sup>

In addition, in the created light which is Intelligence, there is a knowledge and copy of the created things consequent upon it. And even when the human intellect is not fully cleansed so as to gaze immediately on the first light, it often receives rays from the created light, i.e. Intelligence. Moreover, the Intelligence knows the things that come after it in the copies present within itself. For these copies are exemplar forms too. The knowledge of things present in the mind of the Intelligence are created exemplary forms and causal reasons of things and consequently, principles of knowing in the intellect that radiates from it. In such a radiated intellect, they are genera and species.<sup>43</sup>

The causal powers of earthly species are also present in the powers and lights (*lumina*) of the celestial bodies. And in an intellect that cannot contemplate the created or uncreated incorruptible light in itself, it is still possible for it to gaze upon the causal reasons seen in the celestial bodies. And if they cannot be seen there, there is still one final alternative. A thing may also be known in its formal cause present right within itself—and whereby it is what it is—and according as the form itself is seen in *this* form, i.e., in the form which is a part of the thing. The form is not a genus or species, but according as it is a part of a composite whole and a principle of knowing the whole and a principle of knowing the whole composite, it is a genus or species and a principle of being.

In this way, then, the universal may be found present in various levels of being as a principle of knowing on each of those levels, just as the light is found in various orders as a principle of knowing.<sup>44</sup> But those self same principles—light and forms or ideas—are also principles of being, so that illumination and formation in the order of being follows precisely the same pattern as in the order of knowing.

Those divine ideas also perform one final task—they are *regulae* exercising a normative function in the order of being and knowledge and making for truth in both realms: *Quae regula non aliud est, quam ratio rei aeterna in mente divina*.<sup>45</sup> We usually speak of truth in connection with enuntiations when the being in the thing signified is as the words (*sermo*) say it is. It is, in short, an *adaequatio rei et sermonis* or an *adaequatio rei ad intellectum*. But since the inner word is truer than one spoken externally, truth is better seen in the adequation of inner word and thing than in the adequation of external word and thing. Now if that interior word happens to be an adequation of itself to the thing—*adaequatio sui ad rem*—not only will the word be true, it will be Truth itself—the Word of the Father. For the Wisdom or Word of the Father is adequated in precisely this fashion to the thing which He says. Each thing is most fully what this Word says it is, nor is there being in anything otherwise than as stated by this Word—a Word which is not only adequated but which is the very adequation of itself to the thing.<sup>46</sup>

Thus the Word of God is most certainly Truth itself. And in the things said or expressed by this Word, there is a conformity—a conformity to the Word that expresses them. This conformity is their *rectitudo*, the obligation to be what they are. Therefore a thing is right (*recta*) and as it should be when it conforms to this Word (*Verbum*). And to the extent that it is what it should be, is it true. The

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *De Veritate*, p. 177.

<sup>46</sup> *De Veritate*, p. 134.

truth of things, then, is their being as they should be. It is their *rectitudo et conformitas* to the Word in which they are eternally spoken. And since this *rectitudo* is such as can only be observed by the mind, St. Anselm quite properly defined truth as *rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis*.<sup>47</sup> This definition even embraces the highest truth which is a *rectitudo rectificans*, as well as the truth of things—a *rectitudo rectificata*.<sup>48</sup>

There is, then a supreme truth present in God and an inferior truth in things to the extent that they conform to their reason present in the Word of God. That Word is most like the Father and is what the Father is, and consequently full Truth and Light is present only in Him: *And there is no darkness in it.* (John, 1,5.). And since the truth of things consists in their conformity to the reasons present in the Word, it is clear that every created truth is seen only in the light of the supreme Truth.<sup>49</sup> All created Truth, then, is evident insofar as the light of eternal reasons is present to the observer. Nor can anything be known as true in its created light only, any more than a body can be seen to be colored in virtue of its color alone and without an extrinsic light being shed upon it. Created truth, the reflection of divine Truth and the divine ideas as *regulae*, shows an observer what is not only by its own light (*lumen*) but in the light (*lux*) of the supreme Truth.<sup>50</sup>

Now in the case of light falling on a body and revealing that body through its color, it is not an insufficiency on the part of light that it requires color in the object to reveal it. Rather, the very power of light consists in the fact that it does not obscure the color which lights the thing up in addition to itself. So also does the power of the supreme Truth's light illumine created truth in such wise that, being illumined itself, it may reveal the true object. Thus the light of supreme Truth is not related to other truths as the sun is related to other heavenly luminaries—the sun obscures them in its own brilliance. Rather, it is related as the sun to color. It illumines it. Thus only the light of supreme Truth primarily and of itself shows what is—as the light of the sun alone shows bodies. But by that light, the truth of the thing shines forth and shows what the thing is—as color exhibits bodies in the light of the sun. The truth of things, then, can only shine forth in the light of supreme Truth, and it is in this sense that St. Augustine says that truth is only seen in the light of the supreme Truth.<sup>51</sup>

Let us push the parallel one step further. The weak eyes of the body only see colored bodies in the light of the sun spread upon them. They are quite unable to look upon the sun's brilliance in itself. So, too, the eyes of the mind look upon the truth of things only in the light of supreme Truth and yet cannot bear to let their gaze fall on that supreme Truth itself. They can do so only in a kind of conjunction and superfusion in true things. It is only in some such way, Grosseteste thinks, that many impure men see the supreme Truth and yet many of them do not know that they see it. They are in the position of a person seeing a colored body for the first time in the light of the sun but never turning his gaze to the sun itself and being quite unaware that there is a sun or any other light illumining the body he sees. For him all that would be seen would be the colored body.<sup>52</sup>

The pure of heart, on the contrary, look upon the light of truth itself. Consequently, no one who knows any one truth is ignorant of the supreme Truth—all know it in some manner, either knowingly or unknowingly. Only the pure of heart see the supreme Truth, but even the impure are not kept entirely from its

<sup>47</sup> St. Anselm, *De Veritate*, c. X. ed. Schmitt, p. 191.

<sup>48</sup> Grosseteste, *De Veritate*, pp. 134-135.

<sup>49</sup> *De Veritate*, p. 137.

<sup>50</sup> *De Veritate*, pp. 136-137.

<sup>51</sup> *De Veritate*, pp. 137-138; St. Augustine, *In Joan.* 35. PL. 35, 1658.

<sup>52</sup> *De Veritate*, p. 138.

vision.<sup>53</sup> Every man, then, may see the truth of things and, to that extent, the supreme Truth which illumines that created truth to make it shine forth. And as every created truth is seen in the light of the first Truth, so is the rectitude of every true thing due to its being measured or ruled by the rectitude of that first Truth. Consequently, we once more have the ideas in God as rules measuring the truth of created things and shedding a light on them so that they may be seen to be true.

Thus the truth of each thing depends on the rectitude that is the First Truth or Word. And since truth is what is—according to St. Augustine<sup>54</sup>—then truth is being and the being of each thing must depend on the supreme being for its being. For things, like fluid water—of itself possessed of no determined form but receiving one from the shape of its container—have being only in receiving support from the eternal Word of the Father. And as that same fluid water loses its shape and relapses into shapelessness when the container no longer forms it, so also do things fall back into the nothingness from which they sprang when not supported by the Word. *Hoc est igitur, ut videtur, alicui creaturae esse, quod ab aeterno Verbo supportari.*<sup>55</sup>

We have now returned once more to one of the first points Grosseteste made in regard to the exemplar as a cause of being—it not only is the pattern on which the world was fashioned but also the power that conserves it in being. For, he has already told us, the matter out of which things are made is, as it were, fluid and cannot retain the form impressed on it when the original is removed. The exemplar must keep impressing the form on the things it makes—it must conserve them in being and constantly extend its support to them.<sup>56</sup> Our journey then from God as the *unica forma omnium* in the line of being, having taken us through the various orders of being and knowing, at this point restores us once more to the company of the Word. We have now but to cast our eyes back over our course to recall briefly the main points of interest we have encountered.

Whenever knowing and knowledge are discussed by Grosseteste, recourse is always had to illumination. Thus the external senses see in an external light, sensible in kind, and proportionate to them; reason and intelligence in the human soul see intelligibles in a light proper to them, in a light radiated from the Intelligences or in some cases in the first light. And the angels likewise see in that first light. So, too, the universals reached by reason and intelligence are but reflections of created or uncreated exemplary causes or ideas. And all truth, i.e. the rectitude of every created thing, is seen only in the light of a *rectitudo rectificans*—the Word.

All objects of knowledge, then, and all truth depends on and is known in the light of the divine ideas which constitute the first cause and first light. And since these ideas are not only causes of knowing but also of being, the illumination of the ideas in the order of knowledge is repeated in the order of being. The result is that we find light playing a causal role in the constitution of the angels and the whole corporeal universe as such.

Therefore in considering the ideas as illuminative and creative, let us say that Grosseteste is taking his place in a long tradition that returns to St. Augustine. There is no question of introducing an Aristotelian active intellect, for there is no Aristotelian abstraction. There is only Augustinian illumination along with a very interesting attempt to extend the doctrine of light to the order of being. In Grosseteste, then, we find surviving certain fundamentally Augustinian notions regarding divine ideas, knowledge and the relation of body and soul in man interpreted at times in the light of St. Anselm. There is, it is true, evidence of an

<sup>53</sup> *De Veritate*, p. 138.

<sup>54</sup> St. Augustine, *Solil.* 2, 5, 8. PL. 32, 889.

<sup>55</sup> *De Veritate*, p. 141.

<sup>56</sup> *De unica forma omnium*, p. 109.



Aristotelian influence particularly in the natural philosophy, but it does not appear to have exercised any appreciable effect on the psychological and epistemological orders. But in this we are only justified by the texts at hand. Grosseteste quotes the *De Anima*<sup>67</sup> and it may have exercised a greater influence on other works. It does not appear to have done so in the works we have examined. For, as Prof. Gilson points out,<sup>68</sup> Grosseteste does not even trouble to deny that we possess an active intellect, thereby indicating that he was probably unaware of it. We may conclude then, that our author is entirely within the old Augustinian tradition in all essential points of doctrine.

<sup>67</sup> *De Generatione Stellarum*, p. 34.  
*De Motu Supercaelestium*, p. 94.

<sup>68</sup> E. Gilson, *Pourquoi S. Thomas a critiqué S. Augustin*, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, Vol. 1, p. 97.

# L'Humanisme de Saint Thomas d'Aquin<sup>1</sup>

JACQUES MARITAIN

C'EST pour moi un grand privilège de parler aujourd'hui devant l'Académie Médiévale et je suis très sensible à l'honneur d'avoir été invité à ouvrir cette séance de discussion.

Si j'avais voulu vous entretenir de l'*humanisme du moyen âge*, c'est sans doute le XII<sup>e</sup> siècle que j'aurais choisi comme thème; car l'humanisme médiéval n'a jamais paru sous des couleurs plus fraîches, plus poétiques et plus libres qu'en cette sorte de première Renaissance qu'a été le XII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Mais ce n'est pas en historien, c'est en philosophe que j'ai à parler. Et s'il s'agit, non pas de la culture humaniste d'un siècle, mais de la *qualité humaniste* d'une doctrine et d'une pensée, c'est bien dans la doctrine de Thomas d'Aquin qu'il convient de considérer à son degré le plus élevé la qualité caractéristique de l'humanisme médiéval.

Je n'ai pas à m'excuser de la façon plutôt abstraite et métaphysique dont j'ai traité mon thème. Les grands siècles médiévaux ont été eux-mêmes des siècles métaphysiques. Et au surplus, dès l'instant qu'on veut bien inviter un philosophe à ouvrir une discussion, c'est qu'on est disposé à supporter les conséquences de cet acte peut-être téméraire . . .

## I

Je suis persuadé que saint Thomas d'Aquin est, pour employer un mot à la mode aujourd'hui, le plus *existential* des philosophes. C'est parce qu'il est par excellence un philosophe de l'*existence* que saint Thomas, est, (lui, le Docteur "Angélique"), un penseur incomparablement humain, et le philosophe par excellence de l'humanisme chrétien. L'humain en effet est caché dans l'existence. A mesure qu'il se dégageait des influences platoniciennes, le moyen âge chrétien a de mieux en mieux compris qu'un homme n'est pas une idée,—c'est une personne, il subsiste dans l'univers et devant Dieu; l'homme est au coeur de l'existence, c'est là que toutes les flèches du bien et du mal viennent le frapper, et que l'action, l'incompréhensible action du premier Etre et des êtres l'atteint et le soutient, ou le blesse, et que lui-même il poursuit dans le temps son tenace effort de créature tirée du néant et faite pour le bonheur. On pourrait formuler ainsi le principe métaphysique de l'humanisme médiéval: celui-là même qui a fait l'existence, seul il sait *ce qu'il y a dans l'homme*. Seule une pensée centrée sur l'existence peut donc approcher tant bien que mal des retraites du coeur humain, et de la grandeur originelle de l'homme et de ses abîmes, et s'accorder aux aspirations secrètes de cette étrange image de Dieu. Dieu est appelé zélote, disait le pseudo-Denys, à cause de son grand amour pour tout ce qui est. Saint Thomas répète souvent ce mot. C'est parce que lui-même il a eu le zèle de l'existence qu'il a cette vertu de rassurer et apaiser et fortifier avec une souveraine sérénité tout ce qu'il y a en nous de véritablement humain.

On pourrait diviser sommairement les grandes doctrines philosophiques en deux groupes. Dans le premier groupe on rangerait les philosophes qui vénèrent l'intel-

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read at the annual meeting of the Mediaeval Academy of America held at Princeton University, April 25, 1941.

ligence et la philosophie mais s'arrêtent à la considération des essences, des possibles et des intelligibles contemplés dans le ciel de l'abstraction et détachés de l'existence effective. Ces philosophes-là, les Descartes, les Malebranche, les Leibniz, les Spinoza, les Hegel, sont tous plus ou moins subjugués par la flûte enchantée de Platon. Ils ne connaissent pas l'univers, mais un livre d'images. Ils feuilletent les pages de ce beau livre, et ils croient toucher la réalité. Quelle déception! La réalité, et la vie humaine et les profondeurs de l'homme, il faudrait passer à travers le livre pour les atteindre.

Par dépit d'une telle impuissance, les philosophes de l'autre groupe, les anti-platoniciens, les grands pessimistes de la volonté ou de la vie élémentaire, les Schopenhauer, les Nietzsche, brisent à la fois le livre d'images, et la philosophie et la raison. Mais l'idéalisme mis en pièces n'est pas le réalisme; et en saccageant la raison on ne découvre pas, on défigure et mutile la vie humaine et les profondeurs de l'homme. Au plus bas degré, un Klages proclamera sauvagement la guerre de la vie contre l'esprit, et l'on entendra à la fin de malheureux jeunes hommes, pervertis par la nouvelle barbarie, déclarer,—je cite le jeune écrivain Ernst Junger: "La meilleure réponse à la trahison de la vie par l'esprit, c'est la trahison de l'esprit par l'esprit. Et l'une des plus grandes et des plus cruelles jouissances de notre temps, c'est de participer à ce travail de destruction."

Je crois bien qu'entre ces deux groupes de philosophes il n'y a que saint Thomas pour respecter vraiment la vie humaine et les profondeurs de l'homme, en allant par l'intelligence même à l'existence même. Il a de la science l'idée la plus hautement classique, il est scrupuleusement attentif aux plus légères exigences, aux plus fines règles et mesures de la logique, de la raison, de l'art d'articuler les idées. Et ce n'est pas un livre d'images qu'il connaît, c'est ce ciel et cette terre où il y a plus de choses que dans toutes les idées des faiseurs de systèmes, c'est cet univers existant, posé sur les faits premiers qu'il faut constater, non déduire, et parcouru par tous les influx producteurs d'être que le vivifient et l'unifient.

## II

De cet *existentialisme* et de cet humanisme de saint Thomas, je voudrais considérer rapidement, dans les trois parties de cet exposé, quelques exemples typiques, d'abord dans l'ordre de la connaissance spéculative, ensuite dans l'ordre de la connaissance pratique, enfin dans l'ordre de la vie spirituelle.

Dans l'ordre de la connaissance spéculative, le premier caractère typique qui apparaît aussitôt de ce point de vue, c'est le *réalisme* de saint Thomas.

*Veritas sequitur esse rerum*, affirme-t-il constamment, la vérité suit l'existence des choses, elle est l'adéquation de l'immanence en acte de notre pensée à ce qui existe hors de notre pensée. Une surexistence spirituelle par laquelle je deviens, dans un suprême acte vital, l'autre en tant même qu'autre, et qui correspond à l'existence exercée ou détenue par cet autre lui-même dans le champ de réalité qui lui appartient en propre, voilà en quoi consiste la connaissance vraie.

Ainsi la connaissance baigne dans l'existence. L'existence,—l'existence des réalités matérielles,—nous est donnée d'abord par le sens, le sens atteint l'objet en tant même qu'existant, autrement dit dans l'action réelle et existante qu'il exerce sur nos organes sensoriels; et c'est pourquoi le paradigme de toute connaissance vraie c'est l'intuition de la chose que je vois et qui rayonne sur moi. Le sens atteint l'existence en acte, sans savoir lui-même que c'est de l'existence: il la donne à l'intelligence, il donne à l'intelligence un trésor intelligible que lui-même ne connaît pas comme intelligible et que l'intelligence, elle, connaît et nomme par son nom, qui est: l'être.

Et l'intelligence, se saisissant des intelligibles, qu'elle dégage par sa propre force

de l'expérience des sens, atteint au sein de sa propre vitalité interne ces natures ou essences réelles, qu'elle a détachées par l'abstraction de leur existence matérielle en tel point donné de l'espace et du temps,—mais pour quoi faire? Pour contempler seulement dans ses idées le tableau des essences? Non certes! Pour les restituer à l'existence par l'acte en lequel s'achève et se consomme l'intellection, je veux dire par le jugement, qui déclare: *ita est*, il en est ainsi. Quand je dis par exemple: "tout triangle euclidien a la somme de ses angles égale à deux droits", ou "la terre tourne autour du soleil", je dis en réalité: tout triangle euclidien *existe* dans l'existence mathématique comme possédant la propriété en question, la terre *existe* dans l'existence physique comme ayant le mouvement en question. La fonction du jugement est une fonction existentielle.

L'intelligibilité sur laquelle porte le jugement est plus mystérieuse que celle que les idées ou notions nous apportent, elle ne s'exprime pas dans un concept, mais dans l'acte même d'affirmer ou de nier,—c'est la surintelligibilité, si je puis ainsi dire, de l'acte même d'exister, possible ou effectivement donné. Et c'est à cette surintelligibilité de l'existence que saint Thomas suspend toute la vie de l'intelligence.

C'est pourquoi, à la racine de la connaissance métaphysique, il met l'intuition intellectuelle de cette réalité cachée qui se dissimule sous le mot le plus commun et le plus banal de notre langage, le mot *être*, et qui se révèle à nous comme une gloire incompréhensible quand nous avons la chance de percevoir un jour dans la plus humble chose cet acte d'exister qu'elle exerce, cette poussée victorieuse par laquelle elle triomphe du néant. Pour le réalisme de saint Thomas l'acte d'exister, qu'on le considère dans ce pauvre brin d'herbe ou dans ce faible battement de notre coeur, est déjà l'acte et la perfection de toute forme et de toute perfection. Quoi d'étonnant qu'au sommet transcendant de toutes choses, par au-delà tout l'ordre des êtres, il regarde Dieu comme l'océan infini de l'acte d'exister subsistant par lui-même, et resplendissant par là même de toutes les perfections?

Descartes et toute la philosophie rationaliste issue de la révolution cartésienne ont posé une inimitié insurmontable entre l'intelligence et le mystère, et c'est là l'origine la plus profonde de l'*inhumanité* foncière de la civilisation à base rationaliste. Saint Thomas réconcilie l'intelligence et le mystère au coeur de l'être, au coeur de l'existence. Et par là il délivre notre intelligence, il la rend à sa nature en la rendant à son objet. Mais par là, en même temps, il apparaît comme le plus foncièrement humain et le plus vraiment humaniste des penseurs, il nous donne la force et le courage de faire notre travail d'hommes au sein de l'étrange nature et de notre propre étrangeté. Et en faisant la paix entre notre esprit et le mystérieux univers, il fait aussi la paix entre notre esprit et le mystérieux Créateur; au lieu de séparer la philosophie de la théologie, comme Descartes devait le faire, et de refuser à la théologie toute valeur de science, il met la philosophie en continuité avec la théologie, et il fonde en raison l'éminence de la sagesse théologique,—participation en nous, disait-il, de la science des esprits qui voient Dieu.

Je mentionnerai rapidement un second caractère typique de la pensée spéculative de saint Thomas, étroitement connexe au réalisme dont je viens de parler: par là même qu'elle est centrée, non sur les essences, mais sur l'existence, sur le mystérieux jaillissement de l'acte d'exister, en lequel s'actualisent et se forment, selon la variété analogique des degrés de l'être, toutes les qualités et les natures qui réfractent et multiplient dans ses participations créées l'unité transcendante de l'Être même subsistant, dès le principe la pensée de saint Thomas saisit l'être comme *surabondant*. Partout l'exister surabonde, il donne,—et c'est ici-bas l'*action* par où tous les êtres sont en intercommunication. Nous avons là un des traits

fonciers de la synthèse thomiste. Au dessus du temps, dans la Source première et transcendante, c'est la surabondance de l'exister divin, surabondance en acte pur qui se manifeste en Dieu même, comme la révélation nous l'apprend, par la pluralité des Personnes divines, et, comme la raison à elle seule est apte à le savoir, par le fait que l'existence même de Dieu est Intelligence et est Amour, et par le fait qu'elle est librement créatrice. Et cette divine plénitude ne donne pas seulement, elle se donne, et c'est pour se donner à des esprits capables d'elle qu'en définitive elle a créé le monde. Ce n'est pas pour lui mais pour nous, dit saint Thomas, que Dieu a fait toutes choses pour sa gloire.

Or si l'être est surabondant et communicatif de soi, s'il se donne, l'amour est justifié,—et cette stimulation et cette aspiration à sortir de soi pour vivre de la vie même de l'aimé qui sont consubstantiels à l'être humain, et qui scandalisent toute philosophie des pures essences. Pour un Spinoza le sommet de la sagesse et de l'humaine perfection sera d'aimer Dieu intellectuellement, c'est-à-dire de consentir comme un pur spectateur désintéressé à l'ordre universel des choses, sans demander d'être aimé en retour, parce que le Dieu de Spinoza n'est qu'une essence subsistante, des attributs et des modes de laquelle les choses sont l'expression nécessaire et comme le déroulement, il n'est pas une personne créatrice, capable d'aimer librement et de se donner librement. Mais pour saint Thomas d'Aquin le sommet de la sagesse et de l'humaine perfection était d'aimer Dieu d'amour, c'est-à-dire de s'ouvrir librement à la plénitude de l'amour du Dieu vivant descendant en nous, et débordant de nous pour nous faire continuer dans le temps son oeuvre et communiquer sa bonté.

Les philosophies rationalistes posent toutes inévitablement un divorce mortel entre la connaissance et l'amour. L'existentialisme thomiste les accorde et les unit, et fonde l'amour sur l'intelligence et fortifie l'intelligence par l'amour,—et nous montre aussi que l'amour n'est un torrent bénéfique et pacifiant que s'il passe par le lac du Verbe. Et par ce trait encore la pensée thomiste apparaît comme une pensée profondément humaine et véritablement humaniste, qui ne délivre pas seulement l'intelligence, mais la réconcilie avec le coeur et nous réconcilie avec nous-mêmes.

Si l'on a une fois compris cette primauté de l'exister dans la pensée de saint Thomas, on comprend aussi le pouvoir synthétique qu'elle manifeste à un si haut degré à l'égard de tout l'héritage de l'humaine et divine sagesse, et son pouvoir d'accueil à toutes les vérités, les plus humbles et les plus grandes, que les recherches et les systèmes des hommes tiennent si souvent captives de l'erreur, et qu'il faut ramener dans leur patrie. Un tel pouvoir de synthèse et d'accueil suppose à vrai dire une originalité très haute et une force poétique exceptionnelle. C'est l'intuition de l'être, l'aperception très simple et infiniment féconde de l'existence,—à tous les degrés de sa valeur analogique perfection des perfections et unification du multiple,—qui est le secret de saint Thomas d'Aquin, et qui a donné au grand boeuf muet de Sicile la force de faire concerter ensemble tout ce qu'ont dit de vrai les philosophes païens, et Aristote avec sa clique éblouissante de Juifs et d'Arabes, et les Pères de l'Eglise et saint Augustin avec son platonisme transfiguré par la sagesse de grâce,—de faire concerter toutes ces voix précieuses sous la Parole unique, supérieure à toute philosophie et à toute théologie, que l'Evangile nous transmet.

Et voilà, à un autre titre encore, la leçon d'humanisme dont nous sommes redevables à saint Thomas. Il vénérât si intelligemment l'antiquité qu'il ouvrait à chaque pas des perspectives nouvelles, mettait partout la fraîcheur de l'esprit d'enfance, a été sans le vouloir le plus hardi instigateur de nouveauté que les écoles médiévales aient connu.

Mais c'est en un sens beaucoup plus profond encore qu'il convient de concevoir le pouvoir de synthèse que je viens de mentionner. C'est dans l'homme que l'esprit et la doctrine de saint Thomas tendent à faire l'unité, et toujours en vertu du même secret, qui est de tout comprendre dans la lumière et la générosité de l'existence. La nature et la grâce, la foi et la raison, les vertus surnaturelles et les vertus naturelles, la sagesse et la science, les énergies spéculatives et les énergies pratiques, le monde de la métaphysique et celui de l'éthique, le monde de la connaissance et celui de l'art, saint Thomas s'applique à reconnaître à chacune des constellations de notre ciel humain son domaine propre et ses droits propres, mais il ne les sépare pas, il les distingue pour les unir, et fait converger toutes nos puissances dans une synergie qui sauve et stimule notre être.

Les principes de saint Thomas permettent en particulier de comprendre comment, au noeud immatériel des énergies de l'âme, la sagesse mystique et la sagesse théologique vivifient et fortifient la sagesse métaphysique, de la même façon que celle-ci vivifie et fortifie les activités philosophiques de rang moins élevé. C'est la question de la philosophie chrétienne qui surgit ici, je ne l'aborderai pas dans cet exposé, je remarquerai seulement que saint Thomas, sans traiter explicitement cette question, a eu à son sujet une position des plus nettes. Il a affirmé cette position non seulement par ses principes mais par son action même, — en combattant et en souffrant, car toute sa lutte a été de faire reconnaître Aristote et de renverser Averroès, c'est-à-dire tout à la fois de faire reconnaître l'autonomie de la philosophie comme celle du droit naturel et de la cité temporelle, et de subordonner vitalement, dans leur exercice humain, la philosophie à la foi et à la sagesse des saints, comme le droit naturel et la cité temporelle à la loi de grâce et au royaume de Dieu, comme l'humaine raison à cette folie dont parle saint Paul. S'il y a aujourd'hui des auteurs thomistes pour se scandaliser de l'idée même d'une philosophie chrétienne, c'est simplement la preuve qu'on peut répéter les formules d'un maître sans savoir de quel esprit on est, et que le thomisme, comme toute grande doctrine, peut être disséqué comme un cadavre par des professeurs d'anatomie au lieu d'être pensé par des philosophes. Beaucoup de tentatives, généreuses en soi, d'humanisme, même d'humanisme chrétien, comme la tentative d'Erasmus et de ses amis, ont échoué parce qu'elles ne prenaient pas leur origine assez haut; il est à croire qu'un seul humanisme peut descendre assez profondément dans les recès de l'être humain, c'est celui qui dérive de la sagesse des saints tout en assurant et respectant intégralement l'ordre et la dignité de la nature. C'est en cela qu'à mon avis apparaît le privilège de Thomas d'Aquin, à la fois dans sa théologie, dans son épistémologie et dans son éthique.

### III

J'arrive ainsi à la seconde partie de cet exposé, qui concerne la connaissance pratique. Dans l'ordre de la connaissance pratique et de la vie morale, ce que je voudrais rappeler d'abord, c'est la doctrine classique de saint Thomas sur la perfection de la vie humaine et sur la charité. C'est dans l'amour de charité, enseigne-t-il, que consiste la perfection, et chacun est tenu de tendre vers la perfection de l'amour selon sa condition et pour autant qu'il est en lui: ce n'est pas un conseil, c'est un précepte, c'est le premier précepte. L'existentialisme que j'ai signalé se retrouve ici d'une manière bien typique, car l'amour, saint Thomas le dit constamment, ne va pas à des possibles ni à de pures essences, il va à des existants réels. Et c'est en définitive parce que Dieu est l'Acte même d'exister souverain et surabondant que l'amour parfait de Dieu est la souveraine perfection de notre être.

Dire que la perfection de la vie humaine consiste dans l'amour, c'est dire que cette perfection consiste dans une relation et communication entre personnes, et premièrement entre la personne de l'homme et celle de Dieu. Voilà dès lors ce qui importe avant tout,—la plénitude et la délicatesse toujours plus grandes du dialogue et de l'union de personne à personne, jusqu'à la transfiguration qui, comme dira saint Jean de la Croix, fait de l'homme un dieu par participation. A suivre ainsi les prolongements de la théologie thomiste dans la pratique des grands spirituels, il apparaît que la perfection de la vie humaine est une perfection de l'art d'aimer, non de l'art de nous parfaire nous-mêmes et nous suffire à nous-mêmes dans notre intelligence, notre puissance ou notre vertu. Quand on considère l'attitude pratique des hommes du moyen âge dans le domaine spirituel, on comprend que pour eux la perfection évangélique n'était pas une perfection d'athlétisme spirituel où l'homme se rendrait impeccable, mais la perfection de l'amour, de l'amour envers un Autre que l'âme aime plus qu'elle-même, et qu'il lui importe avant tout d'aimer davantage et de joindre, fût-ce en trainant avec elle imperfections et faiblesses,—qu'elle lui donne aussi, et qu'il se charge d'ôter. Qui ne voit la profonde humanité d'un tel détachement, plus qu'humain, de la perfection dans la perfection même?

Telle est donc l'idée qu'en suivant les principes et la doctrine de saint Thomas nous pouvons nous faire du "sens de la vie humaine" et du terme auquel elle tend ici-bas. Nous sommes ici au centre de l'humanisme de saint Thomas, et nous voyons à la fois comment cet humanisme est un humanisme intégral, et comment il répond très spécialement à un vœu urgent de notre temps. Car la signification typique du thomisme, du point de vue de la philosophie de la culture, c'est de montrer la consistance propre, la valeur et la dignité de la nature,—en ordre à la grâce, "dont un seul bien vaut mieux que tous les biens de l'univers réunis", et comme procédant de la sainte surabondance de l'Être même subsistant; disons que la signification du thomisme c'est de *dignifier* et de réhabiliter la créature en Dieu et pour Dieu; et cela même, cette dignification et cette réhabilitation théocentrique de la créature, et particulièrement de l'être humain et de la vie humaine, c'est, j'en suis persuadé, ce que demande la civilisation si elle doit se renouveler pour ne pas périr. Que la personne humaine et la vie humaine soient vraiment et profondément respectées *dans* leur liaison à Dieu et *parce que* tenant tout de lui; que les choses créées, l'histoire temporelle, l'effort et le travail de la cité profane soient non pas méprisés,—et non pas adorés, et non pas saccagés par la rage esclavagiste de domination de l'homme sur l'homme,—mais respectés, assumés et surélevés dans un amour supérieur aux choses, cette *réhabilitation de la vie humaine en Dieu* me paraît caractéristique d'un nouvel âge de chrétienté, et d'un nouvel humanisme, essentiellement différent de l'humanisme de la Renaissance ou de celui de l'âge classique,—humanisme théocentrique, enraciné là où l'homme a ses racines, humanisme qu'on pourrait appeler humanisme de l'Incarnation, et dont je vois le docteur en Thomas d'Aquin. "Être humain, disait-il, c'est avoir pour l'homme un sentiment d'amour et de pitié."

Pour avoir une idée plus complète de l'humanisme de saint Thomas d'Aquin, il faudrait mentionner encore bien des points particulièrement significatifs de sa doctrine: il n'enseigne pas seulement que la grâce parfait la nature et ne la détruit pas, il enseigne que tout être,—même les choses inanimées, dans l'aspiration ontologique qui est au fond d'elles ce que l'amour est en nous,—aime naturellement Dieu par dessus tout; il enseigne que pour faire mourir l'amour égoïste de nous-mêmes, racine de tout nos maux, nous devons nous aimer nous-mêmes, notre âme et notre corps, d'un amour de charité; il enseigne à la fois que sans la

charité il n'est pas de parfaite vertu, et que les vertus des païens, celles que les jansénistes appelaient des vices resplendissants, sont, quoique sous un état imparfait, de vraies vertus d'ordre naturel; et que les vertus surnaturelles ne remplacent pas les vertus naturelles, mais les appellent, les fortifient et les surélèvent; il enseigne que ce qui est principal dans la Loi Nouvelle,—qui n'est pas une loi écrite, mais une loi infuse au coeur,—ce qui importe avant tout dans la Loi Nouvelle, et ce en quoi consiste toute sa vertu, c'est la grâce du Saint-Esprit qui est donnée par la foi vive. Voilà en quoi consiste *toute la vertu* de la Loi Nouvelle; sans cela elle n'a plus aucune efficacité, elle n'est plus qu'une image vide. Cela revient à dire que le christianisme authentique est un christianisme *existentiel*, où le principal est l'amour évangélique et la grâce intérieure du Saint-Esprit.

En réhabilitant en Dieu la créature et l'ordre naturel, l'humanisme de saint Thomas réhabilite en Dieu l'art et la beauté. Et il réhabilite aussi la vie de la cité profane, l'ordre social et politique, le mouvement de progression temporelle de l'humanité. Ici, bien des développements seraient nécessaires, je me contenterai des remarques suivantes: Saint Thomas pensait que notre nature est blessée et que le monde ne sera jamais le royaume de Dieu, mais il pensait aussi que la fin de la cité temporelle est la bonne et droite vie terrestre de la communauté, et qu'à travers toutes les vicissitudes de l'histoire et les défaillances des hommes il faut tendre vers un régime temporel conforme à l'humaine dignité; et il enseignait que si les réalités sociales et politiques appartiennent de soi à l'ordre naturel, non seulement cependant elles ressortissent en propre au moral, non au physique, mais elles ne peuvent atteindre à leur accomplissement que si elles sont aidées et surélevées dans leur ordre propre par les énergies de la grâce, en telle sorte qu'une civilisation temporelle, je ne dis pas sans défauts ni sans tares, je dis vraiment digne de l'homme, doit s'appeler de son nom véritable une *chrétienté*. La position de saint Thomas est ainsi une position aussi éloignée du pessimisme d'un Hobbes et des théoriciens de despotisme que de l'optimisme absolu de Rousseau, c'est une position intégraliste et progressive. Les problèmes sociaux auxquels nous avons affaire de nos jours ne se posaient évidemment pas de son temps. Mais il a établi des principes qui font aisément voir dans quelle direction iraient aujourd'hui ses solutions; et quand il enseigne qu'un minimum de bien-être est nécessaire pour que l'homme accède à la vertu, de sorte que la question de la moralité publique est tout d'abord une question de travail et de pain; quand il enseigne que la propriété des biens matériels et des moyens de production doit être privée quant à la gestion, mais commune quant à l'usage, qui d'une certaine façon doit se reverser sur tous; quand il insiste sur la dignité de la personne humaine, image de Dieu, et fait voir dans le bien commun de la société civile un bien commun de personnes humaines, supérieur au bien privé de chacun mais qui doit se redistribuer à chacun, et respecter les droits fondamentaux de chacun, et l'ordination de chaque personne humaine à la vie éternelle; quand il caractérise les chefs politiques, en quelque régime que ce soit, comme les détenteurs d'une autorité dont la source est en Dieu, mais en même temps comme les vicaires de la multitude; quand il affirme que le consentement du peuple est requis à la légitimité de la forme d'Etat, qu'elle soit du type monarchique ou d'un autre type, et fait partie intégrante du dynamisme de la vie politique, et que le gouvernement proprement politique, à la différence du gouvernement despotique, est un gouvernement d'hommes libres, traités non comme des enfants, mais comme des personnes majeures, nous pouvons dire que saint Thomas d'Aquin trace dans ses traits généraux, dont l'application dépend des conditions particulières de chaque âge historique, l'esquisse d'un véritable humanisme social et politique.



## IV

J'arrive enfin à la troisième partie de cet exposé, où je voudrais indiquer comment l'humanisme de saint Thomas d'Aquin se manifeste dans l'ordre même de la vie spirituelle. A vrai dire, si on considère tout ce que l'effort des hommes a pu tenter hors de la tradition judéo-chrétienne, ce domaine de la vie spirituelle, qui est celui des aspirations de l'homme au surhumain, apparaît aussi comme celui des grands échecs et des suprêmes antinomies de notre être. Les grandes civilisations antiques, celle de la Grèce et surtout celle de l'Inde, ont compris que la vie contemplative est supérieure à la vie active, et ouvre seule à l'homme cette béatitude anticipée dont il a soif. Mais parce qu'elles concevaient la suprême contemplation comme un bien à acquérir par la plus haute tension des forces de l'homme, et parce qu'elles la faisaient consister toute dans l'intellect, elles la réservaient à un petit nombre de privilégiés, en lesquels seuls et par lesquels seuls vivait le genre humain, et pour lesquels travaillait la multitude esclave. Le monde moderne, lui, a proclamé l'affranchissement de cette multitude et son droit à avoir sa part aux biens par lesquels se parfait la vie humaine, et en cela il a eu raison. Mais ces biens il ne sait guère où ils sont, il méconnaît comme par principe l'ordre entier des suprêmes activités immanentes ou suprêmes activités de contemplation par où, à la cime de l'intelligence et de la volonté, la vie humaine porte son fruit, bref il préfère la technique à la sagesse, et cherche la béatitude dans la science et le travail: et nous commençons à apercevoir aujourd'hui à quelle déception les hommes sont ainsi conduits. Une réflexion de Montaigne me revient à la pensée à ce propos: "Quand bien nous pourrions estre sçavants du sçavoir d'autrui, disait Montaigne, au moins sages ne pouvons-nous estre que de nostre propre sagesse."

La solution de saint Thomas d'Aquin est la solution typiquement chrétienne, et peut être résumée sommairement de la façon suivante. Oui, Aristote et la grande sagesse antique avaient raison de dire que la vie contemplative est supérieure à la vie active, et ouvre seule à l'homme les portes d'une vie divine. Mais en parlant ainsi les sages de l'antiquité, pareils à certains prophètes ou poètes, parlaient mieux qu'ils ne pensaient, et ne savaient pas ce qu'ils disaient; et c'est l'Evangile qui donne leur signification véritable aux formules d'Aristote. Car la contemplation véritablement libératrice et déforme n'est pas la contemplation des philosophes, qui s'arrête dans l'intelligence et se fait par le seul effort des plus hautes énergies de l'homme, et a pour but l'achèvement de soi par soi, le perfectionnement suprême du sage lui-même;—c'est la contemplation des saints, qui ne s'arrête pas dans l'intelligence mais passe dans le coeur et y surabonde,—et qui ne se fait pas par la suprême tension des forces naturelles de l'homme, mais par l'amour de charité qui nous fait un seul esprit avec Dieu, et qui devient sous l'inspiration supérieure de ses dons moyen lui-même d'une suprême connaissance expérimentale, et qui n'a pas pour but le bien propre du sage et sa suprême suffisance à soi-même, mais l'amour de Celui qui est contemplé, la communication d'amour et la coopération d'amour avec Dieu, dont le bien et la beauté, et l'oeuvre de bonté et de salut, importent beaucoup plus que le bien propre et l'oeuvre propre du sage.

Et ainsi, parce que la contemplation vraiment libératrice et vraiment déforme est dans l'intelligence elle-même l'oeuvre et la gloire de l'amour en acte, et parce que l'amour est essentiellement surabondance et don de soi, cette contemplation demande à surabonder en action, à se répandre au dehors en générosité salvatrice et en fécond sacrifice de soi, en telle sorte que l'homme communique avec les autres hommes dans la même communication d'amour qui l'unit à l'Amour subsistant.

Telle est, dans les perspectives thomistes, la fin à laquelle tend dès ici-bas la vie spirituelle. Mais par là même aussi on voit que cette vie spirituelle et les fruits de l'humaine perfection ne sont pas réservés à une aristocratie de privilégiés. Parce qu'elle procède beaucoup moins de l'effort de l'homme que de la grâce et de la générosité divines, et parce qu'elle est essentiellement surnaturelle, la contemplation par union d'amour, qui n'a pas seulement les formes typiques décrites par une sainte Thérèse ou un saint Jean de la Croix, mais qui peut prendre dans la vie commune des hommes tous les déguisements, toutes les formes masquées et secrètes dont l'Esprit qui souffle où il veut est le seul maître, appelle à soi, d'un appel prochain ou d'un appel éloigné, tous les hommes, à quelque condition qu'ils appartiennent et quel que soit leur degré d'humaine culture. A cette sagesse qui transcende tous nos concepts et qui se cache dans l'obscurité divine, tous sont appelés, les ignorants comme les savants et les pauvres comme les riches, et les pauvres plus que les riches, car elle est le grand luxe des pauvres. Jamais le monde d'avant le Christ n'avait eu l'idée de cela.

L'immense révolution ainsi accomplie par le christianisme, du fait qu'il appelle tous les hommes à la perfection, a été essentiellement et avant tout une révolution d'ordre spirituel, et c'est par la grâce de Dieu qu'elle s'effectue. Mais parce que la grâce suppose et parfait la nature et ne la détruit pas, nous devons dire que cette révolution spirituelle découvrait aussi, indirectement, de grandes vérités d'ordre naturel, et devait produire aussi, peu à peu, et indirectement, de grands changements dans l'ordre temporel. Elle devait évacuer progressivement de la conscience, et de l'existence, la nécessité de l'esclavage, et tendre non pas sans doute à effacer toute différenciation sociale et toute inégalité sociale, mais à faire reconnaître l'égalité fondamentale de tous les hommes dans la même dignité de créatures raisonnables et dans les mêmes droits premiers, et à promouvoir une égalité proportionnelle de plus en plus haute dans la commune jouissance des biens qui se reversent du trésor commun de la cité sur chaque personne humaine. "Tous les hommes, qui sont nés d'Adam, écrit St. Thomas, peuvent être regardés comme un homme unique, en tant qu'ils communient dans une même nature, qu'ils ont reçue de leur premier père." Et cette grande révélation évangélique découvrait à la nature humaine sa propre vérité jusque là méconnue, elle lui apprenait qu'il n'y a pas deux espèces d'hommes, ceux qui sont faits pour le travail et ceux qui sont faits pour la sagesse, mais que tout homme est à la fois *homo faber* et *homo sapiens*, et *homo faber* afin d'être *homo sapiens*, homme pour le travail afin d'être homme pour la sagesse, homme pour le travail afin de trouver son bonheur et le sens de sa vie non pas dans le travail mais dans la sagesse et dans la liberté d'épanouissement à laquelle sa nature spirituelle aspire.

Et nous voilà encore une fois ramenés à l'humanisme intégral de saint Thomas d'Aquin. L'antinomie que je signalais tout à l'heure à propos des aspirations de l'homme à la vie spirituelle est surmontée, s'il est vrai que, comme il l'enseigne, la contemplation (la contemplation par union affective) est supérieure à l'action, mais demande elle-même à surabonder en action, et n'est plus réservée à une catégorie de spécialistes ou de privilégiés, mais s'offre à tous les hommes quels qu'ils soient qui entendent l'appel de Dieu. Et non seulement il en est ainsi dans l'ordre propre de la vie spirituelle en son souverain accomplissement, qui relève de la grâce et du royaume de Dieu; mais encore, dans l'ordre de la vie temporelle et de la civilisation terrestre, c'est pour l'humanisme en question une vérité fonda-

\* Sum. Theol. I-II, 81, 1.

mentale que le travail des hommes a pour fin de leur ouvrir l'accès de ces biens intérieurs de l'âme qui sont l'objet des activités de loisir ou de repos,—des activités "*immanentes*" propres à la connaissance et à l'amour, et qui sont une ébauche déjà et une participation naturelle de la vie contemplative. S'il est vrai qu'un jour,—du moins quand une grande transformation morale, qui commence peut-être aujourd'hui dans l'horreur et dans le sang, nous aura appris à nous servir de la technique pour le bien des hommes, non pour une régression bestiale vers les pires formes de domination,—les progrès de la technique permettront à la multitude humaine de se procurer par un travail quotidien de durée relativement très courte les biens matériels dont elle a besoin, on voit comment alors, pour reprendre un mot de M. Bergson, la mécanique appellera la mystique, et comment il faudra bien reconnaître ce fait que le travail producteur de valeurs économiques est ordonné de soi aux activités d'épanouissement libre et de fruition,—désormais ouvertes à tous de plus en plus largement,—qui nourrissent l'âme de vérité et de beauté, et de cette expérience savoureuse et de cette sagesse de vie auxquelles les tâches de la vie commune conduisent plus sûrement que l'érudition, si elles sont accomplies avec amour.

Dans le même ordre d'idées, on voit que le bien commun de la cité temporelle a pour principale valeur l'accession des personnes humaines aux richesses intérieures et à la liberté qui les dignifient; et on voit aussi que l'oeuvre commune de la cité temporelle n'est pas ordonnée comme à sa fin principale à une activité matérielle et tournée vers le dehors, qu'elle tende à dominer la nature par la puissance industrielle, ou à dominer les nations par la puissance politique, mais à ces activités immanentes et immatérielles dont je viens de parler, et qui dans le domaine social se traduisent avant tout par un effort héroïque vers un régime de justice et d'amitié civile, de liberté et de coopération fraternelle à instituer parmi les hommes.

Ces implications et ces exigences d'un humanisme intégral, qui de l'ordre spirituel descendent à l'ordre social-temporel, trouvent leur justification rationnelle dans la doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin. Et en même temps l'idée que saint Thomas se fait de la nature humaine nous laisse sans illusions sur tout ce qu'un tel idéal, pour passer dans la vie commune des hommes, requiert d'énergie progressive et de patience pendant de longues suites de générations; dans les perspectives de l'humanisme de saint Thomas, on peut penser qu'à ce point de vue des réalisations sociales-temporelles, nous en sommes encore aux premiers temps du christianisme.

Je terminerai en remarquant qu'à l'image de son Maître, saint Thomas d'Aquin n'a reçu de son temps l'hommage visible des hommes qu'en un bref dimanche des Rameaux.

Il n'a pas exercé d'influence sur les structures temporelles de son époque. Si grande qu'ait été sa gloire, et si forte son influence dans l'Eglise, son oeuvre n'a pas *réussi* de son temps, je dis à l'égard du mouvement de l'histoire et de la civilisation. Il est arrivé pour tirer du moyen âge une substance supratemporelle que le moyen âge n'a pas su utiliser, il a vécu à l'instant critique où la haute culture du moyen âge jetait ses derniers feux, après lui c'est la dissolution éclatante de la civilisation médiévale qui commencera. Son humanisme théocentrique était trop grand pour son temps. Il est permis de penser que saint Thomas d'Aquin a été un saint prophétique, réservé aux temps à venir, et que c'est aux hommes d'aujourd'hui de préparer l'avènement de sa sagesse dans la culture, et de son humanisme dans la cité.

Un tel avènement paraît bien éloigné encore du moment présent,—une pluie de sang, un voile de douleurs, d'humiliations sans nom, de misère et de cruauté

nous'en sépare. Il est probable que nos yeux, qui ont vu trop de crimes impunis, trop de morts désespérées, ne verront pas, sinon en espérance, cette nouvelle chrétienté. C'est que la liquidation de quatre ou cinq siècles d'histoire ne se fait pas en un jour. Mais après une nuit dont Dieu seul connaît la durée, et des renouvellements dont il connaît seul la profondeur, nous voulons espérer qu'un nouvel âge chrétien de la culture, un âge d'humanisme intégral surgira, et je crois, pour ma part, que la pensée de saint Thomas d'Aquin en sera l'âme, comme celle de saint Augustin a été l'âme de la chrétienté médiévale. C'est un grand mystère de voir tant de chrétiens dormir sur le monde, tandis que le monde hurle à la mort, et souffre les angoisses de l'agonie. A ceux d'entre eux qui devant un tel spectacle risquent de perdre coeur, saint Thomas d'Aquin apporte une suprême leçon d'humanisme, en leur montrant, par son exemple et par sa doctrine, que si on met tout son espoir en Dieu, et sans doute à cette condition seulement, on ne désespère pas de l'homme.

MAISTRE NICOLE ORESME  
LE LIVRE DU CIEL  
ET  
DU MONDE

TEXT AND COMMENTARY

ALBERT D. MENUT and ALEXANDER J. DENOMY, C.S.B.

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FOREWORD

With this issue, *Mediaeval Studies* publishes the first of the four Books of the hitherto unpublished *Du Ciel et du monde*, earliest vernacular translation of Aristotle's *De Coelo et mundo*. Books II, III and IV will appear in subsequent issues and the critical introduction will complete the edition.

This French translation was made in 1377 by Nicole Oresme at the request of Charles V of France and was the last of four Aristotelian treatises translated and commented on by the foremost French savant of the Fourteenth Century. *Le Livre de Ethiques* (1370) and *Les Politiques et Yconomiques* (1374) were published by Vérard at Paris in 1488-89; a critical edition of the former appeared in 1940.

Oresme's Latin original was the third mediaeval Latin version of *De Coelo et mundo*, translated from the Greek about 1270 by William of Moerbeke. Occasionally he refers to Michael Scot's version from the Arabic (ca. 1230) as *l'autre translacion*; in his commentary, he used freely Scot's translation of Averrois' Great Commentary, largely to confute it. There is no evidence that Oresme employed the early Latin version by Gerard of Cremona (ca. 1170). Short passages of the French commentary have been published by Duhem<sup>1</sup> and Borchert<sup>2</sup> in the course of research upon Oresme's contribution to scientific thought. The present edition will make the complete commentary available for the first time in conjunction with the text upon which it is based.

The editors believe that students of the history of science will welcome the opportunity afforded by this edition to examine more critically and intensively than has been conveniently possible hitherto the oldest known example of a scholarly commentary on an Aristotelian scientific treatise in any of the modern languages. Those concerned with the historical development of French will find this work especially rich in lexical material and of exceptional interest as an outstanding example of French prose style in a period for which available prose texts are notoriously scarce. The editors' introduction will contain historical and biographical material, a linguistic study, an extensive word-study and a chapter on the evolution of style in Oresme's French writings.

<sup>1</sup> *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, 3 vols., Paris 1906-1913; *le Système du Monde*, 5 vols. Paris, 1913-1917.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Nicolaus Oresme*, (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, xxxi, 3) Münster, 1934.

NOTE ON THE PRESENT EDITION

The hitherto unpublished text of *Du Ciel et du monde* is preserved in the following six manuscript copies:

Siglum

- A Bibl. Nat., *MS. Franç. 1082*, ff. 1a-209c, (late 14th century).
- B Bibl. Nat., *MS. Franç. 565*, ff. 23a-171d, (15th century).
- C Bern, Bibl. Bongarsiana, *MS. 310*, ff. 28a-152d, (late 14th century).
- D Bibl. Nat., *MS. Franç. 1083*, ff. 1a-125b, (15th century).
- E Bibl. Nat., *MS. Franç. 24278*, ff. 1a-146a, (15th century).
- F Bibl. de la Sorbonne, *MS. 571*, ff. 1a-234d, (15th century).

This first printed edition reproduces the text of A, with the following exceptions:

1. The geometrical figures appearing in the text have been assembled and printed conveniently throughout each Book, with suitable references in foot-notes in the order of their appearance; arabic numerals have been inserted at the beginning of chapter headings; proper names are uniformly capitalized throughout; all abbreviations have been solved<sup>3</sup> and words run together in the text have been separated in accordance with modern usage; punctuation has been supplied, without strict adherence to any system; the original of A is retained save in cases where a scribal error is clearly indicated and all textual emendations are indicated by [] with the original reading in a foot-note; unless otherwise indicated, emendations are derived from C; unhistorical final s is enclosed in (); in so far as practical, the rules for the use of diacritical marks recommended by the Committee of the Société des Anciens Textes Français have been followed.<sup>4</sup>

2. Folio numbers are indicated in the margin, the two recto columns lettered a and b and the two verso columns lettered c and d respectively; variant readings are included only when a change of meaning is definitely involved and in Latin quotations;<sup>5</sup> graphic variants are noted only when philological significance warrants.

3. For the reader's convenience, the translator's commentary is set off from the translated text by indenting the latter; in the original, text and commentary are distinguished only by the words "Tiexte" and "Glose" or by suitable abbreviations. References are to folios of A.

4. All foot-note references to works in the Aristotelian corpus are from *Aristotelis Opera ex recensione I. Bekkeri*, 10 vols., Oxford, 1837.

ABBREVIATIONS

Guthrie *Aristotle on the Heavens*, Greek text with English translation by W. K. C. Guthrie (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The Loeb Classical Library, 1939).

Juntas *Quintum Volumen Aristotelis De Coelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, Meteorologicorum, De Plantis, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis*, Venetiis apud Juntas, MDLXXIII.

<sup>3</sup> The practice or usage of the scribe of A has been followed in solving abbreviations and contractions. Thus, when writing in full *comme, comment, commencement* and the various forms of *commencier*, the scribe wrote either *con-* or *com-*, but most frequently *com-*. The editors have followed his more usual practice. The scribe wrote invariably *homme*. In solving the contraction, we have respected his usage.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Romania*, LII (1926), 243-246.

<sup>5</sup> Therefore are omitted minute additions or omissions, e.g. BCDF omit 'chappitre' 1b3, E adds 'generalment' 1b21, B omits 'en un livre' 4c9, etc.; repetitions of the type of CD 'en tiers' 3d4, B 'que' 6c8, F 'est' 17d4, etc.; orthographical errors of minor importance, BE 'ces' for 'ses' 3d12, etc.; all inversions: variants of no contextual importance of the type of A 'preuve' BCDF 'monstre' 1c7, AEF 'dessus dicté', BCD 'devant dicté' 1c17, etc.

## PROLOGUE

- 1a Ou nom de Dieu, ci commence le livre d'Aristote appelé *Du Ciel et du monde*, lequel du commandement de tres souverain et tres excellent prince Charles, quint de cest nom, par la grace de Dieu roy de France, desirant et amant toutes nobles sciences, je, Nychole Oresme, doien de l'eglise de Rouen, propose<sup>1</sup> translater et exposer en françoys. Et est cest livre ainsi intitulé quar il traite du ciel et des elemens du monde, en prenant cest nom *monde* pour les .iiii. elemens contenus dedens le ciel et souz le ciel, quar autrement et communelment en cest livre, cest nom est prins pour toute la masse du ciel et des .iiii. elemens ensemble. Et est cest mot prins ailleurs en plusieurs autres significacions qui ne sont pas propres a cest propos. Et en cest livre sont .iiii. livres partialx. Ou premier, il determine de tout le corps du monde selonc soy et de ses proprietéz; ou secont, en especial du ciel; ou tiers, des elemens selonc les anciens; ou quart, des elemens selon son opinion. Et contient le premier livre .xxxvi. chapitres.

## SOMMAIRES DES CHAPITRES DU PREMIER LIVRE

- 1.—Ou premier chapitre, il monstre que le monde est parfait selonc quantité ou magnitude.
- 1b 2.—Ou secont chapitre, il monstre comment / des corps du monde sont .iii. simples mouvemens locaux.
- 3.—Ou tiers chapitre, il applique aucuns des mouvemens locaux a aucuns des corps du monde.
- 4.—Ou quart, il monstre par .v. raysons que sanz les .iiii. elemens il convient mettre .i. autre corps simple.
- 5.—Ou .v.<sup>e</sup> chapitre, il monstre que le ciel ne est pesant ne legier.
- 6.—O[u]<sup>2</sup> .vi.<sup>e</sup>, il monstre que le ciel ne puet avoir esté engendré ne estre corrompu ne creü ne appeticié ne alteré.
- 7.—Ou .vii.<sup>e</sup>, il preuve par .iii. singnes les choses devant dictes.
- 8.—Ou .viii.<sup>e</sup>, il monstre que a<sup>3</sup> mouvement circulaire ne est aucun mouvement contraire.
- 9.—Ou .ix.<sup>e</sup>, il propose a savoir mon se aucun corps est infini et monstre comment ce appartient a ceste science.
- 10.—Ou .x.<sup>e</sup>, il monstre que ce est impossible que corps meü circulairement soit infini.
- 11.—En le .xi.<sup>e</sup>, il monstre que nul corps mouvable de mouvement droit ne peut estre infini.
- 12.—Ou .xii.<sup>e</sup>, il monstre que nulle pesanteur ne puet estre infinie<sup>4</sup> ne legiereté.
- 13.—Ou .xiii.<sup>[e]</sup>,<sup>5</sup> il monstre generalment que nul corps ne puet estre infini par raysons prinses quant a mouvement local.
- 1c 14.—Ou .xiii.<sup>e</sup>, il monstre que nul // corps ne puet estre infini par raysons prinses generalment quant a toute transmutacion.<sup>6</sup>
- 15.—Ou .xv.<sup>e</sup>, il monstre par autres raysons plus generalles et moins evidentes que nul corps ne puet estre infini.
- 16.—Ou .xvi.<sup>e</sup>, il propose a savoir mon se plusieurs mondes sont ou peuent estre et prove que non par .ii. raysons.

<sup>1</sup> A proposer.<sup>2</sup> A o.<sup>3</sup> A au.<sup>4</sup> BCDF il monstre que ce est impossible que quelconque pesanteur soit infinie . . .<sup>5</sup> A .xiii.<sup>6</sup> BCD quant a tout mouvement ou action.

- 17.—Ou .xvii.\* il preue par une autre rayson que il ne puet estre fors un seul monde.
- 18.—Ou .xviii.\* il prove que les elemens sont meüs a certains lieux determinés sanz ce que la distance soit infin[i]e;<sup>7</sup> et ce avoit il suspousé devant.
- 19.—Ou .xix.\* il reprove les oppinions contraires a ce que dit est ou chapitre precedent.
- 20.—Ou .xx.\* il monstre encore par deux raysons que il ne puet estre que un seul monde.
- 21.—Ou .xxi.\* il met une rayson par laquelle aucuns cuideroient que pluseurs mondes peüssent estre.
- 22.—Ou .xxii.\* il met solucion<sup>8</sup> a la rayson dessus dicte en confermant son propos.
- 23.—Ou .xxiii.\* il monstre que hors cest monde ne puet estre corps sensible quelconque; et ce avoit il supposé ou chapitre precedent.
- 1d 24.—Ou .xxiiii.\* il monstre que hors / cest monde ne est chose qui appartientegne a corps sensible.
- 25.—Ou .xxv.\* il commence a enquerir se le monde est pardurable et met les oppinions des autres anciens.
- 26.—Ou .xxvi.\* il reprouve l'opinion de Plato.
- 27.—Ou .xxvii.\* il reprove les oppinions de Empedocles et de Anaxagoras.
- 28.—Ou .xxviii.\* chapitre, il met disti[n]ctions<sup>9</sup> d'aucuns termes dont il entent user en cest propos.
- 29.—Ou .xxix.\* il determine de ce que est possible ou impossible ou resgart d'aucune puissance.
- 30.—Ou .xxx.\* il entent et commence a prouver que toute chose qui a eü commencement, et toute chose corruptible ara fin, et que toute chose qui avra fin a eü ou avra commencement.
- 31.—Ou .xxxi.\* il veult monstrier universelment que chose qui n'est pas sanz commencement ne est pas sanz fin, [et se elle ne est pas sans fin elle ne est pas sans commencement];<sup>10</sup> et que chose qui est sanz commencement est sanz fin, et se elle est sanz fin elle est sanz commencement.
- 32.—Ou .xxxii.\* il monstre comment des termes de ceste matere aucuns sont convertibles.<sup>11</sup>
- 33.—Ou .xxxiii.\* il s'efforce encore de prouver que, par neccessité, toute chose qui eüt commencement avra fin, et [qui]<sup>12</sup> avra fin eüt commencement.
- 34.—Ou .xxxiiii.\* il argüe encore a cest meïsme(s) propos. //
- 2a 35.—Ou .xxxv.\* chapitre, il veult dire que de neccessité toute chose corruptible<sup>13</sup> sera corrompue, et argüe encore au propos dessus dit.
- 36.—Ou .xxxvi.\* chapitre, il fait a son propos une autre raison plus especiale et de science naturele. /

<sup>7</sup> A infinie.

<sup>8</sup> BCDF il fait response . . .

<sup>9</sup> A distinctions.

<sup>10</sup> A omits 'et se elle ne est pas sans fin elle ne est pas sans commencement.' Cf.

chapter heading, 51b.

<sup>11</sup> BCDF aucuns ensuient l'un l'autre convertiblement.

<sup>12</sup> A omits 'qui.'

<sup>13</sup> A chose cor se corruptible . . .



# Du Ciel Et Du Monde

## LIVRE I

3a 1.—*En ce premier chapitre il monstre que le monde est .i. corps tres parfait.<sup>1</sup>*

3b La science naturele, presque toute, est des corps et des magnitudes qui sont, et de leurs passions ou qualitez, et de leurs mouuemens, et encore de quelconques principes ou causes, de tele sub- / stance.

Glose. Il dit *presque toute*, par aventure, pour ce que une partie de, celle science traicte de l'ame intellective laquelle n'est pas chose corporele, ou pour ce que elle traicte de lieu et de vieu<sup>2</sup> et de infini, si comme ou tiers et ou quart de *Phisique*.<sup>3</sup>

Texte. Car des choses natureles, les unes si sont corps et magnitudes.

3c Glose. Si comme sont les pierres et // teles choses qui sont sanz ame.

Texte. Et les autres ont corps et [magnitude].<sup>4</sup>

Glose. Comme celles qui ont ame, quar une beste a corps et aussi elle puet estre dite corps.

Texte. Et les autres sont principes ou causes des choses qui ont corps.

Glose. Si comme la forme ou la matere ou les elemens. Et ces .iii. mo<sup>z</sup>,—*magnitude et chose continu* et *continu*—signifient une chose. Et pour ce que tout corps est continu, [il] diffinist<sup>5</sup> après *continu* et dit:<sup>6</sup>

Texte. Continu est ce qui est divisible<sup>7</sup> en parties touzjours divisibles.

Glose. Divisible est dit en .ii. manieres; une par separacion de parties realment, et l'autre par signacion de entendement. Et n'est pas a entendre que toute magnitude ou tout continu soit divisible en la premiere maniere, quar ce est impossible par nature que deviser le ciel aussi comme l'en devise une busche en separant une partie de l'autre. Item, en devisant une busche ou une pierre ou autre corps materiel et corruptible, l'en puet venir a si petite partie que on ne la pourroit plus deviser sans corrompre sa substance. Mais

3d tout continu ou magnitude est divisible par signacion en en- / tendement en parties touzjours divisibles, si come les astrologiens divisent les cercles du ciel en degrez, et les degrez en minuz, et les minuz en secons, et les secons en tiers, et puis en quars, et puis en quins. Et ainsi puet l'en, par ymagination, proceder sans cesser. Et semblablement de quelconque(s) corps ou magnitude si comme terre, eaue, une pierre, une busche, et *cetera*, chascun a plusieurs parties, et de ces parties chascune a plusieurs parties, et ainsi touzjours oultre; si come chascun corps a .ii. moitiéz et chascune moitié a .ii. moitiéz, et ainsi en procedant sans fin, combien que par tele division l'en viengne a si petites parties qu'elles sont insensibles. Et est semblablement de toutes choses continues si come sont ligne, superficie, corps, mouvement, temps et teles choses, quar chascune a parties et ne puet l'en dire ne penser si grant nombre de ses parties que encore ne soit il plus grant, et plus grant .c. ou mil foiz, et oultre toute proporcion sans fin et sans terme, combien que la chose soit petite et

<sup>1</sup> D omits chapter heading.

<sup>2</sup> AD bien F dieu.

<sup>3</sup> *Physicorum*: de lieu, III, 1, 200b, 12-15; IV, 1, 208a, 28; de vieu, III, 1, 200b, 21; IV, 6, 213a, 12-13; de infini, III, 1, 200b, 18-20 and 4, 202b, 30-203a, 3.

<sup>4</sup> 'A corps et ame. E corps et ame, but has 'magnitude' superscript before 'ame.' The Latin text reads: "Entium enim naturalium quedam sunt corpus, et magnitudo, et quedam habent corpus, et magnitudinem et que-

dam sunt . . ." Cf. *Quantum volumen Aristotelis Stagiritae de celo, de generatione et corruptione, meteorologicorum, de plantis libri, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis*, Venetiis, apud Juntas, MDL, fol 1b. *In De Coelo*, I, 1, 268a 5-6, "alia corpora ac magnitudinem habent."

<sup>5</sup> A continu et diffinist . . .

<sup>6</sup> A et est dit.

<sup>7</sup> A dit visible.

fust ore la [millesme] partie<sup>8</sup> d'un grain de millet. Et ce est determiné par Aristote ou vi<sup>e</sup> de *Phisique*.<sup>9</sup>

- 4a Texte. Et corps est divisible de toutes pars ou en touz senz, et a touz léz ou selon // toutes dimensions et mesures, car des magnitudes, celle qui est divisible en un sens ou selonc une dimension, ce est ligne; et celle qui est divisible en .ii. sens ou selonc .ii. dimensions, ce est plain [ou] superficie;<sup>10</sup> et celle qui est divisible en .iii. sens, ce est corps.

Glose. Troys dimensions ou mesures sont longitude et latitude et spissitude ou parfondesce, et selonc ce, un corps est lonc et lé et espés. Et ne pueent estre plusieurs dimensions, quar selonc ymaginacion mathematique, se un point indivisible fluoit et aloit et il lessast après soy son estrace, ce seroit une ligne, laquelle seroit divisible seulement selonc longitude. Item, se ceste ligne fluoit et aloit ou estoit meüe et elle lessast après soy une estrace, ce seroit superficie<sup>11</sup> qui seroit longue et lee sanz parfondeur ou sanz spissitude. Item, [s]e<sup>12</sup> ceste superficie estoit meüe et fluoit, elle descriroit et lesseroit une estrace qui seroit longue et lee et espesse; et ce sont .iii. dimensions et est ceste quantité appellee corps. Et se cest corps estoit meü et fluoit et il lessoit après soy une estrace, elle ne avroit plus de dimensions fors .iii. et seroit un corps.

- 4b Et pour ce, ne pueent estre plusieurs dimensions. Item, encor appert / autrement, quar en une plaine superficie l'en puet ymager .ii. lingnes qui se intersequent en un point et font .iiii. angles escarrés ou drois aussi comme en une croiz; et sont ces .ii. lignes longitude et latitude. Et se l'en ymagine<sup>13</sup> une autre ligne traversant selonc spissitude ou parfondesce parmy cestes en cel point, et a angles escarrés ou drois, ces .iii. lignes feront environ le point moyen .xii. angles drois. Mes ce ne puet bien estre figuré en plain, et est simplement impossible de ymager en une superficie plus que .ii. lignes environ ce point tellement disposees ne en quelconque(s) magnitude plus de .iii. lignes tellement disposees<sup>14</sup> environ un point, si comme il puet legierement apparoir a tout homme de cler entendement. Et donques ce est impossible que les dimensions soient plus que .iii., et pour ce di(s)t Aristote après:

Tiexte. Et ne est autre magnitude ou dimension fors cestes.

Glose. L'en doit savoir que chascune de ces .iii. dimensions selonc verité puet estre indifferenment dicte longitude, et chascune latitude ou profundité selonc verité, fors que tant que celle qui premiere est nommee ou ymaginee est dicte longitude, et la seconde latitude, et la tierce profundité ou spissitude. Mais

- 4c selonc le commun usage de parler, // la ou elles sont inequales, la plus grande est appellee longitude, et l'autre après latitude, et la plus petite est dicte spissitude. Après il met encor une cause pourquoy elles ne sont plusieurs, et dit:

Tiexte. Pour ce que .iii. choses sont toutes choses, et que estre divisible .iii. foys ou treblement, ce est estre divisible en toutes manieres.<sup>15</sup>

Glose. Il di(s)t: *propter tria omnia esse*. Et selonc l'autre translacion il dit: *omnia sunt tria*.<sup>16</sup> De ce dit un aucteur en un livre intitulé *De Vetula: inquit*

<sup>8</sup> A la mendre partie . . .

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Physicorum* VI *passim* and especially 1, 231a, 21—232a, 22; also 231b, 16.

<sup>10</sup> A plain en superficie . . .

<sup>11</sup> A 'une' before 'superficie' deleted. BCDF une sup.

<sup>12</sup> A ce.

<sup>13</sup> F et selon ce ymagine on . . .

<sup>14</sup> BCDF omit 'ne en quelconque(s) . . .

disposees.'

<sup>15</sup> E en .iii. manieres.

<sup>16</sup> "L'autre translacion" is the *nova translacio*, which reads: "omnia enim sunt tria, et divisa in tres mensuras." The *antiqua translacio* reads: "propterea quod ipsa tria omnia sunt." Oresme's reading corresponds with the Latin text of the Leonine edition of St. Thomas, III, 5. Cf. Bekker, 26a, 9-10.

*Aristotiles, grecorum philosophorum princeps et dominus verique perhennis amicus, omnes res sunt tres, numerus ternarius in re qualibet existit.*<sup>17</sup> Il vouloit dire que en chascune chose est aucune trinité, et en ce appert la perfection de elle. Et pour ce, la magnitude qui a .iii. dimensions est parfaite, quar elle a toutes dimensions. Après il prouve par .iii. signes la perfection de cest nombre.

Tiexte. Quar en la maniere que dient les Pithagoriens,

Glose. Ce estoient ceus qui ensuioient les opinions de Pythagoras.

Tiexte. Tout et toutes choses sont determinees par .iii., car le acomplissement ou fin, et le moien et le commencement sont tout et sont en cest nombre, lequel est trinité.

- 4d Glose. Nous disons que chascune chose est parfaite parce que elle / a commencement et moien et fin ou accomplissement. Mais ces termes ne sont pas distinctes royalment en chose pardurable, et selon ce disoit Nostre Seingneur: *Je sui commencement et fin.*<sup>18</sup> Et aussi en la circonference d'un cercle le commencement est partout indifferenment. Après il met un autre signe.

Tiexte. Item, et pour ce, anciennement les gens prinstrent leurs loys de cest nombre,—et par nature—et usent de cest nombre aus sanctifications des diex.

Glose. Les loys qui sont volontaires doivent ensuir nature laquelle encline voulenté bien ordenee a maittre loys telles ou telles. Et pour ce que les loys qui sont a magnifier le createur ont regart a cest nombre et veullent que il soit loé et magnifié selon cest nombre .iii., ce est signe que trinité est es natures des choses et est es creatures, et que nature nous enseigne a Dieu louer selonc cest nombre. Et pour ce disoit l'auteur devant allegué: *numerus ternarius in re qualibet existit, nec enim invenimus istum a nobis numerum, sed eum natura docet nos,*<sup>19</sup>—cest nombre .iii. est en chascune chose et nous ne avons pas ce trouvé, mais nature le nous aprent. Et pour ce, les anciens poiens faisoient leurs sacrefices et mettoient plusieurs choses divines selonc

- 5a cest nombre, // si comme il appert meismement es livres de Virgile et des autres poètes, et es hystoires et en un livre que l'en lit aus enfans appellé Grecisme.<sup>20</sup> Et dit Virgile que Dieu se esjoist de nombre nomper: *numero deus impare gaudet;*<sup>21</sup> et .iii. est le premier nomper. Item, les Pythagoriens mettoient nomper en la coordinacion de bien, et per en la coordinacion de mal; et .iii. est le principal et premier nomper comme dit est. Item, unité est principe, commencement et naissance de tous nombres aussi comme Dieu est de totes creatures, lequel est souveraine et vraie et simple unité. Or est unité en l'ordre des nombres nompers desquelz .iii. est le premier, pourquoy appert la dignité et perfection de cest nombre. Item, selon le livre des *Misteres des nombres*,<sup>22</sup> le premier per est ou fu aussi comme commencement de division et de separacion ou inymisté, et par le premier nomper est reformee union et amistié aussi comme se il retornast a unité, et comme se .iii. fussent

<sup>17</sup> Cf. P. Ovidii Nasonis *Pelignensis de Vetula libri tres* (1534), fol. 5v, ll. 20-24:

Inquit Aristoteles Graecorum philosophorum

Princeps et dominus, verique perennis amicus.

Res omnes sunt tres, numerus ternarius in re

Qualibet existit, nec nos extraximus istum

A nobis numerum, sed eum natura docet nos.

See also *La Vieille ou les dernières Amours d'Ovide. Poème français du xiv<sup>e</sup> siècle tra-*

*duit du Latin de Richard de Fournival par Jean Lefevre*, ed. Hippolyte Cocheris. Paris, 1861. n. 265, ll. 5653-54.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Apoc., I, 8: "Ego sum Alpha et Omega, principium et finis."

<sup>19</sup> See note 17 above.

<sup>20</sup> Eberhardi Bethuniensis *Graecismus* (*Corpus grammaticorum medii aevi*, I), Uratistaviae, 1887, ed. Ioh. Wrobel, cap. vii, ll. 18-19 and 38-68.

<sup>21</sup> P. Vergili Maronis *Opera*, Ecloga viii, 75, ed. G. Iannell (Leipzig, 1923), p. 23. B numerus.

<sup>22</sup> Unidentified.

un;<sup>23</sup> et par ce appert la digneté et perfection de cest nombre. Item, qui met ensemble<sup>24</sup> .i. et .ii. et .iii., ce sont .vi. lequel est le premier nombre parfait a prendre<sup>25</sup> perfection si comme elle est prinse en arismetique, quar, a parler  
5b. realment et proprement, .iii. / est plus parfait que .vi. Item, la premiere figure de lignes droites et en laquelle toutes les autres sont resolutes, et qui est aussi comme ellement et principe de toutes, si comme il est demonsté en geometrie, ce est triangle lequel a .iii. costés<sup>26</sup> et .iii. angles. Et donques appert la dignité et la perfection de cest nombre par arismetique et par geometrie et par plusieurs autres considerations des dictes sciences et des autres math[e]ma-  
tiques<sup>27</sup> desquelles je me passe pour cause de briété. Après il met son tiers signe.

Tiexte. Item, nous assignons les appellacions selon ceste magniere quar quant .ii. choses sont, nous disons ambes .ii., et .ii. hommes ambes .ii., et ne disons pas que il sont touz mais nous disons premierement ceste predicacion ou appellacion de .iii.

Glose. Quar en grec et, par aventure, presque en tout autre language, l'en ne disoit pas de .i. ne de .ii., il y sont touz, mais l'en le disoit de .iii. et des nombres ensuiantz.

Tiexte. Et si comme dit est, nous disons ainsi pour nature laquelle nous ensuions.

Glose. Après il applique cest signe a propos.

Tiexte. Et pour ce que ces .iii. choses, ce est a savoir tout et tout et parfait, ne different pas en espede mais different en la matiere<sup>28</sup> en laquelle il sont dis. //

5c. Glose. Ces .iii. mos segnefient une chose fors tant que le premier *tout*, ce est *omne*, est plus apropié a nombre; et le secont, ce est *totum*, a magnitude, et le tiers a forme ou espede.

Tiexte. Il s'ensuit donques que corps sera ou est entre(s) les magnitudes celle qui est parfaite, car ceste seulle est determinée par .iii.

Glose. Ce est assavoir par .iii. dimensions comme dit est.

Tiexte. Et ce est tout.

Glose. Et tout et parfait sont une chose comme dit est.

Tiexte. Quar ce que est<sup>29</sup> divisible en touz sens ou de toutes pars est divisible en totes manieres. Mais des autres magnitudes, une est divisible a .ii. ou en .ii. manieres, et l'autre en une, quar aussi comme elles ont du nombre des dimensions, en celle maniere ont elles division. Une, c'est assavoir ligne, a une dimension, et l'autre, c'est a savoir superficie, a .ii., et l'autre, ce est corps, a division<sup>30</sup> a toutes dimensions.

Glose. Et tout ce est desclairié devant.<sup>31</sup>

Tiexte. Et toutes magnitudes sont continues, mais se toutes choses continues sont divisibles il ne appert pas par ce que dit est maintenant.

Glose. Mais au sixte de *Phisique* est monsté que nul corps n'est indivisible ne autre magnitude ne compose de parties indivisibles.<sup>32</sup>

5d. Tiexte. Mais il appert yci que / de corps l'en ne puet passer en autre guerre ou en autre espede de magnitude aussi comme de longitude

<sup>23</sup> B .vii.

<sup>24</sup> A en ensemble . . .

<sup>25</sup> A parfait et a prendre . . .

<sup>26</sup> B C D F testes.

<sup>27</sup> A mathometiques.

<sup>28</sup> B maniere.

<sup>29</sup> A quar ce est que est . . .

<sup>30</sup> A E divisions.

<sup>31</sup> 4a.

<sup>32</sup> *Phisicorum*, VI, 1, per totum especially 231a, 24; 2, per totum, 232a, 23—233b, 33, especially 232a, 23—25 and 233b, 31—32.

ou de ligne l'en passe en superficie et de superficie en corps. Et telle magnitude qui passe en autre gerre ou en autre espesce ne est pas parfaite, quar par neccessité telle issue ou passee en autre est faite selon et pour la defection ou imperfection de la chose, et ce qui est parfait ne puet avoir telle defaute quar il est divisible et estendu de toutes pars ou en toutes manieres.

Glose. Tout ce puet apparoir par une consideracion devant mise,<sup>33</sup> car se l'en ymagineoit que un point indivisible par son mouvement lessast ou descrist<sup>34</sup> une estrace après soy, ce seroit une ligne et est la premiere magnitude qui est divisible seulement selonc longitude. Et par le mouvement de ceste ligne seroit [descripte]<sup>35</sup> une superficie divisible selonc longitude et selonc latitude, et ceste description est ce que il appelle passer en autre espesce de magnitude. Et superficie descri[r]oit<sup>36</sup> corps ou passeroit en corps par samblable mouvement, mais corps ne pourroit descrire autre espesce de magnitude que corps, quar il a toutes dimensions et est magnitude parfaite comme dit est.<sup>37</sup> Après il met comment le monde est de touz corps le tres plus parfait. //

6a Texte. Et chascun des corps partialz est tel comme dit est selonc raison ou selonc soy car il a toutes dimensions.<sup>38</sup> Mais il est terminé au corps qui est prochain de lui par atouchement, et pour ce chascun de ces corps est partie d'une multitude.

Glose. Si come la terre touche a l'eau et a l'air et nous touchons a l'air et l'air au corps en quoy il est contenu, et ainsi de chascun jusques au derrenier ciel qui n'est contenu en nul autre corps mais encore touche il au corps qu'il contient.<sup>39</sup>

Tiexte. Mais le tout de quoy ces corps sont parti[e]z<sup>40</sup> est parfait par neccessité si come le nom le signifie, c'est assavoir tout le monde, quar il ne contient pas une partie des corps et les autres non.

Glose. Mais il contient et comprend tout et dehors lui n'est quelconque(s) corps. Et donques tout corps est parfait en quantité, et celui est tres parfait qui tout contient par aggregation.

Or avons donques en ce chapitre comment Aristote, a ceste conclusion prouver, prent pour supposition que le nombre de .iii. est parfait, et me semble qu'il touche .iii. manieres de trinité. Une est celle que mettoient les Pythagoriens et est que toute creature a commencement et moyen et fin, 6b quar combien que / aucunes soient perpetueles, toutesvoies selonc Plato<sup>41</sup> ce n'est pas de leur nature ne par elles, mais seulement<sup>42</sup> du maintieng et de la volenté du createur. Et meisme selonc la philosophie de Aristote, toutes sont conservees et gardees en estre par l'influence de Dieu aussi come, par le solail, la lumiere est continuellement causee et maintenue. Et donques, par neccessité, la trinité dessus dicte est en toute creature quant est de soy. Et pour ce que la chose faite doit avoir et a similitude a son faicteur ou a ce qui est en la pensee de son faicteur, ce est signe evident que en Dieu est trinité selonc ce que, par sa puissance infinie, trinité et pluralité est en lui avec simple unité. Item, autre maniere est quar les principales choses du monde et les proprietéz de elles sont selonc cest nombre, si comme .iii. simples mouvemens et .iii. manieres de corps mouvables de simple mouvement,<sup>43</sup>—et ce appert

<sup>33</sup> 4ab.

<sup>34</sup> A descruisist.

<sup>35</sup> A desqri a ce. E escripte.

<sup>36</sup> A descrisoit.

<sup>37</sup> 4c.

<sup>38</sup> B omits 'car il a toutes dimensions.'

<sup>39</sup> B corps en quoy il est contenu.

<sup>40</sup> A partiz.

<sup>41</sup> *Timaeus*, 41a, 5—41b, 6. *Platonis Opera*, recognovit Iohannes Burnet, IV, Oxonii, 1905.

<sup>42</sup> A mais seulement mais du . . .

<sup>43</sup> A simples mouvemens.

- ou chapitre ensuyant<sup>44</sup>—et .iiii. parties de temps,—preterit, present et futur—et pluseurs autres trinitéz sont es creatures et en signe de perfection, et es choses sacrees meismes selon les payens, si comme il est touchié devant.<sup>45</sup> Et pour ce fu dit que le createur veult estre magnifié selon cest nombre, et
- 6c ce nouz enseig- // ne nature<sup>46</sup> en laquelle est relucente la fourme,<sup>47</sup> vestige ou estrace de Dieu. Et pour ce appert que en Dieu est trinité et par consequent Dieu est trinité. Item, une autre maniere est en ce que toute chose corporelle a .iiii. dimensions si comme déclaré est devant.<sup>48</sup> Et posé que nul corps ne fust, encore est ce simplement impossible et enclot contradiction<sup>49</sup> que Dieu feïst et formast une chose corporelle qui eüst plus ou moins de dimensions si comme chascun de cler entendement puet legierement ymaginer. Et donques convient par nécessité que Dieu qui est exemplaire des creatures ait en soy trinité incorporelle, quar ce est impossible que la divine substance soit selon soy corporelle. Et ceste trinité de Dieu laquelle nature nous montre, [apparceurent]<sup>50</sup> jadis pluseurs solempnelz philosophes en lumiere naturelle, combien que ce fust obscurément ainsi comme l'en voit une chose de loing.<sup>51</sup> Item, les sains patriarches et les prophetes la cognurent par inspiration du saint Esperit et ne la nouz exposerent pas clèrement mais en figures et en paroles obscures.<sup>52</sup> Item, nostre Sauveur par soy et par ses disciples et par
- 6a les sains docteurs la nouz a plainement des- / claree en tant comme il souffist a croire pour nostre sauvement,<sup>53</sup> et avec ce comment creature incorporelle est ymage de ceste divine trinité.

2.—Ou second chapitre il monstre comment des corps du monde sont trois simples mouvemens [locals].<sup>1</sup>

Texte. Mais de la nature de tout le corps du monde se elle est infinie selon magnitude, ou se elle est finie et de certaine quantité selon toute la masse de elle, nous entendrons après a ce.

Glose. Ou ix<sup>e</sup> chapitre et après.<sup>2</sup>

Texte. Or, disons donques maintenant des parties de cest corps, et faisons nostre commencement de ce que touz corps naturelz et toutes magnitudes sont mouvables selon lieu, car nature est en eulz principe et cause de cestui mouvement.

Glose. Telz corps sont le ciel et les .iiii. elemens et les choses compostes ou composees des elemens, car [tous]<sup>3</sup> sont mouvables ou en leur lieu naturel, si comme les esperes du ciel, ou a leur lieu naturel se il en estoient hors, si comme les choses pesantes en bas et les legieres en haut, et tout par inclincacion naturelle selon leur forme substancielle. Quar posé que toute la terre ensemble fust perpetuellement sans soy mouvoir, jouxte ce que dit

7a l'Escripture: // *terra vero in eternum stat*,<sup>4</sup> et alibi: *qui fundasti terra[m] super stabilitatem suam non inclinabitur in seculum seculi*;<sup>5</sup> ou que les parties

<sup>44</sup> 7c.

<sup>45</sup> 4d.

<sup>46</sup> B enseigne cest nombre en ...

<sup>47</sup> AE et la fourme.

<sup>48</sup> A par devant. Cf. 4a.

<sup>49</sup> B consideration.

<sup>50</sup> AE apertement; 'ont' inserted in A in margin, to be read before 'monstre.'

<sup>51</sup> Plato, Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists. Cf. R. Arnou, *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XII,<sup>2</sup> Paris, 1935, art. Le Platonisme des Pères, col. 2322-2338. Cf. also R. Arnou, *De Platonismo Patrum*, textes et documents,

Romae, 1935 (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, series theologica, 21) p. 17 ff.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Genesis I, 28; III, 22; Isaias VI, 3; Psalm XXXII, 6.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Matthew III, 16; XXVIII, 19; Luke I, 35; John XIV, 16; XV, 26; I John IV, 13; V, 8.

<sup>1</sup> AB omit 'locals.' Guthrie, ch. ii.

<sup>2</sup> 17c.

<sup>3</sup> A toutes.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Eccles. I, 4: "Terra autem in aeternum stat."

<sup>5</sup> Ps. CIII, 5. A terra.

de elle qui sont vers le centre fussent touzjours sanz mouvement, si comme dit Av[er]roïs<sup>6</sup> ou secont de *Physique*,<sup>7</sup> toutesvoies elles pueent estre dictes mouvables pour ce que elles ont ce par quoy elles se mouvroient a leur lieu naturel se elles en estoient hors, et par quoy elles y reposent, et pour ce que semblables en espesce se mouvent aucune foys. Et nyentmoins, je diray après ou secont livre<sup>8</sup> comment il est possible, et par aventure neccessaire selon le cours de nature, que toute la terre ensamble soit meüe aucune foys.

Tiexte. Et tout mouvement selon lieu ou local est droit ou circulaire ou composé de ces .ii., car ces .ii. mouvemens sont meïsmement simples. Et la cause est quar ces magnitudes seules sont simples, ce est a savoir, la droite et la circulaire.

Glose. Tout mouvement local est mesuré par aucune espasce ou ligne laquelle descript la chose meüe par tel mouvement, et tote telle mesure ou ligne est droite si comme l'en droit une estade ou une lieue en lon[c],<sup>9</sup> ou elle est  
7b circulaire et en ront ou composee de ces .ii. Et ceste composition / puet estre en .ii. manieres. Une est par parties dont une soit droite et l'autre courbe si comme ainsi.<sup>10</sup> Autre maniere est que la ligne ne soit pas droite ne circulaire mais que elle soit corve et tortueuse autrement que circulairement, si comme le cercle d'une cuve beslongue.<sup>11</sup>

Tiexte. Et donques mouvement circulaire est celui qui est fait environ le milieu.

Glose. Ce est entor un point appellé centre qui est ou milieu du cercle.

Tiexte. Et le mouvement droit est celui qui est en haut ou en  
7c montant, et celui qui est en bas ou en descendant. Et je // di celui estre en montant qui est en soy esloingnant du milieu, et celui estre en descendant qui [est]<sup>12</sup> en soy approchant du milieu. Et donques est neccessaire que tout mouvement local simple soit: un en soy esloingnant du milieu, autre en tendant a milieu et autre environ le milieu. Et semble que ceste chose soit consequante selonc rayson a celles que nous avons dictes au commencement, quar corps est parfait en .iii. et mouvement de corps en .iii.

Glose. Il appert par le premier chappitre comment tout corps est parfait parce que il a .iii. dimensions, et comment cest nombre est parfait et a ce s'acorde ce que maintenant est dit que des corps du monde sont .iii. mouvemens simples. Et appert parce que dit est que tout mouvement n'est pas simple qui est selonc droite ligne mais seulement celui qui est en montant droit ou en descendant droit. Et ce est selonc partie d'une ligne ymaginee du centre du monde a la circonference qui est appelee semidiametre du monde, si  
7d comme est la lingne *ab*.<sup>13</sup> / Et donques le mouvement qui seroit selonc quelconque(s) autre ligne droite ou en travers ou en biés ne seroit pas symple, mais seroit composé de circulaire en tant comme aucunement et en partie il est environ le centre du monde, et seroit composé de mouvement droit en tant comme il est aucunement en approchant ou esloingnant du centre si comme le mouvement qui seroit selonc la ligne *cd*. Et semblablement le mouvement circulaire est simple seulement qui est environ le centre du monde ou qui est sanz monter et sanz descendre, et nul autre n'est proprement simple. Et donques sont .iii. mouvemens symples en general pour ce que

<sup>6</sup> A Avrois.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Quantum volumen Aristotelis de physico auditu, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eodem commentariis*, Venetiis, apud Junta. MDLXX, IV, t.c. 45 fol. 67 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Ch. 9, 92b-94c.

<sup>9</sup> AE en loing.

<sup>10</sup> Fig. 1, p. 199.

<sup>11</sup> Fig. 2, p. 199.

<sup>12</sup> ACDF omits 'est.'

<sup>13</sup> Fig. 3, p. 199.

tant seulement en .iii. manieres se puet avoir par mouvement un corps ou regart du centre ou du milieu du monde, c'est a savoir en approchant et en esloignant et en avironnant.

3.—Ou .iii.<sup>1</sup> chapitre il applique aucuns des mouvemens locaux a aucuns corps du monde.

Et des corps les uns sont simples et les autres sont composts ou composés de ces simples. Et je di que les simples sont ceulz quelconques [qui]<sup>2</sup> ont principe ou cause de mouvement en eulz selonc nature, si comme sont le feu et la terre, et corps de leur espeece // et ceulz qui sont prochains de eulz.

8a

Glose. C'est a savoir l'air qui est prochain du feu en son espere et l'yaue qui est prochaine de la terre. Et ces .iiii. ellemens sont simples et les autres corps de ci bas sont mixtes et composts des ellemens. Et ces elemens et leurs parties qui sont de leur espeece ont en soy principe de mouvement local, et les corps composts ont tel mouvement par la nature des simples si comme il sera dit après.

Tiexte. Pour ce est il nécessaire que des mouvemens les uns soient simples et les autres mixtes aucunement, et que des simples corps les mouvemens soient simples et que des corps composts les mouvemens soient mixtes et que le corps compost soit meü selonc le mouvement du simple element qui est predominant et a la seingnourie en tel corps compost.

Glose. Icy sont .ii. choses a desclairier. Une est comment un mouvement est mixte; et est pour ce que il n'est pas purement droit ne purement circulaire. Et en general ceste mixcion puet estre en .iii.<sup>3</sup> manieres. Une est de plusieurs mouvemens drois, et l'autre de plusieurs circulaires et la tierce de droit et de circulaire ou de plusieurs telz. Exemple du premier: se une lance estoit portee tout droit en travers et / une mouche montast tout droit contremont ceste lance, le mouvement de la mousché seroit mixte de .ii. mouvemens drois, c'est a savoir de celui dont elle est meüe aveques la lance et du sien propre, et descriroit par son mouvement une ligne dyametrale<sup>4</sup> ou biëse. Et samblablement feroit un homme qui traverseroit une nef quant elle est meüe et va tot droit aval. Et en ceste maniere .i. mouvement puet estre composé de .iii. ou de .iiii. ou de plusieurs mouvemens drois, si comme l'en puet ymaginer legierement. De la seconde maniere sont pour exemple les mouvemens des plannettes, si comme du solleil le mouvement est mixte du mouvement journal de tout le ciel et du mouvement propre de son espere, et ainsi des autres planetes. Et ne sont pas ces mouvemens mixtes seulement de .ii. mais de plusieurs selonc plus et selonc moins. De la tierce maniere seroit exemple le mouvement d'une chose sus le semidiametre d'un cercle, lequel semidiametre seroit meü circulairement. Et par tel mouvement est describee une ligne appelee *Elycen* de laquelle use Archymenides<sup>5</sup> en la demonstreson<sup>6</sup> de la quarreüre de cercle // et est telle comme il appert yci en figure.<sup>7</sup> Item, selonc la premiere magniere est possible [que]<sup>8</sup> de .ii. mouvemens drois soit

<sup>1</sup> A omits superscript 'e.'

<sup>2</sup> A omits 'qui.'

<sup>3</sup> D .ii.

<sup>4</sup> A dyamentrale.

<sup>5</sup> DE Archimienides. For the definition of *linea spiralis*, cf. *Archimedes Omnia Opera*,

ed. J. L. Heidberg, II (Leipzig, 1913), 44, 11. 16-23.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Archimedes Omnia Opera*, II, 262-315. The term *linea spiralis* is not used throughout the text; the figure used throughout is *conus*.

<sup>7</sup> Fig. 4, p. 199.

<sup>8</sup> A omits 'que.'



- fait un mouvement circulaire, si comme se la ligne .bcd. descend[oi]<sup>9</sup> droit en bas, et .a. fust meü sus elle en alant de .c. vers .b.<sup>10</sup> Je di que les velocitez de ces .ii. mouvemens pourroient estre tellement disposees que quant .a. vendroit sus .b.; il avroit describe la quarte partie de une circonference.
- 8d Item, en retournant de .b. vers .c. et que la / lingne total descendist touzjours, .a. pourroit descripre une autre quarte partie de la circonference. Item, se la ligne total retournoit en montant droit en haut et .a. alast outre vers .d. et après retourmast vers .c.; ainsi pourroit estre describe l'autre moitié de la circonference. Item, selonc la seconde magniere, un mouvement droit pourroit estre mixte de .ii. ou de pluseurs movemens circulaires, si comme qui signeroit un point en la circonference d'un epicicle,<sup>11</sup> cest point pourroit descripre une ligne droite par son propre mouvement circulaire environ le centre de l'epicicle et par le mouvement de l'epicicle environ le centre du grant cercle. Mais en touz telz cas les simples mouvemens dont les mixtes sont composés ne sont pas reguliers. Après convient desclairier comment
- 9a chascun corps mixte est meü selonc le // mouvement de l'element qui a dominacion en cel corps. Et premierement, ce est a entendre de mouvement purement naturel qui n'est pas violent, si comme quant l'en jecte une pierre en haut, et qui n'est pas selonc fantasie et appetit de beste, si comme courir, voler, nœr, qui sont mouvemens mixtes et de corps mixtes. Et nientmoins, telz corps mixtes sont mouvables du simple mouvement de l'element qui a en eulz dominacion. Item, ceste dominacion est a entendre quant as qualités motives lesquelles sont gravité et levité, ce est a dire pesanteur et legiereté. Et celle est dicte avoir dominacion qui habonde et passe l'autre et est la [plus]<sup>12</sup> forte. Or, est ainsi que es corps mixtes parfaits, gravité [ou]<sup>13</sup> pesanteur a dominacion, si comme il appert ou secont livre de *Generacione et corruptione*.<sup>14</sup> Et sont telz corps plus pesans que legiers, et pour ce, il tendent en bas naturellement par simple mouvement, aussi comme feroit la terre qui seroit simple element. Mais en aucuns corps mixtes imparfés, legiereté habonde et a dominacion, si comme sont flämme, fumee, exalacions et aucunes impressions dont est traité ou livre de *Metheores*.<sup>15</sup> Et pour [ce],<sup>16</sup> telz corps,
- 9b quant est de soy, seroient meüz droit en haut, mes / par accident ou par aucune violence, leur mouvemens sont souvent obliques ou tortueus ou traversains et mixtes, si comme il appert par ce que dit Senèque ou livre des *Questions naturelz*.<sup>17</sup> Et se aucun demandoit a savoir mon se un corps porroit estre mixte equalment de ces .ii. qualités motives, je di que non quar se ces .ii. qualités, c'est a savoir pesanteur et legiereté, estoient equales en un corps, les qualités actives, comme sont chaleur et froidure, seroient en tel corps inequales. Et ne puet estre autrement par nature, quar la chaleur passeroit et avroit dominacion. Et donques par son action tel corps seroit tantost alteré et fait [encor]<sup>18</sup> plus chaut et plus sec et par consequant plus legier. Et ainsi l'equalité<sup>19</sup> de ces .ii. qualités motives ne pourroit demourer. Et donques appert que un corps mixte ou mixtioné equalment de ces .ii. qualités motives ne puet durer par temps en ceste equalité, mais convient que une ait dominacion et que elle encline cest corps plus fort que l'autre qualité ou a monter ou a descendre. Et donques tout corps mixte est mouvable selonc

<sup>9</sup> A descendist.<sup>10</sup> Fig. 5, p. 199.<sup>11</sup> Fig. 6, p. 199.<sup>12</sup> A omits 'plus.'<sup>13</sup> A en.<sup>14</sup> Cf. *De Generatione et corruptione*, II, 8 (334b, 31-35) and also Averrois II, t.c. 49.<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Meteorologicorum*, IV, 9 (387a, 8—

388a, 9).

<sup>16</sup> A omits 'ce.'<sup>17</sup> Cf. *L. Annaei Senecae naturalium Quaestionum libros VIII*, ed. Alfred Gercke (Teubner: Leipzig, 1907), II, ch. 24, p. 61, especially II, 16-21.<sup>18</sup> A ou corps.<sup>19</sup> BDF la qualité. E le qualité.

la qualité motive qui a en lui domination. Et pour miex entendre ce qui s'ensuit, l'en doit savoir que les .iiii. elemens sont dis corps simples pour ce  
 9c que de eulz sont com- // posés les autres corps corruptibles et eulz non, fors seullement de leur fourme et de leur matiere et de leur parties integrales. Et des .iiii. elemens le plus bas et le plus gros c'est la terre toute ronde; et après est l'eaue tot environ fors tant que une partie de la terre est decouverte; et après, par dessus, est l'air qui environne yaue et terre; et après, par dessus l'air est le feu qui environne l'air. Et de tant comme l'yaue est plus soubtile et plus clere que la terre, et<sup>20</sup> l'air plus soubtil et plus cler que n'est l'yaue, de tant est l'element du feu en sa region et en son espere plus subtil et plus cler que n'est l'air. Et pour ce, cest feu est invisible et n'est pas ardent aussi comme celi qui est ou charbon ou en la flamme, quar il n'a pas en son espere estrange matiere que il arde ainsi comme busche ou telle chose et il ne art pas soy meïsme(s).

4.—Ou quart chappitre il monstre par .v. raysons que sanz les .iiii. ellemens il convient mettre un autre corps simple.<sup>1</sup>

Or disons donques que se ainsi est que d'un corps le mouvement qui est en circuit est mouvement simple.

Glose. Sy comme il fu dit ou secont chappitre.<sup>2</sup>

9d Tiexte. Et tout simple / mouvement est d'aucun simple corps, quar le mouvement d'un corps compost et mixte est selonc la nature du simple corps qui en tel mixte est predominant et a seingneurie.

Glose. Tout ce fu dit ou tiers chappitre.<sup>3</sup>

Tiexte. Et pour ce que ainsi est, il convient par neccessité que aucun corps simple soit lequel est enclin selonc sa nature a estre meü de mouvement circulaire.

Glose. Et se aucun disoit que cest mouvement est naturel a aucun des .iiii. elemens, il oppose encontre et dit.

Tiexte. Quar bien puet estre que un corps qui a autre mouvement naturel seroit meü de cestui par violence, mais ce est imposible que un corps simple ait plus d'un simple mouvement selonc nature.

10a Glose. Et chascun des elemens est par nature mouvable de mouvement droit, si comme il appert au tiers chappitre.<sup>4</sup> Et donques mouvement circulaire est as elemens aucunement violent et hors nature, et par consequent, il est propre et naturel a un autre simple corps; et c'est le ciel. Et par ce appert que susposé que nul ne veïst le ciel, nientmoins rayson naturele enseigne que aucun corps simple est de autre nature que les .iiii. elemens et qui est mouvable circulairement. // Mais une doubte est de ce que il dit que un simple corps n'a que un simple mouvement, quar l'air descent quant il est en la region du feu et monte quant il est en l'yaue. A ce je respon que ces .ii. mouvemens sont aussi comme un pour ce que il sont en un meïsme terme, c'est a savoir au lieu naturel de l'air. Mais je [fais]<sup>5</sup> encor une doubte, et pose par ymaginacion que un tuel ou canel de cuivre ou d'autre matiere soit si lonc que du centre de la terre il ataingne jusques a la fin de la region des elemens, c'est a savoir jusques au ciel. Je di que [se]<sup>6</sup> cest tuel est[oit]<sup>7</sup>

<sup>20</sup> A est.

<sup>1</sup> B C D F omit 'simple.' B ou .x. c.

<sup>2</sup> 7a.

<sup>3</sup> 8a.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> A omits 'fais.'

<sup>6</sup> A omits 'se.'

<sup>7</sup> A est.



FIG. 1  
(FOL. 7b)




FIG. 2




FIG. 3  
(FOL. 7c)




FIG. 4  
(FOL. 8c)




FIG. 5  
(FOL. 8c)




FIG. 6  
(FOL. 8d)




FIG. 7 (FOL. 15b)




FIG. 8 (FOL. 15c)




FIG. 9  
(FOL. 15c)




FIG. 10 (FOL. 15d)

plain de feu fors que un petit de air fust par dessus tout en bout de haut, cest air descend[r]oit<sup>8</sup> jusques au centre de la terre quar touzjours le moins legier descent sous le plus legier. Et se cest tuel estoit plain de yaue fors que cest tanteit de air fust pres du centre, cest air monteroit jusques au ciel, quar touzjours monte air en yaue naturellement. Et par ce appert que l'air puet naturellement descendre et monter par le s[e]mydiametre<sup>9</sup> de l'espere des elemens. Et ces .ii. mouvemens sont simples et contraires, et donques un simple corps est mouvable naturellement par .ii. simples mou- /  
 10b vemens et contraires. Je respon que, par aventure, l'en pourroit dire que le mouvement de cest tantet d'air, ou cas dessus mis, en descendant est naturel jusques a tant que cest air soit endroit la region ou est le lieu naturel de cest element, et après cest air descent encor en bas par violence parce que le feu qui est plus legier le foule et le met dessous soy. Et ainsi ceste descendue est partie naturelle et partie violente. Semblablement le mouvement de cest air en montant en l'yaue est naturel jusques a tant que il est monté du centre de la terre jusques a la region de l'air, la ou est son lieu naturel.<sup>10</sup> Et après ce, il monte par violence pour ce que l'yaue eslieve cest air et se boute sous luy par sa pesanteur. Et donques toute la descendue de cest air et toute la montee, ces .ii. mouvemens en tant comme il sont contraires, un est naturel et l'autre violent. Et ainsi pourroit l'en dire pour salver les dis d'Aristote; mais il me semble que ce ne soffist pas.<sup>11</sup> Après il met au propos principal la seconde rayson.

10c Tiexle. Item, se le mouvement qui est hors nature est contraire a celui qui est selonc nature, et une chose est contraire seulement a une chose, il s'ensuit par necces // sité que le mouvement simple circulaire, se il est d'aucun corps et non selonc nature, que il soit de celui corps hors nature. Et donques se le feu ou aucun autre de telz corps est meü circulairement, il convient que le mouvement naturel de tel corps soit contraire a mouvement circulaire. Et une chose n'a que un contraire. Et le mouvement qui est droit en haut et celui qui est droit en bas sont contraires.

Glose. Et selonc ce qu'il appert ou comment,<sup>12</sup> les paroles d'Aristote sont fortes et obscures, mais pour la chose entendre, je di que mouvemens sont de .iii. manieres. Un est naturel, si comme du feu droit en haut; l'autre est pur violent contre nature, si comme du feu droit en bas; l'autre est ne selonc nature ne contre nature, mais hors nature, si comme se le feu en son lieu ou en son espere. estoit selonc partie meü en travers. Et Aristote use yci aucune foys de cest mot *hors nature* pour pur violent et qui est contre nature. Je di donques que il a prouvé par la rayson devant mise que mouvement circulaire n'est pas naturel a quelconque(s) des .iiii. elemens, et par ceste seconde il vult monstrier que a nul element cest mouvement n'est pur violent et contre na- / ture, quar chascun element<sup>13</sup> a un mouvement contraire au sien naturel, si comme mouvement droit en bas est contraire au mouvement naturel du feu. Et donques mouvement circulaire n'est pas contraire au mouvement naturel du feu,<sup>14</sup> quar une chose n'a pas .ii. contraires, mais un tant seullement quant est de parfaite contrarieté, si comme sont contraires tres chaut et tres froid, quar ce qui est tiede est contraire a touz ces .ii. de contrarieté imparfaite.

<sup>8</sup> A descendoit.  
<sup>9</sup> A somy di a mettre.  
<sup>10</sup> B omits 'la ou est son lieu naturel.'  
<sup>11</sup> B C D F omits 'Et ainsi pourroit l'en . . . ne soffist pas.'

<sup>12</sup> Averrois, t.c. 10. B commencement, F convient.

<sup>13</sup> B mouvement, F omits 'element.'

<sup>14</sup> D omits 'Et donques mouvement circulaire . . . naturel du feu.'

Tiexte. Et se aucun autre corps estoit meü circulairement hors nature ou contre nature, il co[n]vendroit<sup>15</sup> que cest corps eüst aucun autre mouvement selonc nature; et c'est impossible, quar se c'estoit mouvement en haut, tel corps seroit feu ou air; et se c'estoit mouvement en bas tel corps seroit yaue ou terre.

Glose. Et donques est ce impossible que ce fust autre(s) corps simple que un des .iiii. elemens, et, par consequent, tel mouvement circulaire est naturel et non pas violent a un corps simple autre que un des .iiii. elemens; et c'est le ciel, etc. Après il met la tierce rayson.

Tiexte. Item, encor convient il par necessite que tel mouvement circulaire soit premier, quar chose parfaite est premiere par nature qui n'est chose imparfaite.

11a Glose. En intencion et en dignité, combien // que aucune foys chose imparfaite soit premiere selonc temps et par generacion.

Tiexte. Et figure ou lingne circulaire est parfaite, mais la droite n'est pas parfaite, soit infinie ou finie, car chose qui n'a fin et accomplissement n'est pas parfaite.

Glose. Et donques la lingne qui seroit infinie seroit imparfaite.

Tiexte. Et la droite ligne finie n'est pas parfaite quar l'en puet a elle adjouster et la alongier<sup>16</sup> tant comme l'en veult.

Glose. Selonc ymaginacion. Et donques figure circulaire est parfaite et finie de soy meisme(s) et ne puet estre alongie[e]<sup>17</sup> ne creüe, combien que l'en puisse bien faire une autre ligne circulaire plus grande, mais il n'est pas ainsi de figure droite.

Tiexte. Et le mouvement qui est premier par nature est du corps qui est premier par nature. Et mouvement circulaire est premier par nature qui n'est mouvement droit. Et convient que tel mouvement circulaire soit d'aucun corps simple, et les corps simples de [c]<sup>18</sup> bas, si comme sont feu et terre, ont mouvement droit et nous avons dit devant.

Glose. Ou tiers chappitre.<sup>19</sup>

11b

Tiexte. Que tout corps mixte est meü selonc le mouvement du simple qui a dominacion en luy. Et donques par ces choses appert manifestement que une substance de corps / est laquelle est autre que les elemens et les corps mixtes qui sont yci bas, et qui est plus divine et premiere que toutes les<sup>20</sup> substances corporelles qui sont yci bas ou yci aval.

Glose. C'est le ciel que l'en appelle la quinte essence, qui est plus divine et plus precieuse pour ce qu'elle est plus haut que les elemens. Et des elemens la terre qui est la plus basse est la plus ville, et le feu est le plus noble. Après il met la quarte rayson qui est telle en sentence.

Tiexte. Item, tout simple mouvement qui est d'aucun corps ou ce est selonc nature ou hors nature. Et tout tel mouvement qui est trouvé en un corps hors nature, il compete a .i. autre corps selonc nature. Et ainsi le voions nous es elemens de cy bas, quar le mouvement que la terre a hors nature, si comme est monter haut, compete au feu selonc nature; et descendre est au feu hors nature et a la terre selonc nature. Et pour ce, donques, que mouvement circulaire est a ces elemens hors nature,— quar autres mouvemens leur sont

<sup>15</sup> A covendroit.

<sup>16</sup> AE aloignier.

<sup>17</sup> A aloingnie; CD alongnie; E aloingnee.

<sup>18</sup> A si.

<sup>19</sup> 8a.

<sup>20</sup> F repeats 'substance de corps ... premiere que toutes les.'

naturelz—il convient par neccessité que cest mouvement compete a autre corps selonc nature.<sup>21</sup>

Glose. Ceste rayon coïncide ou est pres de la premiere. Après il met la quinte [raison].<sup>22</sup>

- 11c Tiexte. Item, puis- // que le mouvement circulaire est d'aucun corps selonc nature, il convient que aucun des corps simples et premiers soit mouvable de cest mouvement selonc nature, et que, aussi comme le feu est meü vers en haut et la terre en bas, que cest corps soit meü circulairement selonc nature. Quar se les corps qui sont meüs selonc circuite ou circulairement sont ainsi meüs hors nature ou violement, ce est mervilleuse chose et du tout desraysonnable que cest mouvement qui seul est continuel et perpetuel soit hors nature, quar en autre[s] chose[s]<sup>23</sup> l'en voit que les choses qui sont hors nature sont tres tost corrompues et ne durent pas longuement. Et pousé que le ciel qui est meü circulairement fust feu si comme aucuns dient, cest mouvement ne seroit pas moins hors sa nature que celui qui est en bas.

Glose. Combien que il fust moins contre sa nature.

Tiexte. Quar nous voions que le mouvement du feu est en soy esloingnant du moien ou du milieu selonc droite ligne.

- Glose. Aucuns, si comme fu Anaxagoras, disoient que le ciel est de nature de feu, mais se ainsi estoit, le mouvement circulaire ne luy seroit pas naturel  
11d quar il a autre mouvement propre a sa nature. / Et donques li seroit il violent ou hors nature. Mais une doubte est; quar selonc ce que il appert ou premier de *Metheores*,<sup>24</sup> le feu en son espere et la plus haute partie de l'air sont meüs circulairement, continuellement et perpetuellement. Et cest mouvement leur est hors nature. Et de ce s'[en]suient<sup>25</sup> deux choses contre ce que dit est. Une est que posé que le ciel fust de nature de feu, niémoins il puet estre ainsi meü perpetuellement; l'autre est que mouvement hors nature puet estre et est perpetuel. Je respon et di que le feu est meü circulairement en son espere non pas par sa nature, mais pour ce que le ciel le trait aveques soy par son mouvement et par son influence. Et seroit chose impossible que le ciel fust ainsi meü hors nature se ce n'estoit par la vertu d'un autre corps qui fust ainsi meü par nature. Et donques convient il que aucun corps soit meü circulairement par nature, autre cors que n'est le feu. A l'autre consequant je di que, combien que le feu soit meü circulairement, ce n'est pas pure violence quar il est touzjours en son lieu, mais est hors nature. Et tel mouvement n'est pas perpetuel, quar nul feu n'est perpetuel, mais perpetuellement feu est ainsi  
12a meü aussi comme l'en // diroit que perpetuellement est ou fu et sera<sup>26</sup> aucune violence et aucune maladie hors nature. Et toutevoies [nulle]<sup>27</sup> telle chose singuliere ne dure longuement. Après il conclut.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, l'en puet conclurre par ces raysons que hors ou sanz les corps qui sont yci bas environ nous [est]<sup>28</sup> un autre corps separé de ceulz yci, lequel a plus hounourable nature de tant comme il est plus esloingnié de ces yci.

Glose. Quar des elemens l'un est plus noble que l'autre selonc ce qu'il a plus haut lieu. Et donques le ciel qui est pardessus eulz est encor plus noble.

<sup>21</sup> B omits 'Et ainsi le voions nous . . . a autre corps selonc nature.'

<sup>22</sup> AE omit 'raison.'

<sup>23</sup> A autre chose.

<sup>24</sup> *Meteorologicorum*, I. 2. 339a.11-21.

<sup>25</sup> A sousvient, CDF sensuit.

<sup>26</sup> BCDEF fu ou a esté aucune . . .

<sup>27</sup> A omits 'nulle.'

<sup>28</sup> A et.

5.—*Ou quint chappitre il monstre que le ciel n'est pesant ne legier.*<sup>1</sup>

Pour ce que des choses devant dictes nous supposons les unes estre vraies.

Glose. Si comme que .ii. magnitudes simples sont, et ce fu dit ou secont chappitre.<sup>2</sup>

Tiexte. Et les autres nous avons monstrees et prouuees.

Glose. Si comme que le ciel est d'autre nature que les elemens, ou chappitre precedent.<sup>3</sup>

Tiexte. Il convient dire que tout le corps du ciel n'est pesant ne legier, et convient supposer qu'est a dire *pesant* et qu'est a dire *legier*. Et de ce dirons maintenant tant comme il souffist a la neccessité presente, mais nous / considererons de ce plus diligamment quant nous dirons derechief de la substance de ces choses.

12b

Glose. Ce sera ou tiers et ou quart livre.

Tiexte. Or disons donques que chose pesante est qui est nee et encline a estre meüe au melieu ou vers le centre du monde, et chose legiere est encline a soy esloingnier de cest milieu. Et la chose est tres pesante qui est en bas dessous toutes autres qui tendent en bas, et celle est tres legiere qui est sus toutes choses qui tendent en haut et tent en haut. Et convient par neccessité que toute chose qui tent ou est meüe en bas ou en haut ait en soy legiereté ou pesanteur ou tous les .ii., mais non pas en un regart. Quar aucunes choses sont pesantes et legieres en divers regars, si comme l'air est legier ou regart de l'yaue et de la terre, et est pesant ou regart du feu; et est l'yaue legiere ou regart de la terre et est pesante ou resgart et ou lieu du feu et de l'air. Mais le corps qui est meü en circuite par nature, c'est impossible que il ait en soy pesanteur ou legiereté, quar ne estre meü au milieu ou en soy esloignant du milieu ne luy compete selonc nature ne hors nature. Premièrement, mouvement selonc droi- // te ligne ne li compete pas selonc nature quar chascun tel mouvement est propre a aucun des .iiii. simples elemens, et ainsi le ciel seroit de la nature d'aucun des corps tellement meüs.

12c

Glose. Et c'est contre ce qui est determiné ou chappitre precedent.<sup>4</sup>

Tiexte. Item, tel mouvement ne li compete pas hors nature ou par violence car se estre meü en bas est au ciel hors nature ou par violence, donques estre meü en haut li sera selonc nature. Et se estre meü en haut li est contre nature, estre meü en bas li sera selonc nature, quar nous avons mis devant que les mouvemens qui sont contraires, se un est a un corps contre nature, l'autre li est selonc sa nature.

Glose. Et par ce s'ensuiroit que le ciel fust de la nature d'aucun des .iiii. elemens. Et se aucun disoit que tout le ciel en son lieu n'est pas meü de mouvement droit, mes se aucune partie du ciel estoit hors de son lieu et yci bas, elle tendroit naturellement en haut selonc droite ligne, et donques elle est legiere. Et pour ceste doubte oster, il di(s)t après.

Tiexte. Et verité est que le tout et sa partie sont meüs selonc nature a un meïsme lieu si comme toute la terre et une petite mote.

12d Glose. C'est a entendre posé que tote la terre fust hors de son lieu / quar le tout et sa partie tendent en un lieu.

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. iii.

<sup>2</sup> 7a.

<sup>3</sup> 9d.

<sup>4</sup> 9d.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, le premier corps, c'est a savoir le ciel, n'a en soy quelconque(s) legiereté ne quelconque(s) gravité ou pesanteur, quar se il avoit un ou l'autre il pourroit estre meü au milieu ou en soy esloingnant du milieu selonc nature.

Glose. Et ce ne porroit estre, quar il a autre mouvement qui li est naturel.

Tiexte. Et par ce appert il que c'est impossible que aucuné partie de luy qui seroit detraite et separee soit ou fust meüe en haut ou en bas, car nul autre mouvement que circulaire ne compete au ciel selonc nature ne contre nature, ne a luy ne a quelconque(s) partie de luy, quar quant a ce, une meïsme rayson est du tout et de sa partie.

Glose. Et est a savoir que combien que les planettes soient plus bas et plus près du centre du monde une foy que autre, toutevoies ce n'est pas par mouvement droit mais par mouvement circulaire selonc leurs excentriques et epicles. Item, les impressions qui semblent estoilles qui cheent selonc droit mouvement ne sont pas estoilles du ciel, si comme il appert ou premier de *Metheores*.<sup>6</sup> Item, par ce que dit est appert que, se par impossible selonc nature, une petite porcion du ciel estoit yci bas, elle ne mon- // teroit pas amont, car elle n'a pas en soy la qualité qui encline a tel mouvement ne a autre mouvement droit. Ore avon donques par cest chappître que le ciel n'est ne legier ne pesant, et ces .ii. qualités regardent mouvement local.

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6.—Ou .vi.\* chappître il monstre que le ciel ne puet avoir esté engendré ne estre corrompu ne creü ou apeticie ne alteré.

Semblablement est chose raysonnable de cuidier que le ciel ne fu onques engendré et que il est incorruptible et que il ne puet crestre ne estre alteré.

Glose. Tout ce est a entendre selonc le cours de nature et non pas que il ne puisse estre autrement par la puissance divine qui crea le monde de nient.

Tiexte. Premièrement, que le ciel ne puet avoir esté engendré ne estre corrompu il appert pour ce que toute chose qui est engendree est faite de son contraire; et convient supposer aucun sujet, et est de quoy elle est faite. Et semblablement toute chose corruptible est corrompue de son contraire et en son contraire,<sup>1</sup> et suppose aucun sujet, si comme nous avons dit es premieres paroles.

Glose. C'est ou premier livre de *Phisque*<sup>2</sup> et ou livre de *Generacion*,<sup>3</sup> etc., ou il appert que en toute generacion et corrupcion il convient aucune matiere qui est / le sujet de ceste transmutacion; et est une meïsme en la chose engendree qui estoit en la corrompue. Item, la chose engendree est faite en celle matiere ou de celle matiere<sup>4</sup> après la chose corrupte, et sont ces .ii. choses contraires selonc leurs qualités, et par ce est faite alteracion de froit en chaut ou de chaut en froit, etc. Et s'ensuit corrupcion d'une chose et generacion d'autre, si comme quant une busche ou autre chose est corrompue en feu ou en autre chose, etc.

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Tiexte. Et des choses qui sont contraires les movemens locaux sont contraires.

Glose. C'est a entendre des corps simples, si comme nous voions en l'air que le feu et l'yaue qui sont contraires, un monte [et]<sup>5</sup> l'autre descent.

<sup>6</sup> *Meteorologicorum*, I, 4, 341b, 1—342a, 33 and especially 342a, 12—13.

<sup>1</sup> B omits 'et en son contraire.'

<sup>2</sup> *Physicorum*, I, 5, 188b, 21—23; 7, 190a, 34—190b, 10.

<sup>3</sup> *De Generatione et corruptione*, II, 4—5, 331a, 7—333a, 15 and especially 331a, 14; I, 1, 314b, 26—27.

<sup>4</sup> DE omit 'ou de celle matiere.'

<sup>5</sup> A omits 'et.'



Tiexte. Et au mouvement du ciel rien n'est contraire, quar a mouvement circulaire nul mouvement n'est contraire.

Glose. Et ce sera desclairié après en [le] .viii.\*" chappitre.

Tiexte. Et par ce semble que nature a bien fait en ce que le ciel qui devoit non point<sup>7</sup> avoir esté engendré et estre incorruptible, elle l'a exempté de contrariété, car generacion et corrupcion sont en toutes choses<sup>8</sup> contraires.

13c Glose. C'est a savoir qui sont contraires selonc les qualités actives et passives comme sont chaut et froid, et sec et moiste. // Et le ciel n'a en soy nulle telle qualité, combien qu'il ait vertu et puissance de les causer et faire es corps corruptibles.

Tiexte. Item, le ciel ne puet crestre, quar tote chose qui prend creissance, c'est de chose conveniente qui vient dehors et est resoluë en la matiere.

Glose. La chose dehors est altere[e]<sup>9</sup> et corrompue ou résoluë, et par ce elle passe et est convertie en la substance de la chose qui creste soit par nut[ri]cion<sup>10</sup> ou nourrissement, si comme il est es bestes et es plantes, ou par autre addicion, si comme il est de la pierre qui creste en la terre.

Tiexte. Et il n'est chose de quoy le ciel soit fait ou partie de luy.

Glose. Quar le ciel n'est pas chose materiele ou se il est de matiere, elle est d'autre nature que la matiere des choses de ci bas qui est subjecte a corruption et generacion, etc. Après il monstre comment le ciel ne puet estre alteré.

Tiexte. Item, se le ciel ne puet crestre ne estre fait plus grant ne plus petit, l'en doit entendre par semblable rayson que il n'en puet estre alteré.

13d Glose. Alteracion est transmutacion a aucune qualité et le ciel si puet bien en aucunes de ses parties estre alteré a qualité de lumiere, tant pour l'approchement du soleil a elles comme pour / l'ombre de la terre et de la lune et d'aucunes estoilles. Item, aus qualités des vertus par lesquelles sont faites les influences peuent estre altere[e]s<sup>11</sup> les parties du ciel selonc la diversité des regars et des disposicions que il ont par leurs mouvemens. Mais le ciel ne puet estre alteré selonc les qualités actives et passives, [si]<sup>12</sup> comme sont chaleur et froidure et semblables ne<sup>13</sup> selonc celles qui sont causees de cestes, si comme sont odeur, saveur, santé, langueur, etc. Et ainsi est a entendre ce que dit est.

Tiexte. Quar alteration est mouvement selonc qualité et les habis des qualités et les disposicions, si comme sont santé et langueur, ne sont pas sanz transmutations qui sont selonc passions.

Glose. C'est a savoir selonc qualités actives et passives.

14a Tiexte. Et nous voions de touz les corps naturelz qui sont transmués selonc tele passion qu'il ont accroissement et appetisement, si comme les corps des bestes et des plantes et les parties de telz corps et semblablement des elemens. Et donques se le corps circulaire du ciel ne puet avoir accroissement ne appetisement, c'est chose raysonnable que il ne puisse estre alteré. Or donques se l'en croit les choses // yci suspousees, il appert par ce que dit est que le premier des corps, c'est a savoir le ciel, est pardurable et ne reçoit accroissement

\* A en VIII\* chappitre. Cf. 14d-15a.

<sup>7</sup> BCDEF 'non pouvoir avoir ...'

<sup>8</sup> BCDEF 'sont entre choses ...'

<sup>9</sup> A altere.

<sup>10</sup> A nutacion.

<sup>11</sup> A alteres.

<sup>12</sup> A omits 'si.'

<sup>13</sup> A nes.

ne appetisement, et ne puet enuieillir ne estre alteré et est impassible. Glose. Tout ce est a entendre selonc le cours de nature ou selonc ce que puet apparoir par rayson naturelle, car selonc verité le ciel eût commencement non pas par generacion naturelle mais par creacion de Dieu.

7.—Ou .vii.\* chapitre il preuue par .iii. signes les choses devant dictes.

Et semble que rayson face tesmoingnage et que elle s'acorde as choses apparantes, et les choses apparentes<sup>1</sup> a rayson, quar touz hommes ont estimacion des diex et que aucunes choses divines sont.

Glose. Et ce desclaie Tullies en son livre *De la Nature des Diex*.<sup>2</sup>

Tiexte. Et touz atribuent a Dieu le lieu qui est lasus, c'est a sauoir le ciel.

Glose. *Celum celi domino*, etc.;<sup>3</sup> *Pater noster*, qui es<sup>4</sup> in celis.<sup>5</sup>

Tiexte. Et Barbares et Grecs, quiconques cuident que aucuns diex soient, attribuent a Dieu cest lieu aussi comme se<sup>6</sup> a chose inmortelle fust deü et convenable lieu inmortel; et est impossible autrement.

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Et donques se aucune chose divi- / ne est comme si est, les choses maintenant dictes de la premiere substance corporelle sont bien dictes.

Glose. Selonc verité Dieu est en ciel et en terre et partout, mais l'en li approprie le ciel par especial pour la noblesce du lieu et pour ce que yleques apparissent les oeuvres de Dieu plus mervilleusses. Et les autres substances incorporelles appellees intelligences sont où ciel et non ailleurs selonc Aristote.<sup>7</sup> Après il met le secont signe.

Tiexte. Item, ceci appert sensiblement a souffisance quant a creance humaine quar, en tout le temps passé selonc le memoire qui a esté baillié des uns aus autres, nulle chose n'est transmuee ou ciel ne en tout ne en partie.

Glose. Et c'est grant signe que il est incorruptible, quar autrement il fust enuieilli ou son mouvement fust retardé ou meü,<sup>8</sup> ou il fust aucunement alteré en tout ou en partie, si comme il est des autres corps corruptibles. Mais aucunes choses estoient avenues et sont depuis desquelles Aristote n'avoit pas congnoissance, si comme de ce dont saint Augustin fait mencion ou .xxi.\* livre de *la Cité de Dieu*,<sup>9</sup> et alegue un appellé Varro, lequel Varro alleguoit

14c

.ii. anciens nobles mathematiciens // qui disoient que ou temps du roy Ogiges la tres belle estoille que nous appellons journal mua sa couleur et mua sa quantité et sa figure et son cours. Et en ce temps fu un deluge de yaue en Egipte ou en Achaïe, et fu environ mil et .vii.\* et .lx. ans avant la nativité nostre Seingneur.<sup>10</sup> Item, nous avons en la sainte Escripture comment le

<sup>1</sup> BCDEF omit 'apparentes.'

<sup>2</sup> M. Tullii Ciceronis, *Scripta omnia*, recognovit C. F. W. Mueller (Teubner: Leipzig, 1898), Parts IV, vol. II, I, 2 (p. 48); I, 4 (p. 51, ll. 19-21); II, 16 (p. 62, ll. 6-7; II, 21 (p. 65, ll. 27-29); II, 24 (p. 68, ll. 24-26); II, 31 (p. 74, ll. 24-30); III, 3 (p. 109, l. 33—p. 110, l. 1); III, 4 (p. 111, ll. 3-6).

<sup>3</sup> Psalm CXIII, 16.

<sup>4</sup> A est.

<sup>5</sup> Matthew, VI, 9.

<sup>6</sup> A comme que se.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *De Caelo* II, 2, 285a, 28-30; II, 6, 288a, 34-288b, 6; *Metaphysicorum*, Lambda, 8, 1073a, 28-38. Cf. also René Mugnier, *La Théorie du Premier Moteur et l'Évolution de la Pensée Aristotelicienne*, Paris, 1930, especially ch. 2.

<sup>8</sup> BCF mué; DE minué.

<sup>9</sup> *Sancti Aurelii Augustini episcopi De Civitate Dei*, ex recensione B. Dombart quartum recognovit A. Kalb, II (Teubner: Leipzig, 1929), XXI, 8, p. 504, ll. 16-23.

<sup>10</sup> Apparently Oresme has computed the date of this flood, recorded by Orosius as having taken place in Achaia 1040 years before the founding of Rome, *Pauli Orosii Historiarum adversum Paganos*, I, 7 (ed. Carolus Zangemeister, Teubner, Leipzig, 1889), p. 20, and by Eusebius as taking place in Egypt 1020 years before the first Olympiad in the reign of Ogyges, *Eusebii Caesariensis Opera*, I, *Praeparationis Evangelicae*, X, 10 (ed. Guilielmus Dindorfius, Teubner, Leipzig, 1867), from St. Jerome's interpretation of Eusebius.

solleil se arresta ou temps de Josue<sup>11</sup> et comment il retourna ou temps de Ezechias,<sup>12</sup> et comment il fu eclipsé ou temps de la passion nostre Seingneur;<sup>13</sup> mais telles choses furent hors le commun cours de nature. Après il met le tiers signe.

Tiexte. Item, il semble par le nom qui fu donné au ciel des anciens jusques au temps present que eulz avoient telle estimacion comme est celle que nous avons dicte. Quar il convient cuider que uns meïsmes oppinions reviennent ou retournent non pas seulement une foys ne .ii., mais par foys infinies ou [in]nombrables.<sup>14</sup>

Glose. Suspousé que le monde n'eüst onques eü commencement si comme aucuns tenoient, et cest oppinion recite *Ecclesiastes* quant il dit *nichil novum sub sole*,<sup>15</sup> etc.; et n'est pas vraie.

14d Tiexte. Et pour ce, le corps qui est ou lieu souverain / aussi comme s'il fust autre que feu et terre et air et yaeue, les anciens l'appellerent etheir et li metoient ceste d[en]ominacion<sup>16</sup> en segnefiant que il court et est meü touzjours en temps pardurable.

Glose. Quar etheir en leur language segnefie perpetuellement courant.

Tiexte. Mais Anaxagoras use de cest nom et non pas bien, quar il prent ether pour feu. Or appert donques par ce que dit est que le nombre des corps simples du monde ne puet estre plus grant, quar de corps simple, il convient par neccessité que le mouvement soit simple, et nous disons que les mouvemens simples sont seulement droit et circulaire. Et de mouvement droit sont .ii. parties; un[e]<sup>17</sup> est en esloingnant du milieu et l'autre en ap[roch]ant.<sup>18</sup>

Glose. Et donques, en general, sont .iii. corps simples. c'est a savoir pesant, legier et celui qui n'est pesant ne legier; et, en especial, son[t]<sup>19</sup> .v., c'est a savoir .ii. pesans et .ii. legiers et le ciel.

8.—Ou .viii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre il monstre que a mouvement circulaire n'est aucun mouvement contraire.<sup>1</sup>

Mais que a mouvement circulaire nul autre mouvement local n'est contraire, l'en puet de ce prendre foy par plusieurs raysons.

15a Glose. Et ce avoit esté susposé au sixte // chappitre.<sup>2</sup> Et doit l'en savoir que l'en puet ymaginer en .iii. manieres que ce mouvement ait contraire: une est que mouvement droit soit son contraire; autre est que une partie de mouvement circulaire soit contraire a l'autre; la tierce est que tot .i. mouvement circulaire soit contraire a tout un autre circulaire. Et selonc ce, Aristote procede en .iii. manieres.

Tiexte. Et premierement, il sembleroit meïsmement que a chose circulaire fust contraire chose droite, quar concave et convex ou courbe ne sont pas seulement opposite[s]<sup>3</sup> un a l'autre, mais touz .ii. semblent opposites a ce que est droit.

Glose. Concave et convexe sont opposites par relacion et non pas par con-

*Chronica*. According to St. Jerome's interpretation, the flood which occurred under King Ogyges took place in the two hundred fifty-fourth year after Abraham. S. *Hieronymi Interpretatio Chronicae Eusebii Pamphili* (P. L., XXVII, 142). Now, from Abraham until the birth of Our Lord there is a period of 2015 years (*ibid.*, 558). By subtracting the 254 from 2015, one obtains very nearly Oresme's date of B.C. 1761.

<sup>11</sup> Jos. X, 13.

<sup>12</sup> Isaias XXXVIII, 8.

<sup>13</sup> Luke XXVIII, 45.

<sup>14</sup> A nombrables. C innombrables. F omits.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Eccles. I, 10: "nichil sub sole novum."

<sup>16</sup> A dominacion. C nomination.

<sup>17</sup> ABCF un.

<sup>18</sup> A apraisant.

<sup>19</sup> A son.

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. iv. BCDEF circulaire nul mouvement n'est contr.

<sup>2</sup> 13b.

<sup>3</sup> AB opposite.

trariété, quar la chose circulaire est dicte concave ou regart de ce qui est dedens, et est dit[e]<sup>4</sup> convexe ou regart de ce qui est dehors, et toutevoies c'est une meisme chose.

Tiexte. Et donques se en ce est contrariété, il convient par neccessité que mouvement droit soit contraire a celui qui est en circuite. Et mouvement droit est contraire a mouvement droit pour la contrariété des lieux, quar haut et bas sont differances de lieu et sont contraires.

- 15b Glose. Les movemens sont contraires qui sont a termes contraires en distance, si comme sont monter / et descendre. Et un mouvement n'a fors un contraire, si comme il fut dit ou quart chappitre.<sup>5</sup> Et donques a mouvement droit n'est pas contraire mouvement circulaire, ne par consequant, circulaire a droit. Après il monstre que une partie de mouvement circulaire n'est pas contraire a l'autre.

Tiexte. Et se aucun disoit que une meisme(s) rayson est de mouvement droit et du circulaire.

Glose. Quant a ce que les parties du mouvement circulaire qui sont a termes contraires fussent contraires.

Tiexte. Et que le mouvement qui est selon demycerle de .a. jusques a .b., fust contraire au mouvement qui est de .b. jusques a .a. selonc<sup>6</sup> cest demycerle.<sup>7</sup> Mais ce dit est voir en mouvement droit ouquel les manieres des voies sont finies, de .a. jusques a .b. et de .b. a .a.

- 15c Glose. Quar entre .a. et .b. ou de .a. a .b. n'a fors une ligne droite.  
Tiexte. // Mais de .a. a .b. et de .b. a .a. les lingnes ou voies circulaires ou tortueuses sont infinies et innombrables.

Glose. Et donques ne sont pas les movemens selonc elles contraires, quar une chose n'a fors un contraire comme dit est. Après il oste une cavillacion que aucun pourroit faire.

Tiexte. Et semblablement le mouvement qui est de .d. a .g. par i. demycerle, et de .g. a .d. par le dyametre ne sont pas contraires, quar nous mettons que chascune distance local de contraires est prinse selonc lingne droite.<sup>8</sup>

- 15d Glose. Quar contrariété est distance et toute distance est mesuree par lingne droite comme par le plus brieve. Après il oste une autre cavillacion.

Tiexte. / Semblablement,<sup>9</sup> se aucun faisoit un cercle et metoit que le mouvement qui est par un demycerle est contraire au mouvement qui est par l'autre demycerle, si comme qu'en tout le cercle le mouvement qui est de .e. a .z. par le demycerle signé par .i. soit contraire a l'autre qui est de .z. a .e. par le demycerle signé par .t. Quar possé que il fussent contraires, il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que le mouvement qui est selonc tout le cercle eüst contraire.

Glose. Et d'autre partie, contra[riété]<sup>10</sup> de distance local est prise selonc ligne<sup>11</sup> droite comme dit est. Et ce entent Aristote par ce que il dist "semblablement", c'est a dire par semblable rayson comme est la devant dicte. Après il monstre que tout un mouvement circulaire n'est pas contraire a tout un autre circulaire et par .ii. raysons.<sup>12</sup>

- 16a Tiexte. Quant la circulacion ou mouvement circulaire qui commence // de .a. et procede par .b. et après par .g. et revient a .a., qui mettroit qu'elle est contraire a la circulacion qui commence de .a. et procede

<sup>4</sup> A dit.

<sup>5</sup> 10bc.

<sup>6</sup> D .a. si come il appert cy selon . . . E si come apert ici selon . . .

<sup>7</sup> Figure 7, p. 199. A selonc meismes cest . . .

<sup>8</sup> Figure 8, p. 199.

<sup>9</sup> Figure 9, p. 199.

<sup>10</sup> A contraire.

<sup>11</sup> A selon la ligne . . .

<sup>12</sup> Figure 10, p. 199.

l'autre voie par .g. et puis par .b. et revient a .a., ce ne<sup>15</sup> puet l'en dire, quar l'une et l'autre sont ou procedent d'un<sup>11</sup> meisme terme [a]<sup>16</sup> un meisme terme; et mouvement contraire est de terme contraire a terme contraire.

Glose. Il me semble que se une chose tournoit environ un cercle en une maniere, et un[e]<sup>16</sup> autre en autre maniere, et ces .ii. mouvemens seroient aucunement contraires; et quant les corps s'entr'encontreroient il s'entr'empescheroient aussi comme se l'un montoit et l'autre descendoit. Mais telz mouvemens ne sont pas proprement circulaires, quar mouvement circulaire est quant un corps circulaire ou sperique est meü environ son centre. Et selonc ce, Aristote met après la seconde rayson.

16b

Tiexte. Item, se un mouvement circulaire estoit contraire a un autre circulaire, il convendroît que un des .ii. fust pour noient, quar de quelconque(s) partie que tel mouvement commence, il retourne a uns meismes liex, et par toutes les distances contraires. Et les contrarietés des lieux et des distances sont haut / et bas, devant et derriere, destre et senestre.

Glose. Il sera dit après ou secont livre comment telles differences sont prises et assignees ou ciel.<sup>17</sup>

Tiexte. Et les contrarietés des movemens sont selonc la contrariété des liex. Je di donques que se les puissances motives qui veullent mouvoir circulairement en manieres opposites estoient egales, elles ne mouvroient pas; et se une de elles avoit dominacion, l'autre ne mouvroit pas. Et donques se les .ii. ne pavoient mouvoir, toutes .ii. seroient pour noient; et se une ne pavoit movoir, elle seroit pour noient, quar nous disons que le chausement est pour nient dont l'en ne se puet chaucier. Et Dieu et nature ne font rien pour noient.

16c

Glose. Deux corps mouvables de mouvement proprement circulaire ne pueent estre ensemble, quar ce seroit penetracion de dimensions qui ne pueent estre par nature, si comme il appert ou quart livre de *Phisique*.<sup>18</sup> Et se il estoient un dedens l'autre aussi comme sont les corps du ciel, et un fust meü d'orient en occident et l'autre a l'opposite, ces mouvemens ne sont pas contraires et ne empeschent pas un l'autre. Mais se un meisme(s) corps estoit une foys meü en une ma- // niere, et autre foys en autre, il sembleroit que telz mouvemens fussent contraires, aussi comme les mouvemens d'une pierre qui monteroit et puis descendroit. Je respon que telz .ii. mouvemens circulaires ne sont pas contraires. Et la cause est pour ce que il pueent estre un après l'autre sanz discontinuacion mais non pas sanz moien et naturellement, quar posé que quelconque(s) espere, si comme tout le ciel, fust meüe de orient en occident sus .ii. poles si comme le pole artique et le pole ant[ar]tique,<sup>19</sup> et aveques ce que le ciel fust meü sus .ii. autres poles, un ymaginé en orient<sup>20</sup> et l'autre en occident, en tant que, par procès de temps, le pole artique venist par cest mouvement la ou est le pole antartique, adonques le ciel tourneroit a l'opposite du mouvement present et naturellement. Et tout ce puet l'en legierement considerer ou esprouver en une petite espere materielle. Et donques ces .ii. mouvemens ainsi opposites ne sont pas contraires. Mais aucun pourroit obicier encontre, quar se une mousche montoit contremont une lance, et cependant la lance fust tournee ce dessus dessous, la mousche

<sup>15</sup> E omits 'ne.'

<sup>16</sup> A une.

<sup>16</sup> A et.

<sup>16</sup> A un.

<sup>17</sup> Ch. 6, 80d-87a.

<sup>18</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 1, 209a, 6-7 and 5, 212b, 25.

<sup>19</sup> A antrartique.

<sup>20</sup> CDEF occident.

- 16d descendroit, et donques ces .ii. mouvemens, monter / et descendre, sont en ce cas un après l'autre sanz descontinuacion et non pas sanz moien. Et nientmoins il sont contraires. Item, se une pierre descendoit jusques au centre du monde et passoit oultre tout droit en montant de l'autre part, il appert clerement que [en]<sup>21</sup> ce cas .ii. mouvemens contraires seroient continues et sanz moien, et donques telle continuité n'oste pas contrariété. Je respon de di que combien que en ces .ii. cas derreniers un mouvement soit après l'autre sanz descontinuacion, toutesvoies ce n'est pas naturellement, quar un est naturel et l'autre est violent. Mais ou cas devant mis un et l'autre seroient naturelz equalment, et selonc ceste science c'est impossible que .ii. simples mouvemens contraires soient naturelz a un corps simple. Et par ceste consideracion l'en pourroit soustenir une chose que dient Pomponius<sup>22</sup> et Solinus, laquelle sembleroit a plusieurs impossible. Pomponius<sup>22</sup> dit ainsi en son premier livre: *Mandatum litteris servant, Egipcii dum sunt, solem bis occidisse unde nunc oritur.*<sup>23</sup> Et Solinus dit ainsi: *Egipcii ferunt a primis sibi gentis sue avis traditum, ubi nunc occasus est, quo[n]dam<sup>24</sup> ibi ortus solis // fuisse.*<sup>25</sup> Il dient que la ou le solleil rescouse, il leva anciennement. Et combien que ce soit faulz, quar le monde n'a pas tant duré que ce peüst avoir esté, toutevoies, se le mouvement du ciel duroit perpetuellement, ce seroit bien possible<sup>26</sup> pour ce que le pole artique vendroit la ou est le pole antartique par un mouvement si tardif que il n'est encor pas appareü. Item, telle chose pourroit apparoir ou estre par le mouvement de la terre si comme je diray autre foyz, quar ce ne fet pas a ce propos.
- 17a

9.—Ou .ix.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il propose a savoir mon se aucun cors est infini et monstre comment ce appartie[n]t a ceste science.<sup>2</sup>

Mais pour ce que il appert des choses dessus dictes, il convient entendre a parler des autres. Et premierement a savoir mon se aucun corps est infini, si comme plusieurs des anciens ont cuidé, ou se c'est impossible; quar se il est ainsi ou non, ce n'est pas peu de difference, mais fait differer toute la speculacion de verité, quar presque a touz ceulz qui dient aucune chose de toute nature, ceci est commencement de contradicion.

- Glose. Quar ceulz qui tiennent que aucun corps est infini ou plusieurs, il convient que la plus grande partie de leurs conclusions et les plus principales
- 17b contredient / a celles de ceulz qui tiennent l'opposite. Et ce desclaire il après. Tiexte. Quar se aucun se depart de verité au commencement, il se trouvera après plus loing de elle .x.m. fois, si comme celi qui diroit que aucune magnitude ou quantité est tres petite et indivisible pour certain, en mettant ou entroduisant ceste opinion, il oste et destruit tres grande partie des conclusions mathematiques. Et la cause est quar le principe est plus grant en vertu que en quantité et pour ce, l'erreur qui est bien petite au commencement et ou principe est en la fin moult grande.

Glose. Et l'en suppose comme principe en mathematiques que toute chose

<sup>21</sup> A omits 'en.'

<sup>22</sup> B Pompinus.

<sup>23</sup> *Pomponii Melae de situ orbis* (ed. Carolo Henrico Tzschvckio, Leipzig, 1807), I, 9, p. 21: "mandatum litteris servant, dum Aegyptii sunt, quater cursus suos vertisse sidera, ac solem bis jam occidisse, unde nunc oritur."

<sup>24</sup> A quodam.

<sup>25</sup> *C. Julii Solini collectanea rerum memorabilium* (iterum recensuit Th. Mommsen, Berlin, 1895), ch. 32, p. 146, ll. 39-41.

<sup>26</sup> F impossible.

<sup>1</sup> A appartiet.

<sup>2</sup> Guthrie, ch. v.

continue<sup>3</sup> est divisible et composee de parties qui sont touzjours divisibles sanz ce que l'en puisse devenir a parties qui soient simplement tres petites, si comme il fu dit ou premier chappitre.<sup>4</sup>

Tiexte. Et dire que aucune chose est infinie et meïsmement en quantité, cest dit a vertu de principe, et donques n'est ce pas chose merveilleuse ne desraysonnable se grant diffrance vient<sup>5</sup> de ce que l'en met aucun corps a estre infini. Et pour ce, nous dirons de ceste chose en repetant aucunes choses dites au commencement. //

17c Glose. Ce fu ou .iii.<sup>6</sup> chappitre.<sup>6</sup>

Tiexte. C'est a savoir que par neccessité tout corps est ou des simples ou des composts, et pour ce, cors infini, se il povoit estre, seroit simple ou compost. Mais il est certain que, se les simples sont finis, le corps qui est composé de eulz est fini, car le cors qui est composé de corps finis en multitude et en quantité est fini en multitude et en quantité pour ce qu'il est tant grant comme sont ceulz dont il est composé(s). Or reste donques considerer a savoir mon se aucun des corps simples est infini en magnitude ou quantité. Et nous monstrerons que ce est impossible. Et premierement nous argüerons du premier corps, c'est a savoir du ciel, et après nous dirons des autres.

10.—Ou .x.<sup>7</sup> chappitre il monstre que c'est impossible<sup>1</sup> que un corps meü circulairement<sup>2</sup> soit infini.

17d Il appert par les raysons qui ensuient que tot cors meü circulairement est fini,<sup>3</sup> / premierement quar s'il est infini, chascune des lignes qui issent du milieu ou du centre de cest mouvement et procede outre e[s]t<sup>4</sup> infinie. Et de .ii. telles lingnes infinies la distance ou esp[a]sse<sup>5</sup> d'entre elles .ii. est infinie. Et donques se par le mouvement de cest corps, la ligne .ab. venoit la ou est la ligne .ac., celle ligne .ab. avroit trespasce en celuy temps une esp[a]sce<sup>6</sup> infinie et c'est impossible.

Glose. Si comme il appert ou sixte de *Phisque*.<sup>7</sup>

Tiexte. Et donques un corps infiny ne puet estre meü circulairement. Et nous voions sensiblement que le ciel est meü circulairement et avons determiné par rayson que mouvement circulaire est naturel a aucun corps.

Glose. Ce fu ou quart chappitre<sup>8</sup> et c'est la premiere rayson en sentence. Après il met la seconde qui est en sentence telle.

18a Tiexte. Item, se de temps fini l'en oste partie finie, le residu est finy. Et se le temps<sup>9</sup> est finy le mouvement est finy, et l'espasce passee est finie et les autres choses semblablement. Or est le temps finy ouquel le ciel fait une circulacion et donques chascune partie de cest temps est finie. // Or<sup>10</sup> mettons donques que le centre du mouvement soit .a. et que de ce centre isse une ligne .age. qui soit infinie devers la partie de .e. Et après ymaginon une autre ligne en l'espasce inmouvable qui soit decoste ceste et ne passe pas par le centre, mais

<sup>3</sup> A continuee.

<sup>4</sup> 3cd.

<sup>5</sup> D meust. E ni eust.

<sup>6</sup> 7d-8a.

<sup>7</sup> E possible.

<sup>8</sup> DE naturellement.

<sup>9</sup> Figure 11, p. 220. B infini.

<sup>4</sup> A et.

<sup>5</sup> A espesce.

<sup>6</sup> A espesce.

<sup>7</sup> *Physicorum*, VI, 2, 233a, 31—233b, 14.

<sup>8</sup> Ch. 4 *passim*, especially 9d.

<sup>9</sup> DE corps.

<sup>10</sup> Figure 12, p. 220.

est equidistante a ceste et est infinie d'une part et d'autre, et soit .bb. Et donques quant la ligne .age. tornera, elle passera toute la ligne .bb. qui est infinie en une partie du temps en quoy elle fait son circuite. Et c'est impossible, comme dit est. Et donques un corps infini ne puet faire circulacion ou estre meü circulairement, ne, par consequent, le monde ne le ciel se il est infiny.

Glose. Et nous voions que il est ainsi meü et donques est il finy. Après il met la tierce rayson telle en sentence.

- 18b Tiexte.<sup>11</sup> / Item meton que .ii. lignes finies, .a. et .b., intersequent une l'autre et que par mouvement une passe l'autre et se separe<sup>12</sup> de elle, posé que une soit meüe et l'autre non ou ambes .ii., car aussi tost ou plus seroient elles separees par le mouvement d'une seulle se il estoit viste ou isnel, comme par les mouvemens des .ii. se il estoient tardis. Et convient que ceste separacion<sup>13</sup> soit faite en temps fini, puisque les lignes sont finies. Et donques se les lignes estoient infinies, ceste separacion ne pourroit estre faite en temps finy, et, par consequant, c'est imposible que corps infiny puisse estre meü en temps finy. Et le ciel fait un circuite en temps finy.

Glose. Une de ces .ii. lignes est ou corps qui seroit meü, et l'autre en l'espace qui est ymaginee immouvable laquelle il trespasse par son mouvement. Après il met la quarte rayson.

- 18c Tiexte. Item, aussi comme c'est impossible que ligne droite ou // longitude ou latitude qui a fins et termes soit infinie, semblablement est ce imposible que quelconque(s) figure soit infinie, si comme seroit un triangle, quar il est comprins et finy et terminé de toutes pars. Et donques un cercle<sup>14</sup> ne puet estre infini ne un[e]<sup>15</sup> espere infinie et mouvement circulaire n'est naturellement fors de corps circulaire. Et donques est ce impossible que un corps infini qui ne puet estre circulaire soit meü en circuite.

Glose. Et aveques ce, se un corps estoit infini, l'en ne pourroit dire ou assigner ou seroit le milieu ou le centre plus en un lieu que en autre, quar tel corps n'aroit nulle circumference. Après il met la quinte rayson.

- 18d Tiexte.<sup>16</sup> Item, posons que .g. soit le centre du mouvement et que de .g. procede la ligne .gd. qui soit infinie de la partie vers .d.; et en l'espace qui / est ymagyne immouvable soit une ligne .ab. passante par le centre et infinye d'une part et d'autre; et hors le centre soit une autre ligne .ez. traversaine et infinie et ymagyne immouvable; et que la ligne .gd. soit meüe circulairement tant que elle vienne au point .z. Et ainsi elle avra passé de .e. jusques a .z.<sup>17</sup> en certain temps, et passera une partie de la ligne .ez. en un autre certain temps. Et ceste ligne .ez. est infinie, et donques jamais ne sera passee. Et la ligne .dg. ne puet venir jusques a la ligne .ab. sanz passer toute la ligne .ez. et donques .dg. ne pourra faire tout son tor ou circuite.

Glose. Après il met la sixte rayson.

Tiexte. Item, se le ciel est infini et il est meü en circuite, une espace infinie sera passee en temps finy, quar le ciel passera une espace equale a soy ymaginee immouvable et en temps fini. Et autre foy

<sup>11</sup> Figure 13, p. 220.

<sup>12</sup> DE mouvement une espace l'autre et je separe . . .

<sup>13</sup> B raison.

<sup>14</sup> BCDEF omit 'un cercle.'

<sup>15</sup> A un.

<sup>16</sup> Figure 14, p. 220.

<sup>17</sup> F omits 'Et ainsi elle avra passé de .e. jusques a .z.'



19a

fu dit que c'est impossible, quar l'en doit dire qu'il s'ensuit convertiblement que, se le temps de la revolution est fini, l'espace qui est passee est finie, et le corps qui la trespasse est equal a ceste espace, et donques est il fini. Or appert donques que le corps qui est meü circulairement n'est pas sanz terme et infini, mes // a fin en sa quantité.<sup>18</sup>

19b

Glose. Par aventure que ces raysons ne sont pas purement evidentes ne simplement demonstratives sanz autre chose supposer, quar nul mouvement n'est si tardif que encor ne soit autre la moytié plus tardif et autre plus, et ainsi sanz fin oultre toute proporcion, si comme il appert des parties du ciel en approchant vers la pole; or metons donques que un corps passast en ce jour la moytié d'une estade et l'autre jour après la moytié du demourant de l'estade, et le tiers jour la moitié du demourant ou residu, et ainsi procedast sanz fin en retardant son mouvement, jamais toute l'estade ne seroit passee. Et donques en cest cas tel corps seroit meü par temps infini sus une espace finie. Et en .i. autre cas, se tel corps passoit en demyjour toute l'estade, et en la moitié du residu du jour une autre estade, et après en l'autre moytié de l'autre residu une autre estade, et ainsi en procedant sanz fin et en hastant son mouvement, cest corps en la fin du jour avroit passee une espace infinie et en temps fini; toutevoies l'en ne pourroit signer ou il seroit en la fin du jour. Et Aristote es raysons devant mises / suspouse le contraire de ce que appert par ces .ii. cas. Et joust le secont, aucun pourroit dire que sus le ciel que nous voions est ou puet estre un autre ciel invisible a nous qui est meü plus tost ou plus tart que le ciel qui est souz luy, et dessus cest ciel est encore un autre et puis un autre, et ainsi sanz fin. Je di donques que combien que les .ii. cas premiers soient possibles selonc ymaginacion mathematique, toutesvoies ce ne puet estre naturellement, quar les mouvemens des corps naturelz qui ne sont partie d'autre sont determinés a certaine tardiveté, et touz generalment a certayne velocité ou ysnelleité, quar quant as corps qui sont partie d'autre l'en puet proceder sanz fin vers tardiveté, si comme dit est des parties du ciel vers les poles. Mais il n'est pas ainsi de velocité ou d'ysneleté, aussi comme en magnitude ou quantité le procès est infini en division ou diminucion, si comme il fu dit ou premier chappitre,<sup>19</sup> mais non pas en augmentation ou acressement. Et quant est de mettre que un ciel est sus le ciel que nous voions et puis un autre et encor un autre, etc., je di que telles ymaginacions sont faines et // sanz apparence. Et d'autre partie, tel procès infini est reprouvé en plusieurs liex en philosophie.<sup>20</sup>

19c

11.—*En le .xi.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il monstre que nul [corps]<sup>1</sup> mouvable d[e]<sup>2</sup> mouvement droit ne puet estre infini.<sup>3</sup>*

Or convient encor monstre que ne corps qui est meü au milieu ou au centre n'est infini, ne celui qui est meü en soy esloignant du milieu. Premierement, quar les mouvemens sont contraires dont un est en montant et l'autre en descendant, et mouvemens contraires sont a lieux et a termes contraires; et de choses contraires, se une est determinee et finie, il convient que l'autre soit finie.<sup>4</sup> Or est il

<sup>18</sup> F' a fin sanz quantité en sa quantité.

<sup>19</sup> 3cd.

<sup>20</sup> E philosophie naturele. Cf. *Physicorum*, VIII, 4 ff. and especially 5, 256a, 28-29. Cf. also Averrois, t.c. 27 ff.

<sup>1</sup> A omits 'corps.'

<sup>2</sup> A du.

<sup>3</sup> Guthrie, ch. vi.

<sup>4</sup> A finiee.

ainsi que le milieu est déterminé et finy; c'est le centre de la terre qui est symplement bas et ce a quoy se areste toute chose qui descent sanz passer plus loing.

Glose. Et va jusques la ou jusques a ce qu'elle soit conjointe au corps de quoy le milieu est ou centre du monde.

Tiexte. Et donques puisque le lieu de bas<sup>5</sup> est ou milieu et déterminé, il convient que le lieu qui est symplement haut soit déterminé et fini.

Glose. Et tel lieu est en la concavité du ciel emprés l'espere de la lune.

19d Tiexte. Et se les / lieux sont déterminés, il convient que les corps soient finis.

Glose. Quar un corps infini ne pourroit<sup>6</sup> estre en un lieu déterminé et fini. Or avons donques que l'element de la terre et celui du feu sont corps finis. Après il monstre que les elemens moyens, c'est assavoir l'yaue et l'air, sont finis.

Tiexte. Et se le lieu qui est symplement bas et celui qui est simplement haut sont déterminés et finis, il convient que ce que est entre .ii. et moien soit fini, quar se le moien estoit infini, le mouvement qui est entre .ii. termes seroit infini; et nous avons monstre que c'est impossible.

Glose. Ou chappitre precedent.<sup>7</sup> Après il met une autre rayson a monstre que les lieux extremes qui sont symplement haut et bas sont finis.

Tiexte. Mais il convient que le corps qui est meü en bas et celui qui est meü en haut puissent venir a[s]<sup>8</sup> termes asquelz il tendent, quar l'un a inclinacion au milieu et l'autre au contraire.

Glose. Et autrement ces inclinacions seroient pour noient, et Diëu et nature ne font rien pour noient, si comme il fu dit ou .viii.<sup>9</sup> chappitre.<sup>9</sup>

Tiexte. Et donques la distance de ces lieus et ces liex<sup>10</sup> sont finis, et, par consequent, les corps qui sont conmesurés as liex sont finis, et // par ce s'ensuit que [nul]<sup>11</sup> tel corps n'est infini.

20a

Glose. Après il met une autre rayson.

Tiexte. Item, se pesanteur n'est infinie nul corps pesant n'est infini, quar il convient par neccessité que la pesanteur du corps infini soit infinie. Et aussi est il de corps legier, quar se pesanteur est infinie il convient que legiereté soit infinie<sup>12</sup> se le corps qui est mouvable en haut est infini. Et ceste consequence, c'est a savoir se le corps pesant est infini sa pesanteur est infinie, appert par ce que nous dirons. Or mettons donques que .ab. soit un corps infini et que la pesanteur de cest corps soit .g.; et pour grace de exemple, je met que ce soient .iiii. livres. Et après, prenons une porcion finie de cest corps infini et soit .bd., et la pesanteur de ceste porcion soit .c.; et pour grace d'exemple soit une livre, car il convient que elle soit mendre que la pesanteur de son tout. Et donques se l'en prent de cest corps infini .iiii. telles porcions, ce sera un corps fini pesant .iiii. livres; et ainsi la pesanteur d'un corps infini et celle d'un corps fini seront egales, et c'est impossible. Et encore porra l'en bien prendre en cest corps infini un corps fini pesant plus de .iiii. livres. Et donques le poys d'un corps / fini sera plus grant que le poys d'un corps infiny, et ce

20b

<sup>5</sup> DE ca.

<sup>6</sup> A pourroient.

<sup>7</sup> 17cd.

<sup>8</sup> A a.

<sup>9</sup> 15b.

<sup>10</sup> DE omit 'et ces liex.'

<sup>11</sup> A omits 'nul.'

<sup>12</sup> BCDEF infinie, legiereté est infinie.

ne puet estre.<sup>13</sup> Et donques est ce impossible que la pesanteur d'un corps infiny soit finie.

Glose. Après il exclude<sup>14</sup> .ii. cavillacions.

Tiexte. Et se aucun disoit que la pesanteur du petit corps fini ne mesure pas celle(s) du grant corps fini, ce ne fait difference ne force, quar l'en puet tant de foys rapliquer la petite que, se elle ne vient en egalité aveques la grande, toutevoies elle la passe.

Glose. Si comme .iiii. ne mesure pas .x. et ne puet estre tant de foys repliqué que il face .x. precisement, mais se il est pris .iiii. foys c'est plus que .x.

Après il oste une autre cavillation ou response.

Tiexte. Item, se aucun disoit que posé que la pesanteur d'une porcion de cest corps soit une livre, il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que la porcion qui est .iiii. foys plus grande soit .iiii. livres pour ce que cest corps poise plus en une partie de luy que en l'autre egalle, et est la pesanteur de luy diverse et dessemblable en ses parties. Mais commencer a la quantité du corps ou a la quantité du poys ne fait en ce difference, quar posé que un pié de ce corps poise une livre, se un autre pié de ce corps ne poise une livre, si en prengne l'en .ii. piéz ou tant // que il poise une livre et autant ou plus après. Et ainsi oultre tant comme l'en weult,<sup>15</sup> pour ce que cest corps est infini. Et pour ce, supposé que la pesanteur soit d'une maniere et semblable partout ou que elle soit difforme et dessemblable, ce ne fait difference a la rayson devant dicte. Or appert donques par ce que dit est que de corps infini la pesanteur n'est pas finie et donques elle seroit infinie. Et se ce est imposible il s'ensuit que c'est impossible que aucun corps quelconque(s) soit infini.

Glose. Mais il me semble que la rayson dessus mise n'est pas evidente sanz supposer autre chose. Quar selonc la seconde response, [je]<sup>16</sup> met que un corps soit infini et pren ou signe en ce corps une<sup>17</sup> porcion finie qui soit comme une espere et soit appelée .a.<sup>18</sup> Et après pren environ ceste espere une autre qui soit aussi gran- / de et soit .b., et après environ ceste une autre aussi grande et<sup>19</sup> soit .c., et ainsi en procedant sanz fin. Et selonc ce, en ce corps infini sont infinies porcions egalles .a. et .b. et .c. et .d., et ainsi sanz fin.<sup>20</sup> Après ce, je pouse que en la partie ou porcion appelée .a. soit egalment esparti le poys ou la pesanteur de demie-livre, [et en la porcion .b. soit egalment espartie la moitié de l'autre demie-livre,]<sup>21</sup> et en .c. la moytié du residu et en .d. la moytié de l'autre residu, ce seroit la .xvi.<sup>e</sup> partie d'une livre; et ainsi en procedant oultre sanz fin. Et en ce cas appert que tout ce cors infini ne pesera que une livre, et que .a. pesera autretant comme tout le demourant, et toutevoies en ce corps ne sera partie qui ne poise, combien que ce soit. Et donques Aristote ne reprove pas souffisanment la seconde response, se ainsi n'estoit que aveques tout ce qu'il dit l'en supposast que pesanteur puet estre tant atteneue et tant remisse que naturellement elle ne pourroit durer plus petite aussi comme des autres choses naturelles. Mais ce n'est pas chose purement evidente.

<sup>13</sup> At this point in B (fol. 36d, l. 11), the text continues at fol. 38a, l. 2. The inserted passage corresponds to 21d, l. 16, to 23c, l. 3. in A. It would appear that the scribe of B was following a manuscript with a folio out of sequence or that he inadvertently copied a folio in wrong sequence.

<sup>14</sup> C excude. DE excuse.

<sup>15</sup> A weult quar pour ce . . .

<sup>16</sup> A il.

<sup>17</sup> D pren en signe en cest corps une p. E preng en cest corps en signe une p.

<sup>18</sup> Figure 15, p. 220, B .eg.

<sup>19</sup> B omits 'soit .b. et après environ ceste une autre aussi grande et.'

<sup>20</sup> A repeats 'et selonc ce en ce corps infini sont infinies porcions' from the line above.

<sup>21</sup> A omits 'et . . . livre.'

12.—Ou .xii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre<sup>1</sup> il monstre que nulle pesanteur ne puet estre infinie ne legiereté.<sup>2</sup>

21a Mais encor appert par ce que nous dirons // que c'est impossible que quelconque(s) pesanteur soit infinie.

Glose. Et a ce prouver il met .iii. supposicions.

Tiexte. Quar se aucune pesanteur finie meut un corps par une espace en certain temps, une pesanteur plus grande movrra tel corps par tant d'espace en mendre temps.

Glose. Quar la puissance qui est plus grande muet un corps plus isnelment que ne fait celle qui est mendre quant les autres choses sont pareilles. Après il met la seconde supposicion.

Tiexte.<sup>3</sup> Item, telle proporcion comme la grande puissance a ou resgart de la petite, telle proporsion a le temps en quoy meut la petite au temps ouquel meut la grande, si comme se une pesanteur meut par une espace en une heure, la pesanteur qui est plus grande au double movra en demie-heure.

Glose. Il veult dire que de tant comme la puissance motive est plus grande, de tant meut elle en mendre temps et plus isnellement se les autres choses sont pareilles. Et semblablement dit il ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> de *Phisique*.<sup>4</sup> Mais sauve sa reverence, ce n'est pas bien dit, quar par ce il s'ensuiroit que une puissance peüst mouvoir resistance ou aveques resistance egalle a elle, et que quelle-

21b conque(s) puissance, tant fust petite, peüst mover / quelconque(s) resistance, tant fust grande. Et je le monstre et prouve, posé que une puissance esmeuve une resistance par certaine isneleté; et supouse qu'il est possible que une puissance soit mendre telle que elle puet mouvoir ceste resistance par isneleté sousdouble precisement, et une autre qui puet ce par isneleté subquadruple, et une autre par isneleté .viii. foyes mendre, et ainsi outre. Et selon Aristote, ycy et ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> de *Phisique*,<sup>5</sup> la seconde puissance seroit subdouble a la premiere, et la tierce subquadruple a la premiere, etc. Et ainsi quelconque(s) puissance, tant fust petite, pourroit mouvoir ceste resistance, mes la petite puissance movroit plus tardivement que la grande. Si comme, en exemple, se une puissance est comme .viii. et la resistance comme .iiii. et le temps du mouvement un jour; et donques selon Aristote, la puissance qui pourroit faire tel mouvement precisement en .ii. jours seroit .iiii. et seroit egalle a la resistance, et celle qui ce feroit en .iiii. jours seroit .ii. et mendre que la resistance, et ainsi en procedant outre. Et ce est inconvenient et impossible. Et pour ce, la supposicion doit estre non pas que l'accroissement ou apétissement de la isneleté ensuive l'accroissement ou apétissement // de la puissance motive proporcionelment, mais ensuit l'accroissement ou apétissement de la proporcion qu'a la puissance motive ou resgart de la resistance. Si comme se une puissance est comme .iii.<sup>6</sup> et la resistance comme .i.,<sup>7</sup> c'est proporcion treble, et donques la puissance qui seroit comme .vi. ne movroit pas par isneleté double; mais ce feroit la puissance qui est comme .ix., quar la [pro]porcion<sup>8</sup> de .ix. a .i. est doble a la [pro]porcion<sup>8</sup> de .iii. a .i. Item, se .xviii. puet mouvoir .viii. en un jour la puissance qui feroit ce mouvement en .ii. jours ne sera pas .ix. mais sera .xii., et celle qui ce feroit en .iiii. jours seroit plus grande que n'est .viii. en une

<sup>1</sup> B Ou .xiii. c.

<sup>2</sup> BCDEF omit 'ne legiereté;' inserted in margin in A.

<sup>3</sup> D G; E Glo.

<sup>4</sup> *Physicorum*, VII, 5, 249b, 30—250a, 9.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* B ou .viii; DE ou .viii<sup>o</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> B .iiii.

<sup>7</sup> EF .vii.

<sup>8</sup> A porcion.

proporcion qui n'est pas en nombres et est appelle *medi[e]tas<sup>9</sup> sequialtere*. Et la suspousicion ainsi mise, la rayson qui est après procede. Après il met la tierce suspousicion.<sup>10</sup>

Tiexte. Item, toute pesanteur finie meut par espace finie et en aucun temps fini.

Glose. Mais contre ceste suspousicion est une objection qui fu mise ou chappitre precedent aveques sa response.<sup>11</sup> Après il forme sa rayson.

21d Tiexte. Et par ces supposicions il s'ensuit de neccessité, se une pesanteur infini[e]<sup>12</sup> estoit, que elle mouvroit par telle isneleté comme feroit une pesanteur finie. / Et encore s'ensuit autre inconvenient, quar elle ne pourroit movoir et la cause est quar il co[n]vient<sup>13</sup> que les isneletés des mouvemens soient selonc les proporcions des puissances as resistences, et que de tant comme la proporcion est plus grande, l'isneleté soit plus grande et le temps mendre. Et chascun temps fini a certaine proporcion a autre temps fini, et de puissance finie a puissance infinie la proporcion est nulle. Et l'en ne peut dire que aucun temps soit indivisible.

Glose. Si comme il appert ou sixte de *Phisique*.<sup>14</sup>

Tiexte. Et pousé qu'il fust, encor seroit autre inconvenient, quar se la puissance infinie mouvoit en ce temps indivisible [et une puissance<sup>15</sup> finie mouvoit en temps divisible],<sup>16</sup> l'en pourroit prendre une autre puissance finie qui seroit ou regart de ceste resistance en telle proporcion comme cest temps fini est ou regart de ce temps indivisible.

Glose.<sup>17</sup> Quar [s]e<sup>18</sup> temps fini estoit compost de momens<sup>19</sup> indivisibles, il convendroit que le temps divisible eüst proporcion au temps indivisible dont il est composé. Si comme se un temps estoit compost de .iiii. [momens]<sup>20</sup> indivisibles ce temps seroit ou regart d'un moment<sup>21</sup> en proporcion quadruple.

22a Et ainsi l'en porroit tant acroistre une puissance // finie qu'elle mouvroit en un moment.

Tiexte. Et donques la puissance finie mouvroit en egalle mesure comme celle qui seroit infinie et c'est impossible, et donques est ce impossible que aucune pesanteur soit infinie,<sup>22</sup> et semblablement de legiereté; et donques est ce impossible que aucuns cors soient qui aient en eulz pesanteur infinie ou legiereté infinie. Or appert donques en considerant les parties du monde que nul corps ne puet estre infiny.

Glose. Quar il est monstre ou .ix.<sup>e</sup> chappitre<sup>23</sup> que ce ne puet estre le ciel, et es .ii. chapitres après que ce ne puet estre nul des .iiii. elemens, quar il convendroit que la pesanteur ou legiereté de cel corps fust infinie, si comme il est monstre en le .xi.<sup>e</sup> chappitre; et c'est impossible, si comme il appert par le .xii.<sup>e</sup>.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>9</sup> A *mediatas*.

<sup>10</sup> B omits 'Après il met la tierce suspousicion.'

<sup>11</sup> 20abc.

<sup>12</sup> A infini.

<sup>13</sup> A covient.

<sup>14</sup> *Physicorum*, VI, 4, 235a, 11-12.

<sup>15</sup> F omits 'infinie mouvoit en ce temps indivisible et une puissance.'

<sup>16</sup> AB omit 'et une . . . divisible.'

<sup>17</sup> B resumes at this point the text dropped at fol. 36d, l. 11.

<sup>18</sup> A ce.

<sup>19</sup> BCDEF mouvemens.

<sup>20</sup> ABCDEF mouvemens.

<sup>21</sup> BCDEF mouvement.

<sup>22</sup> DE omits 'et c'est impossible, et donques . . . soit infinie.'

<sup>23</sup> 17c.

<sup>24</sup> B omits 'si comme il appert par le .xii.<sup>e</sup>'; DE .xi.<sup>e</sup>. 21a.

13.—Ou .xiii.<sup>1</sup> chappitre il monstre generalment que nul corps ne puet estre infini par raysons prinsees quant a mouvement local.

22b Et se nous voulons entendre a parler de ceste chose universelment, nostre propos n'appert pas seulement par les raysons que nous avons mises ou livre de *Phisique*<sup>2</sup> ou nous avons dit des principes de nature, quar ileuques nous avons determiné devant de in- / fini universelment. Mais nous determinons de ce maintenant autrement.

Glose. Quar les raysons que il met en cest livre regardent plus en especial mouvement local.

Tiexte. Et après ce, pousé que tout le corps du monde ne soit pas infini, encor entendrons nous a determiner se plusieurs mondes pueent estre, quar, par aventure, aucun(s) feroit doubte ou cuideroit que aussi comme ce monde est constitué et fait que plusieurs autres telz fussent ou peüssent estre, mais non pas infinis.<sup>3</sup>

Glose. C'est assavoir que nul(z) de telz mondes ne fust infiny en quantité ne touz ensemble infinis en nombre, mais fussent .ii. ou .iiii. ou en autre nombre.

Tiexte. Mais or disons premierement en general de infini. Je<sup>4</sup> di donques que tout corps par neccessité est fini ou infini. Item, se aucun corps est infiny, il convient que ses parties soient dessemblables ou semblables.

Glose. Sy comme de yaue les parties so[n]t<sup>5</sup> semblables et chascune est yaue, mais d'une beste elles sont dessemblables.

Tiexte. Item, se corps infini estoit de parties dessemblables, ou elles seroient de especes infinies ou de especes finies.

Glose. Après il<sup>6</sup> reprouve le premier membre.

22c Tiexte. Et il n'est pas possible // que elle[s]<sup>7</sup> soient de especes infinies, supousees les choses devant mises, quar se les premiers movemens sont finis, il convient par neccessité que les especes des simples soient finies pour ce que de simple corps le mouvement est simple. Et les movemens simples sont finis et il convient par neccessité que tout corps naturel ait mouvement.

Glose. Tout ce fu dit et desclairié ou secont et ou tiers chapittres. Après il reprouve par .iiii. raysons le secont membre de la distinction dessus mise.

Tiexte. Mais qui diroit que tel corps est un compost ou composé de parties dessemblables finies selonc especes si comme de .ii. especes, ou de .iii. ou de .iiii., il s'ensuir[oi]t<sup>8</sup> par neccessité que chascune de [c]es<sup>9</sup> parties ou especes fust infinie ou aucune de elles, si comme l'yaue ou le feu dont tel corps seroit composé. Et nous avons monstre devant que pesanteur ou legiereté infinie ne puet estre.

Glose. Ce fu monstre ou chappitre precedent.<sup>10</sup> Et par consequent, nul corps legier ou pesant, si comme feu ou terre, ne puet estre infiny, quar de corps pesant infini la pesanteur seroit infinie si comme il appert par le .xi.<sup>11</sup> chappitre.

22d Tiexte. Item, se les parties de tel corps estoient infini- / es en quantité, il convendrait que les lieux fussent infinis<sup>12</sup> et les distances

<sup>1</sup> B ou .x. c.

<sup>2</sup> *Physicorum*, III, 5, 204a, 8—206a, 8.

<sup>3</sup> B omits 'mais non pas infinis.'

<sup>4</sup> Guthrie, ch. vii.

<sup>5</sup> A sot.

<sup>6</sup> CDEF je.

<sup>7</sup> A elle.

<sup>8</sup> A sensuient.

<sup>9</sup> A ses.

<sup>10</sup> 21a.

<sup>11</sup> 20a.

<sup>12</sup> A infinies.

infinies et que les mouvemens fussent infinis. Et tout ce est impossible, supposé ce que nous avons dit devant.

Glose. Ou .xi.<sup>e</sup> chappitre.<sup>13</sup>

Tiexte. Item, c'est impossible que les distances soient infinies et que ce qui descendent en bas soit meü touzjours sanz fin, et ceste rayson meisme est de ce qu'est meü en haut, quar c'est impossible que une chose soit meüe au lieu ou jamais ne pourroit ataindre. Et semblablement en autres choses, si comme se ce estoit impossible d'une chose que elle fust blanche ou que elle fust de la quantité d'un coute ou que elle fust en Egipte, le mouvement ou la façon par quoy l'en tendroit a telle fin seroit impossible. Et donques c'est impossible que une chose tende au terme ou elle ne pourroit venir.

Glose. Ne elle ne sa semblable en espesce, quar nature selonc espesce ne se efforce onques de faire chose qui ne peu(s)t estre, quar si comme il fu dit en la fin du .viii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre, Dieu et nature ne font rien pour noyent.<sup>14</sup> Et donques la distance de haut en bas ne puet estre infinie et, par consequent,

23a corps dont le lieu naturel est haut ou bas // ne puet estre infini. Après il oste une response.

Tiexte. Et se aucun disoit que les parties de tel cors infini sont finies e[n]<sup>15</sup> espesce et chascune finie en quantité, mes elles sont infinies en multitude, qui diroit ainsi, nientmoins se telle multitude de parties estoient conjointes, ce seroit un corps infiny aussi comme un feu infini.

Glose. Après il met la quarté rayson.

Tiexte. Item, comment pourroit ce estre que corps infini eüst plusieurs parties dessemblables et en certain nombre, car il conven-droit que chascune ou aucune de elles fust infinie et corps infini. Et tout corps est estendu de toutes pars selonc .iii. dimensions.

Glose. Si comme il appert ou premier chappitre.<sup>16</sup>

Tiexte. Et donques se un corps est infini, il est estendu de toutes pars sanz fin et est infini de toutes pars et occupe tout, et par consequent, [se]<sup>17</sup> une partie de corps infini est infinie, tel corps ne puet avoir autre partie dessemblable.

Glose. Et ce [est]<sup>18</sup> a entendre des parties integrales; mais il me semble que se un corps est infini, il ne s'ensuit pas que il soit infini de toutes pars et semblablement de ligne et de superficie, quar l'en puet ymaginer un corps simplement infini et plus grant que quelcon- / que(s) corps fini oultre toute proporcion. Et nientmoins tel cors ne sera infini fors en long et d'une part seullement, et toutesvoies il ne sera pas mendre que celui qui seroit infini de totes pars.<sup>19</sup> Et tel corps seroit un de quoy la premiere partie .a. seroit d'un pié en touz sens, et l'autre après .b. egale et semblable a .a., et l'autre .c., et ainsi sanz fin.<sup>20</sup> Et joustee ce, je met par esbatement telle ymaginacion, et pouse que .a. soit un corps de la quantité d'un pié en touz sens et .b. un autre egal et semblable, et que la moitié de .b. soit prinse et faite plate et ronde ou circulaire, et soit le semydiametre de elle d'un pié et que la moytié du residu de .b. soit faite encore plus tenve en tant que, quant elle sera

23c ad- // joustee aveques l'autre en figure circulaire, elle soit aussi large comme le semydiametre de la premiere partie ou moytié. Et semblablement

<sup>13</sup> 19cd.

<sup>14</sup> 16b.

<sup>15</sup> A et.

<sup>16</sup> 3d-4a.

<sup>17</sup> A omits 'se.'

<sup>18</sup> A omits 'est.'

<sup>19</sup> Figure 16, p. 220.

<sup>20</sup> Figure 17, p. 220.




FIG. 11  
(FOL. 17c)




FIG. 12  
(FOL. 18a)




FIG. 13  
(FOL. 18b)




FIG. 14  
(FOL. 18c)




FIG. 15  
(FOL. 20c)



FIG. 16 (FOL. 23b)





FIG. 17 (FOL. 23b)




FIG. 18  
(FOL. 24b)




FIG. 19  
(FOL. 27b)



soit fait de la moytié de l'autre residu et ainsi sanz fin. Et ce fait par ymaginacion, tout ce corps soit appellé .c. Item, soit un corps infini tel, ne plus ne mains comme celuy qui fu mis en l'ymagynacion precedente qui estoit appellee .abcd. etc., et soit ce corps appellé .d. Je di donques que le corps appellé .c. est infiny en lonc et en lé de toutes pars, mais non pas en parfont, et .d. n'est infiny fors seulement en lonc et d'une part. Et toutevoies, .c. est simplement finy<sup>21</sup> et egual a .a. qui n'est que d'un pié, et .d. est simplement infiny et n'est pas mendre que un corps infiny de toutes pars et qui tout occuperoit. Et encor pourroit l'en ceste ymagynacion efforcier et dilater et faire conclusions plus merueilleuses mais ceci souffist quant a present. Après il monstre que corps compousé de parties semblables ne puet estre infiny.

23d

Tiexte. Mais encore voulons nous monstrier que corps compost de parties semblables ne puet estre infiny, premierement quar il n'est mouvement symple quelconque(s) fors ceulz / qui sont devant mis.

Glose. Ou secont chappitre, et sont monter et descendre et mouvement circulaire.<sup>22</sup>

Tiexte. Et convendroit que tel cors infiny eüst un de ces mouvemens. Et se ainsi estoit que tel corps infiny fust mouvable en bas ou en haut, il s'ensuiroit que aucune pesanteur ou legiereté fust infinie.

Glose. Sy comme il appert par le .xi.\*<sup>23</sup> chappitre, et ce est imposible, si comme il appert par le .xii.[\*] chappitre.<sup>24</sup>

Tiexte. Mais encore n'est ce pas possible que corps meü en circuite soit infiny, quar ce ne seroit autre chose a dire fors que le ciel est infiny, et c'est imposible, si comme il est monstrier devant.

Glose. Ce fu ou .ix.[\*] chappitre.<sup>25</sup> Après il met une autre rayson.

Tiexte. Item, corps infiny ne pourroit estre meü comment que soit, quar ou ce seroit selonc nature ou par violence; et se il pavoit estre meü par violence,<sup>26</sup> il convendroit que le mouvement contraire li fust naturel. Et donques avroit tel corps un lieu infiny ou il seroit par violence et un autre lieu infiny ou il seroit meü naturellement; et ce est imposible.

24a

Glose. Quar il convendroit que ce lieu infiny auquel il seroit meü fust plain d'un autre corps infiny et que ce corps le meist hors de ce lieu. Et ceste rayson procede de mouvement droit // et il avoit monstrier devant ou .ix.\*<sup>27</sup> chappitre que corps infiny ne puet estre meü circulairement.

14.—Ou .xiiii.\* chappitre il monstre que nul corps ne puet estre infiny par raysons prinnes generalment quant a tout mouvement ou action.

Par ce que nous dirons sera manifeste que cors infiny ne puet souffrir mouvement ou action faicte par corps fini et aussi il ne puet faire action en corps fini.

Glose. Et encor monstr[er]a<sup>1</sup> il après que infiny ne puet faire action en infiny.<sup>2</sup>

Tiexte. Premierement quar se corps infiny mouvoit ou eschaufoit ou faisoit quelconque(s) action en corps fini, ce seroit en aucun temps certain si comme en un jour. Et soit .a. infiny et .b. fini. Or puet estre un autre corps fini mendre que .b., et soit .d. le quel fera

<sup>21</sup> F infini.

<sup>22</sup> 76c.

<sup>23</sup> 20a.

<sup>24</sup> A .xii. DE .xi.\* Cf. 21a.

<sup>25</sup> A .ix. Cf. 17c.

<sup>26</sup> DE omit 'et se il pavoit estre meü par violence.'

<sup>27</sup> 17cd.

<sup>1</sup> A monstra.

<sup>2</sup> E fini.

telle action en un jour en un autre corps fini qui soit .c. Et donques puisque ces .ii. corps .b. et .d. oeuvrent d'une velocité, il convient que quelle proporcion a .d. ou regart de .c., que telle proporcion ait .b. ou regart de .a. Et ce est impossible, quar de fini a infini n'est quelconque(s) [pro]porcion.<sup>3</sup>

- 24b Glose.<sup>4</sup> / Se .d. estoit comme .i.<sup>5</sup> et .c. comme .iii. et .b. fust comme .iiii., il convendrait que .a. fust comme .xii. Et donques .a. seroit fini et il estoit mis infini. Et est a savoir que Aristote met ceste rayson et celles d'après en autres termes et plus obscurément. Après il monstre que corps infini ne peut faire action en corps fini.

Tiexte. Item, ce qui est infini ne pourroit mover ce qu'est fini en quelconque(s) temps quar se .a. infini mouvoit .b. fini en un jour, un autre corps fini puet estre, et soit .c., qui mouvroit en un jour un autre corps fini et soit .d. Et donques convient il que la proporcion qui est de .a. ou regart de .b. soit telle comme est la proporcion qui est de .c. ou regart de .d., et que infini et fini facent leur action en temps egal; et c'est impossible.

- Glose. Et ce pourroit estre declaré en nombres aussi comme la rayson precedente. // Après il oste une cavillacion se aucun disoit que infini meut fini en un jour et fini meut fini en temps infini, et pour ce il dit après.

Tiexte. Et ne puet estre que une chose ait meü ou esté meüe en temps infini quar action et passion ont fin.

Glose. Et ce que il dit de mouvement est a entendre de mouvement qui est par espasce<sup>6</sup> finie sanz circulacion. Après il monstre que infini ne puet faire mouvement ou action en infini.

Tiexte. Item, infini ne puet rien faire de infini,<sup>7</sup> quar se .a. infini est meü ou alteré de .b. infini en .i. jour, une partie de .a. qui seroit finie pourra estre meü par .b. infini en mendre temps, si comme en une heure; et soit telle partie .c. Or puet l'en prendre une autre plus grande partie qui sera plus forte a mouvoir que .c., en telle proporcion comme est la proporcion d'un jour a une heure; et sera celle partie finie et soit .d. Et donques .b. infini mouvra .a. infini et .d. fini en egal temps fini, et c'est impossible. Et par consequant, infini ne puet mouvoir ou alterer infini en temps fini ne en temps infini, quar jamais ne seroit fait.<sup>8</sup> Et donques se tot corps sensible ou qui puet estre senti par quelconque(s) sens naturel a en soy vertu active ou passi- / ve ou touz les .ii.

24d

Glose. Le ciel a en soy vertu active par quoy il altere les choses de cybas, mais il n'a pas vertu passive, quar il ne puet estre alteré de alteracion qui dispouse a corrupcion, si comme il appert par le sixte chappitre.<sup>9</sup> Et les ellemens ont vertu active et passive.

Tiexte. Et puisque ainsi est, c'est impossible que corps sensible soit infini.

Glose. Après il oste une objection, quar, par aventure, aucun droit que hors le ciel est .i. infini insensible<sup>10</sup> et pour ce dit il.

Tiexte. Et toutesvoies, touz cors qui occupent lieu sont sensibles, et donques dehors le ciel ne a corps quelconque(s), ne infini ne autre.

<sup>3</sup> A porcion.

<sup>4</sup> Figure 18, p. 220. A repeats 'glose.'

<sup>5</sup> B .vii.

<sup>6</sup> D espece.

<sup>7</sup> A infinie.

<sup>8</sup> A fait. Tiexte. Donques . . . F omits 'en temps fini ne en temps infini.'

<sup>9</sup> 13d-14a.

<sup>10</sup> DEF sensible.

quar se corps estoit hors le ciel et il fust sensible, il seroit en temps. Et se il estoit intelletuel, il seroit en lieu, quar *hors* et *ens* segnefient lieu. Et aussi tout cors sensible est en lieu quar nul cors sensible n'est qui ne soit en lieu.

Glose. Et souvent est dit en philosophie que tout corps naturel est mouvable, et toute chose mouvable est en aucun lieu.<sup>11</sup>

15.—Ou .xv.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il monstre par autres raysons plus generales et moins evidentes que nul cors ne puet estre infini.

25a

Encor nous efforcerons nous de monstre que il est ainsy comme dit est par raysons // provables. Et premierement, ce n'est pas possible que corps infini de parties semblables soit meü en circuite, quar tel corps n'a point de milieu ou de centre, et tout ce qu'est meü en circuite a milieu.

Glose. Par aventure, ceste rayson n'est pas purement evidente, quar l'en pourroit dire que en tel corps est le milieu et le centre du mouvement, mais non pas le milieu de sa quantité qui ne diroit que [de]<sup>1</sup> tel corps le centre est partout et [la]<sup>2</sup> circonference nulle part. Après il monstre [par]<sup>3</sup> .vii. raysons que corps mouvable de mouvement droit ne puet estre infini.

Tiexte. Mais encore n'est ce pas possible que corps infini fust meü de mouvement droit, quar il convendroit que un lieu infini fust auquel il seroit meü selonc nature, et un autre lieu infini ouquel il seroit hors nature.

Glose. Quar tot mouvement droit qui n'est fait par ame est de lieu non-naturel a lieu naturel, et c'est impossible que .ii. lieux soient dont chacun soit infini de toutes pars.

25b

Tiexte. Item, pousé que tel corps fust meü de mouvement droit par nature ou par violence, comment qu'il fust, il convendroit que la puissance qui le mouvroit fust infinie. Et puissance qui est infinie est de corps infini, et aussi de / corps infini la vertu ou puissance est infinie. Et donques seroit un autre corps mouvant infini.

Glose. Quar mouvement violent est fait par vertu qui est hors le cors meü, et mouvement naturel droit suppose autre puissance dehors laquelle a mis ou tenu le cors meü hors son lieu naturel ou qui a esté obstacle ou empeeschement qui tenoit tel corps hors son lieu naturel.<sup>4</sup>

Tiexte. Et nous avons monstré par rayson ou livre de *Phisque*<sup>5</sup> que nul corps fini n'a vertu infinie ne nul corps infini ne puet avoir vertu finie. Et donques se corps infini<sup>6</sup> estoit meü droit ou selonc nature ou hors nature, il convendroit que .ii. corps infinis fussent, un qui mouvroit et l'autre qui seroit meü.

Glose. Et Aristote reputé impossible que .ii. corps infinis<sup>7</sup> fussent, quar il suppose que corps infini est infini<sup>8</sup> de toutes pars; mais de ce fu dit ou .xiii.<sup>[\*]</sup> chappitre.

Tiexte. Item, se tel corps infini estoit, aucune chose le mouvroit; et se il mouvoit soy meisme(s), il avroit ame. Et comment seroit ce possible que une beste ou chose qui ait ame fust infinie?

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Physicorum*, IV, 5, 212a, 31 ff., especially 212b, 29; and Averrois' Commentary, *Juntas* IV, t.c. 43 ff., especially, t.c. 47.

<sup>1</sup> A omits 'de.'

<sup>2</sup> A omits 'la.'

<sup>3</sup> A que.

<sup>4</sup> B omits 'ou qui a esté . . . lieu naturel.'  
<sup>5</sup> *Physicorum*, VIII, 10, 266a, 10—266b, 27 and especially 266b, 25-27.

<sup>6</sup> BCDEF fini.

<sup>7</sup> DE finiz.

<sup>8</sup> B fini.

<sup>\*</sup> A omits superior e. Cf. 23a.

Glose. Ce ne pourroit estre, quar toute telle chose est figuree et corps infini ne pourroit estre figuré.

25c Tiexte. Et se un autre corps mouvoit ce corps // infini, il convendrait qu'il fust infini. Et donques seroient .ii. cors infinis differens selonc forme et selonc vertu desquelz un mouvroit et l'autre seroit meü.

Glose. Et Aristote le repute impossible comme dit est, mais ce ne me semble pas plus impossible de .ii. ou de .iii. etc., que de un joust ce qui fu dit ou .xiii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre.<sup>10</sup> Après il met la quarte rayson contre aucuns anciens.<sup>11</sup>

25d Tiexte. Item, se tel corps infini n'estoit pas tout continu mais estoit devisé par aucunes vacuitéz qui sont entre les parties indivisibles, si comme disoient Democritus et Leucippus, il convendrait par neccessité que un meisme mouvement fust de toutes ces parties indivisibles, quar, selonc ces philosophes, ces parties different seulement en figure et sont toutes d'une nature se elles estoient separees, si comme sont les parties d'une masse d'or dont chascune est or. Et est neccessité que de toutes soit un meisme mouvement, quar un petit de terre et toute la terre tendroient a un meisme lieu et aussi une estincelle de feu et tout le feu. Et donques se totes telles parties indivisibles et leur tout ont pesanteur et sont d'une nature, il s'ensuit que rien ne soit legier; et se il sont le- / gieres, que rien ne sera pesant.

Glose. Et nous voions le contraire, quar aucunes choses tendent en bas et les autres en haut.

Tiexte. Item, pousé que tel cors ait pesanteur ou legiereté, donques convient il que aucune extremité ou circonference de tot ou aucun milieu soit.

Glouse. Si comme il appert par le secont et par le tiers chappitre.<sup>12</sup>

Tiexte. Et c'est impossible que en corps infini soit milieu ne fin ou circonference. Item, generalment la ou n'est milieu ne extremité ou circonference, la ne puet estre que aucune chose soit haut et l'autre bas.

Glose. Quar tot est semblable quant a ce.

Tiexte. Et donques ne seroit nul lieu ou les corps fussent meüs, quar, par neccessité, il convient que eulz soient meüs ou selonc nature ou hors nature et par violence. Et telles choses sont determinees, parce que des liex, les uns sont propres et naturelz as corps meüs et les autres leur sont estranges et desnaturelz.

Glose. Quar mouvement naturel est a lieu naturel et mouvement violent a lieu estrange. Et en infini touz liex sont d'une maniere.

26a Tiexte. Item, se aucun cors est arresté ou meü hors nature et par violence a .i. lieu, il // convient que aucun autre corps soit arresté ou meü a ce lieu selonc nature. Et ce nous est creable et appert par induction.

Glose. Quar nous voions que terre est haut par violence et est bas par nature, et, au contraire, feu est bas par violence et haut par nature.

Tiexte. Et donques s'ensuit par neccessité que toutes choses n'ont pas pesanteur ou toutes legiereté.

<sup>10</sup> 23abc.

<sup>11</sup> F omits 'Après il met la quarte rayson

contre aucuns anciens.'

<sup>12</sup> 7b.

Glose. Et se un corps infini estoit, il seroit ou tout pesant ou tout legier et ne seroit nul cors dehors cestuy, comme plusieurs foyz est dit.

Tiexte. Et donques appert par ces raysons que nul corps n'est infini.

16.—Ou .xvi.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il propose a savoir mon se pluseurs mondes sont ou pueent estre et preve que non par .ii. raysons.<sup>1</sup>

Or disons que ce n'est pas possible que plusieurs cielz, c'est a dire plusieurs mondes, soient, quar nous avions promis a dire de ce.

Glose. Ou .xiii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre.<sup>2</sup>

Tiexte. Quar, par aventure, aucun cuideroit que nous n'avons pas monstré universelment estre impossible que hors le ciel soit aucun cors, mais avons mises raysons a ce seulement de corps infini.

26b Glose. Quar il fu dit ou .xiii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre generalment que hors le ciel n'est quelconque(s) corps, mais ce fu / prouvé seulement de corps infini. Et puisque monstré est que cest monde est corps fini en quantité, tantost l'ame est meüe a penser se un autre monde est ou puet estre ou plusieurs. Et Aristote monstre que non par plusieurs raysons. Et pour la premiere il met .iii. suppousicions. Une est:

Tiexte. Et tout corps puet repouser par nature et par violence et estre meü par nature et par violence.

Glose. C'est a entendre des corps de cibas, quar le ciel ne repouse onques et ne puet estre meü par violence. Mais les corps de cybas pueent estre alterés et courrompus et mis hors de leurs lieux naturelz selonc tout ou selonc partie.

Tiexte. Item, ou lieu ou aucuns corps repousent par nature, a ce lieu sont il meüs non pas par violence mais par nature; et la ou il sont meüs par nature, ileuques repousent par nature; et la ou il repousent par violence, yleuques sont meüs par violence; et la ou il sont meüs par violence, yleuques repousent par violence. Item, mouvement violent est contraire a mouvement qui est selonc nature.

26c Glose. C'est a entendre du meïsme(s) corps ou de semblables, quar le mouvement naturel du feu et le violent de terre // ne sont pas contraires. Après il forme sa rayson.

Tiexte. Or disons donques se .ii. mondes estoient, il convendroit que en chascun fust une terre, et se la terre qui est en l'autre monde estoit meüe a cestuy ou vers cestui, ce seroit ou par violence ou par nature. Et se ce estoit par violence, le mouvement contraire qui seroit<sup>4</sup> de ce monde vers l'autre seroit naturel a terre, et ce ne puet estre. Et se la terre de l'autre monde estoyt meüe a cestuy par nature, donques repouserait elle en l'autre monde par violence. Et se elle repouse en l'autre monde par violence, elle seroit meüe a cestui selonc nature.

Glose. Et tout ce appert par les suppousicions devant mises. Mais ceste rayson ne conclut pas de neccessité, si comme il sera dit après. Et après il met .iii. suppousicions pour une autre rayson.

Tiexte. Item, se .ii. mondes estoient ou plusieurs, il convendroit par neccessité que les corps ou les elemens de ces .ii. mondes fussent d'une maniere et semblables selonc nature. Item, il convendroit par neccessité que les corps ou parties de ces .ii. mondes eüssent

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. viii.

<sup>2</sup> 22b.

<sup>3</sup> B .xiii. Cf. 24d.

<sup>4</sup> A seroit qui . . .

26d

une meïsme vertu ou inclinacion, si comme le feu et la terre et les autres elemens de ce monde et ceulz de l'autre monde, / quar se eulz estoient de diverses natures et de diverses inclinacions aussi comme se la terre de l'autre monde n'estoit pas pesante, ce ne seroit pas proprement terre, ne le feu, feu<sup>8</sup> se il n'estoit chaut. Et ainsi tout tel autre monde ne seroit pas proprement monde. Item. par ce appert donques que des ellemens de ces .ii. mondes, les uns sont enclins a soy esloingnier du milieu ou du centre, et les autres a estre meïs vers le milieu ou centre, quar il sont d'une meïsme espesce en un monde et en l'autre si comme le feu de l'un et le feu de l'autre, et semblablement des autres elemens, aussi comme en ce monde les parties du feu sont d'une espesce et d'une nature. Et que ainsi soit de neccessité, il appert par les suppousicions que nous avons faites devant quant as mouvemens, quar les mouvemens drois simples sont finis en certain nombre et chascun ellement est mouvable d'aucun tel mouvement. Et donques se les mouvemens sont d'une<sup>9</sup> nature partout, il convient par neccessité que les elemens soient d'une nature partout.

Glose. Ce que il dit ycy des mouvemens symples fu determiné et declairié ou secont et ou tiers chappitre.<sup>7</sup> Après il fait sa rayson.

27a

Tiexte. Et donques les parties de la terre // de l'autre<sup>8</sup> monde sont enclines a estre meïes au milieu de ce monde et les parties du feu de l'autre monde enclines a estre meïes au lieu du feu de cest monde. Mais c'est impossible, quar se ainsi estoit, il convendroït par neccessité que la terre de l'autre monde montast en son propre monde et que le feu de l'autre monde fust meü vers le milieu de ce monde pour ce que ces .ii. mondes seroient ainsi mis un ou regart de l'autre, ou il convendroït mettre que les corps symples ou ellemens ne sont pas d'une meïsme nature en plusieurs mondes.

Glose. Et ce est reprouvé devant.

Tiexte. Ou se nous disons que il sont d'une nature, il convient dire que il n'est que un milieu ne que une extermité ou circonference de elemens.

Glose. A laquelle tent tout feu et au milieu toute terre.

Tiexte. Et se ainsi est, c'est impossible que plusieurs mondes soient.

Glose. Et après il oste une cavillation.

Tiexte. Et dire que de telz simples corps la nature ou inclinacion est autre [et]<sup>9</sup> differente sellonc ce qu'il sont plus pres ou plus loing de leurs propres liex.

Glose. Si comme dire que la terre de l'autre monde est meïe au centre de son monde pour ce qu'elle en est plus pres, et s'elle estoit en cesti, elle y- / roit au centre de cesty.

27b

Tiexte. C'est chose desraysonnable, quar la distance ne fait en rien difference en la nature ou espesce des choses.

Glose. Quar une porcion de terre ne müe en rien sa nature ou inclinacion pour ce seullement qu'elle est plus pres ou plus loing du centre du monde. Mais je fis autrefoys un fort argüement contre ceste rayson.<sup>10</sup> Suppousons par ymaginacion que ou centre de ce monde soit une porcion de l'element du feu tellement que la moytié de elle soit d'une part du centre et l'autre moitié d'autre; et soit le centre .a., et une moytié .b. et l'autre .c. Et pouse

<sup>8</sup> B omits 'feu.'

<sup>9</sup> BCDEF d'autre nature.

<sup>7</sup> 7a, 7c, 7d. F omits 'Après il fait sa rayson.'

<sup>8</sup> A terre et de l'autre . . .

<sup>9</sup> A omits 'et.'

<sup>10</sup> Figure 19, p. 220.

- ou met que tout ce soit osté qui pourroit empeeschier le mouvement naturel de cest feu. Et donques convendroît il que chascun[e]<sup>11</sup> de ces .ii. parties montast en haut, chascune de sa part vers la circonference, et se esloigneroyent l'une de l'autre et depar- // tiroient. Item, se ces .ii. parties de feu estoient conjointes en une espere tellement que une partie ne se peüst separer ou deviser de l'autre, et tout autre empeeschement fust hors, ceste petite espere ou porcion de feu ne se mouvroit, quar l'en ne pourroit assigner cause pourquoy elle se traisist plus a une partie de la circonference qui a autre. Mais se elle estoit hors le milieu, elle yroit vers la partie de la circonference dont elle seroit plus pres. Et tout cecy est a otrier selonc la philosophie de Aristote. Et l'en pourroit dire semblablement que se une porcion de terre estoit entre .ii. mondes par egalle distance et elle se peüst deviser, une partie yroit au centre d'un monde et l'autre au centre de l'autre monde. Et se elle ne se povoit deviser, elle ne se mouvroit pour l'indifference et seroit aussi comme un fer entre .ii. aÿmans egalz et également. Et se elle estoit plus pres d'un monde que de l'autre, elle tendroit vers le centre du plus prochain. Je respon et di que ce n'est pas semblable, quar, ou premier cas, les .ii. parties du feu, qui sont .b. et .c., tendent a un meïsme(s) lieu, c'est a savoir a la circonference qui est lieu de l'element du feu, et tendent a estre conjoin- / tes a un corps ou a un tout, c'est a savoir a l'element du feu, combien que elles y tendent par diverses voies, aussi comme .ii. pierres descendent vers le centre de la terre par diverses voies. Et ou secont cas les parties de celle terre qui seroit entre deux mondes ne tendroient pas vers un lieu ne a estre conjointes a un corps. Et quant est d'une chose qui est dicte ou premier cas, c'est a savoir que une porcion de feu seroit ou centre du monde sanz soy mouvoir, je cuide que ce soit vray se le cas estoit tel comme il est devant mis. Mais il ne pourroit par nature estre tel et durel en tel estat pour les variacions ou alteracions ou autres mouvemens qui sont de commun cours aussi comme une pesante espee ne pourroit longuement estre en estant sus sa pointe, etc.
- 27c
- 27d

17.—Ou .xvii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il monstre par une autre rayson que il ne puet estre fors un seul monde.

- Mais encor convient par neccessité que ces elemens aient aucuns naturelz mouvemens, quar il nous appert que il sont meüs et nous ne povons dire que touz les mouvemens contraires dont il sont meüs soient violens, quar c'est impossible que une chose soit meüe par violence qui n'a quelconque(s) inclinacion // a estre meüe naturellement.
- 28a

Glose. C'est la premiere des .ii. suppousicions que il met pour la rayson qui ensuit. Et après il met la seconde.

Tiexte. Et puisque ainsi est que des ellemens est aucun mouvement selonc nature, il convient par neccessité que le mouvement de ceulz qui sont d'une espesce et de chascun de eulz soit a un meïsme lieu selonc nombre, si comme a un seul milieu<sup>1</sup> ou centre et a une seulle extremité ou circonference.

Glose. Après il met une objection.

Tiexte. Mais aucun pourroit dire que le cors simple qui est un singulier, est meü a un lieu singulier en nombre, et plusieurs telz corps qui sont d'une espesce sont meüs a plusieurs lieux lesquelz sont d'une espesce et non pas a un lieu singulier.

<sup>11</sup> A chascun.

<sup>1</sup> F lieu.

Glose. Après il respont.

Tiexste. Mais se telz corps sont plusieurs sans estre differens en espesce, il sont aussi comme parties d'un tout et, pour ce, une de telles parties ne est pas meüe a un lieu et autre a autre, mais toutes sont meües semblablement a un lieu. Et ne sont pas differentes en espesce,<sup>2</sup> mais sont differentes et autres en nombre.

- 28b Glose. Quar une porcion de terre, [se] elle est haut,<sup>3</sup> elle descent; et par celle meïsme(s) voie descendroit une autre / porcion<sup>4</sup> de terre quelconque(s). Et donques toutes porcions de terre tendent a un seul lieu, c'est assavoir a milieu ou au centre du monde, quar se une porcion tendoit a un centre et autre a autre, il convendroit mettre la multitude des centres selonc la multitude des parties ou porcions de terre. Et c'est impossible, quar telles parties sont infinies, si comme il appert par le premier chappitre, et le monde ne puet avoir que .i. milieu ou centre. Et pour ce mieux entendre, je argüe contre; premierement, quar il dit que le milieu ou le centre est le lieu a quoy les parties de terre tendent ou sont meües. Et tel centre, c'est un point indivisible qui ne puet rien contenir et ne puet estre egal a quelconque(s) corps. Et tout lieu contient le corps qui est en tel lieu et est egal a luy, si comme il appert ou quart de *Phisique*.<sup>5</sup> Item, il dit que toutes les parties de terre tendent a un singulier lieu naturellement. Et nature n'entent onques chose impossible, et c'est impossible que plusieurs corps soient en un lieu, quar ce seroit penetracion de dimensions, si comme il appert ou quart de *Phisique*.<sup>6</sup> Au premier, je respon et di que lieu est dit de .ii.<sup>7</sup> choses; une
- 28c est ce qui contient un corps et est egal // a cel corps aucunement, si comme il appert ou quart de *Phisique*,<sup>8</sup> et en ceste maniere un tonneau selonc<sup>9</sup> sa concavité est lieu du vin qui est dedens, et l'yaue est en partie lieu de la terre. Mais autrement, lieu est ce selonc quoy un corps est dit estre bien apoint, assis en son propre lieu naturel, et en ceste maniere le centre du monde est le lieu de la terre et de toute la masse des choses pesantes, quar telle masse est la ou elle doit estre et en son propre lieu naturel, parce que le centre de sa pesanteur est ou milieu du monde et que tel centre<sup>10</sup> et le centre du monde sont un meïsme point, combien que ceste masse soit ou fust environnee et contenue de yaue ou de air ou de touz .ii. Au secont, je di que plusieurs corps qui ne sont parties d'un corps ou parties un de l'autre ne pueent estre en un lieu qui soit propre a chascun de eulz, meïsment a pre[n]dre<sup>11</sup> lieu en la premiere maniere pour la chose qui contient. Mais plusieurs cors dont un est tout et les autres sont parties de luy ont un meïsme(s) lieu, si comme il appert ou quart de *Phisique*,<sup>12</sup> et meïsment a prendre lieu en la seconde maniere. Et selonc ce, non pas seulement les parties de terre, qui est element, mais toutes choses pesantes
- 28d ten- / dent a un lieu tellement [et]<sup>13</sup> affin que les choses soient conjointes et uniees a toute la masse de pesanteur de laquelle le centre du monde soit milieu et centre. Quar les choses mixtes sont meües<sup>14</sup> selonc l'element qui habonde et a signeurie en elles, si comme il fu dit ou tiers chappitre,<sup>15</sup> combien que en la masse dessus dicte aucunes choses mixtes aient certains

<sup>2</sup> A especes.

<sup>3</sup> A terre celle est haut . . .

<sup>4</sup> DE omit 'selelle est haut, elle descent; et par celle meïsme(s) voie descendroit une autre porcion de terre.'

<sup>5</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 4, 210b, 34—211a, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 5, 212b, 25.

<sup>7</sup> B de trois ch.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 4, 211a, 1-3.

<sup>9</sup> A tonneau est selonc . . .

<sup>10</sup> A que de tel centre . . .

<sup>11</sup> A predre.

<sup>12</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 5, 212b, 11-13.

<sup>13</sup> A omits 'et.'

<sup>14</sup> B mixtes.

<sup>15</sup> 8a.



lieus sus terre convenables a leur espesce et que aucunes aient autre mouvement par vertu d'ame si comme ont les oysiaus et les poyssons et les bestes. Après il applique a propos en formant sa rayson.

Tiexte. Je di donques que les parties de terre qui sont en ce monde et celles qui sero[ie]nt<sup>16</sup> en l'autre monde sont semblables quant a ce que dit est. Et donques qui prendroit aucune chose de la terre qui est en cest monde, elle ne differe en rien des parties de terre de l'autre monde ne celles de l'autre monde ou resgart de celles de cestui, mais seroit semblablement des un[e]s<sup>17</sup> comme des autres, quar elles ne different en rien en espesce.

Glose. Et par ce il s'ensuit que toute terre, ou que elle soit, tent a un lieu et a un centre. Après il conclut.

29a

Tiexte. Et donques convient il par neccessité ou oster et neer ces suppositions, ou oc - // trier que il n'est que un seul milieu auquel tendent toutes choses pesantes ne que une seulle extermité ou circonference a laquelle tendent toutes choses legieres. Et puisque ainsi est, par cestes meïsmes raysons et argüemens il s'ensuit par neccessité que il ne est que un seul monde et ne sont pas plusieurs.

Glose. Tutevoies il sera monsté après que<sup>18</sup> ces raysons ne les autres ne concludent<sup>19</sup> pas evidanment que plusieurs mondes ne puissent estre.

18.—Ou .xviii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il preuve<sup>1</sup> que les ellemens sont meüs a certains lieux determinés sanz ce que la distance soit infinie. Et ce avoit il supposé devant.

29b

Et que aucun lieu soit auquel la terre et l'yaue sont enclines a estre meües il appert par induction en autres choses, quar toutes choses qui sont meües ou transmuees [sont transmuees]<sup>2</sup> d'aucune chose en autre. Et celle chose et l'autre different en espesce. Et toute transmutacion est finie et terminee, si comme ce qui est en voie de guerir est transmué et vient de enfermeté en santé, et ce qui crest vient de petitesse en grandeur. Et donques ce qui est meü selonc lieu est fait ou transmué d'aucun lieu et en aucun lieu. Et pour ce convient il que le lieu ou terme dont tel cors / est enclin a partir et le lieu auquel il est enclin a estre meü different en espesce, et aussi comme le cors qui garist n'est pas transmué a l'aventure en quelconque(s) chose ne la ou weult ce qui le meut indiffe[re]nment.<sup>3</sup>

Glose. Mais est transmué de enfermeté en santé et non pas en blancheur ne en grandeur.

Tiexte. Et donques semblablement le feu ne la terre ne sont pas meüs a une chose infinie et indeterminée.

Glose. Sy comme disoit Democ[rit]us.<sup>4</sup>

Tiexte. Mais il sont meüs a lieus et a termes opposites. Et le lieu qui est haut est opposite a celui qui est bas. Et donques ces lieux sont les termes et les fins de telz movemens.

Glose. Et par consequent, ces movemens ne procedent pas infiniment sanz fin et sanz terme. Après il oste une doubte, quar il semble par ce que il a dit que tout mouvement soit entre termes opposites et contraires, et il avoit dit ou .viii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre que mouvement circulaire n'a point de contraire.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>16</sup> A seront.

<sup>17</sup> A uns.

<sup>18</sup> B par. Cf. 35c-39b.

<sup>19</sup> A concludent.

<sup>1</sup> BCDEF monstre.

<sup>2</sup> A omits 'sont transmuees.'

<sup>3</sup> A indiffenment.

<sup>4</sup> A Democircus.

<sup>5</sup> 14d.

Tiexte. Et le mouvement qui est en circuite a aucunement opposite selonc la ligne du dyametre, mais tout ensemble il n'a point de contraire.

29c Glose. Se le ciel estoit meü tout d'un lieu a autre, il convendroit que ces lieux fussent distans et opposites; mais le ciel tout est meü non pas de son lieu, mes // en son lieu. Et pour ce, son mouvement n'a point de contraire. Mais ses parties, aucunes sont meües ou transportees d'un lieu en autre, si comme de orient en occident, et sont ces lieux distans et opposites selonc dyametre.

Tiexte. Et donques de ces choses les mouvemens sont aucunement en choses opposites et qui sont finies.

Glose. Et en especial, que movement droit ne puisse touzjours proceder oultre sanz fin. Ce prove il après par signe.<sup>6</sup>

Tiexte. Et que les choses pesantes et les legieres ne aient pas inclinacion a estre meües touzjours sanz fin, l'en puet de ce prendre argüement par signe, car la terre, quant elle descent, tant plus descent<sup>7</sup> et elle est meüe plus isnellement; et le feu, tant plus monte et il est meü plus isnelement. Et donques se tel mouvement procedoit sanz fin, la velocité ou isneleté seroit infinie.

29d Glose. Ceste consequence n'est pas simplement neccessaire, quar se une isneleté estoit en un jour intense ou forte ou grande comme .ii., et ou jour ens[u]iant<sup>8</sup> l'en adjoustast un et fust forte comme .iii., et l'autre jour après l'en adjoustast la moytié de un, et l'autre après la moytié moins, et que ainsi touzjours sanz fin l'adiccion fust selonc proporcionna- / leté subdouble, jamais perpetuellement la velocité ou isneleté ne vendroit a ce qu'elle fust plus grande au double; et puet apparoir par une ymagynacion presque semblable mise en glose vers la fin du .ix.<sup>e</sup> chappitre.<sup>9</sup> Mes se l'ysneleté cressoit en precedant et seurmontant oultre toute proporcion, ce seroit infiniment.

Tiexte. Et se l'isneleté estoit infinie, il convendroit que la pesanteur fust infinie, et ainsi de la legiereté, quar tant plus descent la chose pesante, tant est l'isneleté plus grande, et de tant est la pesanteur plus grande. Et *e converso*, tant est la pesanteur plus grande<sup>10</sup> et l'isneleté est plus grande. Et donques se l'adiccion de la pesanteur est infinie, l'addicion de l'isneleté sera infinie.

30a Glose. Et *e converso*, et il fu dit ou .xi.<sup>e</sup> chappitre<sup>11</sup> que pesanteur infinie ne puet estre. Mais yci est a noter premierement que l'isneleté du mouvement de la chose pesante ne crest pas touzjours en descendant, quar se le moien par quoy il est fait estoit plus espés ou plus fort a diviser en bas que en haut, ce pourroit estre tellement que il seroit plus tardif en la fin que au commencement, et tellement que l'isneleté seroit touzjours egalle. Item, de ce que il dit que la // pesanteur est plus grande de tant comme l'isneleté est plus grande, ce n'est pas a entendre de pesanteur a prendre la pour qualité naturelle qui encline en bas. Quar se une pierre d'une livre descendoit d'une lieue de haut et que le mouvement fust grandement plus isnel en la fin que au commencement, nientmoins la pierre n'avroit plus de pesanteur naturelle pour ce une foyz que autre. Mais l'en doit entendre par ceste pesanteur qui crest en descendant une qualité accidentele laquelle est cause[e]<sup>12</sup> par

<sup>6</sup> B apres sanz fin.

<sup>7</sup> F omits 'tant plus descent.'

<sup>8</sup> A ensiant.

<sup>9</sup> Ch. 10, 19 abcd.

<sup>10</sup> BCDEF omit 'Et e converso, tant est la pesanteur plus grande.'

<sup>11</sup> 20ab.

<sup>12</sup> A cause.

l'enforcement<sup>13</sup> de l'acressement [de]<sup>14</sup> l'isneleté, si comme j'ay autrefois declarié ou .vii.<sup>e</sup> de *Phisique*.<sup>15</sup> Et ceste qualité puet estre appelée impetuosité. Et n'est pas proprement pesanteur, quar se un pertuis estoit de ci jusques au centre de la terre et encor oultre, et une chose pesante descendoit par ce pertuis ou treu, quant elle vendroit ou centre, elle passeroit oultre et monteroit par ceste qualité accidentelle et aqoise, et puis redescendrait et yroit et vendroit plusieurs foys en la maniere que nous voions d'une chose pesante qui pent a un tref par une longue corde. Et donques n'est ce pas proprement pesanteur puisqu'elle fet monter en haut. Et telle qua- / lité est en tout mouvement et naturel et violent toute foys que l'isneleté va en cressant, fors ou mouvement du ciel. Et telle qualité<sup>16</sup> est cause du mouvement<sup>17</sup> des choses jetees quant elles sont hors de la main ou de l'instrument, si comme je [ay]<sup>18</sup> monsté autrefois sus le .vii.<sup>e</sup> de *Phisique*.<sup>19</sup>

19.—Ou .xix.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il repreuve les oppinions contraires a ce que dit est ou chappitre precedent.

Mais encore ne puet l'en dire que des elemens un soit meü en haut et l'autre en bas par aucune autre chose dehors.

Glose. Quant une chose pesante est engendree hors de son lieu naturel, ce qui l'engendre li donne, partie après autre, forme substancielle et pesanteur et lieu. Et selonc cè, dit l'en que ce qui l'engendre la meut; mais quant elle est toute formee et elle est hors de son lieu, elle se meut de soy meisme par sa pesanteur. Et la chose qui oste tout ce qui la tenoit hors son lieu la meut par accident, et semblablement de la chose legiere.

Tiexte. Et ne puet l'en dire que telle chose soit ainsi meüe par violence, si comme aucuns disoient que ce estoit par trusion ou deboutement.

30c Glose. Il disoient que le ciel deboute les choses pesantes et les fait assembler ou //milieu, et les legieres monter en haut par la force de son mouvement et par violence. Et ce reprouve Aristote par .iii. raysons.

Tiexte. Quar se ainsi estoit, le feu qui est plus grant seroit meü en haut plus tardivement que le petit, et aussi de la terre en bas.

Et le contraire est touzjours, quar le plus grant feu est meü plus isnellement a son lieu, et aussi de la terre.

Glose. Et une chose meüe par violence, tant est plus grande<sup>1</sup> et elle est plus forte a mouvoir et est meüe plus tardivement, se les autres choses sont pareilles. Et ceste rayson est contre l'opinion de ceulz qui disoient que le centre meut et atrait a soy les choses pesantes, aussi comme l'aymant atrait le fer. Mais le centre n'est rien fors un point ymaginé, qui ne diroit que ou centre est aucune chose materielle qui a en soy telle vertu attractive. Et donques atrairait elle plus legierement et plus isnelement la petite terre que la plus grande. Et nous voions sensiblement que la plus grande descent plus isnellement.

Tiexte. Item, une chose pesante ne seroit pas meüe plus isnellement en la fin du mouvement que au commencement se elle estoit meüe

<sup>13</sup> B omits 'par l'enforcement.'

<sup>14</sup> A et.

<sup>15</sup> This is the first of four similar references in *Du Ciel* to a commentary by Oresme on the *Physics*, now lost.

<sup>16</sup> D quantité. E quaitité.

<sup>17</sup> BCDEF omit 'du mouvement.'

<sup>18</sup> ABCF omit 'ay.'

<sup>19</sup> Cf. note 15 above.

<sup>1</sup> E omits 'grande.'

30d

par violence et par trusion, quar / toutes choses meües par violence sont meües plus tardivement quant elles sont plus loing.

Glose. C'est a savoir vers la fin du mouvement, quar vers le commencement leur isnelleté va en cressant, si comme d'un dart ou d'un vireton, tant comme il est meü par violence, et est une distance certaine ou l'isnelleté est la plus grande,<sup>2</sup> et yleuques seroit le plus fort coup. Et après l'isnelleté va en appetisant. Et se aucun obeïtoit<sup>3</sup> contre ce que dit est, quar le fer est meü vers l'aïmant par violence et toutevoies, il est meü plus isnellement en la fin du mouvement quant il approche de l'aïmant, je respon que les choses autres ne sont pas paretles, quar la vertu de l'aïmant est plus grande et oeuvre plus fort pres de l'aïmant que loing, et pour ce, elle attrait le fer plus tost de pres que de loing.

Tiexte. Item, nul corps n'est meü par violence au lieu dont il seroit osté par violence.

Glose. Et la terre est ostee de bas et meüe en haut par violence, et donques est elle meüe au contraire et en bas par sa nature.

20.—Ou .xx.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il monstre encor par .ii. raysons que il ne puet estre que .i. seul monde.

31a

Encor puet l'en monstre que il n'est que .i. seul // monde par raysons prinses de la premiere philosophie, c'est a savoir de methaphisique, et prinses du mouvement qui est en circuite; c'est le mouvement du ciel lequel est pardurable par neccessité en ce monde et seroit semblablement aus autres mondes se il estoient.

Glose. Il appert par le .viii.<sup>e</sup> de *Phisique*<sup>1</sup> et ou .xii.<sup>e</sup> de *Methaphisique*<sup>2</sup> que touz mouvemens sont reduis a un qui est perpetuel et premier, et est le premier mouvement du ciel, et que ce qui le fait est chose immaterielle et esperituelle de laquelle tout depent et est cause premiere. Et dit Ave[r]roÿs<sup>3</sup> que ce est impossible que en une espesce soient .ii. ou plusieurs telles choses immaterielles et que une telle chose ne puet faire fors un seul mouvement. Et donques, se un autre monde estoit, il convendroit que le premier mouvement de ce monde fust fait par une autre intelligence et d'autre espesce que celle qui fait le premier mouvement de cest monde. Et ainsi il convendrait que ces .ii. mondes fussent de diverses espesces. Et ce fu reprové ou .xvi.<sup>e</sup> chappitre.<sup>4</sup> C'est en [s]entence<sup>5</sup> la rayson d'Aristote selonc Ave[r]roÿs.<sup>6</sup> Mais que ceste rayson ne conclude pas je le monstre par les

31b

dis meïsmes d'Ave[r]roÿs, / quar il di(s)t plusieurs foys après, ou secont livre expressement,<sup>7</sup> que la lune et les autres planettes et estoilles sont d'une meïsmes espesce, et non pas seulement d'un gerre si comme cuidoit Avicenne.<sup>8</sup> Et les intelligences qui les mouvent sont plusieurs selonc Ave[r]roÿs<sup>9</sup> et appert ou .xii.<sup>e</sup> de *Methaphisique*.<sup>10</sup> Et donques convient il

<sup>1</sup> B certaine en l'isnelte la plus grande.

<sup>2</sup> A obeïtoit.

<sup>3</sup> *Physicorum*, VIII, 6 *passim*, especially 259b, 32–260a, 1; also 8, 261b, 27–28.

<sup>4</sup> *Metaphysicorum*, Lambda, 7, 1072a, 21–26; 8, 1073a, 22–34.

<sup>5</sup> A Avenroÿs. C Avenroÿz. Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 90.

<sup>6</sup> 26c–27d.

<sup>7</sup> A centense.

<sup>8</sup> AC Avenroÿs. Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 90.

<sup>9</sup> AC Avenroÿs. Cf. *Juntas*, II, t.c. 41, 42, and especially t.c. 49 and 59.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Avicennae Metaphysica*, Venice, 1508, fol. 104v., and *Die Metaphysik Avicennas enthaltend die Metaphysik, Theologie, Kosmologie und Ethik*, IX, 6, übersetzt und erläutert von M. Horten, Halle, 1907, p. 595. Cf. also *Averrois de Substantia Orbis*, ch. 7, *Juntas*, vol. IX, 1573.

<sup>11</sup> A Avenroÿs. C Avenroÿz.

<sup>12</sup> *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri xiii cum Averrois Commentariis*, *Juntas*, vol. 8, 1574, t.c. 42 and 43.

dire par neccessité selonc Ave[r]roï<sup>9</sup> ou que ces intelligences inmateriaelles sont plusieurs en une espede differentes en nombre, ou que plusieurs intelligences de diverses espedes meuvent plusieurs corps qui sont d'une espede. Et pour ce, selonc la verité, il est possible que d'une espede esperituelle et inmateriaelle soient plusieurs supposts, si comme sont plusieurs ames humaines et plusieurs angelz. Et est possible que plusieurs corps premiers et plusieurs mouvemens premiers soient en plusieurs mondes, et que les choses qui meuvent ces premiers corps soient d'une espede ou de plusieurs nonobstant que les corps ou mondes soient d'une espede, et que tous ces mondes et ceulz qui les meuvent soient souz un souverain createur qui est commencement et fin de toutes choses. Et Aristote ne Ave[r]roï<sup>9</sup> ne monstrent onques evidenment le contraire, si comme il //

31c appert et sera declairié encore après plus a plain.<sup>11</sup> Après il met la seconde rayson.

Tiexte. Item, que de neccessité soit un seul monde il appert a ceulz qui entendent a ce qui s'ensuit, car comme .iii. elemens corporelz soient, il convient que ces elemens<sup>12</sup> aient .iii. liex, c'est a savoir .i. qui est dessouz et qui est vers le milieu, et l'autre qui est du corps meü circulairement qui est sus tout et derrenier, et le tiers est moien entre ces .ii. et est le lieu du corps moien entre ces .ii.

Glose. Par un de ces .iii. elemens il entent toute la masse des choses pesantes qui a son lieu vers le centre ou au centre du monde; et par l'autre il entent le ciel, qui est element pour ce que c'est une des principals et la premiere partie corporelle du monde; et par le tiers il entent les choses legieres dont le lieu est moien entre le ciel et les choses pesantes. Après il forme sa rayson.

31a Tiexte. Et est neccessaire que toute chose qui monte ou tent en haut soit en ce lieu, quar se non, il convendroit que aucune telle chose fust dehors. Mais c'est imposible que chose legiere soit par dessus cest lieu et hors du monde, quar ce qui est pesant est au plus bas et ne puet estre / lieu plus bas que le [centre]<sup>13</sup> et le milieu la ou est la chose pesante. Et donques ne puet estre lieu qui soit naturel a chose legiere plus haut qu'est le lieu moien dessus dit et qui est souz le ciel. Et l'en ne puet dire que chose legiere soit en l'autre monde hors nature, quar il convendroit que cel lieu fust naturel a aucun autre corps.

Glose. Il veult dire que aussi comme nulle chose pesante ne puet estre plus bas qu'est le centre qui est le lieu de la terre, semblablement nulle chose legiere ne puet estre plus haut que est la concavité du ciel laquelle est le lieu du feu. Mais ceste rayson ne conclud pas, quar se Dieu faisoit un autre monde, tel monde ne le feu de tel monde ne seroit plus haut ne plus bas que cestuy monde, si comme il sera declairié après.

Tiexte. Et nous dirons après de cest ellement moien quelles sont les differences de luy.

Glose. Ce sera ou tiers livre et ou quart ou il dira comment l'element legier est divisé en air et en feu, etc.<sup>14</sup>

Tiexte. Et ainsi par les choses devant dites nous appert des elemens corporelz quelz il sont et en quel nombre, et de chascun quel est son lieu, et universelment ou generalment de leurs lieux quans il sont. //

<sup>11</sup> Bk. II, 16, fols. 120b-122c.

<sup>12</sup> BCDEF ces .iii. elemens.

<sup>13</sup> A lieu.

<sup>14</sup> III, 9, 170d-172b; IV, 7, 193b-196b.

- 32a 21.—Ou .xxi.' chappitre il propose une rayson par laquelle aucuns cuidoiēt que plusieurs mondes peüssent estre.<sup>1</sup>

Et nous disons non pas seulement que il n'est que [un]<sup>2</sup> seul monde, mais disons que c'est impossible que plusieurs mondes soient. Et encor dirons nous que ce monde est incorruptible et que il ne fu onques engendré ne fait. Et premierement nous traiterons une dobte que l'en fait de luy.

Glose. C'est la doubte et la rayson que faisoie[n]<sup>3</sup> aucuns anciens pour laquelle il met une suppousicion.

- 32b Tiexte. Quar il sembleroit a ceulz qui entendraient a la rayson qui s'ensuit et la creroient que c'est impossible que un seul monde soit ou que plusieurs ne puissent estre. Quar en toutes choses qui sont par nature et en celles qui sont par art et en celles qui sont engendrees et faites de nouvel, la fourme de elles est autre, consideree selonc elle et selonc ce qu'elle est mixte ou conjointe a la matiere, si comme de espere, autre chose e[s]<sup>4</sup>t dire l'espece et autre chose est dire espere d'or ou de arein. Et aussi de cercle, autre chose<sup>5</sup> est considerer la fourme et autre chose est considerer cercle de arein ou de fust, quar quant nous disons / "Quoy est espere?" ou "Quoy est cercle?" nous ne disons pas en sa diffinicion que espere ou cercle est d'or ou d'arain, aussi comme se or et arain ne fussent pas de la substance d'espere ou de cercle. Et c'est verité, pousé que la chose fust telle que nous ne peüssons entendre ne prendre la forme ou l'espece sanz le singulier suppost et sanz la matiere, quar ce puet bien<sup>6</sup> estre.

Glose. Si comme l'en ne puet entendre honme sanz char et ós ne chamus sanz neis, mais l'en entent et ymagine bien cercle ou telles choses mathematiques sanz matiere entendre.

Tiexte. Sy comme qui diroit cercle, autre chose est considerer en universel et autre en particulier ou en singulier en disant "Cestuy cercle," quar un est considerer l'espece absolument et l'autre est considerer l'espece en matiere et en singulier.

Glose. Briefment, combien que honme en universel ne soit autre chose fors cestuy et cestuy, toutevoies la consideracion et l'intencion ou concevement de l'entendement est autre de honme en espece et [de]<sup>7</sup> cestuy ou de cestuy, quar le premier est general et commun a plusieurs et ne represente plus un que l'autre, mais le secont est propre a cestuy ou a cel autre. Aprés il applique a propos. //

- 32c Tiexte. Et donques, puisque le monde est chose sensible, c'est une chose singuliere, quar toute chose<sup>8</sup> singuliere est en matiere et, par consequant, singuliere. Et se il est chose singuliere, donques dire monde simplement et universellement est une chose, et dire ce monde singulierement est autre chose, quar une est comme espece et forme et l'autre est comme chose mixte et mise en matiere.

Glose. Quar *monde*, c'est un nom universel, et *ce monde*, c'est un non singulier. Aprés il fourme la rayson des anciens.

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. ix.

<sup>2</sup> A omits 'un.'

<sup>3</sup> A faisoiet.

<sup>4</sup> A et.

<sup>5</sup> DE aussi de telle autre chose.

<sup>6</sup> E ce ne peut bien estre.

<sup>7</sup> A omits 'de.'

<sup>8</sup> B repeats 'une chose singuliere, quar toute chose.'

Tiexte. Et de toutes choses dont l'en puet considerer, aucune forme selonc elle et aucune espee de telle chose sont de fait plusieurs supposts singuliers ou pueent estre. Et pousé que l'espee soit une chose separee ou une ydee, si comme aucuns dient, ou pousé qu'il ne soit nulle telle chose separee, nientmoins il est neccessaire que il soit ainsi comme dit est, quar nous voions en toutes choses qui ont substance ou forme en matiere sensible que plusieurs supposts et innombrables sont en une meisme espee.

Glose. Si comme il est des hommes et des bestes et des arbres etc.

32d

Tiexte. Et donques, ou plusieurs mondes sont ou il est possible que il soient plusieurs. Et par ce que dit est / cuideroit aucun que plusieurs mondes soient ou puissent estre.

22.—Ou .xxii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il met solucion a la rayson dessus dicte en con-fermant son propos.

Or convient derechief considerer des choses devant dictes ce qui est bien dit, et ce qui est non bien dit,<sup>1</sup> quar dire que la rayson de la forme<sup>2</sup> qui est consideree sanz matiere est autre que n'est celle qui est consideree en matiere,—ce est bien dit et est verité.

Glose. Quar, comme dit est, le concevement<sup>3</sup> universel, comme seroit dire soleil ou monde, est commun et indifferent a plusieurs supposts qui sont ou qui pourroient estre. Mais le con[cev]ment<sup>4</sup> particulier, comme dire ce solleil ou ce monde, est propre et ne pourroit represanter autre solleil, pousé que il fust, ne autre monde.

Tiexte. Mais nientmoins, il n'est pas pour ce neccessaire que plusieurs mondes soient ou puissent estre se ce monde est de toute la matiere de quoy<sup>5</sup> l'en porroit faire mondes; et il est ainsi.

Glose. Et ce declaire il après par exemples.

33a

Tiexte. Et, par aventure, ce que dit est sera fait plus manifeste en ceste maniere: quar se camuseté est courveté<sup>6</sup> en neis ou en char, et char est la matiere de camuseté, se de toutes les chars qui sont et qui pueent estre, estoit // faite une char et elle fust une chose camuse, nulle autre chose camuse ne seroit ou pourroit estre. Semblablement se char [et]<sup>7</sup> os sont la matiere de homme, et se de toute la char et de touz les os<sup>8</sup> qui sont et qui pueent estre, estoit fait un homme le quel ne puet estre dissolut ou courrompu, pour certain nul autre homme ne pourroit estre. Et semblablement en autres choses, quar generalment de toutes choses dont la substance ou forme<sup>9</sup> est en matiere subjecte, rien ne puet estre fet qui n'a aucune matiere.

Glose. Quar c'est impossible naturellement de fere aucune chose de nient. Et selonc Aristote, la multiplicacion des supposts en une espee est selonc la multitude des porcions de la matiere dont sont telz supposts.<sup>9</sup> Après il applique a propos.<sup>10</sup>

Tiexte. Or est le monde une chose singuliere et de celles qui sont en matiere(s).

Glose. Pousé que le ciel n'ait pas matiere,—a prendre matiere proprement

<sup>1</sup> BCDEF omit 'et ce qui est non bien dit.'

<sup>2</sup> BCDEF omit 'de la forme.'

<sup>3</sup> BF commencement.

<sup>4</sup> ABF commencement.

<sup>5</sup> A matiere que de quoy . . .

<sup>6</sup> B commueté. C corvereté. DEF courté.

<sup>7</sup> A ou.

<sup>8</sup> F omits 'sont de la matiere de homme, et se de toute la char et de touz les os.'

<sup>9</sup> *Metaphysicorum*, V, 6, 1016b, 32; X, 9, 1058a, 37; XII, 8, 1074a, 34.

<sup>10</sup> B omits 'Après il applique a propos.'

ou telle comme est la matiere des elemens,—toutesvoies a prendre matiere largement, les parties integrales du monde sont matiere de luy comme sont le ciel, les elemens et les choses mixtes.

33b

Tiexte. Et se ainsi est, comme si est, que ce monde n'est pas d'une partie de la matiere de quoy / monde puet estre, mais est de tote, c'est bien verité que autre chose est considerer ou dire *monde* et dire *ce monde*. Mais pour ce ne convient il pas que un autre monde soit ne que plusieurs mondes puissent estre. Et la cause est pour ce que toute la matiere de quoy monde puet estre. est comprinse en cestuy. Or demeure donques a monstrier que cest monde est composé de tout corps naturel et sensible.

23.—Ou .xxiii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il monstre que hors ce monde ne puet estre corps sensible quelconque(s), et ce avoit il supposé ou chappitre precedent.

Nous dirons premierement en quantes manieres *ciel* est dit afin que ce que nous querons soit plus manifeste.

Glose. Aristote met icy une distinction qui avoit lieu en langage grec, mais elle n'a pas du tout lieu en latin ne en françoys, quar les Grecs appeloient tout le monde et le ciel par un nom et nous n'appelons pas le monde *ciel*.

Tiexte. Quar en une maniere ou signification nous disons que le ciel est la substance ou circonference derreniere de tout ce qui est meü circulairement, ou le corps naturel qui est en la circonference de tout.

33c Glose. Le ciel en ceste signification, c'est le derrenier ciel qui est suz tous // les autres, ou la circonference de ce ciel qui contient tout.

Tiexte. Quar nous avons acoustumé a appeller *ciel* le derrenier corps qui est en haut sus tout autre et ouquel nous disons estre toute chose devine comme en son lieu. Item, en autre maniere nous appellons *ciel* toute la masse qui est meüe circulairement et contenue en la desreniere circonference. Et ainsi nous disons estre ou ciel le solleil et la lune et les autres estoilles. Item, encor appellons nous *ciel* tout le corps contenu en la derreniere circonference, quar nous avons acoustumé a appeller *ciel* toute la masse de touz les corps qui sont.

Glose. C'est tout le monde qu'il appelloient en grec par tel nom comme le ciel. Après il descent a propos.

33d

Tiexte. Et donques comme *ciel* soit dit en .iii. manieres, a prendre le en la tierce maniere pour tout ce qui est contenu en la desreniere et souveraine circonference, c'est le monde. Je di que il convient par neccessité que il soit compousé de tout corps naturel et sensible pour ce que hors ce monde n'est et ne puet estre quelconque(s) corps, quar se hors celle derreniere circonference estoit aucun corps naturel, il convendrait par neccessité que tel corps / fust simple ou compost, et que il fust la dehors selonc nature ou hors nature. Or, ne puet ce estre un des corps simples quelconques, quar le corps simple qui est meü circulairement ne puet muer son lieu, si comme autrefois est monstrier.

Glose. C'est a savoir ou sixte de *Phisique*,<sup>1</sup> quar le ciel est meü en son lieu et non pas de son lieu. Et se un autre ciel estoit hors de ce monde. son lieu

<sup>1</sup> *Physicorum*, VI, 9, 240a, 29—240b, 9.



seroit naturel au ciel de ce monde aussi bien comme a l'autre ciel, quar les .ii. seroient d'une espee et d'une nature, si comme il appert par le .xvi.<sup>o</sup> chappitre.<sup>2</sup> Et donques le ciel de ce monde seroit enclin a estre meü vers l'autre ciel et a issir de son lieu contre ce que dit est.

Tiexte. Mais des autres corps simples, c'est a savoir des ellemens, il n'est pas possible que quelconque(s) ellement qui est meü en haut ne quelconque(s) qui est meü en bas vers le milieu soit hors de ce monde, ne quelconque(s) chose semblable, quar telz corps ne seroient pas la dehors selonc nature pour ce qu'il ont autres lieux propres a leur nature. Et se telz corps estoient yleuques hors nature et par violence, il<sup>3</sup> convendroit que ce lieu, qui est hors ce monde, fust selonc nature ou naturel a un autre corps, quar, par neccessité, // il convient que le lieu qui est hors nature ou violent a un corps soit selonc nature ou naturel a .i. autre corps. Et il n'est quelconque(s) corps simple fors les dessus dis, c'est a savoir le ciel et les elemens, si comme il est dit devant.

34a

Glose. Ou secont et ou .xvi.<sup>o</sup> et en plusieurs autres chappitres.<sup>4</sup>

Tiexte. Et donques n'est il pas possible que aucun(s) des corps symples soit dehors ce monde. Et se nul corps symple n'y est, nul corps mixte n'y est, quar il est necessaire que les<sup>5</sup> corps simples y soient se le corps mixte y est.

Glose. Quar se les [corps]<sup>6</sup> simples sont ou mixte en propre forme, il sont la ou est le mixte; et se il ne sont ou mixte en propre nature, toutevoies le mixte et le simple qui a domination ou mixte tendent naturellement a un lieu, si comme il appert par le tiers chappitre.<sup>7</sup> Et donques hors le ciel ou hors le monde n'est de present ou de fait corps naturel quelconque.

Tiexte. Mais encor ne puet l'en dire que corps [y]<sup>8</sup> puisse estre, quar se il estoit possible, ou il seroit la selonc nature ou hors nature et par violence, et convendroit que il fust ou symple ou mixte. Et revendroit derechief la rayson dessus mise, quar il ne differe en rien se corps y est de present ou / se il est possible que il y soit fait.

34b

Glose. Quant a la rayson dessus mise et aus autres, par lesquelles l'en puet conclure non pas seulement que nul corps n'est hors le ciel de fait, mais que c'est impossible.

Tiexte. Or appert donques par les choses devant dictes, que hors le ciel n'est et<sup>9</sup> ne puet estre corps pour ce que tout ce monde est de toute sa matiere et qui li est propre, quar la matiere de luy est corps naturel et sensible comme dit est. Et donques maintenant ne sont pas plusieurs mondes et onques ne furent et ne pourroient estre plusieurs, mes un seullement, et est ce monde qui est un seul et est parfait.

24.—Ou .xxiii.<sup>o</sup> chappitre il monstre que hors ce monde n'est chose qui appartienge a corps sensible.<sup>1</sup>

Aveques ce puet apparoir que hors le ciel ou hors ce monde n'est lieu ne vieu ne temps, quar en tout lieu puet estre corps. Et ceulz qui dient que vieu puet estre, dient que vieu est la ou n'est quelconque(s) corps. Et est possible que aucun corps y soit.

<sup>2</sup> 26c-27b.

<sup>3</sup> DE violence, se il convendroit.

<sup>4</sup> 6d. 26a.

<sup>5</sup> BCDEF que se les corps.

<sup>6</sup> A omits 'corps.'

<sup>7</sup> 8a.

<sup>8</sup> ABCDF il.

<sup>9</sup> B omits 'n'est et.'

<sup>1</sup> A sensible.

Glose. Et hors le ciel ne peut<sup>2</sup> estre corps, si comme il appert par le chappitre precedent. Et donques hors le ciel n'est lieu ne plain ne vieu.

34c Tiexte. Et temps // est nombre et mesure de mouvement.

Glose. Sy comme il appert ou quart de *Phisique*.<sup>3</sup>

Tiexte. Et mouvement n'est pas sanz corps naturel, et il est monstré devant que hors le ciel n'est et ne puet estre quelconque(s) corps. Et donques appert il que hors le ciel n'est lieu ne vieu ne temps. Et pour ce, les choses qui sont yleuques ne sont pas habiles a estre en lieu, ne temps ne les fait enviellir, quar nulle transmutacion ne puet estre de quelconque(s) des choses qui sont sus ce qui est meü ordeneement.

Glose. C'est a savoir sus le ciel derrenier lequel est meü regulierement. Et par les choses qui sont lasus le ciel, Aristote entent les intelligences et principalement [la premiere],<sup>4</sup> c'est a savoir Dieu. Et c'est selonc l'Escripture qui dit: *Quod apud eum non est transmutacio*.<sup>5</sup>

Tiexte. Mais [c]es<sup>6</sup> choses sont sanz alteracion et impassibles et ont vie tres bonne, et par soy tres sufisante et parfaite, et l'ont en tot le temps pardurable. Quar cest nom *pardurable* fu par les anciens enoncié et approprié a la divinité ou aus choses divines pour ce que la fin qui contient le temps de la vie de quelconque(s) chose, duquel temps rien de ceste chose n'est hors selonc nature, il l'ap- / pelloient le pardurable ou l'eternité<sup>7</sup> ou siecle de celle chose. Et selonc ceste rayson, la fin de tout le monde et tout le temps et la perfection qui contient infinité est pardurableté, et prent sa d[en]ominacion<sup>8</sup> ou est ainsi dicte de ce qu'i est chose immortelle et divine.

34d

Glose. C'est Dieu, si comme il appert par ce qui s'ensuit. Et pour entendre ce que dit est, l'en doit savoir que les anciens appelloient l'aage d'une chose vive sa perpetuité ou son siecle. Mais, par excellence, la duracion qui est sanz commencement et sanz fin est proprement dicte perpetuité, et de siecle sera dit après.<sup>9</sup> Item, des duracions des choses, a parler generalment, aucune est succes[siv]e<sup>10</sup> et partie après autre et des choses qui de fait sont en transmutacion, et ceste est appelée temps. Autre est successive de choses transmuables et qui de fait ne sont pas en transmutacion, si comme pueent estre aucunes creatures incorporelles. Et ceste duracion n'a pas nom approprié fors que en latin puet estre dicte *evum*. La tierce est non pas successive mais toute ensemble, et de choses qui ne pueent estre transmuees et est appelée eternité. Et la premiere puet estre telle qu'elle a fin et commencement, si

35a comme est l'aage d'un honme, et puet estre yma- // ginee telle que elle seroit sanz commencement et non pas sanz fin, ou telle qu'elle est sanz fin et non pas sanz commencement. Et c'est perpetuité et telle est la duracion d'une ame. Ou duracion puet estre telle qu'elle seroit sanz commencement et sanz fin, et telle est la duracion du mouvement du ciel selonc Aristote.<sup>10a</sup> Item, l'en puet ymaginer en la seconde maniere de duracion totes ces differences. Et la tierce est par neccessité sanz commencement et sanz fin et sanz quelconque(s) succession, mais est toute ensemble et est la duracion de Dieu si comme dit l'Escripture: *Dominus excelsus et sublimis habitans*

<sup>2</sup> A peent. Cf. 34a.

<sup>3</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 11, 219b, 1-2; 12 *passim*, especially 221b, 7.

<sup>4</sup> A omits 'la premiere.'

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Jac., I, 17: "descendens a Patre luminum, apud quem non est transmutatio."

<sup>6</sup> A ses.

<sup>7</sup> BDEF la trinité.

<sup>8</sup> A dominacion.

<sup>9</sup> II, 1, 65b.

<sup>10</sup> AC succeive. DE surceive.

<sup>10a</sup> De Caelo, II, 4, 287a, 24; De Generatione et Corruptione, II, 11, 338a, 18.

*eternitatem*.<sup>11</sup> Et est Dieu meïsme duquel dit l'Escripture: *Quod apud eum non est vici[ssi]tudinis*<sup>12</sup> *obumbratio*.<sup>13</sup> Et est sanz preterit et sanz futur, toute de present: *Quia nec preteritorum momenta deficiunt nec*<sup>14</sup> *ulla super*<sup>15</sup> *est expectacio futurorum*,<sup>16</sup> et est appellee moment de eternité. Mais pour ce que nostre pensee ne puet estre sanz transmutacion, nous ne povons comprendre ne proprement entendre ou ymaginer ceste chose, et nientmoins rayson naturelle nous enseigne que telle chose est, et elle contient / toute

35b

autre duracion possible et est cause de tout. Et pour ce dit Aristote après.

Tiexte. Et de ce est as autres choses communiqué et dirivé estre et vivre, as unes plus clerement et as autres plus obscurément.

Glose. Sy comme estre et vivre est communiqué et donné de Dieu aus hommes plus clerement et plus parfaitement que aus bestes. Après il desclaire une chose qu'il avoit dicte devant.

Tiexte. Quar si comme il est mainte foys declairé par raysons es livres des choses divines, ce qui est divin et premier et souverain est intransmuable par neccessité et ne peut estre transmué. Et ce que il est en ceste maniere donne testimonie aus choses devant dictes.

Glose. Après il conferme son dit par .ii. raysons.

Tiexte. Quar se telle chose estoit transmuee ou meüe, celle qui la mouvroit seroit meilleur et plus devine. Et rien n'est meilleur de la chose dessus dicte.

Glose. Quar c'est Dieu le souverain.

Tiexte. Item, il n'a en soy rien de mal ne defaut<sup>17</sup> de quelconque(s) bien.

Glose. Et ce qui est meü [est meü]<sup>18</sup> pour aquerir miex ou pour la conservation de son bien. Et Dieu ne puet miex avoir et n'a mestier d'estre meü pour garder son bien.

35c

Tiexte. Et donques s'ensuit il par rayson que il moeve //le ciel par mouvement qui onques ne cesse, quar toutes choses qui sont meües et cessent de leur mouvement et repousent, c'est quant elles sont venues en leur propre lieu.

Glose. Par mouvement naturel et du lieu qui ne leur estoit pas naturel.

Tiexte. Et du cors qui est meü circulairem[en]t,<sup>19</sup> le lieu est un meïsme et dont il commence et la ou il fine.<sup>20</sup>

Glose. Quant a parler proprement, il n'a fin ne commencement fors par signacion volontaire, si comme nous disons que il commence en orie[n]t<sup>21</sup> de nostre ozizon et ileuques fine et recommence, et ainsy touzjours sanz cesser, comme dit est. Et donques ce mouvement est perpetuel quant est de la rayson du corps meü, mais il peut bien cesser par la voulenté du premier mouvant, nonobstant que celle voulenté soit inmuable.

Or sont finés les chapitres ou Aristote entendoit prouver que c'est impossible que plus d'un monde soit. Et est bon de considerer selonc verité ce que l'en puet dire en ceste matiere sanz regarder a auctorité de honme, mais seulement a pure rayson. Je di que, quant a present, il me semble que l'en puet y- / maginer plusieurs mondes estre en .iii. manieres. Une est que un monde soit après un autre par succession de temps, si comme aucuns anciens

35d

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Isai. LVII, 15: "Quia haec dicit Excel-  
sus, et Sublimis, habitans eternitatem."

<sup>12</sup> ACDEF viciitudinis.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Jac. I, 17: "Apud quem non est trans-  
mutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio."

<sup>14</sup> D ne.

<sup>15</sup> DE omit 'super.'

<sup>16</sup> Unidentified.

<sup>17</sup> A de faute.

<sup>18</sup> A omits 'est meü.'

<sup>19</sup> A circulairem.

<sup>20</sup> B et donques il commence la ou il fine.

<sup>21</sup> A oriet.

cuidèrent que ce monde eüst commencement parce que tout estoit devant en une masse confuse sanz ordre, sanz forme et sanz figure. Et après ce, par amour ou par concorde, ceste masse fu desmelee et formee et ordenee, et ainsi fu fait ce monde. Et après un grant temps, finalement ce monde sera defait par discorde et retournera en telle masse confuse, et derechief après par concorde sera fait un autre monde. Et tel procès sera ou temps avenir sanz fin par foys innombrables, et semblablement a esté ou temps passé. Mais ceste opinion n'est pas yci touchiee et est reprouvee par Aristote en plusieurs lieux de philosophie,<sup>22</sup> et ne puet ainsi estre naturellement, combien que Dieu pourroit faire, et peüst avoir fait tellement de sa toute-puissance ou du tout anichiler ce monde et après créer un autre. Et Origenes disoit, si comme re[c]ite<sup>23</sup> saint Jerome,<sup>24</sup> que ainsi fera Dieu par foys innombrables. //

- 36a Une autre ymaginacion puet estre laquelle je weul traitier par esbatement et pour exercitacion de engin, c'est a savoir que en un meïsme(s) temps un monde fut dedens un autre monde, si comme se dedens et dessouz<sup>25</sup> cest monde estoit contenu un autre monde semblable et mendre. Et combien que ce ne soit pas voir ne vraysemblable, toutevoies il me semble qu'il n'appert pas evidentement par rayon que ce soit impossible, quar les plus fortes raysons au contraire, si comme il me semble, seroient cestes où semblables. Premièrement, se ainsi estoit, il s'ensuiroit que la terre de ce monde fu la ou elle est par violence, puisque dedens elle et souz elle vers le centre seroit un autre ciel et autres ellemens, etc. Item, la terre du monde desouz seroit toute massee et ou centre des mondes, et la terre de cestuy seroit creuse et concave et ne seroit pas ou centre ne toute ne partie de elle. Et donques, puisque leurs liex sont differens, il s'ensuit par ce qui fu dit ou .xvii.<sup>26</sup> chappitre que ces .ii. terres different en espece. Et donques, le monde dessouz nous et cesti seroient dessemblables, etc. Item, toutes choses naturel- / les
- 36b sont determinees en grandeur et en petitesse, quar la quantité d'un homme pourroit tant appeticier ou tant crestre que ce ne seroit pas honme, et ainsi des autres choses. Et donques le monde qui seroit faint estre en cestuy et souz cestuy seroit si tres petit que ce ne seroit pas monde, quar le solleil de cestuy seroit plus de .ii.<sup>27</sup> foys plus grant que le solleil de celui, et chascune estoille de cestuy plus grande que tout celui. Item, se ainsi estoit, l'en pourroit fourir en terre si en parfont que l'en vendroit ou ataindroit jusques a l'autre monde qui seroit la desouz. Et c'est une absurdité inopinable. Item, il con- vendroit mettre .ii. diex, un en ce monde et autre en l'autre, etc. Item, par semblable pourroit l'en dire que dedens la lune ou autre estoille est un monde tel comme cestuy, etc. Item, par semblable pourroit estre un autre monde sus cestuy et un autre souz<sup>27</sup> celui qui est souz cestuy, etc. Pour monstrar que ces raysons et semblables ne concluent pas que telle chose soit simplement impossible, je supouse premierement que tout corps est divisible
- 36c en partie[s]<sup>28</sup> touzjours divisibles sanz fin; et ce // appert par le premier chappitre.<sup>29a</sup> Item, que grant et petit sont nons relatis di[s]<sup>29</sup> en comparoyson et non pas absolument, quar chascune chose, tant soit petite, est grande ou regart de la .m.<sup>o</sup> partie de elle, et quelconque(s) chose, tant soit grande, seroit petite au regart d'une plus grande; ne la grande n'a pas plus de

<sup>22</sup> Plato's *Timaeus* 30A ff. ed. J. Burnet, IV, Oxonii, 1910. and for Empedocles, etc. cf. *De Caelo* I, 10, 279b, 12—280b, 1.

<sup>23</sup> A. resiste.

<sup>24</sup> *Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi Epistulae* (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum latinorum, LVI), ed. Isidorus Hilberg, Vindobonae, 1918,

CXXIV, ad Avitum, pp. 101, 107. F Gereoesme.

<sup>25</sup> DE dessus.

<sup>26</sup> 28a. D .xvi.<sup>o</sup>

<sup>27</sup> DE foiz.

<sup>28</sup> A partie.

<sup>29a</sup> 3c-4a.

<sup>29</sup> A dit.

- parties qu'a la petite, quar de chascun corps les parties sont infinies en multitude.<sup>30</sup> Item, par ce s'ensuit que se le monde estoit fait entre cy et demain plus grant ou plus petit .C. foyz ou .M. foyz que il n'est maintenant, et toutes ses parties estoient creües ou apeticiees proporcionnellement, toutes choses appareroient demain tout aussi comme maintenant aussi comme se rien ne fust mué. Item, se [en]<sup>31</sup> une pierre qui est en une carriere estoit un petit pertuis ou une concavité plaine de ayr, il ne convient pas pour ce dire que celle pierre soit hors de son lieu naturel. Et par semblable, se ou centre de la terre estoit une concavité plaine d'air du grant d'une pomme, il ne s'ensuiroit pas pour ce que la terre fust hors de son lieu naturel, ne qu'elle fust la ou elle est par violence. Item, se telle concavité estoit un pou plus grande et après plus grande / et ainsi tant que elle fust bien grande, l'en ne pourroit signer terme en ceste cressance ou l'en peüst dire que la terre fust myse hors de son lieu naturel, meismement car grant et petit sont nomz relatis, si comme dit est. Et donques a ce que la terre soit en son lieu naturel, il souffist que le centre de sa pesanteur soit le centre du monde,—quel-conque(s) concavité soit dedens elle fors que elle se tienne fermem[en]t<sup>32</sup> ensemble. Et par ce appert la response au premier argüement, quar se un monde estoit enclos en une concavité dedens la terre de cestuy monde, nientmoins ceste terre seroit en son lieu naturel, puisque le mylieu du monde seroit le milieu et le centre de sa pesanteur. Et joust ce, je dis oultre que selonc l'Escripture, yaue est sus le ciel ou sus le firmament: *unde<sup>33</sup> in psalmo: qui extendis celum, etc. Qui tegis aquis superiora eius;*<sup>34</sup> *et alibi, benedicite, aquae super celos sunt, Domino.*<sup>35</sup> Et se ceste yaue n'estoit pesante [en substance combien que non de fait]<sup>36</sup> ce ne seroit pas yaue. Et pour ce dit l'en qu'elle est ferme et aussi comme congeliee ou engelee et est appelée *celum glaciale* ou *celum cristallinum*. Et selonc ce que dit est, cest ciel ou
- 36d ceste yaue est en son lieu naturel non- // obstant que touz les autres cielz et elemens soient enclos en la concavité de cestuy; quar il est ferme, et le centre de sa pesanteur est le centre du monde. Au secont argüement, je di que nonobstant que ceste terre fust creuse et [con]cave,<sup>37</sup> nientmoins elle seroit ou centre du monde ou des mondes comme en son propre lieu, a prendre lieu selonc le secont membre de la dis[ti]ncion<sup>38</sup> qui fu mise ou .xvii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre<sup>39</sup> en la response d'un argüement. Et par ce appert que ceste terre et la terre de l'autre monde qui seroit souz cestuy seroient en un meisme lieu. Au tiers, ou fu dit que les choses naturelles sont determinees en quantité, je di que elles sont en ce monde determinee[s]<sup>40</sup> a une quantité ou a aucuns termes, et en un autre monde elles seroient determinees a autres; quar *grant et petit*, comme dit est, sont nons relatis et ne sont pas variacion ou difference en espeece. Et selonc ce nous voions que hommes qui sont d'une espeece sont plus grans en une region et plus petis en autre. Au quart, ou il fu dit que l'en pourroit foïr si avant en terre, etc., je di que nature ne pourroit souffrir, aussi comme l'en ne pourroit par nature approchier du ciel tant
- 37b que / l'en y touchast. Au quint, ou fu dit que .ii. diex seroient, il ne s'ensuit pas; quar un seul dieu souverain gouverneroit touz telz mondes, mais il pourroit<sup>41</sup> estre que autres intelligences mouvroient les cielx d'un monde et

<sup>30</sup> DE d'une plus grande ne pas plus de parties en multitude.

<sup>31</sup> A omits 'en.'

<sup>32</sup> A ferment.

<sup>33</sup> B un. F unus.

<sup>34</sup> Psalm CIII, 2-3: "amictus lumine sicut vestimento. Extendens caelum sicut pellem, qui tegis aquis superiora ejus."

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Dan. III, 60: "benedicite, aquae omnes quae super caelos sunt, Domino."

<sup>36</sup> A omits 'en substance . . . de fait.'

<sup>37</sup> A comme cave.

<sup>38</sup> A discension.

<sup>39</sup> 28b-29a. B .xxvi.

<sup>40</sup> A determinee. BCDEF terminees.

<sup>41</sup> B il ne pourroit.

autres les cielz de l'autre. Au sixte, ou fu dit que par semblable pourroit l'en dire que dedens la lune est un monde, et au .vii.<sup>e</sup>, ou fu dit que plusieurs mondes sont dedens cestuy et plusieurs dehors ou dessus qui le contiennent, etc., je di que le contraire ne puet estre evidentement monsté ne par rayson ne par experience. Mais aussi que telz mondes soient, il ne appert ne par rayson ne par experience ne autrem[en]t.<sup>42</sup> Et donques l'en ne doit pas pour noient et sanz cause adeviner ne mettre une chose estre qui n'appert aucunement, ne soustenir un oppinion dont le contraire est vraysemblable, mais il est bon d'avoir considéré se ce est impossible.

- La tierce maniere de mettre plusieurs mondes est que un soit du tout hors de l'autre en une espace<sup>43</sup> ymaginee, si comme cuida Anaxagoras. Et ceste seulle maniere reprouve ycy Aristote et comme impossible. Mais il me sem- // ble que ses raysons ne concludent pas evidanment, quar la premiere et<sup>44</sup> la plus principale est que se plusieurs telz mondes estoient, il s'ensuiroit que la terre de l'autre monde fust encline a estre meüe au centre de cesti et e *converso*, etc., sy comme il a desclairié diffusement ou .xvi.<sup>e</sup> et ou .xvii.<sup>e</sup> chappitres.<sup>45</sup> Pour monstrier que ceste consequence n'est pas neccessaire, je di premierement que combien que *haut* et *bas* soient dis en plusieurs manieres, si comme il sera dit ou secont livre,<sup>46</sup> toutesvoies quant au propos present, il sont dis en une maniere ou reguard de nous, si comme nous disons que une moytié ou partie du ciel est haut sus nous et l'autre est bas sous nous. Mais autrement sont dis *haut* et *bas* ou regart des choses pesantes et des legieres, si comme nous disons que [l]es<sup>47</sup> pesantes tendent en bas et les legieres en haut. Je dy donques que *haut* et *bas* en ceste seconde maniere ne sont autre chose fors l'ordenance naturelle des choses pesantes et des legieres, laquelle est telle que toutes les pesantes, selonc ce qu'il est possible, soient ou milieu des legieres sanz determiner a elles au- / tre lieu inmob[i]le.<sup>48</sup> Et ce puet l'en entendre par ce qui sera dit après. et par une consideracion qui fu mise ou quart chappitre<sup>49</sup> ou il fu monsté comment une porcion de air pourroit monter naturellement du centre jusques au ciel et descendre naturellement du ciel jusques au centre.<sup>50</sup> Je dy donques que la ou seroit une chose pesante et que nulle legiere ne fust conjointe a elle ou a son tout, celle chose pesante ne se mouvroit, quar en tel lieu ne seroit ni haut ne bas pour ce que, tel cas estant, l'ordenance dessus dicte ne seroit pas, ne, par consequant, bas ne haut ne seroient pas ylleues. Item, ce peut<sup>51</sup> apparoir par ce que dit Aristote ou quart de *Phisique*,<sup>52</sup> c'est assavoir, que en lieu qui seroit simplement v[i]eu<sup>53</sup> ne a quelconque difference, c'est a dire difference de lieu, si comme sont haut et bas. Et pour ce dit Aristote que la chose qui seroit en vieu ne se mouvroit. Item, par le .xi.<sup>e</sup> chappitre de ce premier livre<sup>54</sup> appert selonc Aristote que aussi comme rien n'est plus bas que le centre, semblablement en ce monde rien n'est ne puet estre plus haut que la circonference ou concavité de l'espere // de la lune la ou est le lieu du feu comme souvent est dit. Et donques a prendre *haut* en la seconde maniere dessus mise, oultre ou hors ceste circonference ou ciel n'est haut ne bas. Et par ce, s'ensuit clerement que se Dieu par sa puissance creet une porcion de terre et la mettoit ou ciel ou sont les estoilles ou hors le ciel, ceste
- 37c
- 37a
- 38a

<sup>42</sup> A autremt.

<sup>43</sup> E espesce.

<sup>44</sup> A est.

<sup>45</sup> 28a-29b.

<sup>46</sup> Ch. 4, fol. 76a-b,

<sup>47</sup> A des.

<sup>48</sup> AB immobile.

<sup>49</sup> 10ab.

<sup>50</sup> B omits 'et descendre . . . au centre.'

<sup>51</sup> E ce ne puet.

<sup>52</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 8, 215a, 6-14.

<sup>53</sup> A veu.

<sup>54</sup> 19c.

terre n'avroit quelconque(s) inclinacion a estre meüe vers le centre de ce monde. Et ainsi appert que la consequence d'Aristote devant recitee n'est pas neccessaire. Après je di que se Dieu creet un autre monde semblable a cestuy, la terre et les ellemens de cel autre monde seroient en luy si comme sont en cestui les ellemens de luy. Mais Aristote conferme sa consequence par une autre rayson ou .xvii.<sup>65</sup> chappitre, et est telle en sentence: quar toutes parties de terre tendent a un seul lieu qui est un selonc nombre, et donques la terre de l'autre monde tendroit au centre de cestui. Je respon que ceste rayson a peu d'apparance, considéré ce que dit est maintenant et ce qui fu dit ou .xvii.<sup>66</sup> chappitre, quar verité est qu'en ce monde une partie  
38b de terre ne tent pas vers un centre et l'autre vers / un autre centre, mais toutes les choses pesantes de ce monde tendent a estre conjointes en une masse tellement que le centre de la pesanteur de celle masse soit ou centre<sup>67</sup> de cest monde, et toutes sont un corps selonc nombre.<sup>68</sup> Et pour ce ont elles un lieu selonc nombre. Et se une partie de la terre de l'autre monde estoit en cestuy, elle tendroit au centre de cesti et<sup>69</sup> a estre conjointe a celle masse, et e converso. Mais pour ce ne s'ensuit il pas que les parties de la terre ou les choses pesantes de l'autre monde, se il estoit, tendissent au centre de cestuy, quar en leur monde, elles feroient une masse qui seroit un corps selonc nombre et qui avroit un lieu selonc nombre et seroit ordenee selonc haut et bas en la maniere dessus dicte, aussi comme est la masse des choses pesantes en cestuy. Et<sup>70</sup> seroient ces .ii. corps ou masses d'une espeece et ces .ii. lieux d'une espeece<sup>71</sup> et ces .ii. mondes aussi. Item, Aristote touche une autre rayson ou .xx.<sup>62</sup> chappitre de ce qui en *Metaphisique* est dit comment il ne puet estre fors un dieu et par ce semble qu'il ne puet estre fors un monde.<sup>72</sup>  
32c Je respon que Dieu est infiny par son immensité et se plusieurs // mondes estoient, nul de eulz ne pourroit estre hors de luy ne hors de sa puissance, mais bien pourroit estre que autres in[t]eligenes<sup>73</sup> seroient en un monde et autres en l'autre, si comme il est dit devant. Et l'acomplissement de la réponse a ceste rayson appert plus a plein ou .xx.<sup>63</sup> chappitre.<sup>74</sup> Item, il fet une autre rayson ou .xxii.<sup>64</sup> et ou .xxiii.<sup>65</sup> chappitre<sup>75</sup> laquelle en briefment touchant le moien est telle: quar ce monde est composé de toute la matiere de quoy monde puet estre, ne hors ce monde ne puet estre corps ou matiere quelconque(s). Et donques est ce impossible que autre monde soit. Je respons et di premierement que [posé]<sup>76</sup> que toute matiere qui onques fu et qui est de present fust comprinse en ce monde, toutesvoies selonc verité Dieu pourroit creer de noient nouvelle matiere et faire un autre monde. Mais ce ne octroiroit pas Aristote. Et pour ce, je dy secondement que pousé que rien ne peüst estre fait fors de matiere precedente, nientmoins, consideres les responses devant mises aus premieres raysons que Aristote fait a ce propos et desquelles il repete la substance et se aide en ceste rayson, il  
38d ne preuve / pas que un autre monde ou plusieurs hors cestuy ne puissent estre et avoir esté perpetuellement, tout aussi comme il met ce monde ycy durer sanz commencement et sanz fin. Item, il fait une autre rayson ou .xxiiii.<sup>77</sup> chappitre,<sup>78</sup> quar hors ce monde n'est lieu [ne]<sup>79</sup> plein ne wit ne temps, mes il le preuve parce que hors ce monde ne puet estre corps, si comme

<sup>65</sup> 28d-29a.<sup>66</sup> 28bcd.<sup>67</sup> DE omit 'de la pesanteur de celle masse soit ou centre.'<sup>68</sup> A corps et selonc nombre.<sup>69</sup> BCDEF omit 'au centre de cesti et.'<sup>70</sup> BCDEF 'des choses dessus dictes. Et.'<sup>71</sup> B omits 'et ces .ii. lieux d'une espeece.'<sup>72</sup> 31b.<sup>73</sup> *Metaphysicorum*, Lambda, 7, 1072a, 21-26; 8, 1074a, 31-38.<sup>74</sup> A indeligenes.<sup>75</sup> 31b.<sup>76</sup> 32d-34b.<sup>77</sup> A pour ce.<sup>78</sup> 34bc. A .xxiiii.<sup>79</sup> A omits 'ne.'

- il a monst   par les raysons dessus mises asquelles j'ay respondu, et donques ne convient il autre a ceste respondre. Mais ceste rayson pourroit estre confremee ou formee autrement, quar se .ii. mondes estoient un hors de l'autre, il convendro  t que entre les .ii. e  st vieu pour ce qu'il seroient de ffigure sperique, et ce est impossible que rien soit vieu, si comme Aristote preuve ou quart de *Phisique*.<sup>70</sup> Je respon, et me semble premierement, que entendement humain aussi comme naturellement se consent que hors le ciel et hors le monde qui n'est pas infiny est aucune espace quelle que elle soit, et ne puet bonnement concevoir le contraire. Et semble que ainsi soit par rayson, premierement, quar se le derrenier ciel estoit par dehors de figure  
39a autre que de sperique et qu'il e  st aucune supereminence de- // hors en maniere [de]<sup>71</sup> angle ou de boce et il fust me   si comme il est circulairement, il convendro  t que cele boce passast par une espace qui seroit wide quant celle boce en seroit hors. Et pous  <sup>72</sup> que le ciel ne soit pas de telle figure et que nature ne le pourroit faire, toutevoies est ce chose ymaginable sanz contradicion et que Dieu pourroit faire. Item, pous   que l'espere des ellemens ou touz les corps corruptibles qui sont dedens la concavit   du ciel ou de l'espere de la lune fussent adnichil  s et que le ciel demourast tel comme il est, il convendro  t par neccessit   que en ceste concavit   e  st une distance et une espasce wide. Et telle chose est ymaginable sanz contradicion et symplement possible, ja soit ce que ce ne pourroit estre fait par vertu purement naturelle, si comme il appert par les raysons d'Aristote ou quart de *Phisique*,<sup>73</sup> lesquelles ne concluent pas que ce soit impossible autrement, si comme il puet apparoir legierement par ce que dit est. Et donques hors le ciel est une espasce wide incorporelle d'autre maniere que n'est quel-  
39b conque(s) espace pleine et corporelle, tout aussi comme la duracion appelee eternit   est d'autre maniere que n'est / duracion temporelle, me  sme qui seroit perpetuelle, si comme il appert par ce qui est dit devant en ce chap- pitre. Item, ceste espasce dessus dicte est infinie<sup>74</sup> et indivisible et est le immensit   de Dieu et est Dieu<sup>75</sup> me  sme, aussi comme la duracion<sup>76</sup> de Dieu appelee eternit   est infinie et indivisible et Dieu me  sme, si<sup>77</sup> comme il est dit devant en cest chappitre. Item, en ce chappitre est dit devant que pour ce que nostre pensee ne puet estre sanz transmutacion, nous ne povons com- prendre ne proprement entendre qu'est eternit  , et nientmoins rayson naturelle nous enseigne que elle est. [Et de ce peut estre entendue l'Escrip- ture qui dit de Dieu: *Job*, .xxvi.: *Qui extendit<sup>78</sup> aquilonem<sup>79</sup> super vacuum.*<sup>80</sup>] Semblablement, pour ce que la congnoissance de nostre entendement depent de noz senz qui sont corporelz, nous ne povons comprendre ne proprement entendre quelle est ceste espasce incorporelle qui est hors le ciel. Et toutevoies rayson et verit   nous fait congnoistre que elle est. Je conclu donques que Dieu puet et pourroit faire par toute sa puissance un autre monde que cestuy ou plusieurs semblables ou des[s]emblables,<sup>81</sup> et Aristote ne autre ne prouva onques souffisanment le contraire; mais onques de fait ne fu et ja ne sera //  
39c fors que un seul monde corporel, si comme il est dit devant.

<sup>70</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 8, especially 214b, 12-13; 216b, 20-21; 9, especially 217b, 20-22.

<sup>71</sup> A omits 'de.'

<sup>72</sup> DE Et pour ce que.

<sup>73</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 8 and 9, 215b, 12-217b, 28.

<sup>74</sup> A infinible.

<sup>75</sup> B omits 'et est Dieu.'

<sup>76</sup> DE la divination.

<sup>77</sup> A si si comme . . .

<sup>78</sup> B extendis.

<sup>79</sup> DE aquilam.

<sup>80</sup> *Job* XXVI, 7. A omits 'Et de ce peut . . . vacuum.'

<sup>81</sup> A descenblables.



25.—Ou .xxv.<sup>1</sup> chappitre il commence a enquerir se le monde est pardurable, et met les opinions des autres anciens.<sup>1</sup>

Après ce que ces choses sont determinees, or disons a savoir mon se le monde fu touzjours sanz estre engendré et sanz estre fet, ou se il fu engendré et fait, et se il est incorruptible ou se il est corruptible.<sup>2</sup>

Glose. Il a devant déterminé que le monde est finy en quantité ou extension et que il est un seul en nombre. Or entent maintenant a monstrier qu'il est infiny en duracion.

Tiexte. Et premierement en passant nous traiterons les susposicions<sup>3</sup> ou oppinions des autres.

Glose. Après il met .iii. causes pour quoy c'est bien de traitier les oppinions des autres.

Tiexte. Quar les doubtes des opinions contraires sont probacions des vrayes opinions.

Glose. Quar si comme il appert ou tiers<sup>4</sup> de *Methaphisique*,<sup>5</sup> la solution des doubtes fait trouver la verité.

39d Tiexte. Item, les choses que nous dirons seront miex creables quant elles seront justefiees par les solutions ou responses des doubtes et des raysons contraires. Item, quant nous avrons / respondu aus raysons des oppinions contraires, il ne semblera pas que nous condempnons ces oppinions de voulenté et sanz cause, quar il convient que ceulz qui enquierent la verité jugent souffisamment et non pas comme anemis et adversaires des oppinions contraires.

Glose. Sy comme aucuns qui sont si affichiés et si ahurtés a leurs oppinions que il heent et leur desplest et ne veuillent oïr raysons au contraire. Et c'est un grant empeeschement de congnoissance de verité, et telles gens ne sont pas habilles a ce. Après il recite les oppinions anciens.

Tiexte. Touz les anciens dient que le monde fu engendré et fait; mais les uns dient que il durera touzjours sanz fin, et les autres dient qu'il est corruptible sanz retour aussi comme quelconques des autres choses constituees et compousees de plusieurs. Et les autres dient que il sera corrompu et après refait et après corrompu et ainsi touzjours sanz fin; une fois sera et autre non, si comme disoient Empedocles qui fu de Frague,<sup>6</sup> et Eraclitus qui fu de Ephese.

40a Glose. De ceste question l'en puet ymaginer .iiii. oppinions dont le tiers seroit // devisé en .ii., et ainsi, seroient .v. oppinions. Un est que le monde est pardurable sanz commencement et<sup>7</sup> sanz fin; et dit Ave[r]roÿs<sup>8</sup> que [Aristote fu le premier]<sup>9</sup> des philosophes de Gresce qui y mist ceste opinion, et que ce tenoit la loy encienne de ceulz de Caldee.<sup>10</sup> L'autre est que le monde eü(s)t commencement mais touzjours durera sanz fin, et ce disoit Plato et ceulz qui l'ensuiuent. La tierce est que le monde eü(s)t commencement et avra fin, mes les uns dient qu'il finera sanz plus recommencier; et dit Averroÿs<sup>11</sup> que ce fu l'opinion de Anaxagoras, et que ce tiennent .iii. loys qui sont maintenant, c'est a savoir des Maures et des Crestiens et des Juis. Les autres disoient que le monde finera et recommencera et puis finera, etc., par fois infinies ou temps avenir, et ainsi a esté<sup>12</sup> ou temps passé. Et ce disoient Enpedocles et

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. x.

<sup>2</sup> DE omit 'ou se il est corruptible.'

<sup>3</sup> BCDEF suspensions.

<sup>4</sup> BCDEF quart.

<sup>5</sup> *Metaphysicorum*, III, 8, especially 1012a, 29—1012b, 22.

<sup>6</sup> B Strague. F Sirigae.

<sup>7</sup> A est.

<sup>8</sup> AC Avenroÿs.

<sup>9</sup> A omits 'Aristote fu le premier.'

<sup>10</sup> Juntas, t.c. 102, fol. 70D.

<sup>11</sup> Juntas, t.c. 102, fol. 70D.

<sup>12</sup> A estre.

Eraclitus comme dit est. La quinte ymaginacion seroit que le monde eüst touzjours duré u temps passé sanz commencement et qu'il finast et fust corrompu ou temps avenir; et nul ne mist onques ceste oppinion. Et Aristote tient la premiere et pour ce, il reprouve seullement les .iii.<sup>13</sup> moyennes.

26.—Ou .xxvi.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il reprouve l'oppinion de Plato. /

40b Dire que le monde ait esté fait et que il durera perpetuellement, c'est une chose impossible.

Glose. Et ce preuve il par .ii. raysons:

Tiexte. Quar raysonnablement, nous devons mettre les choses seullement que nous voions estre vraies ou en plusieurs choses ou en toutes. Et le contraire est quant a ce qu'il dient, quar l'en voit que toutes choses engendrees ont esté ou seront corrompues.

Glose. Se Aristote entendoit cecy ainsi generalement, je monstreray après par rayson naturelle et par philosophie que l'opposite est vray et que une chose puet avoir commencement qui onques n'avra fin. Après il met la seconde rayson qui est telle en sentence.

Tiexte. Item, par touz les siècles infinis passés esquelz ces choses avroient esté des [ce que]<sup>2</sup> le monde avroit esté fait, ou ces choses pouvoient estre alterees et avoir soy autrement ou non; et se non, donques estoit ce impossible que de elles fust fait ce monde; et se elles pouvoient estre alterées et transmuées, donques encor sont elles a[1]terables<sup>3</sup> et transmuables et pueent soy avoir autrement. Et par consequant, le monde qui est constitué de elles puet estre corrompu, et defait. // D'autre partie, l'en ne pourroit assigner cause pourquoy le monde n'avroit onques esté par touz les siècles precedens infinis et pourquoy il avroit eü commencement lors plus que autrefois.

40c

Glose. C'est la substance de ceste rayson; et quant a la premiere partie, elle ne fait rien contre ceulz qui diroient que le monde avroit esté créé de noient. Et quant a l'autre, il sera declairé après comment une chose puet estre qui onques ne fu et qui jamais ne cessera. Après il recite une response que aucuns faisoient a sa rayson.

Tiexte. Et l'aide ou l'excusacion a ceste rayson que aucuns s'efforcent de mettre n'est pas vraie, quar il dient que le monde est incorruptible, et qu'il sera tousjours sanz fin. Et par ce que dit est, il n'entendent pas qu'il [ait]<sup>4</sup> esté fait, quar quant il parlent de la generacion du monde, il ne veulent pas dire que il fu aucune foys engendré après ce que onques n'avoit esté,—quar il a esté touz temps perpetuellement,—mais il mettent telle chose par maniere de doctrine aussi comme es descriptions de geometrie. Posé que un triangle soit pardurable, toutevoies, par maniere de doctrine, l'en met qu'il est compousé de lignes et de angles aussi / comme de choses qui sont premieres avant que triangle.

40d

Glose. Après il reprouve ceste response.

Tiexte. Mais ce ne puet estre une rayson ne semblable, quar en telle description ou en tel triangle une chose n'est pas avant que l'autre selonc temps, mais seullement par ymaginacion; et les choses que yl dient de la generacion du monde sont subcontraires, c'est a dire incomp[a]ssibles,<sup>5</sup> et convient que une soit avant l'autre selonc

<sup>13</sup> DE .ii.

<sup>1</sup> Chapter 29, 44b-45c.

<sup>2</sup> A desquelles le monde.

<sup>3</sup> A aterables.

<sup>4</sup> A est.

<sup>5</sup> A impossibles. BCDEF impossible

temps, quar il dient que les ellemens qui estoient desordenés furent ordenés de Dieu, et de ce et ainsi fu fait le monde. Et c'est impossible que une chose soit ensemble desordenee et ordenee, mais est neces-  
sité que la generacion soit separee du temps de la desordenance. Et es descripcions mathematiques, il n'y a rien separé en temps. Et donques est ce impossible que le monde soit pardurable et que il soit fait.

41a Glose. Il semble que ceste repproche ne soit pas contre l'intencion de Plato ne des siens, mais seullement contre la maniere de parler, quar l'en droit qu'il n'entendoient<sup>6</sup> pas que absolument et de fait les ellemens du monde eüssent esté aucunes foys confus et desordenes et par temps après eüssent esté mis en ordenance, mais il entendoient // que le monde n' [eüst]<sup>7</sup> onques commencement selonc temps et que condicionnelment, se Dieu ne maintenoit les ellemens et les parties du monde en ordre, eulz seroient desordenés quant est de leur nature. Et ainsi ceste priorité est selonc nature et non pas selonc temps, aussi comme l'en droit que le soleil mist ou met le ciel de tenebres en lumiere, pousé que le solleil et la lumiere de luy fussent perpetuels sanz commencement de temps. C'est ce que diroient les Platoniens, mais Aristote fu tres affaictueus contre les oppinions de Plato, si comme il appert par ce que dist Eustrace sus le premier d'*Ethiques*.<sup>8</sup>

27.—Ou .xxviii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il reprove les oppinions d'Empedocles et de Anaxagoras.

Et dire que alternativement le monde est une foys et autre foys est destruit et après refait, ce n'est autre chose fors affermer qu'il est pardurable mais il transmue sa forme.

41b Glose. Quar Enped[o]cles<sup>1</sup> disoit que la substance et les parties du monde sont touzjours unes meïsmes, mais par amisté ou concorde elles sont mises en bonne disposicion et ainsi est fait le monde, et par discorde elles sont après mises en autre disposicion et ainsi est le monde depecié.

Tiexte. Aussi comme se l'en / disoit que d'un enfant est fait i. honme et après que cel honme redevenist enfant, et que l'en cuidast que pour ce il fust aucune fois corrompu et aucune fois fust en estre, mais nientmoins ce seroit touzjours un meïsme(s). Semblablement quant les ellemens se acordent et conviennent ensemble par amystié selonc cel oppinion, c'est une constitucion ou disposicion autre que devant; mais nientmoins les ellemens seroient touzjours un meïsme. Item, encor appert autrement, quar [s]elonc<sup>2</sup> ceulz qui mistrent cest oppinion, la contrariété de concorde et de discorde est cause de l'une et de l'autre disposicion.<sup>3</sup> Et donques se tout le cors continu, c'est a savoir toute la masse des ellemens, est une foys dispousee en une maniere et autre foys en autre, et toute ceste masse c'est le monde, donques s'ensuit il que le monde n'est onques engendré ne corrompu, mais seullement les disposicions<sup>4</sup> de luy.

Glose. Quar selonc leur oppinion ceste masse est perpetuelle et c'est le monde,

<sup>6</sup> A n'entendroient. B ne entenderoit.

<sup>7</sup> A n'est onques eü commencement . . .

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Le Livre de Ethiques* (A. D. Menut, New York, 1940, p. 113) where Oresme cites the commentary of Eustrathios concerning Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Ideas. For the original see *Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nichomachea Commen-*

*taria* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, XX), ed. G. Heylbut, Berolini, 1892, pp. 65-72. Oresme repeats the same reference to Eustrathios at the end of Book I (p. 280).

<sup>1</sup> A Enpedecles.

<sup>2</sup> A celonc.

<sup>3</sup> B opinion.

<sup>4</sup> BCDEF les parties de luy.

se il ne vouloient dire que ceste masse est une foys monde et autre foys non. Et donques *monde* seroit un nom accidental et conn[o]tatif<sup>5</sup> et ce est faulz.

41c Après il repreuve l'op- // pinion que tindrent Anaxagoras et Dem[o]critus.<sup>6</sup>

Tiexte. Et dire que le monde fu fait et qu'il sera corrompu a touzjours mais sanz retourner, ce est du tout impossible, quar avant que il fust fait, il convenoit que aucune consistance ou matiere fust de quoy il fu fait. Et donques ou ce n'estoit pas possible que ceste matiere fust transmuee; et se ainsi est, le monde ne pavoit<sup>7</sup> estre fait de elle. Et se elle pavoit estre transmuee, donques quant le monde sera corrompu, elle pourra estre semblablement transmuee et sera refait un monde. Et ainsi se pourroit plus soustenir l'opinion de ceulz qui mettent que les mondes seront infinis un après l'autre par subcession.

Glose. En reprouvant cest opinion, il supouse que c'est impossible de faire aucune chose de noient. Après il propouse ce de quoy il entent a determiner.

Tiexte. Mais par ce que nous dirons après sera manifeste se ce qui s'ensuit est impossible ou possible, car aucuns sont a qui il semble que aucune chose qui onques ne fu engendree mais touzjours a esté sanz commencement puisse estre corrompue, et que aucune chose qui a esté engendree et faite de / nouvel soit incorruptible<sup>8</sup> et puisse touzjours durer sanz fin, si comme il est escript in *Thymeo*,<sup>9</sup> c'est a dire en un livre que fist Plato, quar yleques est dit que le ciel ou le monde fu fait et que il durera d'ore en avant en temps pardurable. Et nous avons dit de ceste chose seullement quant au ciel et naturellement, c'est a savoir par raysons de science naturelle.

41d

Glose. Ce fu ou sixte chappitre, ou il fu monstré que le ciel est perpetuel.<sup>10</sup>

Tiexte. Mais maintenant nous volons quant a ce dire de tout et monstrar nostre propos universelment.

Glose. C'est a dire, de toutes choses et par raysons plus generalles que celles qui sont prinses de philosophie naturelle. Et mon entencion est de les reciter loialment et examiner diligeanment en monstrant les deffautes d'aucunes de elles en rayon naturelle, pour oster occasions d'aucunes grandes erreurs en la foy catholique.

28.—Ou .xxviii.<sup>11</sup> chappitre il met distinctions d'aucuns termes dont il entent user en cest propos.<sup>12</sup>

42a

Il convient premierement deviser comment nous disons aucunes choses estre ingenerables et generables et corruptibles et incorruptibles, quar quant les termes ou paroles ont plusieurs // significacions, adonques pousé que ce ne face difference quant au parler, toutesvoies convient il par neccessité que l'en ait confusement l'entendement des choses se l'en use de ce qui est dit en plusieurs manieres, aussi comme de chose non-devisee, quar lors il n'appert pas selonc quelle signification ce doit estre entendu.

Glose. Quant les parolles sont equivoques ou doubles, l'en doit declairer leurs significacions ou sens afin que l'en ne preingne un sens pour l'autre. Après il disti[n]gue<sup>13</sup> mos dont aucuns n'ont pas proprement equivalent en françoys, mais je passer[ai]<sup>14</sup> en mettant la sentence. Un est en latin *ingenitum*.

<sup>5</sup> A connetatif.

<sup>6</sup> ACD Demêcritus.

<sup>7</sup> B pourroit.

<sup>8</sup> DE corruptible.

<sup>9</sup> Platonis *Opera*, recognovit Ioannes Burnet,

Oxonii, 1910, IV, 31a-31b.

<sup>10</sup> 13ab.

<sup>11</sup> Guthrie, ch. xi.

<sup>12</sup> A distigue.

<sup>13</sup> ABCD passere.

Tiexte. *Ingenitum* est dit en une maniere de chose qui a eü commencement, mais non pas par generacion ne par transmutacion, si comme est mouvement.

Glose. Quar se mouvement estoit mis en estre par mouvement et mutacion, et celuy par un autre, etc. [c]e<sup>4</sup> seroit procès infiny, si comme il appert ou quint de *Phisique*.<sup>5</sup> Et *ingenitum* en ceste maniere puet estre appellé ingenerable.

Tiexte. Item, *ingenitum* est dit d'une chose qui puet estre et n'est pas.

Glose. Si comme Antecrist, et en ceste maniere *ingenitum*, c'est non-engendré.

42b Tiexte. Item, *inge-* / *nitum* est dit de ce qui est simplement impossible que il soit fait et que aucune foys soit en estre et aucune foys non.

Glose. Et ce puet estre en une maniere pour ce que c'est chose simplement necessaire, et ainsi disons nous Dieu le Pere estre *ingenitum* ou ingenerable, ou en autre maniere pour ce que c'est chose simplement impossible<sup>6</sup> et est dicte ingenerable, si comme l'en met exemple de *chymera*.

Tiexte. Et impossible est dit en .ii. manieres. Une est de ce qui ne puet estre comment que soit.

Glose. Si comme que Dieu pechast.

Tiexte. Item, de ce qui puet estre, mais non pas legierement ou non pas tost, ou non pas bien.

Glose. Si comme eschaper d'une forte maladie.<sup>7</sup>

Tiexte. Et semblablement *genitum* ou engendré en une maniere est dit de quelconque(s) chose qui est de nouvel, pousé que elle soit faite par generacion ou sanz generacion.

Glose. Sy comme une beste est faite par generacion et un mouvement sanz generacion.

Tiexte. Item, *generable* est dit de ce qui n'est pas et qui est possible comment que soit, ou qui puet estre de legier. Item, de ce qui est de present ou puet estre de futur par generacion ou transmutacion, et corruptible et incorruptible // semblablement, quar *corruptible* est dit de ce qui est et après cesse par transmutacion ou sanz transmutacion. Item, ce qui n'est pas mais sera ou puet estre est dit corruptible. Item, ce qui est et puet estre de legier corrompu est dit corruptible. Et de incorruptible est une meisme rayson, quar ou c'est chose qui est aucune foys et aucune foys<sup>8</sup> non sanz corrupcion ou transmutacion, si comme est mouvement, ou c'est une chose laquelle c'est impossible<sup>9</sup> que elle ne soit. Ou il est dit de chose qui ne puet estre et donques ne la puet l'en courrompre. Mais il est dit meismement proprement de ce qui est et ne puet estre corrompu ne cesser.

42c

Glose. Sy comme Dieu.

Tiexte. Et finalement, *incorruptible* e[s]t<sup>10</sup> dit de chose qui puet estre corrompue, mais non pas legierement ou aisement. Et se ces choses se ont comme dit est, il convendra co[n]siderer<sup>11</sup> après comment nous disons une chose estre possible et comment impossible, quar une chose est dicte tres proprement incorruptible<sup>12</sup> pour ce

<sup>4</sup> AE se.

<sup>5</sup> *Physicorum*, V, 2, 225b, 32–226a, 6.

<sup>6</sup> B est simplement chose impossible.

<sup>7</sup> B omits 'Si comme eschaper d'une forte maladie.'

<sup>8</sup> B omits 'et aucune foys.'

<sup>9</sup> DE c'est possible.

<sup>10</sup> A et.

<sup>11</sup> A cosiderer.

<sup>12</sup> B corruptible.

42d

que elle ne puet estre corrompue ne estre aucune foys et aucune foys non. Et *ingenitum* en latin est dit de ce que / est impossible et ne puet estre fait ou avenir en telle maniere que premierement il ne soit pas, et puis, qu'il soit après, sy comme [que]<sup>13</sup> le dyametre d'un quarré soit comme[n]surable<sup>14</sup> au costé de celuy quarré.

Glose. C'est une conclusion de geometrie qui dit telle chose estre impossible et donques *ingenitum* est une chose non faisable. Mais *ingenitum* est dit autrement de chose<sup>15</sup> simplement neccessaire et pardurable comme devant est dit, et ceste significacion est la plus propre.

29.—Ou .xxix.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il determine de ce qui est possible ou impossible ou resgart d'aucune puissance

43a

Se une chose a puissance de soy mouvoir ou de lever aucun poys, nous disons et determinons touzjours celle puissance au plus que elle puet, si comme en disant que elle puet lever .c. livres ou qu'elle puet aler .c. lieues. Quar combien qu'elle puisse faire les parties, c'est a dire ce qu'est moins ou mendre, totevoies elle est nommee et diffinee ou determinee par la superabondence et par la vertu de son excellence, pour ce que se elle puet selonc son excellence tant, elle puet tout ce qui est moins; si comme se elle puet lever .c. // vres, elle puet lever .ii. livres, et se elle puet passer .c. estades, elle peut passer .ii. estades, quar vertu est touzjours noctifiee par l'excellence de elle.

Glose. Après il monstre comment l'ympossibleté d'une puissance est determinee.

Tiexte. Et se aucune chose est impossible a une puissance, ceste impossibleté sera dicte et determinee au plus pres de l'excellence de la vertu en disant qu'elle peut<sup>1</sup> ce et que tout ce qui est plus ly est impossible, si comme se elle ne puet passer mil estades, elle ne puet passer mil et une estade.

Glose. Quant la chose en quoy la puissance finie puet ou a quoy elle est comparee est designee<sup>2</sup> par nombre, si comme en disant<sup>3</sup> .c. livres ou cent onces, ou en disant .c. lieues ou [cent]<sup>4</sup> estades, adonques est un nombre le tres plus grant de touz ceulz en quoy elle puet. Et par cest nombre est determinee et diffinee<sup>5</sup> la possibilité de elle, quar elle puet en ce nombre et en touz ceulz de dessouz; et par le plus grant nombre après est determinee l'ympossibilité de ceste puissance, quar en cely ne puet elle ne en quelconque(s) plus grant. Et pour ce, cest nombre est le premier et le tres

43b

plus petit de touz ceulz en quoy elle ne peut. Et ainsi dirions nous que / la possibilité portative d'aucun homme est determinee par .c. livres et son impossibilité par .c. et une livre, quar cent livres est le plus grant poys que il puisse porter, et .c. et une livre est le plus petit de touz ceulz que il ne puet<sup>6</sup> porter. Mais ceste determinacion qui est par nombre ne puet estre precise ne propre quant au poys que l'en puet lever ou porter, quar quiconque(s) puet porter .c. livres, il puet porter plus, et ainsi de chascun poys. Et pour ce di je que toute puissance ou resgart de sa resistance e[s]t<sup>7</sup> determinee precisement par la resistance<sup>8</sup> qui est egualle a elle en vertu de

<sup>13</sup> AF omit 'que.'

<sup>14</sup> A commesurable.

<sup>15</sup> A choses.

<sup>1</sup> A elle ne peut.

<sup>2</sup> DE comparee ou designee.

<sup>3</sup> A comme est en disant . . .

<sup>4</sup> A omits 'cent.'

<sup>5</sup> BCDEF diffinie.

<sup>6</sup> E omits 'ne.'

<sup>7</sup> A et.

<sup>8</sup> DE omit 'e[s]t determinee precisement par la resistance.'

- resister, tellement que c'est la plus tres petite rêsistance de toutes celles en quoy ceste puissance ne puet, et puet en toute mendre sauf ce qui sera dit assés tost après. Et de celles en quoy la puissance [peut],<sup>9</sup> l'en ne porroit assigner la plus grande, quar quelconque(s) signee en quoy elle puet, l'en puet donner une moienne entre ceste signee et celle qui est egualle a ceste puissance. Et en l'autre cas que Aristote met ou regart de l'espace qui est en mouvement local, la puissance est determinee par la tres plus grande espace que elle puet passer. Mais moult d'autres cas sont selonc diverses choses
- 43c asquelles // pueent estre comparees les puissances, si comme de la distance a laquelle une puissance puet alterer ou faire son action, quar puet estre qu'elle est determinee absolument par la tres plus petite distance de toutes celles asquelles elle ne puet estendre son action, si comme un feu puet eschauffer ou illuminer jusques a une distance a laquelle il ne puet ne oultre, mais puet a toute mendre, *ceteris parib[us]*.<sup>10</sup> Et par aventure, une puissance autre est telle qu'elle<sup>11</sup> ne puet pas estre ainsi determinee absolument, mais requiert distance moderee en grandeur et en petitesse. Et est determinee a la tres plus petite de celles ou elle ne puet, pour ce que elles sont trop grandes et trop loing; et a la tres plus grande de celles ou elle ne puet, pour ce que elles sont trop petites et trop pres, si comme est la puissance d'une chose visible. Item, aucunes puissances actives pueent estre comparees ou a l'effit que elles pueent faire, ou a la velocité ou isneleté de leur action ou mouvement,
- 43d ou au temps ouquel elles pueent ouvrer, ou a autres choses et en moult de manieres selonc diverses circonstances. Et selonc ce pueent estre / plusieurs belles consideracions dont je ay autrefois traité, et m'en passe pour ce qu'elles ne sont pas propres a nostre principal propos. Après il traite de la possibilité et de l'impossibilité de puissance passive en metant et ostant une objection contre ce que dit est.

Tiexte. Et pour ce que nous avons dit que [possibilité]<sup>12</sup> est proprement determine[e]<sup>13</sup> par l'excellence de la puissance, ce que aucun porroit dire ne nous doit mouvoir, quar, par aventure, aucun feroit instance de ce que se un puet veoir une grande chose, il ne convient pas pour ce que il peüst veoir toutes les choses qui sont plus petites. Mais le contraire est plus vray, quar qui puet veoir une petite chose, il puet<sup>14</sup> veoir une plus grande; et qui puet oïr un petit son, il puet oïr un plus grant son.

Glose. Après il respont.

- Tiexte. Mais ce que telz diroient ne fait difference a la rayson ou conclusion que nous avons mise, quar nostre dit est veritable generalment, pousé que l'excellence soit ou resgart de la chose dehors ou en la vertu, c'est a dire en la puissance, quar le voiemment qui puet veoir la mendre chose est plus puissant que celui qui ne
- 44a // puet veoir si petite chose, et la puissance qui puet mouvoir par plus grande isneleté est la plus grande.

Glose. Il weult icy mettre conveniencie et difference entre puissance active et puissance passive, et est la conveniencie telle que une et l'autre sont determinees par leur excellence et par le plus fort de leur vertu, si comme il est dit devant generalment sanz distinction. Mais ceste excellence est prinse differenment en une et en l'autre, quar la puissance active qui puet en plus grandes choses est la plus grande ou la plus active, et la puissance

<sup>9</sup> A omits 'peut.'

<sup>10</sup> A *paribi*.

<sup>11</sup> B omits 'autre est telle qu'elle.'

<sup>12</sup> A impossible. BCF possible.

<sup>13</sup> ABCF déterminé.

<sup>14</sup> E il ne puet.

passive qui puet souffrir de mendre chose est la plus passive ou la plus grande en son gerre passif.<sup>15</sup> Et donques la puissance active est determinee par la tres plus petite des choses ou elle ne puet ouvrer pour ce qu'i sont trop grandes, et la passive est determinee par la tres plus grande de celles dont elle ne puet souffrir pour leur trop petitesce et puet souffrir de chascune plus grande. Et pour ce, voiemet et telz sens sont puissances passives. Et une chose est si petite que oeil<sup>16</sup> ne la puet veoir ne autre chose mendre, et puet veoir tote chose plus grande, tant soit / grande, se les autres choses sont propor[cio]nelment<sup>17</sup> dispousees selonc ce qu'il appartient, si comme sont le moien et la distance, etc. Quar se le solleil estoit mil foys plus grant qu'il n'est et il fust plus loing et le moien fust plus cler, et tout selonc proporcion convenable, le solleil apparostroït du tout si comme il appert maintenant.

Après ces choses, Aristote s'efforce de prouver que toute chose, soit substance ou accident ou quelconque(s) disposition qui avra eü commencement, avra fin et cessera par neccessité et ne puet perpetuellement durer, et que semblablement c'est impossible que<sup>18</sup> chose qui avra fin ait touzjours duré sanz commencement. Et pour ce que ce n'est pas verité et que c'est contre la foy quant a la premiere partie, je viel monstre[r]<sup>19</sup> l'opposite selonc philosophie naturelle et mathematique. Et par ce et autrement apparostroïra que les raysons d'Aristote ne concludent<sup>20</sup> pas. Et premierement je pouse aveques Aristote, combien que ce soit faulz, que le monde et les mouvemens du ciel sont pardurables par neccessité, sanz commencement et sanz

fin. Après je suppose comme chose possible que aucuns // des mouvemens du ciel simples et reguliers sont inconmensurables, et est aussi comme l'en diroit que c'est possible que le nombre total des estoilles soit nomper. Et aussi comme l'en ne puet savoir certainement ne evidentment se le nombre de toutes les estoilles e[s]t<sup>21</sup> per ou nomper,<sup>22</sup> semblablement touz les honmes mortelz qui furent et qui seront ne pourroient en lumiere naturelle trouver ne savoir de certain se touz les mouvemens du ciel sont commensurables ou se aucuns d'eulz sont inconmensurables,<sup>23</sup> quar par une partie de mouvement laquelle seroit insensible et imperceptible, pousé qu'el[le]<sup>24</sup> fust .c. mile foys plus grande, .ii. mouvemens quelconques du ciel ou autres seroient inconmensurables qui sembleroient estre commensurables. Et cecy est tout noctoire ou manifeste a ceulz qui sont exercités en geometrie. Et doit l'en savoir que les choses sont commensurables quant telle proporcion comme une a [a]<sup>25</sup> l'autre puet estre trouvee en nombres. Et quant elle ne puet, les choses sont inconmensurables. Et que aucuns des mouvemens du

ciel soient inconmensurables, ce est plus vraysemblable que / n'est l'opposite, si comme je monstray jadys par plusieurs persuasions en un traité intitulé *De Commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum celi*.<sup>26</sup> Or supposons donques comme chose possible et vraysemblable, combien que elle ne soit pas certaine, que aucuns mouvemens du ciel sont inconmensurables. Et pousons pour cause d'exemple que .iii. corps du ciel, si comme sont Saturne et Jupiter et Mars, soient meüs de .iii. ou de plusieurs mouvemens en quelconque(s) nombre desquelz un soit seul inconmensurable as autres,

<sup>15</sup> DE omit 'et la puissance passive . . . en son gerre passif.'

<sup>16</sup> BCDEF on.

<sup>17</sup> A propornelment.

<sup>18</sup> BCDEF durer, et semblablement que chose . . .

<sup>19</sup> A monstre.

<sup>20</sup> A concludent.

<sup>21</sup> A et.

<sup>22</sup> F omits 'Et aussi comme l'en ne peut . . . per ou nomper.'

<sup>23</sup> BCDEF omit 'ou se aucune d'eulz sont inconmensurables.'

<sup>24</sup> A pouse quel fust.

<sup>25</sup> AEF une a l'autre.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. A. D. Menut, *Le Livre d'Ethiques d'Aristote*, New York, 1940, p. 29.



et que les centres de ces .iii. cors soient conjoins precisement en aucun point ou ligne ou lieu, je di que c'est impossible que ces .iii. corps fussent onques ne que jamais soient en tout le temps pardurable tellement conjoins ne en cest lieu ne en autre. Et ainsi est il de oposicion et de quelconque(s) autre resgart ou disposicion. Et semblablement, se un meisme corps du ciel estoit meü de .iii. ou de plusieurs mouvemens, pousé que un seul de [c]es<sup>27</sup> mouvemens fust inconmensurable as autres, je di que, ce posé, ce corps est  
45a touz- / jours en nouvelle disposicion et son centre en tel endroit ou en tel point immobile ou onques mes ne fu ne jamais ne sera, et descript touzjours nouvelle ligne et fera perpetuellement. Et pour ce que le solleil est meü de .iii. ou de plusieurs mouvemens et est possible et vraysemblable, comme dit est, que aucun de ces mouvemens soit inconmensurable as autres, il s'ensuit par neccessité que en chascun movement<sup>28</sup> le centre du corps du solleil est en nouveau point ou onques ne fu, et la pointe de l'ombre de la terre continuellement en aucun endroit ou point ou onques ne fu et jamais ne sera. Et par consequant, aucune lumiere ou ciel cesse estre selonc soy toute ou cesse estre toute laquelle n'eüst onques commencement, et aucune commence qui jamés ne cessera. Item, tant est le solleil plus loing de la terre, de tant est l'ombre de la terre plus grant et entre plus avant ou ciel. Et par l'inconmensurableté desus dicte, puet estre que le solleil en un merid[i]an<sup>29</sup> est si loing de la terre que onques ne puet ne ja na porra estre autrefois si loing en cest meridian. Et donques l'ombre de la terre est si longue et si  
45b en parfont ou ciel en celle partie que / onques ne fu tant ne jamais ne sera. Et par consequant, une lumiere cesse que onques ne commença, et une commence qui ja ne cessera. Et l'inconmensurableté qui pourroit estre es mouvemens du ciel de la lune la ou est ceste ombre fait encor ceste conclusion estre plus vraysemblable.<sup>30</sup> Item, se telle chose estant, il avoient que en ce meridian la lune estoit le plus pres de terre que elle puisse estre quant elle est eclipsee et qu'elle fust droitement opposite au solleil ou point appelle *Nadair solis*,<sup>31</sup> si comme il est possible, il seroit adonques la plus tres grande eclipse de lune qui peüst estre. Et se aucuns des mouvemens de la lune ou du solleil [ou de la lune et du soleil]<sup>32</sup> sont inconmensurables,<sup>33</sup> si comme dit est, et c'est vraysemblable, ce seroit impossible que autrefois  
45c eüst esté ou // fust ou temps avenir si grande eclipse de lunne. Item, posons que la lune soit le plus loing du solleil que elle puisse estre sanz estre eclipsee, et pour l'inconmensurableté desus dicte qui est vraysemblable, il s'ensuit que le solleil et la lune luisant ne furent onques si loing l'un de l'autre ne jamais ne seront. Et donques convient il que l'ombre de la lune soit ou ciel plus grant et plus loing<sup>34</sup> que onques ne fu et que jamais ne puet estre, quar la lune fait ou ciel plus grant umbre de tant comme elle est plus loing du solleil. Et par consequant, aucune lumiere cesse ou ciel qui onques n'ost commencement et aucune commence qui ja ne finera. Or avons donques .iii. cas ou telle chose est possible d'aucune lumiere du ciel. Et tout ce que dit est qui touche l'inconmensurableté dessus dicte est evidentement declairé par demonstracions geometriques ou traytié dessus dit, *De Commensurabilitate vel inconmensurabilitate motuum celi*, ou s'ensuit de ce que est en ce traitié par telles demonstracions.<sup>35</sup> /

<sup>27</sup> ACDEF ses.<sup>28</sup> BC moment.<sup>29</sup> A meridian.<sup>30</sup> Figure 20, p. 254.<sup>31</sup> Cf. Oresme's *Traitié de l'esperere*, ch. 48, B.N. fr. 350, fol. 35c: "Pour ce que le terre est moult plus petite que le soleil, son ombre procede derriere soy, et va en appetissant et en agreissant, si comme il fu dit de l'ombrede la lune ou chapitre precedent. Et est tous-jours la pointe et le bout de cil ombre a l'opposite du soleil. Et cil point opposite du soleil est appellé *Nadir Solis*."<sup>32</sup> A omits 'ou de la lune et du soleil.'<sup>33</sup> DE inmensurables.<sup>34</sup> BCDEF long.<sup>35</sup> 45d is entirely occupied by Figure 21, p. 254.




FIG. 20  
(FOL. 45b)




FIG. 21  
(FOL. 45d)




FIG. 22  
(FOL. 46a)




FIG. 23  
(FOL. 47a)

- 46a Or weul je monstrier après que c'est chose possible, quant est de soy et a ymagynacion sanz contradiction, que aucun mouvement ait<sup>36</sup> commencement et dure sanz fin. Et premierement de mouvement circulaire: je pousse que une roue de quelconque(s) matiere soit aussi comme la roue d'une horloge et soit signee par .a. en son centre et soit appelée .a.<sup>37</sup> /
- 46b Item, soit une autre mendre roue fichiee en la premiere aussi comme en un epicycle et soit signee par .b. en son centre et soit appelée .b. Item, soit une tierce roue fichiee en la seconde et ait son centre en la circonference de la seconde, aussi comme la lune est en son epicycle, et soit signee par .c. Item, soit la quart[e]<sup>38</sup> hors ces .iii. et soit ainssi dispousee que la roue .c. puisse touchier a elle et soit signee en son centre par .d. Item, je pousse que la roue .a. soit meüe environ son centre et que .b.<sup>39</sup> soit meüe au mouvement de .a. en quoy elle est fichiee, et aveques ce que .b. soit meüe de son propre mouvement environ son centre, et que .c. n'ait aucun mouvement propre mais soit meüe au mouvement de .a. et au mouvement de .b. Et en ceste maniere est la lune en son epicycle. Item, je pousse [que]<sup>40</sup> la roue appelée .d. soit tellement atuitee ou dispousee par contrepoys et autrement que elle soit encline a estre meüe, et que elle ne soit meüe jusques a tant qu'elle soit touchiee par la roue .c. et que par ce touchement soit osté<sup>41</sup> l'empeschement, et que .d. commence estre meü[e]<sup>42</sup> regulierement. Et semblable chose ou pres pourroit estre faite artificialment ou par art. Item, je pousse que les .ii. mouvemens de .a. et de .b. // soient incommensurables et reguliers et perpetuels. Mais telle perpetuité de mouvement ne porroit estre faite par art se la fantaisie d'aucuns n'estoit vraye qui ont aucune fois tempté et cuidié faire une chose appelée *rota bina*.<sup>43</sup> Item, je pousse que maintenant en ce present moment<sup>44</sup> la roue .c. touche la roue .d. et di que c'est impossible que elle ait touchié ou touche autre fois la roue de .d., quar elle ne la puet touchier fors quant les centres .b. et .c. et .d. sont en conjonction precisement en une ligne. Et ce ne puet avoir esté en tout le temps passé ne autre fois avenir, si comme il appert par demonstration geometrice en la premiere conclusion de la seconde partie du traytey *De Commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum celi*.<sup>45</sup> Et par ce, il s'ensuit de necessité que la roue .d. commenceroit maintenant a estre meüe et jamais ne cesseroit. Et combien que telle chose ne puet estre faite par nature ne par art de matiere ou en matiere corruptible ne tait longuement durer, toutevoies ce ne enclot ou implique quelconque(s) contradiction ne aucune repugnance quant est de soy, mais est possible
- 46d selonc la nature des mouvemens, et toute / la repugnance est par rayson de la matiere ou d'autre chose dehors. Après je weul dire de mouvement droit et pousse que une chose pesante, et soit .a., doie descendre par un moien ou espasce qui soit .bc., et que ce moien soit plus re[s]istant<sup>46</sup> et plus fort a passer ou a divider en bas que en haut, et [que]<sup>47</sup> la resistance de luy ou resgart de la vertu motyve soit tellement dispousee que .a. passe en un jour la moytié de l'espasce .bc., et ou secont jour après que il passe [la]<sup>48</sup> moytié du residu, et ou tiers jour après la moytié de l'autre residu, et ainsi touzjours. Et pour ce, sera son mouvement plus tardif au double ou secont jour que ou premier, et plus tardif au double ou tiers que au secont, et ainsi ensuiement.

<sup>36</sup> B ou.

<sup>37</sup> Figure 22, p. 254.

<sup>38</sup> A quarta.

<sup>39</sup> E c.

<sup>40</sup> A a.

<sup>41</sup> B soit compté.

<sup>42</sup> ADE meü.

<sup>43</sup> BF viva.

<sup>44</sup> AF mouvement.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. n. 26.

<sup>46</sup> A recistant.

<sup>47</sup> A omits 'que.'

<sup>48</sup> A omits 'la.'

47a Je di donques que ce mouvement avroit commencement et jamais ne fineroit. Et telle ymaginacion fu mise ou .ix.<sup>e</sup> chappitre.<sup>40</sup> Et tout ce quant est de soy n'enclot<sup>41</sup> quelconque(s) repugnance ou im- // possib[ilité].<sup>42</sup> Or avons donques monstré evidentment comment c'est possible<sup>43</sup> que aucuns mouvemens commencent sanz finer, combien que par vertu naturelle en matiere corruptible ce ne puet estre fait.<sup>44</sup> Et estoit dit devant d'aucunes lumieres du ciel comment ce n'est pas seulement possible que elles aient commencement sanz avoir fin, mais est vraysemblable que il soit ainsi de fait. Et Aristote et Averroÿs cuident prouver par raysons que ce est simplement impossible de toutes choses universelment, soit substance ou quelconque(s) accident. Et pour ce que le contraire de leur conclusion est monstré par evidence comme dit est, il appert assés que leurs raysons ne pourroient valoir, pousé que je ne sceüsse monstrer la deffaute de elles ou que je ne les peüsse entendre; si comme qui me argüeroit d'un honme<sup>45</sup> en prouvant que il fust asne et je ne savoie respondre aus sophi[s]mes,<sup>46</sup> nientmoins *Birria semper homo*.<sup>47</sup>

30.—Ou .xxx.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il entent et commence a prouver que toute chose qui a eü commencement et toute chose corruptible avra fin, et que toute chose qui ara fin a eü ou avra commencement.<sup>1</sup> /

47b Après ce que [c]es<sup>2</sup> choses sont determinees, nous avons a dire ce qui s'ensuit.

Glose. Il me semble que le texte qui s'ensuit en ceste matière est obscur. Et puet estre que les textes en grec estoient corrompus en plusieurs lieux, ou que les translateurs ne les entendirent pas bien. Mais nientmoins, il est ja desclairié en partie et sera encor plus a plain que quelconque(s) intencion Ari[s]tote<sup>3</sup> ou Averroÿz peüssent avoir eü[e]<sup>4</sup> en ceste matiere, leurs raysons ne concluent pas. Après Aristote met pour son propos .iiii. supposicions.

Tiexte. Et donques se aucunes choses sont possibles quant a estre et non-estre, il convient par neccessité que aucun temps soit déterminé quant au plus que elles pueent estre, et quant au plus qu'elles pueent<sup>5</sup> non-estre. Et je di et entent ceste possibilité de estre et de non-

<sup>40</sup> Cf. ch. 10, 19ab.

<sup>41</sup> B Et tout ce quant est enclot.

<sup>42</sup> A impossible.

<sup>43</sup> B impossible.

<sup>44</sup> Figure 23, p. 254.

<sup>45</sup> DE omit 'd'un honme.'

<sup>46</sup> ADE sophimes.

<sup>47</sup> In his commentary in *Le Livre de Ethiques*, VII, 3, (Menut, p. 368), Oresme refers to 'la fable *De Birria*', which was often given as the title of the Latin *comedia* written about 1160 by Vital de Blois, best known as *Geta*. The play, the most popular of the mediaeval *comediae*, is based upon Plautus's *Amphitryon*, with a somewhat different dénouement; it was frequently attributed to Ovid and was translated into French by Eustache Deschamps, 'Un Traictié de Geta et d'Amphitryon mis de latin en François,' *Oeuvres complètes*, VIII, 211-246. The Latin text with French translation has been edited by Etienne Guilhou in G. Cohen, *La Comédie latine en France au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, I (Paris, 1931), 1-57. The lines pertinent to Oresme's reference are the following:  
Geta. "Sed precium pene miranda sophismata porto;

Iamque probare scio quod sit asellus homo.

Dum mihi me reddent patine, focus

uncta popina,

Hos asinos, illos esse probabo boves.

Sum logicus; faciam quevis animalis

cunctos;

Birria qui nimis est lentus asellus

erit."

Birria. Birria sic secum: "Quid? Birria fiet asellus?"

Quod natura dedit auferet ille mihi?

Birria sic Geta, quecumque problema

voluat,

Respondabit: erit Birria semper

homo."

The passage presents a telling satire against the misuse of the syllogism, likely enough to impress Oresme as a follower of Ockhamite distrust of the uses of formal logic, and he seems to assume that the lay reader would recognize the reference without explanation merely by the mention of Birria's name.

<sup>1</sup> Guthrie, ch. xii.

<sup>2</sup> A ses.

<sup>3</sup> A Aritote.

<sup>4</sup> A eu.

<sup>5</sup> B elles ne pevent.

estre selonc quelconque(s) predicacion ou predicament, si comme de estre et non-estre honne, et de estre et non-estre blanc, ou du grant de .iii. coutes ou de quelconque(s) autre de telles denominacions.

- 47c Glose. Selonc Ave[r]roës,<sup>6</sup> les choses qui sont a venir commenceront a estre par les puissances qui estoient a ce que elles commençassent. Et // les choses presentes qui ont comincié a estre sont par les puissances qu'il ont a estre et seront corrompues par la defaute de ces puissances, si comme un homme a puissance de durer cent ans, ou une qualité, ou quelconque(s) chose. Et donques aussi comme les puissances actives et passives sont determinees a certaines quantités en la maniere decleree ou chappitre precedent, semblablement les puissances des choses, quant a estre et quant a non-estre, sont determinees a certaines quantités de temps. Mais je monstreyeray après que ceste suppousicion n'est pas vraie universelment, et toutevoies est ce l'entente d'Aristote selonc l'exposicion d'Ave[r]roës.<sup>7</sup>

Tiexte. Quar se le temps n'estoit déterminé quant a grandeur et quant a petitesce mais que, quelconque(s) temps donné, l'en peüst touzjours prendre plus grant et plus grant et ainsi sanz fin, il convendrait que de une meisme(s) chose le temps en quoy elle est possible a estre fust infini et que un autre temps fust infini<sup>8</sup> en quoy elle est possible a non-estre. Et c'est impossible.

- 47d Glose. Aristote reputé impossible que .ii. corps infinis soient; et le contraire est vray quant a ymaginacion et selonc soy, / si comme il fu dit ou .xiii.<sup>9</sup> chappitre.<sup>9</sup> Et par aventure, il reputé semblablement impossible que .ii. temps infinis soient, et le contraire appert clerement selonc sa philosophie, car tout le temps passé est infiny et le temps avenir infiny, et est un infiny d'une part et autre infiny d'autre. Mais que .ii. temps soient infinis chascun de toutes pars, c'est impossible. Et a propos, Plato disoit<sup>10</sup> que les intelligences ou angelz eurent commencement et sont de leur nature corruptibles ou adnichilables, mais la bonne volenté de Dieu les maintendra touzjours en estre perpetuelment. Et ainsi la possibilité que il orent a estre<sup>11</sup> avant leur creacion ot fin et fu sanz commencement, et la possibilité que il ont a non-estre durera sanz fin. Et selonc la philosophie d'Aristote, qui met que le monde fu sanz commencement et sera sanz fin, il convient octroyer chose semblable, quar par la glose<sup>12</sup> du chappitre precedent appert que aucune lumiere ou ciel puet commencer qui onques ne fu et ja ne finira, et si est corruptible de sa nature, quar semblable sera ou ciel corrompue, si comme
- 48a il appert par la glose dessus dicte. // Item, par celle meisme glose appert que une conjunction de .iii. planettes puet estre et est vraysemblable que elle soit aucune foys de laquelle la possibilité inevitable par nature avra fin et avra duré sanz commencement, et l'impossibilité de telle conjunction et de semblable<sup>13</sup> avra commencement et durera sanz fin. Après il met une autre supposicion.

<sup>6</sup> AC Avenroys. Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 118.

<sup>7</sup> AC Avenroys.

<sup>8</sup> F omits 'et que un autre temps fust infini.'

<sup>9</sup> 22abc. DE .xii.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>10</sup> *Timaeus*, 41a, 5-41b, 6 (*Platonis Opera* recognovit Iohannes Burnet, IV, Oxonii, 1905). Oresme is here likely following the translation of Chalcidius (*Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, G. A. Mullachius, II, p. 169, Paris, 1867), or, perhaps, the paraphrase of St. Augustine: "vos quidem im-

mortales esse non potestis, sed mea voluntate immortales eritis" (*De Civitate Dei*, XXII, 26). Both differ textually from Cicero's translation and the accepted text. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford, 1928, pp. 250-252.

<sup>11</sup> F Et ainsi que la possibilité que il entent a estre.

<sup>12</sup> BDE chose. 45b.

<sup>13</sup> E et dessemblable avra.

Tiexte. Item, un autre principe est que *impossible* et *falz* n'ont pas une significacion,<sup>14</sup> quar *possible* et *impossible* et *falz* et *veir* sont .iiii. intencions. Et aucune chose est impossible par supposicion, si comme que triangle ait .ii. angles drois se telle chose ou telle est. et que le dyametre du quarré soit conmensurable a son costé se telle chose est.

Glose. Et le triangle qui contient la quarte partie de la superfice de demie-espere, il a .iii.<sup>15</sup> angles drois; mais a parler de triangle en plaine superfice et de lignes droites. c'est simplement impossible qu'il ait .ii. angles drois. Et aussi est ce simplement impossible que le dyametre du quarré soit conmensurable a son costé. Mais Aristote met ces choses par maniere d'exemple. et  
48b pour ce que aucuns disoient ainsi ou pourroient dire. Après il met / les autres membres.

Tiexte. Mais aucunes choses sont simplement possibles et aucunes simplement impossibles, et aucunes simplement fales et aucunes simplement vraies. Et estre simplement fals et estre simplement impossible n'est pas une chose, quar quant tu n'es pas en estant, se l'en dit que tu te estes, c'est falz mais ce n'est pas impossible. Ou quant tu ne chantes pas, dire que tu chantes est fals et non pas impossible. Mes toy ester et seer ensemble, ou que le dyametre du quarré<sup>16</sup> est conmensurable a son costé, ce n'est pas seulement falz mais est impossible. Et donques n'est ce pas tout un supposer une chose false et la supposer impossible.<sup>17</sup>

Glose. Il me semble selon verité que *impossible* est dit generalment selonc .iii. significacions. Premièrement, il est dit de impossible simplement et ce qui contient ou enclot en soy contradiction. Et puet<sup>18</sup> estre en .iii. manieres. Une est quant la contradiction est expliquee et formee, si comme toy seoir et non seoir ensemble ou telle chose. Autre est quant la contradiction est impliquee et s'ensuit euidamment ou clerement, si comme toy seoir et toy  
48c ester en- / semble ou si comme l'en dit de ceste proposicion:<sup>19</sup> *tantum pater est*. Autre est quant la contradiction est impliquee obscurément et n'appar[ç]oit<sup>20</sup> l'en pas legierement la consequence, si comme que le dyametre du quarré est conmensurable a son costé. Et en ceste tierce maniere est difference selonc ce que l'obscureté est grande ou petite en tant que aucune foys est doute se la proposicion<sup>21</sup> implique contradiction ou non. si comme. par aventure, de ceste proposicion:<sup>22</sup> Aristote ne fu onques. Et tot impossible simplement est tel que il ne puet estre mis en fait ou en estre ou verifié par quelconque(s) vertu ou puissance soit finie ou infinie. Secondement est dit *impossible* non pas simplement et de soy ne pour ce qu'il enclot en soy contradiction, mes pour ce qu'il ne puet estre naturellement. Et est dit en .iii. manieres. Une est pour deffaute de subyet et de puissance active ensemble, si comme que un autre monde soit hors cestuy. Autre est pour la repugnance du subyet, si comme que le ciel repouse ou qu'il soit devisé. Autre est pour deffaute de vertu active qui ce puisce faire, si comme que la terre soit  
48d perciee<sup>23</sup> tout oultre parmy le centre ou qu'elle soit meüe de / son lieu. Tiercement est dit *impossible* sou[s]<sup>24</sup> condicion de present temps, si comme. pour cause d'exemple, l'en diroit que, se le nombre des estoilles est per,

<sup>14</sup> BCDEF supposicion.

<sup>15</sup> B .iiii.

<sup>16</sup> BCDEF omit 'du quarré.'

<sup>17</sup> B impossible. Et donques ne est ce pas seulement falz mez est impossible et donques ne est ce pas tout un.

<sup>18</sup> A pueent.

<sup>19</sup> CDEF proporcion.

<sup>20</sup> A n'apparoit.

<sup>21</sup> DE est douteuse la prop.

<sup>22</sup> C proporcion.

<sup>23</sup> BDEF partie.

<sup>24</sup> A sou.

- c'est impossible que fust nomper, quar selonc Aristote,<sup>25</sup> l'en ne puet ou ciel adjoüster ne oster. Je di après que possible est dit quant a propos en .iii. manieres. Premièrement, generalment de tout ce qui est possible en quelconque(s) maniere, soit neccessaire ou contingent, comme que soit. Secondement, possible est dit de ce qui pourroit estre selonc ymaginacion sanz contradiction, combien que ce ne puisse estre mis en estre naturellement. Et ainsi est possible que un autre monde soit et que un lieu soit du tout vieu ou que le ciel repouse ou que la terre soit meüe et mise hors de son lieu, ou que elle soit [perciee]<sup>26</sup> et que l'en voie de l'autre part et telles choses. Tiercement, possible est dit de ce qui est douteus ou en doute et n'appert pas [s]e<sup>27</sup> c'est vray ou faulz, neccessaire ou impossible, et ainsi disons nous estre possible que le nombre des estoilles est nomper, et toutevoies selonc Aristote, ou c'est neccessaire ou c'est impossible selonc ce que dit est.
- 49a semblablement droit l'en que c'est // possible que aucuns des mouvemens du ciel sont incommensurables, et toutesvoies, selonc la philosophie d'Aristote, c'est neccessaire ou impossible—a prendre impossible selonc aucune autre des significacions devant mises. Et par ygnorance de ceste dist[inct]ion,<sup>28</sup> aucuns ont cuidé faire nouvelles demonstracions a prouver que Diex est par sophisme telz, si comme qui voudroit prover que les estoilles sont nomper en ceste maniere. Il est possible que les estoilles soient nomper et ne enclot quelconque(s) contradiction, et donques se ce est mis en estre, il ne s'ensuit quelconque(s) impossible. Or pousons donques que aucune foys elles<sup>29</sup> soient nomper, et d'autre partie, selonc Aristote, c'est impossible que ou ciel soit faite addicion ou subtraction d'aucune estoille.<sup>30</sup> Et donques est ce chose perpetuellement neccessaire que elles soient nomper et ne puet estre autrement. Mais l'en puet veoir clerement que cest argüement est sophistique, quar, par semblable l'en prouveroit que elles sont per, et semblablement de la commensurabileté ou incommensurabileté des mouvemens du ciel. Et la deffaute de tel argüement est quar quant l'en dit que c'est possible, se l'en
- 49b prent / possible selonc la premiere ou seconde significacion, ce ne seroit pas a octroier selonc Aristote, mais est a doubter; et donques la conclusion seroit douteuse. Et se possible est prins en la tierce maniere, premisses et conclusion,—tot demoure en doute. Après il met la tierce suspousicion.

Tiexte. Item, impossible<sup>31</sup> s'ensuit de impossible.

Glose. Impossible ne s'ensuit onques de possible ne de moins impossible, quar le consequant n'est onques plus impossible que l'antecedent. Après il met la quarte suspousicion.

Tiexte. Item, un homme a ensemble la vertu ou puissance de soy seoir [et]<sup>32</sup> de soy ester, quar aucune foys il a l'une et l'autre puissance, mais non pas a ce que il se sieche et se este ensemble,<sup>33</sup> mais a ce qu'il se sieche en un temps et este en autre.

- Glose. Aver[r]joys<sup>34</sup> met autrement et dit en sentence que aussi comme fais opposez ne pueent estre ensemble en un temps mais un après l'autre, semblablement les puissances ou possibilité a fais opposez ne pueent estre ensemble en un temps,<sup>35</sup> quar aussi comme ceste chose estre et ceste
- 49c meïsme(s) non-estre ne pueent / estre en un temps, semblablement ceste chose pouvoir estre et pouvoir [non]-estre<sup>36</sup> par neccessité sont en divers temps.

<sup>25</sup> De Caelo, I, 3, 270a, 12-25; II, 6, 288a, 34.

<sup>26</sup> ABF partie.

<sup>27</sup> A ce.

<sup>28</sup> A distrction.

<sup>29</sup> A foys elle elles soient . . .

<sup>30</sup> Cf. n. 25.

<sup>31</sup> E possible.

<sup>32</sup> A omits 'et.'

<sup>33</sup> DE omit 'a ce que il se sieche et se este ensemble, mais.'

<sup>34</sup> A Avenroÿs. Cf. Juntas, t.c. 119, 81A.

<sup>35</sup> A repeats 'mes un après . . . en un temps.'

<sup>36</sup> A et non pouvoir estre.

Quar avant que la chose soit, elle a puissance a estre; et quant elle est, elle n'a plus puissance a estre, mais a puissance a non-estre. C'est selonc Averroÿs, et semble qu'il avoit oublié ce qu'il a dit tantost devant en cest chappitre, c'est assavoir que une chose qui est duré par la puissance qu'elle a a estre, et vient en non-estre par la deffaute de ceste puissance et donques a elle puissance a estre quant elle est. Et sont ensemble en un temps possibilité a estre et possibilité a non-estre de une meisme chose. Et se aucun le vouloit gloser en disant qu'il entendoit devant de puissance conjointe au fait, et yci il entent de puissance separee du fait, il appert assés que ceste variacion n'estoit pas a faire en ce propos. D'autre partie, dire que une chose n'[ait]<sup>37</sup> pas puissance a estre quant elle est, [c]e<sup>38</sup> semble inconvenient. Après Aristote fait sa rayson et veult monstrer que c'est simplement impossible que une chose corruptible soit perpetuelle.

49d

Tiexte. Et donques [se]<sup>39</sup> aucun [fe]ignoît<sup>40</sup> ou disoit que une chose eüst puissance / ou possibilité a plusieurs choses opposez et que ces puissances durassent par temps infiny, ce ne pourroit estre que une de ces possibilités fust en un temps et autre en autre, mais convendroit que elles fussent ensemble.

Glose. Puisque chascune seroit ou dureroit par temps infiny, quar par la premiere susposission appert que c'est impossible que .ii. temps soient infinis. Mais j'ay monstré devant comment celle susposicion est false simplement et selonc philosophie. Et donques ceste rayson ne conclude pas et encor default elle autrement.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, se aucune chose est durante en estre par temps infini et elle est corruptible, elle a puissance a non-estre. Et donques, se une chose est ainsi en estre par temps infiny laquelle puet non estre, il s'ensuiroit que de fait elle seroit et ne seroit pas. Et donques s'ensuit faulz de ce qui estoit mis faulz. Mes se ce que estoit mis faulz ne fust impossible, ce que s'ensuit ne fust pas impossible.<sup>41</sup>

Glose. Et si est, quar le consequant enclot contradiction apperte, et il s'ensuiroit<sup>42</sup> de ce que l'en metoit que la chose qui est perpetuelle fust corruptible.

50a

Tiexte. Et donques toute chose qui est touzjours // est incorruptible.

Glose. Cest argüement deffaute en ce que il dit que se une chose dure par temps infiny laquelle puet non estre il s'ensuit que elle seroit et ne seroit pas. Et semble que [il]<sup>43</sup> weille prouver ceste consequence, parce que se ce qui est possible est mis en fait ou en estre, il ne s'ensuit quelconque(s) impossible. Et donques puisque ceste chose puet non estre, meton qu'elle ne soit pas. Et d'autre partie, il est dit que elle sera touzjours, et ainsi elle seroit et ne seroit pas. Je di quar ce ne vault, quar en mettant ou pousant que elle ne soit pas, l'en depouse le contradictoire, c'est assavoir qu'elle sera touzjours, et pour ce,<sup>44</sup> est ce chose contingente que elle soit<sup>45</sup> touzjours; et aussi que aucune foys qu'elle ne soit pas, et puet estre qu'elle sera touzjours et est verité, et puet estre que non sera; et pour ce, est elle dicte corruptible. Mais par aventure, aucun(s) diroit que Aristote suppose que toute chose pardurable durera touzjours et de neccessité. Et je di donques que il ne<sup>46</sup> convenist ja faire telz argüemens comme il fait, mais souffisist dire seule-

<sup>37</sup> A n'est.

<sup>38</sup> A se.

<sup>39</sup> A omits 'se.'

<sup>40</sup> A signoit.

<sup>41</sup> F omits 'ce que s'ensuit ne fust pas impossible.'

<sup>42</sup> F contradiction et par ce il s'ensuiroit.

<sup>43</sup> A omits 'il.'

<sup>44</sup> B touzjours, et ainsi que aucune foiz pour ce.

<sup>45</sup> DE elle ne soit.

<sup>46</sup> B omits 'ne.'



- 50b ment ceste chose est neccessaire, et donques elle / ne puet non estre et, par consequant, elle est incorruptible. Mais qui argüeroit ainsi, je diroie que la suspousicion est false et que la chose durera perpetuellement et non pas de neccessité. Encor pourroit aucun dire que Aristote entent que se une chose est corruptible, il convient qu'elle ait puissance a non-estre. Et Dieu et nature ne font rien pour noient, si comme il fu dit ou .viii.\* chappitre.<sup>47</sup> Et donques convient il par neccessité que ceste puissance soit aucune foys reduite a fait et que la chose corruptible soit aucune foys corrompue. Je respon et di premierement que possibilité a non-estre n'est pas chose positive et ne s'ensuit pas se elle ne vient en fait que Dieu ou nature aient rien fait pour noient; si comme, par aventure, c'est possible que aucun honme soit aveillé,<sup>48</sup> et toutevoies se jamais honme n'estoit aveillé,<sup>49</sup> nature n'avoit fait nulle chose pour noient. Item, aucune lumiere ou ciel causee du solleil est perpetuelle, et nientmoins, quant est de soy, elle est corruptible, quar continuellement aucune semblable est corrompue ou ciel par l'ombre de la terre et par l'ombre de la lune. // Et pour ce diroit l'en que celle lumiere qui est perpetuelle et corruptible de soy est mainten[ue]<sup>50</sup> en estre perpetuel par la presence du solleil et de sa clarté. Et semblablement, les angelz et le monde quant est de soy seroient reduis ou tourneroient en rien(s) se eulz n'estoient maintenus en estre par l'influence de Dieu duquel est aus autres choses dirivé et communiqué estre et vivre, as unes plus clerement et as autres plus obscurement, si comme dit Aristote ou .xxiii.\* chappitre. Et pour ceste similitude est il appellé en l'Escripture 'Pere de Lumieres:' *Omne datum, etc., descendens*<sup>51</sup> *a patre luminum.*<sup>52</sup> Après il veult prouver que chose qui durera sanz fin a esté touzjours sanz commencement.

Tiexte. Semblablement il convient par neccessité que tou[te]<sup>53</sup> chose qui sera touzjours ait esté sanz commencement, quar se une chose qui touzjours sera avoit eü commencement en aucun temps, il s'ensuivroit qu'elle eüst eü en aucun temps possibilité a non-estre.

- Glose. Aristote reputé impossible que chose perpetuelle ait de present ou ait eü autrefois possibilité a non-estre, si comme il cuide avoir monsté devant.  
50d devant. Après il monstre encor que / chose corruptible ne puet touzjours durer.

Tiexte. Et chose corruptible est telle qu'elle a premierement estre et après elle n'est pas, ou puet estre que après elle ne sera pas. Et chose qui a eü commencement est ce que eüst<sup>54</sup> premierement non-estre. Mais de ce qui est touzjours, l'en ne puet donner temps ouquel il soit possible que ce ne soit pas, soit temps finy ou infiny, quar se ce peut non estre en temps infiny, ce puet non estre en temps finy. Et ce est [im]possible<sup>55</sup> que une chose puisse touzjours estre et puis<sup>56</sup> non estre ou selonc negacion devant mise en disant non touzjours estre.

Glose. Sy comme il est monsté devant, quar selon Averroÿs,<sup>57</sup> c'est impossible que de une meïsme chose la puissance a estre et la puissance a non-estre soient ensemble a un temps. Item, selonc Aristote c'est impossible de mettre .ii. temps infinis; et donques est ce impossible que une chose puisse avoir non-estre<sup>58</sup> par temps infiny et que elle puisse estre ou durer par temps infiny.

<sup>47</sup> 16b.

<sup>48</sup> F aveuglé.

<sup>49</sup> B n'estoit nays. C enveillé. F aveuglé.

<sup>50</sup> A maintenant.

<sup>51</sup> B omits 'descendens.'

<sup>52</sup> Jac. I, 17.

<sup>53</sup> A touz.

<sup>54</sup> AB eust. DEF omit.

<sup>55</sup> A possible.

<sup>56</sup> ABF puisse.

<sup>57</sup> Juntas, t.c. 121.

<sup>58</sup> BCDEF non esté.

Mais j'ay monstré devant que ces .ii. suppousicions sont fales; et pour ce, la conclusion d'Aristote est false, qui est telle.

51a Tiexte. Et donques est ce impossible que une chose soit // touzjours laquelle est corruptible.

Glose. Après il retourne a monstrier que ce qui durera sanz fin ne puet avoir eü commencement.

Tiexte. Semblablement chose ne peut avoir eü commencement [qui]<sup>50</sup> sera touzjours, quar .ii. termes sont, c'est assavoir commencement et fin. Et [s]e<sup>51</sup> c'est impossible que fin soit de ce qui durera touzjours, donques est ce impossible que l'autre terme soit et que telle chose ait eü commencement. Et donques se ce qui est touzjours ne puet aucune foys non-estre, et c'est impossible que ce ait eü commencement.

Glose. Il me semble que ceste rayson a petite apparence, quar bien est vray que c'est impossible que une chose dure touzjours et qu'elle [ait]<sup>52</sup> fin; mais deviseement c'est possible que une chose dure tousjours et si est possible qu'elle ait fin, quar chascune de ces .ii. propositions par soy est possible, et la coupulative des .ii. est impossible, si comme de ceste: tu iras demain a Paris, tu n'yras pas demain a Paris.<sup>53</sup> Et ce scevent les enfanz qui apprennent logique. Item, se une chose dure sanz fin, Aristote ne prouve en rien que elle ait duré sanz commencement par neccessité, mais le contraire fu monstré devant ce chappitre.<sup>54</sup> Item Ave[r]roÿs<sup>55</sup> veult / ycy prouver estre impossible que une chose ait fin laquelle n'a eü commencement parce que de ces .ii. termes, fin et commencement, un ne puet estre sanz ce que l'autre soit ou ait esté.<sup>56</sup> Et je respon que la conclusion est vraye, quar Dieu seullement est sanz commencement et ne puet avoir fin. Mais la probacion de Averroÿs est nulle, et le contraire de la conclusion seroit vray se le monde estoit pardurable sanz commencement, si comme j'ay monstré devant ce chappitre.

31.—Ou .xxxi.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il veult monstrier universelment que chose qui n'est pas sanz commencement n'est pas sanz fin, et se elle n'est sanz fin, elle n'est pas sanz commencement; et que chose qui est sanz commencement est sanz fin, et se elle est sanz fin, elle est sanz commencement.<sup>1</sup>

51c De ce qui est touzjours possible estre, la negacion<sup>2</sup> contradictoire est non touzjours possible estre et son contraire // est touzjours possible non-estre, et de cecy le contradictoire est non touzjours possible non-estre.

Glose. Et pour ce miex entendre, je le desclaie en une figure presque semblable a une que l'en fait pour la premiere introduction des enfans en logique.

Tiexte. Et pour ce convient par neccessité que les negacions des .ii. con[tradictiores],<sup>2a</sup> c'est assavoir les .ii. subcontraires, soient dictes d'une meisme chose et que celle chose soit moienne entre touzjours estre et touzjours non-estre. Et est la chose qui est possible estre et possible non-estre, quar chascune des .ii. negacions qui sont subcontraires sera vraie aucune foys, pousé que ce ne soit pas touzjours. Et pour ce, la chose<sup>3</sup> qui n'est pas touzjours en non-estre sera aucune

<sup>50</sup> A omits 'qui.'

<sup>51</sup> AE ce.

<sup>52</sup> A est.

<sup>53</sup> B omits 'tu n'yras pas demain a Paris.'

<sup>54</sup> Cf. ch. 29, 44b.

<sup>55</sup> AC Avenroÿs. Cf. Juntas, t.c. 121, fol. 82D.

<sup>56</sup> E estre.

<sup>1</sup> Figure 24, p. 267.

<sup>2</sup> DE Se ce qui est touzjours possible estre negacion . . .

<sup>2a</sup> A contraires.

<sup>3</sup> A chosose.

foys en estre et aucune foys non, et ne puet estre ensemble aveques ce que dit est que telle chose soit touzjours possible sanz estre, mais elle sera aucune foys en estre, et donques sera elle aucune foys en non-estre. Et donques une meïsme chose sera possible estre et possible non-estre.

Glose. Et seront ces .ii. possibilitéz en divers temps et non pas ensemble.

51d Tiexte. Et c'est ce qui est moien des .ii., c'est assavoir de touz- / jours pouvoir estre et de touzjours pouvoir non-estre.

Glose. Il semble que il weille dire que tout ce qui est possible est aucune foys en estre et l'opposite est certain, quar moult de choses sont possibles<sup>4</sup> qui onques ne furent et ja ne seront. Après il met ce que dit est en termes generaux, affin que ce soit entendu universellement de toute chose, soit substance ou quelconque(s) accident.

Tiexte. Et afin que nostre rayson soit universelle nous dirons ainsi et mettrons que .a. et .b., qui sont contraires, ne pueent estre dis d'une meïsme chose; et de toute chose pueent estre dis .a. ou .g. et .d. ou .d.<sup>5</sup> Et par ce s'ensuit de neccessité que de la chose de quoy .a. ne puet estre dit ne .b. que de celle chose soit dit .gd. Or, pousons donques que .e. soit une chose moienne entre .a. et .b., c'est assavoir par abnegacion, et que de celle chose ne soit dit .a. ne .b., quar ce qu'est autre<sup>6</sup> et neutre entre .ii. contraires est moien entre eulz. Et donques convient il par neccessité que de cest moien soient dis touz ces .ii., c'est assavoir .g. et .d. Et ce appert quar de toute chose est dit ou .g. ou .a.

Glose. Quar il sont contradictoires.

52a Tiexte. Et donques un ou l'autre est dit de .e. // Et pour ce que c'est impossible que .a. soit dit de .e.

Glose. Pour ce qu'il est moien par abnegacion entre les .ii. contraires.

Tiexte. Donques .g. sera dit de .e. Et par ceste meïsme rayson, l'en puet prouver que .d. est dit de .e.

Glose. Il me semble que Aristote et Ave[r]roÿs,<sup>7</sup> en cest chappitre et en celui qui s'ensuit, envelopent cest propos en paroles obscures et font argüemens sophistiques. Et premierement, je pren touzjours possible estre et tousjours possible non-estre et dy que [s]e<sup>8</sup> possibilité de non-estre est prinse pour possibilité qui est quant la chose n'est pas, les .ii. choses dessus dictes ne sont pas contraires, quar l'en diroit que Antecrist est touzjours possible estre et touzjours possible non-estre. Et se ceste possibilité est prinse tellement que la chose ne puisse non estre fors quant elle est et que elle ne puisse estre fors quant<sup>9</sup> elle n'est pas et puet estre, donques touzjours possible estre e[s]t<sup>10</sup> touzjours non-estre et touzjours possible non-estre est touzjours estre. Or est assavoir que ce mot *touzjours* est dit en .ii. manieres. Une est sanz commencement et sanz fin. Et ainsi, *touzjours si* et *touzjours*  
52b *non* sont contraires. / Mais *touzjours* est autrement dit sanz commencement seulement ou sanz fin seulement, si comme l'en diroit d'une chose qui touzjours a esté et jamés ne sera ou qui touzjours sera et onques mes ne fu. Et en ceste maniere, *touzjours si* et *touzjours non* pueent estre subcontraires. Semblablement *aucune foys* est dit en .ii. manieres. Une est par temps fini de toutes pars, si comme est .i. jour ou un an. Autre est par temps finy d'une part seulement, si comme se une chose avoit commencement sanz fin, l'en

<sup>4</sup> BCDEF omit 'possibles.'

<sup>5</sup> DE dis ou .g. ou .d. et .d. ou .d.

<sup>6</sup> DE car c'est en autre . . .

<sup>7</sup> AC Avenroÿs. Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 123.

<sup>8</sup> A ce.

<sup>9</sup> F omits 'elle est et que elle ne puisse estre fors quant.'

<sup>10</sup> A et.

droit que aucune foys est et aucune foys ne fu pas. Et ce mot *touzjours* en la seconde segnificacion et ce mot *aucune foys* en<sup>11</sup> ceste seconde sont une meisme chose. Et pour ce, se Aristote vouloit par cest argüement devant mis reprover *touzjours estre* en la seconde significacion, il peche par equivocacion.<sup>12</sup> Après il conclut.

Tiexte. Et donques ce qui est *touzjours* n'a pas eü commencement et ja n'avra fin, et n'est pas *touzjours* en non-estre. Et ce appert quar se telle chose avoit eü commencement ou [se]<sup>13</sup> elle estoit corruptible et avoit fin, elle ne seroit pas pardurable.

52c Glose. Ce est certain, a prendre *pardurable* pour ce qui est *touzjours* en la premiere segnificacion. Mais après // il repete une autre probacion mise ou chappitre precedent qui se extent contre la seconde segnificacion.

Tiexte. Quar il s'ensuiroit que elle eüst ensemble possibilité de *touzjours estre* et possibilité de non *touzjours estre*, et c'est impossible. Et que ce soit impossible, il est monstré devant.

Glose. Ou chappitre precedent.<sup>14</sup> Mais j'ai declar[é]<sup>15</sup> comment celle rayson deffailloit en .ii. poins principaulz. Après il met que toute chose qui n'a eü commencement est pardurable et que toute chose incorruptible fu sanz commencement.

Tiexte. Et donques se aucune chose n'a eü commencement et elle est en estre, il convient par neccessité que elle soit pardurable sanz fin, et semblablement se elle est incorruptible et est en estre.

Glose. La premiere partie n'est pas vraie, si comme j'ay monstré devant.<sup>16</sup> Après il expouse les termes dont il use.

Tiexte. Et je pren *ingenitum* et *incorruptible* qui sont dis proprement, c'est assavoir que *ingenitum* est ce qui est maintenant et onques devant ne fu vray dire que il n'est pas. Et *incorruptible* est ce qui est maintenant et onques après ne sera vray dire que il n'est pas.

52d Glose. Briefment, il prent *genitum* generalment pour / toute chose qui a eü commencement et *ingenitum* pour ce qui est et n'eü(s)t onques commencement, quelconque(s) chose ce soit ou substance ou accident, et *corruptible* pour ce qui avra fin, etc. Après il met la consequence d'aucuns termes lesquels sont convertibles selonc son oppinion.

Tiexte. Et ces choses s'ensuient une a l'autre ensemble, c'est a savoir que ce qui est sanz commencement est sanz fin, et ce qui est sanz fin est sanz commencement par neccessité. Et estre pardurable s'ensuit a un et a l'autre, quar se aucune chose est sanz commencement, elle est [sans fin],<sup>17</sup> et se une chose est sanz fin, elle est pardurable.

32.—Ou .xxxii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il monstre comment des termes de ceste matiere aucuns ensuient un l'autre convertiblement.

Et ce qui est dit appert par la determinacion des termes dessus dis,<sup>1</sup> quar il convient par neccessité se une chose a fin qu'elle ait commencement, quar ou elle fu sanz commencement ou elle ot commencement, et se elle fu sanz commencement, elle sera sanz fin, si comme nous avons devant supposé.

<sup>11</sup> DE cest mot meïsmes en . . .

<sup>12</sup> E envocacion.

<sup>13</sup> A ou celle estoit.

<sup>14</sup> 50d.

<sup>15</sup> A declaray. B declarere. CD declarerey.

E desclaireray. F. declareray.

<sup>16</sup> 50a.

<sup>17</sup> A est pardurable et . . .

<sup>1</sup> A termes es dessus dis . . .

Glose. Aristote a touzjours cecy supposé et onques ne l'a souffisanment prové, si comme souvent est dit.

53a Tiexte. Item, se elle // eü(s)t commencement, il est neccessaire que elle ait fin, car ou elle ara fin ou non, et se non, donques n'ot elle onques commencement, si comme nous supposons.

Glose. Ceste consequence n'est pas bonne, si comme il appert par la glose après le .xxix.<sup>e</sup> chappitre,<sup>2</sup> quar se le monde avoit duré sanz commencement, aucune lumiere du ciel avroit fin qui onques n'avroit eü commencement.

Tiexte. Et se estre sanz fin et estre sanz commencement ne s'ensuient un a l'autre convertiblement, il n'est pas neccessaire que ce qui est sanz commencement soit pardurable ne ce qui est sanz fin. Mais que il soit neccessaire que ces choses ensuient une l'autre convertiblement il appert, quar avoir commencement et avoir fin ensuient l'un l'autre convertiblement. Et ce appert par ce qui est dit devant, quar de ce qui est touzjours existent et de ce qui est touzjours non existent,<sup>3</sup> une chose est moienne laquelle ne s'ensuit a l'un ne a l'autre. Et c'est ce qui a commencement et qui a fin.

Glose. Aristote laisse .ii. autres moiens, c'est a savoir ce qui a commencement sanz fin et ce qui a fin sanz commencement. Mais par aventure, il veult reprouver telz moiens par ce qui s'ensuit.

53b Tiexte. Quar chascune de ces .ii. / choses est par temps déterminé, c'est assavoir possibilité a estre et possibilité a non-estre, et semblablement estre et non-estre sont déterminés a certain temps.

Glose. Il veult dire que chose qui a commencement ne puet durer fors par temps finy, mais il ne le prove pas. Et le contraire fu monsté après le .xxviii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre.<sup>4</sup>

Tiexte. Et donques se aucune chose a eü commencement ou doit avoir fin, il convient par neccessité qu'elle soit moienne entre touzjours estre et touzjours non-estre.

Glose. Après il met ce que il a dit en termes generalz.

Tiexte. Or mettons donques que touzjours estre soit .a. et touzjours non-estre soit .b. et avoir commencement soit .g. et avoir fin soit .d. Et ce posé, il convient par neccessité que .g. soit moien entre .a. et .b., quar le temps de .a. ne celuy de .b. n'ont point de terme, ne en preterit<sup>5</sup> ne en futur. Et ne puet l'en dire de .a. que aucune foys n'ait esté et que aucune foys ne sera, ne aussi de .b. Mais ce qui a eü commencement, il convient par neccessité que son temps soit déterminé et d'une part et d'autre et qu'il ait fin de fait ou de puissance telle qui sera mise en fait. Et le temps de .a. ne celuy de .b.<sup>6</sup> n'a [point de]<sup>7</sup> terme d'une part // ne d'autre. Et donques .g. sera en estre<sup>8</sup> par une quantité de temps déterminé, et derechief, .g. ne sera pas; et semblablement e[s]t<sup>9</sup> il de .d. Et donques chascun des .ii., c'est a savoir de .g. et de .d., est chose qui a commencement et fin. Et donques avoir commencement et avoir fin s'ensuient l'un a l'autre convertiblement, c'est a dire que toute chose qui a commencement a fin et toute chose qui a fin a eü commencement.

Glose. En ceste rayson sont .ii. defautes. Une est quar il prent ce mot tous-

<sup>2</sup> 46abcd.

<sup>3</sup> B omits 'de ce qui est touzjours non existant.'

<sup>4</sup> F .xxix. Cf. ch. 29, 46abcd.

<sup>5</sup> B point déterminé en preterit . . .

<sup>6</sup> F omits 'ne celuy de .b.'

<sup>7</sup> A omits 'point de.'

<sup>8</sup> A en une estre . . .

<sup>9</sup> A et.

jours tant seulement pour ce qui est sanz commencement et sanz fin. Et il est dit encor autrement, si comme il appert par le chappitre précédent. Autre deffaute est quar il suppose que toute chose qui a eü commencement avra fin, et ce deüst il prover. Et aussi l'opposite est vray, si comme souvent

53d est dit. Après il met en termes<sup>10</sup> / generaux comment estre sanz commencement et estre sanz fin s'ensuient l'un a l'autre convertiblement.

Tiexte. Item, pousons que .e. soit *estre sanz commencement* et que .z. soit *avoir commencement* et que .i. soit *estre sanz fin* et que .t. soit *avoir fin*.<sup>11</sup> Or est monstré devant que .z. et .t. ensuient l'un l'autre convertiblement.

Glose. Quar .z. et .t. sont .g. et .d. de l'autre figure, et il est dit devant que .d. et .g. sont convertibles.

Tiexte. Et donques quant .z. et .t. sont ainsi mis comme consequens, chascun a chascun convertiblement, et verité est que .e. et .z. ne pueent estre dis de une meisme chose, mais de chascune chose est dit l'un ou l'autre.

Glose. Quar il sont contradictoires.

54a

Tiexte. Et semblablement est de .i. et .t. Donques convient il par neccessité que .i. et .e. s'ensuient // chascun a chascun convertiblement, quar se .i. et .e. ne ensuient ainsi l'un l'autre, il convendroit que .z. peüst ester en verité avecques<sup>12</sup> .i., c'est a dire que une chose peüst avoir commencement et estre sanz fin, quar de toute chose puet estre dit .e. ou .z., c'est a savoir *estre sanz commencement* ou *avoir commencement*. Et d'autre partie de quelconque(s) chose est dit .z., de celle est dit .t., et donques .t. seroit dit de .i. Et c'est impossible. Et donques convient il que .e. soit consequant a .i. Et par ceste meisme rayson, .i. est consequant a .e., quar tel resgart a .e. qui est *sanz commencement* a .z. qui est *avoir commencement* comme .i. qui est *sanz fin* a .t. qui est *avoir fin*.

Glose. Briefment, il peu(s)t ainsi dire: .t. et .z. sont convertibles, si comme devant est dit. Et donques .e. et .i. sont convertibles, quar autrement une chose pourroit estre sanz commencement et avoir fin, ou sanz fin et avoir commencement. Et donques .t. et .z. ne seroient pas convertibles. [Et l'opposite est supposé, ce est assavoir que il sunt convertibles].<sup>13</sup> Mais ceste suspension sus quoy il se fonde n'est pas prouvee et est false comme souvent dit est.

33.—Ou .xxxiii.<sup>e</sup> chappitre il s'efforce encore de prouver que par neccessité toute chose qui eüst commencement avra fin, et qui avra fin eüst commencement.<sup>14</sup> /

54b

Dire que c'est possible que une chose soit faite de nouvel et que elle soit incorruptible<sup>2</sup> ou perpetuelle et que une chose qui a duré sanz commencement soit après corrompue, ainsi que une chose ait une foys generacion sans avoir corrupcion ou que une autre ait une foiz corrupcion sans avoir [eü]<sup>3</sup> generacion, ce dire est interimer aucunes des<sup>4</sup> choses devant suppousees. Quar toutes choses peuent et faire et souffrir et estre et non-estre par temps infiny ou par un temps déterminé de certaine quantité. Et ce qui a puissance [a]<sup>5</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Figure 25, p. 267.

<sup>11</sup> Figure 26, p. 267.

<sup>12</sup> BCF onques. DE ou que.

<sup>13</sup> A omits 'Et l'opposite . . . convertibles.'

<sup>14</sup> B et qui a fin avra commencement.

<sup>2</sup> E corruptible.

<sup>3</sup> A omits 'eü.'

<sup>4</sup> B interimer au termiez des . . .

<sup>5</sup> A et.




FIG. 24  
(FOL. 51b)




FIG. 25  
(FOL. 53c)




FIG. 26  
(FOL. 53d)






FIG. 27  
(FOL. 55c)

temps infiny est determiné aucunement parce que rien n'est plus. Glose. Quar tout le temps qui puet avoir esté et qui puet estre a venir et qui est infiny d'une part et d'autre est si grant que nul ne puet estre plus grant.

Tiexte: Mais ce qui est infiny d'une part n'est pas simplement infiny ne déterminé.

Glose. Quar le temps infini seulement en futur et a venir puet estre commencié hui ou demain ou de cy a mil ans. Il me semble que Aristote implique ycy .ii. raysons assés obscurément. Une est que se aucune chose avoit commencement et elle durast après sanz fin, ce seroit contre ce<sup>6</sup> qui fu dit ou .xxx.° chappitre,<sup>7</sup> c'est a savoir que toute chose dure en estre par la //

54c puissance que elle a a durer. Et donques se elle duroit par temps infiny a venir, il s'ensuiroit que elle eüst puissance infinie. A ce je respon et di que quelconque(s) chose, pousé que elle ait eü commencement ou que elle ait esté sanz commencement, ne requiert pour durer autre puissance ou vertu que sa substance ou son essence, se n'estoit pour resister a ses contraires qui la pourroient corrompre. Et pour ce, il ne convient pas que le ciel ou une estoille qui tousjours durera ait en soy une qualité ou puissance infinie. Item, une lumiere est ou puet estre ou ciel qui eût commencement et durera sanz fin, si comme il fu monstré ou .xxviii.° chappitre.<sup>8</sup> Et ne convient pas pour ce que ceste lumiere ait vertu infinie. Et briefment a dire, quelconque(s) chose est sanz avoir contraire, soit accident ou substance, si comme est l'ame intellective, ne requiert telle qualité ou puissance en soy pour durer, nonobstant que telle chose ait eü commencement. Mais la vertu qui la maintient et conserve en estre, c'est l'influence de Dieu, aussi comme le solleil conserve et garde en estre la lumiere du ciel. Item, les parties des

54d ellemens simples qui ont contraire es[quelles]<sup>9</sup> leur contraire ne fet / aucune action, n'ont mestier de telle qualité ou puissance pour durer, si comme les parties de terre qui sont vers le centre et les parties du feu qui sont pres du ciel, quar se<sup>10</sup> touzjours<sup>11</sup> estoient la ou il sont et aucune chose contraire ne approchast de elles, elles dureroient par temps infini sanz aquerir autre puissance que [c]elle<sup>12</sup> que elles ont qui n'est pas infinye. Mes les choses mixtes et compostes de contraires et qui ont contrariété dedens elles et dehors elles, telles choses ont mestier quant a leur duracion de puissance par quoy elles resistent as contraires. Et ceste puissance est en leur complexion ou composicion ou commixcion de leurs qualités. Et telle puissance ou qualité est finie. Et pour ce, telles choses ne pueent touzjours durer pas nature ne passer certains termes, si comme de homme est escript: *Posuisti terminos eius qui preteriri non poterunt*,<sup>13</sup> se ainsi n'estoit que l'action des contraires fust suspendue ou naturellement et a temps par aucune reclusion, si comme l'en dit de ceulz qui dormirent en Sardine dont est faite mencion ou quart de *Phisque*,<sup>14</sup> et semblable chose est recitee en l'*Ystoire(s) des Lombars*;<sup>15</sup>

55a ou // par devin miracle, si comme es cors glorifiés. Une autre rayson ou une autre forme de la rayson Aristote selonc Averroÿs est telle en sentence:<sup>16</sup> ce qui est infiny est si grant que rien ne puet estre plus grant. Et donques

<sup>6</sup> A cen.

<sup>7</sup> 47c.

<sup>8</sup> B .xxx. C .xxviii° F .xxix° Cf. ch. 29, 45a.

<sup>9</sup> A qualitéz.

<sup>10</sup> A ses.

<sup>11</sup> F et les parties qui sont du feu qui sont vers le centre près du ciel, car se tousjours.

<sup>12</sup> A elle.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Job, XIV, 5: "Constituisti terminos eius, qui praeteriri non poterunt." E potept.

<sup>14</sup> *Physicorum*, IV, 11, 218b, 21-27.

<sup>15</sup> *Pauli Historia Langobardum* I, 4, (Scrip-tores Rerum Germanicarum), ed. G. Waitz (Hanover, 1878), p. 54.

<sup>16</sup> *Juntas*, t.c. 133, fol. 91A. Cf. also, t.c. 124, fol. 84D.



infini en duracion est sanz commencement et sanz fin, quar se aucune duracion estoit sanz fin et non pas sanz commencement, l'en ne pourroit dire que elle fust finie, quar elle est sanz fin, ne que elle fust infinie pour ce que celle qui est sanz commencement et sanz fin est plus grande. Et rien n'est plus grant que infini. Mais Averoÿs obice encontre quar le temps a venir qui commence maintenant est infini d'une part seulement, et tout le temps passé qui fine maintenant est ou a esté infini d'une part seulement. A ce il respont, en sentence, quar c'est par accident que le temps preterit ou passé fine maintenant et que celi a venir commence, quar temps est une chose successive qui n'est pas toute presentement de fait ou en fait. Mais se une chose permanente avoit commencement et puissance de durer sanz fin, il convendroît que ceste puissance fust presentement infinie, et la puissance de durer sanz commencement et sanz / fin seroit plus grande. Et c'est impossible que rien soit plus grant d'infiny, et pour ce Averoïs conclut que toute chose dure pardurablement sanz commencement et sanz fin ou par temps fini de toutes pars. Mais sa rayson [et]<sup>17</sup> sa response deffaillent en .iii. poins: quar chose qui dure par temps infini ne requiert pas en soy puissance infinie en vertu, si comme je ay declairé devant.<sup>18</sup> Item, il suppose ycy et ailleurs que tout infini est ou seroit infini de toutes pars, et le contraire fu monstré ou .xiii.<sup>e</sup> chapitre<sup>19</sup> de infini en quantité permanente; et semblable est de chose successive, si comme temps ou mouvement. Item, il suppose que ce qui seroit infini de toutes pars fust plus grant que ce qui seroit infini non pas de toutes pars, et je ay autrefois monstré le contraire<sup>20</sup> et puet apparoir assés legiere-ment. Quar pousé que .a. soit un corps infini de totes pars et que .b. soit un autre corps d'un pié de lé et d'un pié de parfont et infinny en long<sup>21</sup> seulement d'une part et soit vers destre; et ou commencement de .b. soit prins une porcion de la quantité d'un pié et soit signee par .c., et l'autre après eguale soit signee par .d. // et<sup>22</sup> l'autre après par .e. et l'autre par .f., et ainsi touzjours en procedant sanz fin vers destre. Item, je pouse ou met que par les parties d'une heure appellees p[ro]p[or]cionales,<sup>23</sup> en la premiere soit prins .c. et soit fait ou formé de figure sperique ou ronde, et en la seconde de ces parties de heure soit prins .d. et soit adjousté a .c. et tout ensemble soit fait un corps tout ront ou de figure sperique. Et en la tierce de ces parties de heure soit adjousté .e. semblablement, et ainsi en procedant par ces / parties de heure<sup>24</sup> qui sont infinies, en prenant et adjoustant les porcions<sup>25</sup> de .b. en la maniere dicte, lesquelles sont infinies. Je di que il s'ensuit par neccessité que touzjours devant la fin de l'eure estoit en ce cas un corps sperique par telle addiccion, et passee l'eure, .b. qui a ainsi esté ordené ne sera sperique ne de quelconque(s) figure, mes sera un corps infini de toutes pars. Et donques n'est pas .b. mendre que .a. ne .a. plus grant que .b., et toutevoies a .b. ou en .b. n'a esté rien adjousté. Et donques .b. n'est pas plus grant que il estoit devant, et donques .b., qui estoit devant infini seulement en lonc et seulement d'une part, n'estoit pas plus petit que .a. qui estoit infini de toutes pars. Et donques une quantité infinie n'est pas plus grande ne plus petite que une autre infinie. Item, soit .b. infini seulement d'une part selonc le premier cas et soient prinses la seconde porcion<sup>26</sup> de luy et la quarte, c'est a savoir .d. et .f., et la sixte et la .viii.<sup>e</sup> et [la]<sup>27</sup> .x.<sup>e</sup> et ainsi en oultre de celles qui sont denommees par nombre per, et soient conjointes ensemble en figure sperique

<sup>17</sup> A ou.<sup>18</sup> 46c.<sup>19</sup> 23abc.<sup>20</sup> 23c.<sup>21</sup> A loing.<sup>22</sup> Figure 27. Cf. p. 267.<sup>23</sup> A porpocioneles.<sup>24</sup> A heures.<sup>25</sup> DE porporcions.<sup>26</sup> E porporcion.<sup>27</sup> A omits 'la.'

- 56a par la // maniere devant mise. Item, sanz muer la figure des autres porcions qui sont denomees par nombre nomper, et sanz mouvoir<sup>28</sup> la premiere soit la tierce adjoincte a la premiere, c'est a savoir .e. a .c., et la quinte a la tierce et ainsi des autres, etc. Je di que l'eure passee, un cors sera fait infini<sup>29</sup> de toutes pars, et demourera<sup>30</sup> un autre corps tel comme estoit .b. et non pas plus petit, et tout avra esté fait de .b. sanz rien adjouster et sanz rien prendre ailleurs. Item, encore pourroit l'en faire une chose semblable de ce corps qui est demouré tel comme estoit .b., et ainsi tant de foyes comme l'en pourroit ymaginer. Et donques l'en pourroit prendre en .b. cent mille et [cent]<sup>31</sup> mille corps dont chascun seroit infini de toutes pars, et demoureroit un corps qui ne seroit pas mendre que .b. estoit et sanz rien avoir adjouste. Or appert donques clerement que de plusieurs quantités infinies, combien que elles soient dessemblablement infinies, une n'est pas plus grande ne plus petite que l'autre; et est verité, pousé que les quantités soient permanentes et successives, quar une meisme rayson est des unes et / [des]<sup>32</sup> autres. Et donques tout le temps infiny passé et a venir n'est pas plus grant que le temps infiny seulement a venir. Item encor, monstray je autrefoys que .ii. infinis ne sont pas egualz,<sup>33</sup> mais il souffist a present a cest propos ce que dit est contre Averoy's.<sup>34</sup>
- 56b

34.—Ou .xxxiii.° chappitre il argüe encore a ce meisme(s) propos.

Derechief, se une chose avoit touzjours esté ou temps infiny passé, pourquoy seroit elle corrompue et mise en non-estre maintenant en cest signe ou moment plus que en un autre; ou se une chose avoit esté en non-estre par tout le temps infiny passé pourquoy seroit elle faite et mise en estre maintenant en cest signe ou moment plus que en un autre?

Glose. Et se aucun faisoit instance de ce que une beste qui onques ne fu par tot le temps passé infiny commence maintenant estre, et la puissance ou possibilité qui estoit a ce que elle fust a duré par tout le temps infiny passé et cesse maintenant, a ce l'en respondroit selonc Averoy's ou .xxx.° chappitre que telle beste ou telle chose commence par accident et fine,<sup>1</sup> et aussi est il de la puissance proceine<sup>2</sup> que elle avoit a estre. // Et la puissance remote ou lointene est sanz commencement et sanz fin et est la<sup>3</sup> matiere premiere, et l'en ne puet dire que une chose commence par accident qui touzjours durera, ou que ce cesse par accident et a l'aventure qui touzjours a duré. Après il poursuit sa rayson.

Tiexte. Et donques se cause ne puet estre assignee pourquoy telle chose commenceroit ou fineroit maintenant plus que en autre signe, et telz signes ont esté et seront infinis, il s'ensuit que aucune chose ait esté generable et puet avoir eü commencement par temps infiny.

Glose. C'est a savoir ce qui avroit commencement et dureroit sanz fin.

Tiexte. Et que aucune chose ait esté corruptible par temps infiny.

Glose. C'est a savoir ce qui fineroit et avroit duré sanz commencement. Aucuns autres textes ont yci *incorruptibile*, mais ce doit estre *corruptibile*, si comme il appert par ce qui s'ensuit.

<sup>28</sup> B nommer.

<sup>29</sup> A infinie.

<sup>30</sup> BCE demoura.

<sup>31</sup> A contre.

<sup>32</sup> A omits 'des.'

<sup>33</sup> 55a ff.

<sup>34</sup> DE omits 'ce que dit est contre Averoy's.'

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 120, fol. 81D-82A and t.c. 133, fol. 91A.

<sup>2</sup> B puissance remote ou lointene prochaine . . .

<sup>3</sup> DE et aussi la matiere . . .

Texte. Et donques telle chose puet non estre par temps infiny, et donques elle a vertu ou puissance ensemble de non estre et de estre, c'est asavoir de estre premierement se elle est corruptible et puisse cesser, et d'estre<sup>4</sup> après se elle est generable ou puisse commencer a estre. Et donques se / nous mettons que les choses soient en fait qui peuent estre, il s'ensuit que choses opposites soient ensemble.

56d

Glose. C'est a dire que .ii. contradictoires soient vrais ensemble et que l'en puisse dire d'une chose que elle est et que elle n'est pas. Et ce est simplem[en]<sup>5</sup> [im]possible.<sup>6</sup> Il me semble que selonc Aristote et Averoy's<sup>7</sup> la cause de ceste consequence est telle: quar se une chose avoit aucune foy[s] [eü]<sup>8</sup> commencement et elle durast sanz fin, l'en ne pourroit assigner cause ne rayson pourquoy elle eüst commencement en un moment plus que en autre de touz les momens du temps infini devant et après. Donques s'ensuit il que son estre et son non-estre resgardent egalment tout le temps infini passé et a venir. Et donques est ce possible que la chose qui avoit commencement et dureoit sanz fin ait esté en estre par tout le temps infiny passé. Or pousons que ce soit voir, donques il s'ensuit que ceste chose avra eü estre et non-estre ensemble par tout le temps infiny passé, et semblablement pourroit l'en dire de la chose qui avoit fin sanz commencement. Ce me semble l'intencion

57a

d'Aristote. Mais ceste rayson deffaut en .ii. poins. Un est quar de tote // chose a venir contingente, indifferenment l'en puet dire que son estre et son non-estre regardent egalment aucun temps, si comme seroit de la leçon que je pourroie lire demain. Et toutevoies, il ne s'ensuit pas que telle chose puisse avoir estre et non-estre ensemble, quar en me[tt]<sup>9</sup>ant<sup>9</sup> en voir un des contradictoires, l'en depouse l'autre; mais elle a bien ensemble possibilité a estre et a non-estre, [et]<sup>10</sup> non pas ensemble. Item, l'estre et le non-estre de la chose qui a esté ou temps passé ne regarde pas egalment tout le temps passé, pousé que telle chose ait eü commencement ou non, quar puisque elle a esté, c'est impossible que elle ne ait esté. Une autre deffaute principale est en ceste rayson, quar Aristote suppose que l'en ne pourroit assigner cause pourquoy une chose qui eüst touzjours duré cessast en aucun moment plus que en un autre ne aussi pourquoy une chose qui touzjours durera commenceroit estre en un moment plus que en autre. Et le contraire appert evidamment en rayson naturele par ce qui fut dit ou .xxviii.<sup>11</sup> chappitre en plusieurs instances,<sup>12</sup> par lesquelles ceste rayson d'Aristote est faussee et

57b

tout son propos principal / en ceste partie. Premierement, quar pousé que les mouvemens du ciel soient pardurables sanz commencement et sanz fin, il est possible que .iii. planettes soient conjointes precisement en un meridiain<sup>13</sup> ou corporelment, et est vraysemblable que onques ne puet estre et ne pourra plus estre telle conjonccion par nature. Et nientmoins par touz les siecles infinis qui ont esté et devant touz temps finis tant soient ymaginés grans, ceste conjonccion estoit a venir et a estre en cest moment et non en autre et par neccessité naturele. Et la nature ou qualité et ordenance des mouvemens du ciel est la cause neccessaire naturellement de ceste conjonccion et de ce que elle est en cest moment et de ce que en tout le temps infini<sup>14</sup> passé et a venir n'a peü et<sup>15</sup> ne puet estre conjonccion semblable. Et ne convient querir ne assigner autre cause de ce, se ce ne sont les intelligences

<sup>4</sup> B omits 'et d'estre.'

<sup>5</sup> A simplemt.

<sup>6</sup> A possible.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 134.

<sup>8</sup> A omits 'eü.'

<sup>9</sup> A menant.

<sup>10</sup> A omits 'et.'

<sup>11</sup> BF xxxix. C xxviii.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. ch. 29, 44b-47a.

<sup>13</sup> DE omit 'meridiain.'

<sup>14</sup> E fini.

<sup>15</sup> B ne a point et ne . . .

- qui meuvent les cielz. Or appert donques que la suspousicion sus quoy Aristote fondoit sa rayson est fausse. Item, le solleil et la lune et les estoilles par la concurrence et configuracion de leurs lumieres et de leurs influences
- 57c sont causes des choses de cy bas. // Et donques une conjonction de telz corps du ciel<sup>16</sup> telle que onques ne fu semblable puet estre cause d'aucune qualité ou substance telle que onques ne fu semblable, et estre commencement d'une espesce nouvelle qui onques mes ne fu et touzjours sera. Item, ce puet estre couleuré par ce que dit Plinius ou commence[me]nt<sup>17</sup> du .xxvi.\* livre de l'Ystoire naturelle: *sensit<sup>18</sup> et facies hominum novos omnique<sup>19</sup> evo priore incognitos<sup>20</sup> universe prope Europe morbos.*<sup>21</sup> Il dit que en un temps commencerent maladies qui onques devant n'avoient esté en une des grans parties du monde. Item, il est provable que nature, qui onques ne deffaut en choses neccessaires, pourvoist en tel cas et feist aucunes nouvelles espesces de herbe ou d'autre chose en remede contre telles maladies. Item, en retournant as i[n]stances<sup>22</sup> demonstrables ou neccessaires et lesquelles l'en ne pourroit fausser, il fu monstre ou .xxviii.\*<sup>23</sup> chappitre<sup>24</sup> comment c'est possible et vraysemblable que ou ciel cesse une lumiere qui onques ne commença et que une commence qui ja ne finera, et tout par neccessité inevitable naturellement. Et de ce que une telle lumiere commence a telle
- 57d heure / et non a autre ou fine, la disposition et proporcion des mouvemens du ciel est cause naturellement neccessaire, si comme devant dit est de la conjonction de .iii. estoilles.<sup>25</sup> Item, en celuy .xxxviii.\*<sup>26</sup> chappitre<sup>27</sup> fu dit comment un mouvement circulaire puet commencer qui jamais ne cesseroit quant est de soy, et aussi fu dit de mouvement droit. Et donques par ces instances et par semblables appert clerement que dire que une chose puisse avoir commencement et durer sanz fin n'est pas impossible simplement et qui contiengne ou implique contradiction. Quar pousé que les instances devant mises ne fussent pas vraies ou ne fussent pas vraysemblables ou non-possibles<sup>28</sup> a vertu naturelle [ne]<sup>29</sup> si comme l'en ne pourroit faire une tour qui ataignist ou ciel: *turrim construxit que celum tangere possit fabula est,*<sup>30</sup> toutevoies<sup>31</sup> il appert par demonstracion evidente et par rayson neccessaire en lumiere naturelle que les instances devant mises sont possibles quant est de soy sanz impliquer [contra]diction.<sup>32</sup> Et selonc verité, le consequant d'une consequence n'est pas plus impossible que son antecedant. Et donques a la
- 58a conclusion // que Aristote improve ne s'ensuit pas contradiction, si comme il cuide. Et nientmoins, les instances devant mises, aucunes sont vraysemblables, si comme fu dit ou .xxviii.\*<sup>33</sup> chappitre.<sup>34</sup> Item, pousé que tout le temps passé et a venir fust infini de toutes pars, il est dit comment une chose puet commencer et durer sanz fin et comment il ne convient autre cause querir pourquoy elle commence en tel moment fors la disposicion perpetuelle des mouvemens precedens. Et ou .xxiiii.\*<sup>35</sup> chappitre fu faite mencion que une duracion est successive et temporelle et puet estre ymagyne infinie, et

<sup>16</sup> A telz corps ou du ciel . . .

<sup>17</sup> A commençant.

<sup>18</sup> DE naturelle s'ensuit et . . .

<sup>19</sup> DE novos quod omni evo . . .

<sup>20</sup> DE recognitos.

<sup>21</sup> C. Plinii Secundi Naturalis Historia, XXVI, 1, (ed. D. Detlefsen, Berolini, 1871), IV, 106: "Sensit facies hominum et novos omnique aevo priore incognitos non Italiae modo verum etiam universae prope Europae morbos."

<sup>22</sup> A istances.

<sup>23</sup> B .xxix. CF .xxviii.\*

<sup>24</sup> 45c.

<sup>25</sup> 44d.

<sup>26</sup> B .xxix. C .xxviii.\* F .xxiiii.

<sup>27</sup> 46abcd.

<sup>28</sup> B possible.

<sup>29</sup> A omits 'ne.'

<sup>30</sup> Doubtless a reference to the Tower of Babylon, but the citation has not been identified.

<sup>31</sup> A et toutevoies . . .

<sup>32</sup> A quadietion.

<sup>33</sup> BCDEF .xxix.\*

<sup>34</sup> Cf. n. 27.

<sup>35</sup> 34d-35a.

l'autre est permanente toute ensemble infinie et est dicte eternité. Et donques se en duracion successive temporele nature puet commencer une chose qui touzjours mais sera, nul ne devroit doubter que en duracion permanente, qui est eternité, Dieu ne puisse commencer et creer une chose qui touzjours durera. Et aussi comme il ne convient mettre cause pourquoy nature commence ceste chose en un moment plus que en autre de tout le temps infini fors la disposicion des mouvemens du ciel, sem- / blablement de ce que Dieu crea le monde ou [que il]<sup>36</sup> cree une ame quant il li plect et non plus tost ne plus tart en son eternité, il ne convient querir autre cause fors la voullenté devine inmuable et pardurable en son eternité permanente sanz succession. Et ceste eternité est Dieu, si comme il fu dit ou .xxiii.<sup>37</sup> chapitre. Après Aristote met une autre rayson.

Texte. Item, ceste chose qui a touzjours esté et a fin ou ceste qui sera touzjours et a commencement est touzjours semblablement en tot signe ou moment, c'est a dire que son estre et son non-estre regardent semblablement chascun moment. Et donques s'ensuit il que en temps infini elle avra vertu ou possibilité de ce qui est estre et non-estre. Et nous avons monsté devant que c'est impossible.<sup>38</sup>

Glose. Il suppose que de celle chose l'estre et le non-estre regardent semblablement et egualmente ou indifferenment chascun moment de tout le temps infini, et c'est faulz comme dit est. Et ceste rayson coïncide et est semblable a celle qui est devant mise et puet estre semblablement destruite. Après il met une autre rayson.

Tiexte. Item, se en tout le temps devant passé une chose a esté de fait en estre // et sanz commencement ou ingenerable ou se une chose a esté en non-estre par le temps infini passé et touzjours a esté possible que elle fust faite<sup>39</sup> et mise en estre, donques s'ensuit il que quant ceste chose n'estoit pas elle avoit vertu ou possibilité a [estre et avecques ce l'autre quant elle estoit avoit possibilité a]<sup>40</sup> non-estre après. Et donques estoient ces vertus ou possibilités<sup>41</sup> par temps infini

Glose. Selonc les expositeurs,<sup>42</sup> son intencion est que l'en ne porroit assigner cause pourquoy la possibilité que la chose qui onques ne eût commencement avoit a non-estre fust verifiée en fait en un temps ou moment plus que en autre, et semblablement de la possibilité que celle qui avoit commencement sanz fin avoit eü a estre. Mes je di que c'est faulz, comme devant est monsté. Une autre exposition seroit selonc Averoïs<sup>43</sup> quar il convendrait que telles vertus ou possibilités fussent infinies, mais il fu dit devant ou .xxxiii.<sup>44</sup> chapitre que il ne s'ensuiroit pas que elles fussent infinies fors en duracion et seullement d'une part.

35.—Ou .xxxv.<sup>45</sup> chapitre il veult prover que de neccessité toute chose corruptible sera corrompue et argüe encor au propos devant dit.

58d Et autrement appert / que c'est impossible que ce qui est corruptible ne soit aucune foys corrompu.

Glose. Il met ceste conclusion principalement contre Plato,<sup>1</sup> qui disoit que le monde et les anges eurent commencement et sont anichilables quant est de

<sup>36</sup> A omits 'que il.'

<sup>37</sup> 35a9.

<sup>38</sup> 49cd.

<sup>39</sup> DE forte.

<sup>40</sup> A omits 'estre et . . . possibilité a.'

<sup>41</sup> B impossibilitéz.

<sup>42</sup> A iex positours.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 136, fol. 92C.

<sup>44</sup> 54b-56a.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. n. 10, p. 257.

<sup>2</sup> DE bonté.

leur nature, mes il seront touzjours sanz fin par la conservacion et par le maintien de la volenté<sup>2</sup> de Dieu. Après il met a ce .ii. raysons ou .iii.

Tiexte. Quar autrement il s'ensuiroit que telle chose fust touzjours ensemble corruptible et incorruptible de fait, et donques elle sera possible ou avra possibilité de touzjours estre et de non touzjours estre, et donques sera aucune foys corrompu ce qui est corruptible.

Glose. C'est le texte en sentence; mais l'en doit savoir que *incorruptible* est dit de ce qui ne puet estre corrompu, et est dit de ce qui puet estre non-corrompu, aüssi comme *immortel* est dit de ce qui ne puet mourir ne finer, et ce est Dieu seullement: *Qui habet solus immortalitatem*, si comme dit l'Apostle,<sup>3</sup> et si est dit *immortel* de ce qui puet non morir ou non finer, si comme sont les anges et les ames. Je dy donques que se Aristote prent //  
59a incorruptible pour ce qui ne<sup>4</sup> puet estre corrompu, sa rayson n'est pas a propos, quar selonc Plato<sup>5</sup> le monde n'est pas incorruptible fors en la seconde maniere, quar il puet<sup>6</sup> estre corrompu et puet estre non-corrompu. Et se Aristote prent incorruptible en la seconde maniere pour ce qui puet estre non-corrompu, il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que telle chose puisse estre et non estre ensemble, quar une chose a venir contingente puet estre et puet tousjours non estre, si comme la beste qui sera engendree de cy en un an. Et ce ne enclot aucune contradicion, et donques par semblable il ne s'ensuit pas contradicion se l'en dit que une chose puet touzjours estre et puet non estre aucune foys. Mais par aventure, aucun droit que Aristote entent que toute chose perpetuel ou temps a venir est neccessaire et ne puet non estre, et que tout ce qui puet estre non-corrompu ne puet estre corrompu. Et je di que ainsi supposerait Aristote ce que il doit prover, et que l'en li nee et que est falz, si comme il sera monstre après. Après il argüe de ce qui a touzjours esté.

59b Tiexte. Item, se aucune chose est generable et est de present et puet / avoir eü commencement, il convient que elle [ait]<sup>7</sup> esté faite.

Et se elle puet avoir esté faite, elle ne puet pas touzjours avoir esté.<sup>8</sup>

Glose. Quar de ceste chose que tu dis que elle est generable et si a touzjours esté, ou c'est possible que elle [ait]<sup>7</sup> esté faite ou non; se c'est possible, pouson que ce soit voir, et donques ceste chose n'a pas touzjours esté, et donques est ce impossible que elle puisse avoir esté faite et avoir duré sanz commencement. Et par semblable l'en pourroit argüer de la chose qui touzjours durera que c'est impossible qu'elle ait fin ou qu'elle soit corruptible. Je respon et di quant au premier point que c'est possible<sup>9</sup> que une chose ait touzjours duré sanz commencement, et toutevoies une de semblable nature puet avoir eü commencement; et ainsi il ne repugne pas a ceste chose avoir eü commencement quant est de sa nature, mais seullement pour ce que elle a tousjours esté, quar si comme il appert ou .xxviii.<sup>10</sup> chappitre,<sup>11</sup> une lumiere ou ciel a duré sanz commencement en la maniere que fu dit et une autre semblable puet avoir commencement. Après je di que combien que de la  
59c chose qui a touzjours duré ce soit / impossible que elle meïsme ait eü commencement, nientmoins de la chose qui touzjours durera c'est bien possible qu'elle ait fin et qu'elle soit corruptible. Et n'est pas semblable de ces .ii. Et la cause est quar a ce qui est passé n'est quelconque(s) puissance, c'est a

<sup>3</sup> Cf. I Tim., VI, 16: "Qui solus habet immortalitatem."

<sup>4</sup> B omits 'ne.'

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Timaeus*, 41a.6-b.6, *Platonis Opera*, recognovit Iohannes Burnet, IV, Oxonii, 1905.

<sup>6</sup> B il ne peut estre.

<sup>7</sup> A est.

<sup>8</sup> B peut avoir eü tousjours esté.

<sup>9</sup> DE impossible.

<sup>10</sup> BCDEF .xxix."

<sup>11</sup> 45a, 45c.

dire que tout ce qui est passé ne puet avoir non esté. Mais d'aucune chose qui est a venir puet estre que elle ne sera pas. Et semblablement, une chose durera touzjours et puet estre que non fera. Mais se une chose a duré touzjours, c'est impossible que non ait fait. Après il met une autre rayson au premier propos et a cestuy.

Tiexte. Item, l'en puet veoir en la maniere qui s'ensuit que c'est impossible que chose qui ait aucune foys esté faite soit incorruptible ou que chose qui a touzjours esté<sup>12</sup> soit corrompue, quar il ne puet estre que ce qui touzjours sera et ce qui touzjours a esté soit a cas d'aventure, quar chose qui est casuele et a cas d'aventure ou de fortune n'est pas touzjours ou n'est pas touzjours faite ne souvent. Et ce qui est par temps infini simplement de toutes pars ou seulement d'une part est existant et en estre touzjours ou souvent. Et donques con- / vient il par neccessité que telles choses aient de nature ce que elles sont aucune foys et aucune foys non.

59d

Glose. C'est assavoir les choses qui avroient commencement et dureroient touzjours, quar se elles ont de nature que elles soient touzjours, c'est neccessité qu'elles soient sanz fin et qu'elles ne puissent estre corrompues.

Texte. Et donques, de telles choses qui sont aucune foys et aucune foys non est une meisme puissance de contradicion, c'est a dire qu'elles ont possibilité a estre et aussi a non estre. Et la matiere de quoy elles sont est cause de ce que elles pueent estre et pueent non estre.

Glose. Quar puisque ceste chose qui touzjours sera est nouvelle, il convient que elle soit faite de matiere et en ceste matiere est possibilété a ce que ceste chose ait aucune foys non-estre, et donques ceste chose puet non estre.<sup>13</sup> Et d'autre partie, il est dit qu'elle sera touzjours par neccessité. Et donques, pousé, si comme il est possible, que elle soit reducte a non-estre, Aristotele conclut et dit.<sup>14</sup>

Tiexte. Donques convient il par neccessité que les opposites con[tra]dictoires<sup>15</sup> soient vrais ensemble.<sup>16</sup>

60a

Glose. Et par ce s'ensuit se elle est corruptible, qu'elle sera aucune foys corrupte, quar se elle duroit touzjours, elle seroit // neccessaire et incorruptible comme dit est. Après il oste une response qui pourroit estre; et sont les paroles obscures, mais la sentence est tele.

Tiexte. Et se aucun disoit que en la matiere de ceste chose qui est commenciee et sera sanz fin est possibilité au non-estre de ceste chose, non pas pour le temps a venir mais pour le temps passé, ce ne puet l'en dire veritablement, quar l'an passé ne puet estre ne chose qui a eü ou temps passé non-estre ne puet avoir esté perpetuelle sanz commencement, quar au temps passé n'est quelconque(s) possibilité, mais est au temps a venir.

Glose. Briefment, il veult dire que c'est impossible que ce qui onques ne fu ait esté et aussi que ce qui a esté ne ait esté, si comme [que]<sup>17</sup> Adam n'ait esté. Et pour ce disoit Agathon<sup>18</sup> que Dieu ne le pourroit fere. Mais a ceste rayson est autre response, quar elle est fondee sus .iii. choses. Une est que se une chose dure touzjours, c'est par neccessité de nature, et donques elle ne puet avoir fin et est incorruptible. Item, se elle a commencement, elle est

<sup>12</sup> F omits 'soit incorruptible ou que chose qui a touzjours esté.'

<sup>13</sup> BCF omits 'et donques ceste chose puet non estre.'

<sup>14</sup> DE omit the entire gloss.

<sup>15</sup> A condictiores.

<sup>16</sup> BCDF vrais semblables; EF vraysemblables.

<sup>17</sup> A omits 'que.'

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Rhetorica*, II, 24, 1402a, 9-13.

faite de matiere. Item, ceste matiere a possibilité au non-estre de ceste chose. Et donques est ceste chose corruptible. Et ainsi une meisme chose est<sup>19</sup> incorruptible et corruptible, etc. Quant au premier point, je di que une chose  
60b puet / avoir commencement et durer sanz fin par neccessité de nature qui la conserve et maintient, nonobstant que elle de sa nature soit corruptible et que une autre semblable sera corrupue, si comme souvent est dit d'aucune lumiere ou ciel. Item, se telle chose puet estre par nature, il semble par plus forte rayson que Dieu par sa puissance puet une chose fere et la maintenir sanz fin ou tant comme il li plaist par sa voulenté, qui est vraie, neccessaire et souveraine liberté. Quant au secont point, il n'est pas ainsi que toute chose qui est faite par nature soit fete de matiere, mais aucune est faite en matiere et aucune en autre subject qui n'a pas proprement matiere, si comme est le ciel ouquel est faite lumiere. Item, Dieu, qui est par sus nature, puet creer aucune chose de noient et la reduire en autre en noient. Et que ce ne soit pas simplement impossible l'en le puet concevoir par telle ymagynacion: quar se en la premiere moitié d'une heure une chose materiele estoit condempsee et comprimee en tant que elle occupast la moitié moins de lieu que devant, et après en la moitié du residu de celle  
60c heure elle fust encor condempsee et comprimee tant qu'elle occupast moins de lieu la moitié que en la fin de la premiere moitié de l'heure, et ainsi en procedant // par les parties de celle heure lesquelles l'en seult appeller continuellement propo[r]cionnelles,<sup>20</sup> je di que en la fin de celle heure ceste matiere seroit sanz quantité aussi comme .i. point indivisible. Et par consequant, elle seroit adnichilee et du tout anientie. Et semblablement, se par les parties propo[r]cionnelles<sup>20</sup> d'une heure une matiere estoit en la premiere rareficee ou estendue au double, et en l'autre après au quadruple et puis a l'octuple et ainsi ensuiant, il appert que en la fin de l'heure ou après elle seroit du tout sanz matiere et mise au noient. Et tel procès est ymagynable sanz contradiction et possible a puissance infinie. Et se adnichilacion e[s]t<sup>21</sup> possible, creacion de noient est possible. Quant au tiers point, je di que l'en puet octroier que telle chose materielle est corruptible et non pas incorruptible simplement, et nientmoins c'est possible que elle dure sanz fin, si comme il sera declairié ou chappitre ensuiant. [Et ce que dit l'Escripture, *Ecclesiasticus*. xiiii.: *omne opus corruptibile in fine deficiet*,<sup>22</sup> ce est a entendre des oeuvres humaines, si comme il appert par ce que est escript après sanz moien: *et qui illud operatur ibit cum illo*.]<sup>23</sup>

36.—Ou .xxvi. chappitre il fait a son propos une autre rayson plus especialle et de science naturelle.

Et a ceulz qui considereront les choses qui sont naturelles et non pas en argüant universe[l]ment,<sup>2</sup> puet apparoir que c'est impossible  
60d que une chose / qui a esté perpetuelle ou temps passé soit après corrompue ou qui a, ou temps passé, non esté soit perpetuelle ou temps a venir.

Glose. Les raysons dessus mises sont pour la plus grant partie de logique et de miethaphisique et generales a toutes choses, soient substances ou accidens, mais ceste est selonc science naturelle et de choses qui ont commencement par vraie generacion ou fin par vraie corrupcion. Après il fait sa rayson.

<sup>19</sup> B omits 'corruptible. Et ainsi une meisme chose est.'

<sup>20</sup> A propocionnelles.

<sup>21</sup> AF et.

<sup>22</sup> Eccles., XIV, 20.

<sup>23</sup> A omits 'Et ce que dit . . . cum illo.'

<sup>1</sup> BCDEF qui considerent les choses qui sont naturelment et . . .

<sup>2</sup> A universement.



Tiexte. Quar toutes choses qui pueent finir par corrupcion ou commencer par generacion ont generacion et corrupcion par alteracion precedente et tote alteracion est faite par qualitez contraires. Et de ce par quoy les choses naturelles sont faites, par ce meisme(s) sont elles corrompues.

- Glose. C'est assavoir par l'alteracion des premieres qualitez qui sont chaleur et fredeur et moisteur et sec, quar si comme il appert ou premier livre *De Generacione*, generacion est fin d'alteracion et la generacion d'une chose est corrupcion d'autre.<sup>8</sup> Et donques convient il que toute chose qui a eü commencement par generacion ait en soy qualitez qui ont contraire et qu'elle [ait]<sup>4</sup> matiere de quoy elle est faite. Et aussi comme en ceste matiere fu altera- // 61a cion pour la generacion de ceste chose, il convient que semblablement en elle soit aucune foys alteracion a la corrupcion de ceste chose. Et l'en doit savoir que Aristote fait ceste rayson principalement contre ceulz qui mettoient que le monde, qui est perpetuel, avoit esté fait d'une matiere precedente confuse qui avoit duré par tout le temps infini devant, de laquelle disoit Ovide: *ante mare et terras et<sup>5</sup> quod tegit<sup>6</sup> omnia celum unus<sup>7</sup> erat toto nature v[ul]tus<sup>8</sup> in orbe quem dixere chaos rudis<sup>9</sup> indigestaque moles.<sup>10</sup>* Mais ceste rayson n'est pas contre ceus qui dient,—et c'est verité,—que le monde fu créé de noient et non pas fait de matiere pr[e]cedente<sup>11</sup> perpetuelle. Item, encore ne conclute pas ceste rayson contre les philosophes qui diroient le contraire, quar il est possible par nature que une chose soit materielle et que elle ait en soy des premieres qualitez et qui ont contraire, et qu'elle dure sanz fin. Et telles sont les parties de terre qui sont ou centre ou vers le centre pour ce qui puet estre que leur contraire ne approchera onques de elles et ne fera onques alteracion en elles. Et pour ce, quant Aristote dit ou premier de *Phi-* / 61b *sique*<sup>12</sup> que touz corps naturelz sont ou seront meüs ou aucuns, il dit *aucuns* pour les parties centrales de la terre selonc l'exposicion d'Averoÿs.<sup>13</sup> Et donques est ce possible que ces parties ne seront onques meües ne alterees et, par consequant, ne corrompues. Et totevoies, elles sont corruptibles de soy, quar elles sont materielles et ont contraire selonc leurs qualitez, comme dit est. Et semblable puet l'en dire des parties de l'element du feu qui sont pres de la circonference concave du ciel de la lune. Mais pour plus grande decleracion de ce, je argüe au contraire premierement, quar puisque ces parties de terre sont materielles, la matere de elles a possibilité et inclination ou appetit a autre forme et a la generacion d'autre chose et corrupcion de ceste. Et donques se telle partie de terre duroit perpetuellement, ceste possibilité ou inclination seroit pour noient; et Dieu et nature ne font rien pour noient, si comme fu dit en [le]<sup>14</sup>.viii.\* chappitre.<sup>15</sup> Item, l'influence des corps du ciel dont les rays sont concurrens vers le centre de la terre doit yleuques faire action et alteracion. Et donques par la vertu de telz corps est yleuques faite generacion et corrupcion quelle qu'elle

<sup>8</sup> *De Generacione*, I, 1, 314b, 17-20.

<sup>4</sup> A est.

<sup>5</sup> DE omit 'et.'

<sup>6</sup> B omits 'et quod tegit.'

<sup>7</sup> D repeats 'unus.'

<sup>8</sup> A virtus.

<sup>9</sup> A rusdis.

<sup>10</sup> *Meta.*, I, 5-7:

*Ante mare et terras et quod tegit omnia  
caelum*

*Unus erat toto naturae vultus in orbe,*

*Quem dixere chaos: rudis indigestaque  
moles.*

*Die Metamorphosen des P. Ovidius Naso,*  
erklärt von H. Magnus, Gotha, 1892, I, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> A procedente.

<sup>12</sup> *Physicorum*, I, 2, 185a, 12-13.

<sup>13</sup> *Aristotelis de Physico Auditu cum Aver-*  
*rois Cordubensis Variis Commentariis*, Vene-

tiis apud Juntas, 1562, t.c. 11, fol. 11B.

<sup>14</sup> A omits 'le'.

<sup>15</sup> 16b.

- 61c soit, quar nous ne povons avoir experience des choses // qui sont la-bas.<sup>16</sup> Item, par l'influence des corps du ciel, les ellemens selonc aucunes de leurs parties sont transmués et corrompus de l'un en l'autre, si comme il appert ou secont livre *De Generacione*.<sup>17</sup> Et donques puet estre [que]<sup>18</sup> la terre en aucun costé de elle soit corrompu[e]<sup>19</sup> et appeticie[e]<sup>20</sup> et en l'autre costé ou partie soit creüe. Et ainsi elle poiera plus d'un costé que d'autre, et quant ce sera notablement il convendra que toute la masse de la terre se meuve tellement que le centre de la pesanteur de elle le quel estoit hors du centre du monde, pour la mutacion dessus dicte, vienne ou centre du monde. Et ainsi la partie de terre qui estoit ou centre se traitra vers la circonference, et par semblable transmutacion en un autre temps s'approchera encor plus de la circonference. Et ainsi par procès de temps, ceste partie qui estoit ou centre vendra vers la circonference jusques au lieu ou sont faites alteracion et corrupcion et sera corrompue. Et ainsi des autrés parties de terre par lonc procès de temps et par moult de milliers d'anz. Et tout ce est possible, et ceste possibilité sera reduite a fait en ceste maniere par neccessité de nature,
- 61d qui ne / puet souffrir que une matere ait touzjours une forme ne que une chose corruptible dure touzjours. Et semblable diroit l'en d'une porcion de feu qui est pres du ciel de la lune, que par la vertu des corps du ciel elle descendra en son espere tant qu'elle vendra pres de son contraire et finablement sera corrompue, quar par procès de temps toutes choses matérielles prennent fin, si comme dit Maximien: *ipsa etiam<sup>21</sup> veniens consumit saxa vetustas et nullum est quod [non]<sup>22</sup> tempore cedat<sup>23</sup> opus<sup>24</sup>*. Je respon au premier ou est dit que la possibilité de la matere, etc., seroit pour noient: l'en pourroit dire premierement que non seroit, quar combien qu'elle ne soit onques reduite a fait en ceste matiere propre ou en ceste porcion, toutefois elle est reduite en semblable en<sup>25</sup> espesce, quar une autre terre semblable sera corrompue, et il souffist. Après je di que a parler proprement, ceste matiere n'est envieie ne asaciee de quelconque(s) forme et n'a en soy inclinacion ne appetit ou autre qualité qui li soit propre, et telz mozt<sup>26</sup> impropres et ainsi comme poëtiques ne segnefient autre chose que la pure substance de la matiere en connotant ou denotant que, quant est de soy, elle est indifferente a tote forme. Et donques, se elle a touzjours une meisme
- 62a forme, il // ne s'ensuit pas que aucune chose soit pour noient, aussi comme une cire qui est indifferente a tote figure ne seroit pas pour noient, posé qu'elle fust tousjours sperique ou ronde. Au secont argüement ou estoit dit que l'influence du ciel doit ouvrer vers le centre, etc., je di que posé que la terre fust aussi transpare[n]te<sup>27</sup> ou aussi clere comme est le ciel ou pur air, puet estre que vers le centre du monde seroit grande influence et alteracion et generacion; mes l'alteracion des premieres qualités qui dispose a generacion et corrupcion est causee par les lumieres des corps du ciel, si comme nous voions par experience. Et l'espesceté ou obscurté de la terre empesche que telles lumieres ne leur effés ne penetrent ou percent et entrent et ataignent jusques vers le centre, mes ileques sont tenebres perpetueles: *et sempiternus horror inhabitat*.<sup>28</sup> Et donques ileques n'est faite generacion ne

<sup>16</sup> A las bas.

<sup>17</sup> *De Generacione*, II, 10, 336a, 33-35.

<sup>18</sup> A de.

<sup>19</sup> A corrompu.

<sup>20</sup> AC appeticie.

<sup>21</sup> B enim.

<sup>22</sup> AF omits 'non.'

<sup>23</sup> BF cadat.

<sup>24</sup> *Eleg.* I, 273-4;

*ipsa etiam veniens consumit saxa*

*vetustas,*

*et nullum est quod non tempore cedat opus.*

(*The Elegies of Maximianus*, ed. Richard Webster, Princeton, 1900, p. 35.)

<sup>25</sup> DE omit 'en.'

<sup>26</sup> A molz.

<sup>27</sup> A transparete.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Job, X, 22: *Sed sempiternus horror inhabitat. DE inhabitans.*

corrupcion ne alteracion naturelle; et de ce est signe, quar tant plus descent l'en aval et en parfont en terre, l'en treuve choses plus durables et moins de transmutacion ou moins isnelle et plus tardive. Et donques en procedant oultre en aval est terminee et finée toute transmutacion, quar oultre ne [s]e<sup>29</sup> puet estendre ne descendre la lumiere des corps du ciel. Mes pour ce que la terre est transparente aucunement, la lumiere du ciel descent jusques a ce terme insensiblement et en afflebian ou / elle ou la chaleur ou autre qualité causee de elle et non oultre, comme dit est. Et encore appert autrement, quar selonc les philosophes et meïsme selonc Aristote ou secont livre de *Phisique*,<sup>30</sup> totes choses corporelez qui sont en l'espere des elemens sont pour honme, et les generacions et corrupcions qui seroient faites vers le centre de la terre, l'en ne pourroit dire de quoy elles serviroient ne a honme ne as bestes ne [a]<sup>31</sup> autre chose. Et Dieu et nature ne font rien pour noient, si comme il est alegué devant.<sup>32</sup> Mais celle terre qui est vers le centre sert et est a fin de soutenir l'autre; et est ce, si comme dit l'Escripture: *super quo*<sup>33</sup> *bases illius, scilicet terre solidate*<sup>34</sup> s[u]nt?<sup>35</sup> et est le fondement perpetuel de quoy dit le Prophete: f[u]ndasti terra[m]<sup>36</sup> et permanet—et derechief en Job: *ubi eras quando ponebam fundame[n]ta*<sup>37</sup> terre? Et donques la terre devers le centre est fondement de ceste ou sont les transmutacions, quar le lieu de generacion est en<sup>38</sup> un moien du semidiame de l'espere des elemens; et par aventure, cest moyen n'est pas par eguale distance, mes est es parties de terre qui sont plus hautes et en l'yaue et en l'air<sup>39</sup> et es parties de l'element du feu qui sont plus basses [car Averroÿz dit ou secont chapitre du secont que selonc Aristote, des mouvemenz du ciel les uns sunt engendranz et les autres conservanz.]<sup>40</sup> Mes vers le centre de la terre n'est faite par l'influence du ciel generacion ne corrupcion, mes seulement conservacion de ces parties de terre a la fin dessus dite. Et se aucuns mauvés esperis ou autre altera- /  
62c cion sont vers le centre, c'est chose supernaturele et par quoy ces parties de terre ne sont pas disposees a corrupcion. Au tiërs argüement, je di que c'est une belle<sup>41</sup> ymaginacion que j'ay autrefois pensee, mais l'en puet dire qu'elle prove possibilité et ne argüe pas neccessité de la corrupcion de la terre qui est vers le centre; quar posé que la partie qui est maintenant [ou]<sup>42</sup> centre issist du centre selonc celle ymaginacion, encor y porroit elle retourner par semblable maniere, quar il n'est pas vraysemblable que tel appetitement de la masse de la terre soit tousjours d'une part et d'un costé et l'accroissement tousjours d'autre. Et donques quant l'acroissement sera de l'autre partie, celle porcion de terre qui estoit issue et esloingnie[e]<sup>43</sup> du centre retournera vers le centre, et jamés ne vendra jusques au lieu de corrupcion ne pres de son contraire. Et d'autre partie, se tote la terre estoit aucune foyz ainsi meüe comme dit est, il sembleroit que ce fust contre ce que dit le prophete a Dieu: *qui fundasti terra[m]*<sup>44</sup> *super stabilitatem suam: non inclinabitur*<sup>45</sup> *in seculum seculi*,<sup>46</sup> *et iterum*,<sup>47</sup> *etenim*<sup>48</sup> *firmavit*<sup>49</sup> *orbem terre, qui non commovebitur*.<sup>50</sup> Et donques sus ceste terre qui est vers le

<sup>29</sup> A ce.<sup>30</sup> *Physicorum*, II, 2, 194a, 34-35.<sup>31</sup> A omits 'a.'<sup>32</sup> 16b.<sup>33</sup> DE que.<sup>34</sup> BCDEF fundate.<sup>35</sup> A sont. Cf. Job, XXXVIII, 6: *Super quo bases illius soliditae sunt?*<sup>36</sup> A fundasti terra. Psalm CXVIII, 90.<sup>37</sup> A fundameta. Job, XXXVIII, 4.<sup>38</sup> DE omit 'en.'<sup>39</sup> B repeats 'de terre qui sont plus hautes et en l'yaue et en l'air.'<sup>40</sup> A omits 'car Averroÿz . . . conservanz.' Cf. *Juntas*, t. 2, fol 96C.<sup>41</sup> BF fole.<sup>42</sup> A il.<sup>43</sup> A et soy esloingnie. BCF esloingnie.<sup>44</sup> A terra.<sup>45</sup> B movebitur.<sup>46</sup> Psalm CIII, 5.<sup>47</sup> BCF omit 'et iterum,' DE et cetera.<sup>48</sup> B item, CF et item, DE omit 'etenim.'<sup>49</sup> B firmabit.<sup>50</sup> DE omit 'etenim . . . commovebitur.' Psalm XCII, 1.

centre et non pas en elle est faite generacion et corrupcion comme dit est, et elle demeure tousjours, et ainsi le dit le Sage: *Generacio preterit, generacio advenit: terra vero*<sup>61</sup> *in eternum stat*,<sup>62</sup> et parle yleques comme philosophe.

62d Or ay je donques a l'aide de Dieu et a sa loenge<sup>63</sup> monstre / clerement en plusieurs maneres par raysons humaines et en lumiere naturelle comment ce n'est pas impossible que une chose qui est de soy corruptible soit perpetuele, ne que une chose qui ait eü commencement dure sanz fin. Et toutevoies, comme devant appert, Aristote et Averroÿs voudrent prover l'opposite qui est contre verité et contre nostre foy. Mais j'ay leurs raysons recitees loyalment et declairé evidenment qu'elles ne sont pas bonnes et que aucunes de elles sont purement sophistiques, quar combien que Aristote fust excellent philosophe, nientmoins selonc ce que puet apparoir par ce que dit Eustrace sus le premier d'*Ethiques*,<sup>64</sup> Aristote reprovoit<sup>65</sup> aucune foys Plato trop indeüement et avoit ses oppinions en hayne oultre rayon. Et si comme souvent est dit, il argüoit ycy contre Plato; et toutevoies saint Augustin ou .viii.<sup>e</sup> et ou .ix.<sup>e</sup> livre de *La Cité de Dieu*<sup>66</sup> prefere et recommande Platon et ses ensuians comme philosophes pardessus touz autres, et tient que leur doctrine entre lez autres des philosophes est plus congrue ou plus concordable a la foy catholique. *Deo gracias*.<sup>67</sup>

Ci fenist le premier livre de *De Celo et mondo*.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>61</sup> B autem.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Eccles., I, 4: *Generatio praeterit, et generatio advenit: terra autem in aeternum stat.*

<sup>63</sup> B omits 'ay je donques . . . loenge.'

<sup>64</sup> *Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria*, ed. Gustavus Heylbut (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, XX, Berlin, 1892), I, 6 pp. 65-72; see also Oresme's gloss in *Le Livre de Ethiques*, ed. Menut, p. 113.

<sup>65</sup> BCDEF reprehendit.

<sup>66</sup> *Sancti Aurelii Augustini episcopi de Civi-*

*tate Dei*, recensuit B. Dombart, vol. I (Lipsiae: Teubner, 1863), VIII, 5; IX, 23; pp. 288-290; 352-353. Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Nicolaus Oresme*, p. 32, calls attention to Oresme's predilection towards Augustinism and his marked preference for the Platonic cosmology and cites this notable passage as his most forthright statement on the matter.

<sup>67</sup> BCDEF omit '*Deo gracias*.'

<sup>68</sup> CDE omit 'Ci fenist . . . mondo.' F explicit *primus liber de Celo et mundo in gallico*.